Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

The crisis began when President Lee Teng-hui accepted an invitation from his alma mater, Cornell University to deliver a speech on "Taiwan's Democratization Experience". Seeking to diplomatically isolate the Republic of China, the PRC opposed such visits by ROC (Taiwanese) leaders. A year earlier, in 1994, when President Lee's plane had stopped in Honolulu to refuel after a trip to South America, the U.S. government under President Bill Clinton refused Lee's request for a visa. Lee had been confined to the military airfield where he landed, forcing him to spend a night on his plane. A U.S. State Department official called the situation "embarrassing" and Lee complained that he was being treated as a second-class leader.

After Lee had decided to visit Cornell, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that a visa for Lee would be "inconsistent with [the U.S.'s] unofficial relationship [with Taiwan]." However, the humiliation from Lee's last visit caught the attention of many pro-Taiwan figures in the U.S. and this time, the United States Congress acted on Lee's behalf. In May 1995, a concurrent resolution asking the State Department to allow Lee to visit the U.S. passed the House on 2 May with a vote of 396 to 0 (with 38 not voting), and the Senate on 9 May with a vote of 97 to 1 (with 2 not voting).[2] The State Department relented on 22 May 1995. Lee spent 9–10 June 1995, in the U.S. at a Cornell alumni reunion as the PRC state press branded him a "traitor" attempting to "split China".[1]

The People's Republic of China government under CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin was furious over the U.S.'s policy reversal. On 7 July 1995, PRC responded, the Xinhua News Agency announced missile tests would be conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and argued that this attitude would endanger the peace and safety of the region (Mainlander refers to it as the fourth Taiwan strait crisis[3]). At the same time, the PRC mobilized forces in Fujian. In the later part of July and early August, numerous commentaries were published by Xinhua and the People's Daily condemning Lee and his cross-strait policies.

Another set of missile firings, accompanied by live ammunition exercises, occurred from 15 to 25 August 1995. Naval exercises in August were followed by highly publicized amphibious assault exercises in November.

The U.S. government responded by staging the biggest display of American military might in Asia since the Vietnam War.[4] In July 1995, USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) transited the Taiwan Strait, followed by the USS O'Brien (DD-975) and USS McClusky FFG-41 on 11–12 December 1995. Finally on 19 December 1995, the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and her battle group passed through the straits.[5]

Beijing intended to send a message to the Taiwanese electorate that voting for Lee Teng-hui in the 1996 presidential election on 23 March meant war. A third set of PLA tests from 8 March to 15 March (just before the election), sent missiles within 46 to 65 km (25 to 35 nmi) (just inside the ROC's territorial waters) off the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung. Over 70 percent of commercial shipping passed through the targeted ports, which were disrupted by the proximity of the tests.[6][7] Flights to Japan and trans-Pacific flights were prolonged by ten minutes because airplanes needed to detour away from the flight path. Ships traveling between Kaohsiung and Hong Kong had to take a two-hour detour.

On 8 March 1996, also a presidential election year in the U.S., President Clinton announced that the USS Independence CV-62 and her Carrier Battlegroup (Carrier Group Five),[8] returning to Japan from its visit to the Philippines, would deploy to international waters near Taiwan.[9] According to the Washington Post, that same day; the USS Bunker Hill CG-52 (which had detached from the Independence Battlegroup) along with a RC-135 Intelligence aircraft monitored the launch of 3 CSS-6 (DF-15) missiles from the PRC, two of them into shipping lanes near Kaohsiung and one fired directly over Taipei into a shipping lane near Keelung.[10]

On the following day, the PRC announced live-fire exercises to be conducted near Penghu from 12 to 20 March. On 11 March, the U.S. dispatched USS Nimitz CVN-68 and her battlegroup, Carrier Group Seven,[11] which steamed at high speed from the Persian Gulf. Tensions rose further on 15 March when Beijing announced a simulated amphibious assault planned for 18–25 March. Nimitz and her battle group, along with Belleau Wood, sailed through the Taiwan Strait, while Independence did not.[12][13]

Sending two carrier battle groups showed not only a symbolic gesture towards the ROC, but a readiness to fight on the part of the U.S. The ROC government and Democratic Progressive Party welcomed America's support, but staunch unificationist presidential candidate Lin Yang-kang and the PRC decried "foreign intervention."

Aware of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups' credible threat to the PLA Navy, the PRC decided to accelerate its military buildup. Soon the People's Republic ordered Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, a Cold War-era class designed to counter U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, allegedly in mid-December 1996 during the visit to Moscow by Chinese Premier Li Peng. The PRC subsequently ordered modern attack submarines (Kilo class) and warplanes (76 Su-30MKK and 24 Su-30MK2) to counter the U.S. Navy's carrier groups.

