Air Florida Flight 90

On Wednesday, January 13, 1982, Washington National Airport (DCA) was closed by a heavy snowstorm that produced 6.5 inches (16.5 cm) of snow.[4]^: 13 It reopened at noon under marginal conditions as the snowfall began to slacken.

That afternoon, the plane was to return to Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport in Dania, Florida, with an intermediate stop at Tampa International Airport. The scheduled departure time was delayed about 1 hour and 45 minutes because of a backlog of arrivals and departures caused by the temporary closing of Washington National Airport. As the plane was readied for departure from DCA, a moderate snowfall continued and the air temperature was 24 °F (−4 °C).[4]^: 2

The Boeing 737 was deiced with a mixture of heated water and monopropylene glycol by American Airlines, under a ground-service agreement with Air Florida. That agreement specified that covers for the pitot tubes, static ports, and engine inlets had to be used, but the American Airlines employees failed to comply with those rules. One deicing vehicle was used by two different operators, who chose widely different mixture percentages to deice the left and right sides of the aircraft. Subsequent testing of the deicing truck showed, "the mixture dispensed differed substantially from the mixture selected" (18% actual vs. 30% selected). The inaccurate mixture was the result of the replacement of the standard nozzle, "...which is specially modified and calibrated, with a non-modified, commercially available nozzle." The operator had no means to determine if the proportioning valves were operating properly because no "mix monitor" was installed on the nozzle.[4]^: 57–58

The plane had trouble leaving the gate when the ground-services tow motor could not get traction on the ice. For roughly 30 to 90 seconds, the crew attempted to back away from the gate using the reverse thrust of the engines (a powerback), which proved futile.[4]^: 59 Boeing operations bulletins had warned against using reverse thrust in those kinds of conditions.[4]^: 59

Eventually, a tug ground unit properly equipped with snow chains was used to push the aircraft back from the gate. After leaving the gate, the aircraft waited in a taxi line with many other aircraft for 49 minutes before reaching the takeoff runway. The pilot apparently decided not to return to the gate for reapplication of deicing, fearing that the flight's departure would be even further delayed. More snow and ice accumulated on the wings during that period, and the crew was aware of that fact when they decided to take off.[4]^: 80 Heavy snow was falling during their takeoff roll at 3:59 pm EST.

Though the outside temperature was well below freezing and snow was falling, the crew did not activate the engine anti-ice system.[5] This system uses heat from the engines to prevent sensors from freezing, ensuring accurate readings.[4]^: 20

While running through the takeoff checklist, the following conversation snippet took place (CAM-1 is the captain, CAM-2 is the first officer):

CAM-2 Pitot heat?

CAM-1 On.

CAM-2 Engine anti-ice?

CAM-1 Off.

[4]^: 107

Despite the icing conditions with weather temperature of about 24 °F (−4 °C), the crew failed to activate the engine anti-ice systems,[6] which caused the engine pressure ratio (EPR) thrust indicators to provide false readings.[4]^: 29, 47 The correct engine power setting for the temperature and airport altitude of Washington National at the time was 2.04 EPR, but analysis of the engine noise recorded on the cockpit voice recorder indicated that the actual power output corresponded with an engine pressure ratio of only 1.70.

Neither pilot had much experience flying in snowy, cold weather. The captain had made only eight takeoffs or landings in snowy conditions on the 737, and the first officer had flown in snow only twice.[7]

NTSB diagram of flight path for Air Florida Flight 90

Adding to the plane's troubles was the pilots' decision to maneuver closely behind a DC-9 that was taxiing just ahead of them prior to takeoff, due to their mistaken belief that the warmth from the DC-9's engines would melt the snow and ice that had accumulated on Flight 90's wings. This action, which went specifically against flight-manual recommendations for an icing situation, actually contributed to icing on the 737. The exhaust gases from the other aircraft melted the snow on the wings, but during takeoff, instead of falling off the plane, this slush mixture froze on the wings' leading edges and the engine inlet nose cone.[4]^: 61

As the takeoff roll began, the first officer noted several times to the captain that the instrument panel readings he was seeing did not seem to reflect reality (he was referring to the fact that the plane did not appear to have developed as much power as it needed for takeoff, despite the instruments indicating otherwise). The captain dismissed these concerns and let the takeoff proceed. Investigators determined that plenty of time and space on the runway remained for the captain to have abandoned the takeoff, and criticized his refusal to listen to his first officer, who was correct that the instrument panel readings were wrong. The pilot was told not to delay because another aircraft was 2.5 miles (2.2 nmi; 4.0 km) out on final approach to the same runway.[4]^: 5 The following is a transcript of Flight 90's cockpit voice recorder during the plane's acceleration down the runway.

15:59:32 CAM-1 Okay, your throttles.

15:59:35 [SOUND OF ENGINE SPOOLUP]

15:59:49 CAM-1 Holler if you need the wipers.

15:59:51 CAM-1 It's spooled. Really cold here, real cold.

15:59:58 CAM-2 God, look at that thing. That don't seem right, does it? Ah, that's not right.

16:00:09 CAM-1 Yes it is, there's eighty.

16:00:10 CAM-2 Naw, I don't think that's right. Ah, maybe it is.

16:00:21 CAM-1 Hundred and twenty.

16:00:23 CAM-2 I don't know.

16:00:31 CAM-1 V₁. Easy, V₂.

— Transcript, Air Florida Flight 90 Cockpit Voice Recorder[4]^{: 131–132}

As the plane became briefly airborne, the voice recorder picked up the following from the cockpit, with the sound of the stick-shaker (a device that warns that the plane is in danger of stalling) in the background:

16:00:39 [SOUND OF STICKSHAKER STARTS AND CONTINUES UNTIL IMPACT]

16:00:41 TWR Palm ninety contact departure control.

16:00:45 CAM-1 Forward, forward, easy. We only want five hundred.

16:00:48 CAM-1 Come on forward....forward, just barely climb.

16:00:59 CAM-1 Stalling, we're falling!

16:01:00 CAM-2 Larry, we're going down, Larry....

16:01:01 CAM-1 I know!

16:01:01 [SOUND OF IMPACT]

— Transcript, Air Florida Flight 90 Cockpit Voice Recorder[4]^{: 132–133}

The aircraft traveled almost half a mile (800 m) farther down the runway than is customary before liftoff was accomplished. Survivors of the crash indicated the trip over the runway was extremely rough, with survivor Joe Stiley—a businessman and private pilot—saying that he believed that they would not get airborne and would "fall off the end of the runway". When the plane became airborne, Stiley told his co-worker (and survivor) Nikki Felch to assume the crash position, with some nearby passengers following their example.[8]

Although the 737 did manage to become airborne, it attained a maximum altitude of just 352 feet (107 m) before it began losing altitude. Recorders later indicated that the aircraft was airborne for just 30 seconds. At 4:01 pm EST, it crashed into the 14th Street Bridge across the Potomac River, 0.75 nmi (1 mi; 1 km) from the end of the runway. The plane hit six cars and a truck on the bridge, and tore away 97 feet (30 m) of the bridge's rail and 41 feet (12 m) of the bridge's wall.[4]^: 5 The aircraft then plunged into the freezing Potomac River.[4]^: 1 It fell between two of the three spans of the bridge, between the I-395 northbound span (the Rochambeau Bridge) and the HOV north- and southbound spans, about 200 feet (67 yd; 61 m) offshore. All but the tail section quickly became submerged.

The tail section of Flight 90 being hoisted from the Potomac River

Of the people on board the aircraft:[4]

• Four of the crew members (including both pilots) died.
• One crew member was seriously injured.[4]^: 10
• Seventy of the 74 passengers died.[4]^: 10
• Nineteen occupants were believed to have survived the impact, but their injuries prevented them from escaping.[4]^: 76

Of the motorists on the bridge involved:[4]^: 10

• Four sustained fatal injuries
• One sustained serious injuries
• Three sustained minor injuries

Clinging to the tail section of the broken airliner in the ice-choked Potomac River were flight attendant Kelly Duncan and four passengers: Patricia "Nikki" Felch, Joe Stiley, Arland D. Williams Jr. (strapped and tangled in his seat), and Priscilla Tirado. Duncan inflated the only flotation device they could find, and passed it to the severely injured Felch. Passenger Bert Hamilton, who was floating in the water nearby, was the first to be pulled from the water.

Many federal offices in downtown Washington had closed early that day in response to quickly developing blizzard conditions. Thus, a massive backup of traffic existed on almost all of the city's roads, making reaching the crash site by ambulances very difficult.[9] The Coast Guard's 65-foot (20 m) harbor tugboat Capstan (WYTL 65601) and its crew were based nearby; their duties include ice breaking and responding to water rescues. The Capstan was considerably farther downriver on another search-and-rescue mission. Emergency ground response was greatly hampered by ice-covered roads and gridlocked traffic; ambulances dispatched at 4:07 pm took 20 minutes to reach the crash scene.[10] Ambulances attempting to reach the crash site were even driven down the sidewalk in front of the White House. Rescuers who reached the site were unable to assist survivors in the water because they did not have adequate equipment to reach them. Water temperature, which was about 34 degrees Fahrenheit, as well as heavy ice made swimming out to them impossible. Multiple attempts to throw a makeshift lifeline (made out of belts and any other things available that could be tied together) out to the survivors proved ineffective. The rescue attempts by emergency officials and witnesses were recorded and broadcast live by area news reporters, and as the accident occurred in the nation's capital, large numbers of media personnel were on hand to provide quick and extensive coverage.

Roger Olian, a sheet-metal foreman at St. Elizabeths Hospital, a Washington psychiatric hospital, was on his way home across the 14th Street Bridge in his truck when he heard a man yelling that an aircraft was in the water. He was the first to jump into the water to attempt to reach the survivors. At the same time, several military personnel from the Pentagon—Steve Raynes, Aldo De La Cruz, and Steve Bell—ran down to the water's edge to help Olian.

He only traveled a few yards and came back, ice sticking to his body. We asked him to not try again, but he insisted. Someone grabbed some short rope and battery cables and he went out again, maybe only going 30 feet (9 m). We pulled him back. Someone had backed up their jeep and we picked him up and put him in there. All anyone could do was tell the survivors was to hold on not to give up hope. There were a few pieces of the plane on shore that were smoldering and you could hear the screams of the survivors. More people arrived near the shore from the bridge, but nobody could do anything. The ice was broken up and there was no way to walk out there. It was so eerie, an entire plane vanished except for a tail section, the survivors, and a few pieces of plane debris. The smell of jet fuel was everywhere, and you could smell it on your clothes. The snow on the banks was easily two feet high and your legs and feet would fall deep into it every time you moved from the water.

At this point, flight controllers were aware only that the plane had disappeared from radar and was not responding to radio calls, but had no idea of either what had happened or the plane's location.

Around 4:20 pm[10] EST, Eagle 1, a United States Park Police Bell 206L-1 Long Ranger helicopter, based at the "Eagles Nest" at Anacostia Park in Washington, arrived and began attempting to airlift the survivors to shore. At great risk to themselves, the crew worked close to the water's surface, at one time coming so close to the ice-clogged river that the helicopter's skids dipped beneath the surface. At this point, survivors had been in the 34 degree water for over 20 minutes.

The helicopter crew lowered a line to survivors to tow them to shore. First to receive the line was Bert Hamilton, who was treading water about 10 feet (3 m) from the plane's floating tail and closest to the helicopter. The pilot pulled him across the ice to shore, while avoiding the sides of the bridge. By then, some fire/rescue personnel had arrived to join the military personnel and civilians who pulled Hamilton (and the next/last three survivors) from the water's edge up to waiting ambulances; rescuers and civilians on the banks had to duck to avoid the helicopter's rotors. The helicopter returned to the aircraft's tail, and this time Arland D. Williams Jr. (sometimes referred to as "the sixth passenger") caught the line. Williams, not able to unstrap himself from the wreckage, passed the line to flight attendant Kelly Duncan, who was towed to shore. On its third trip back to the wreckage, the helicopter lowered two lifelines, fearing that the remaining survivors had only a few minutes before succumbing to hypothermia. Williams, still strapped into the wreckage, passed one line to Joe Stiley, who was holding on to a panic-stricken and blinded (from jet fuel) Priscilla Tirado, who had lost her husband and baby. Stiley's co-worker, Nikki Felch, took the second line. As the helicopter pulled the three through the water and blocks of ice toward shore, both Tirado and Felch lost their grip and fell back into the water. While being dragged through the ice to the riverbank by the helicopter, Stiley broke multiple ribs.

Priscilla Tirado was too weak to grab the line when the helicopter returned to her. A watching bystander, Congressional Budget Office assistant Lenny Skutnik, stripped off his coat and boots, and in short sleeves, dove into the icy water and swam out to successfully pull her to shore.[11] The helicopter then proceeded to where Felch had fallen, and paramedic Gene Windsor stepped out onto the helicopter skid and grabbed her by the clothing to lift her onto the skid with him, bringing her to shore. From the time the helicopter had arrived on scene to Felch's rescue, 10 minutes had passed.

When the helicopter crew returned for Williams, the wreckage he was strapped into had rolled slightly, submerging him; according to the coroner, Williams was the only passenger to die by drowning.[12] His body and those of the other occupants were recovered later.

The inclement weather had caused an early start to Washington's rush-hour traffic, frustrating the response time of emergency crews. The early rush hour also meant that trains on the Washington Metro were full when just 30 minutes after Flight 90 crashed, the Metro suffered its first fatal crash, at Federal Triangle station. This meant that Washington's nearest airport, one of its main bridges in or out of the city, and one of its busiest subway lines were all closed simultaneously, paralyzing much of the metropolitan area.

The "sixth passenger", who had survived the crash and had repeatedly given up the rescue lines to other survivors before drowning, was later identified as 46-year-old bank examiner Arland D. Williams, Jr. The repaired span of the 14th Street Bridge complex over the Potomac River at the crash site, then named the Rochambeau Bridge, was renamed the Arland D. Williams Jr. Memorial Bridge in his honor. The Citadel in South Carolina, from which he graduated in 1957, has several memorials to him. In 2003, the new Arland D. Williams Jr. Elementary School was dedicated in his hometown of Mattoon in Coles County, Illinois.[22]

Civilians Roger Olian and Lenny Skutnik received the Coast Guard's Gold Lifesaving Medal. Arland D. Williams, Jr. also received the award posthumously. Skutnik was introduced to the joint session of the U.S. Congress during President Ronald Reagan's State of the Union speech later that month.[23]

The Coast Guard awarded a Silver Lifesaving Medal to two crewmen of the U.S. Park Police helicopter Eagle 1. As the U.S. Park Police are part of the United States Department of the Interior, pilot Donald W. Usher and paramedic Melvin E. Windsor also received the Interior Department's Valor Award, presented in a special ceremony soon after the accident by Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt. Usher later became superintendent of the National Park Service Law Enforcement Training Center located at FLETC in Brunswick, Georgia, before retiring in December 2012.[24]

Roger Olian, Lenny Skutnik, Donald Usher, and Melvin Windsor each received the Carnegie Hero Fund Medal.[25] Kelly Duncan, the only surviving flight attendant, was recognized in the NTSB accident report for her "unselfish act" of giving the only life vest she could find to a passenger.[4]^: 78

The investigation following the crash, especially regarding the failure of the captain to respond to crew concerns about the deicing procedure, led to a number of reforms in pilot-training regulations. Partial blame was placed on the young, inexperienced flight crew, who had a combined age of only 65 and had begun their careers as commercial pilots less than five years earlier. Typical of upstart, low-cost carriers, Air Florida frequently hired youthful pilots who worked for less money than veterans, and were for the most part seeking to gain flight experience prior to joining a major airline.[26] It became a widely used case study for both air crews and rescue workers.[27]

Air Florida began lowering its service and reducing the number of its employees to cope with decreasing finances and fare wars. The airline ultimately filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection two and a half years after the crash.[28]

Disagreement arose over whether the Air Florida crash was a significant factor in the company's failure. Ken Kaye of the South Florida Sun Sentinel said, "The Air Florida accident led to the carrier's eventual demise. Though it was once a robust airline, flying to 30 cities through Florida, the Northeast, and the Caribbean, the company filed for bankruptcy and grounded its fleet in July 1984."[29] Good Morning America also stated, "The Air Florida accident led to the carrier's eventual demise".[30]

Weeks after the accident, Air Florida's CEO and founder, Eli Timoner, had a debilitating stroke at age 53, causing additional management strain on the carrier.[31] Timoner retired the following year and was replaced by Donald Lloyd-Jones.[32]

Suzy Hagstrom of the Orlando Sentinel said, "Chronologically, the crash of Flight 90 may have marked the beginning of the end for Air Florida, but aviation experts say it did not cause or trigger the carrier's demise".[28] Paul Turk, the publications director of the aviation consultancy firm Avmark Inc., said that many airlines faced difficulties in the 1980s due to fare wars, a recession, and decline in travel, and that Air Florida had already faced increasing debt and financial losses prior to the crash.[28] Turk argued, "Air Florida would have folded without the crash".[28] Thomas Canning, a senior airline analyst for Standard & Poor's, said, "I don't believe one crash can make or break an airline; there were a lot of other factors involved in Air Florida's bankruptcy."[28]