The PRC's attempts at intimidation were counterproductive. Arousing more anger than fear, it boosted Lee by 5% in the polls, earning him a majority as opposed to a mere plurality.[14] The military tests and exercises also strengthened the argument for further U.S. arms sales to the ROC and led to the strengthening of military ties between the U.S. and Japan, increasing the role Japan would play in defending Taiwan.

During the military exercises in March, there were preoccupations in Taiwan that the PRC would occupy some small islands controlled by Taiwan, causing panic among many citizens. Therefore, many flights from Taiwan to the United States and Canada were full. The most likely target was Wuqiu (Wuchiu), then garrisoned by 500 soldiers. The outlying islands were placed on high alert.[15] The then secretary general of the National Security Council of Taiwan, Ting Mao-shih, flew to New York to meet Samuel Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor of the United States.[16]

Keelung

The four vertices (red) (23°13′N 122°20′E, 25°13′N 122°40′E, 24°57′N 122°40′E, 24°57′N 122°20′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise off Keelung (orange) between 8 and 15 March 1996.[17]

Kaohsiung

The four vertices (red) (22°38′N 119°25′E, 22°38′N 119°45′E, 22°22′N 119°45′E, 22°22′N 119°25′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise off Kaohsiung (orange) between 8 and 15 March 1996.[17]

The four vertices (red) (23°57′N 118°06′E, 23°25′N 118°50′E, 22°30′N 117°30′E, 23°01′N 116°46′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise between 12 and 20 March 1996.[18]

The four vertices (red) (25°50′N 119°50′E, 25°50′N 119°50′E, 24°54′N 119°56′E, 25°12′N 119°26′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise between 18 and 25 March 1996.[19]

In 1999, Major General Liu Liankun, a top Chinese military logistics officer, and his subordinate Senior Colonel Shao Zhengzhong were arrested, court-martialed and executed for disclosing to Taiwan that the missiles had unarmed warheads despite the Chinese government's claims.[28]

According to Sankei Shimbun series "Secret Records on Lee Teng-hui" dated 1 April 2019, Tseng Yong-hsien, Lee's National Policy Adviser, received a direct message from China official in early July 1995; "Our ballistic missiles will be launched toward Taiwan a couple of weeks later, but you guys don't have to worry." This was communicated to Lee soon after, to prevent escalation. Tseng, as an envoy of Lee, had met President Yang Shangkun in 1992 and had a secret connection with Ye Xuanning, Head of the Liaison Department of the PLA.[29]

• Political status of Taiwan
• Battle of Guningtou
• First Taiwan Strait Crisis
• Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
• Taiwan Relations Act
• List of battles in Kinmen
• Chinese Civil War
• Liu Liankun
• 2022 United States congressional delegation visit to Taiwan
• 2022 Chinese military exercises around Taiwan

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• Bush, Richard C. (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. ISBN 978-0-8157-1288-6.
• Lilley, James R.; Downs, Chuck, eds. (1997). Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (PDF). Published in cooperation with The American Enterprise Institute. Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press. ISBN 978-1-57906-000-8. Archived (PDF) from the original on 8 August 2022.
• Carpenter, Ted Galen (2005). America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1-4039-6841-1.
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• Copper, John F. (2006). Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Praeger Security International. ISBN 0-275-98888-0.
• FAS; NRDC (November 2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (PDF) (Report). Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 April 2022.
• Gill, Bates (2007). Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-3146-7.
• Ross, Robert S. (2000). "The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility and the Use of Force". International Security. 25 (2): 87–123. doi:10.1162/016228800560462. JSTOR 2626754. S2CID 57560261.—This article traces in detail the course of the crisis and analyzes the state of Sino-American relations both before and after the crisis.
• Scobell, Andrew (1999). "Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis" (PDF). Shorenstein APARC. Archived from the original on 17 April 2018.
• Shirk, Susan (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-530609-5.
• Thies, Wallace J.; Bratton, Patrick C. (2004). "When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait". Journal of Strategic Studies. 27 (4): 556–584. doi:10.1080/1362369042000314510. S2CID 154467802.
• Tsang, Steve, ed. (2006). If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40785-0.
• Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, ed. (2005). Dangerous Strait: the U.S.–Taiwan–China Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-13564-5.
• Moore, Gregory J. (2007). "The Roles of Misperceptions and Perceptual Gaps in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996". In Hua, Shiping; Guo, Sujian (eds.). China in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Opportunities. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171–194. ISBN 978-1-4039-7975-9.

• The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy