Hobart-class destroyer

The 1992 Force Structure Review contained plans to replace the three Perth-class guided-missile destroyers and four of the six Adelaide-class guided-missile frigates with air defence vessels.[5] The initial proposal – to build an additional six Anzac-class frigates configured for wide-area anti-aircraft warfare – did not go ahead as the Anzac design was too small to effectively host all the required equipment and weapons.[5] Instead, the RAN began to upgrade the Adelaides in 1999 to fill the anti-aircraft capability that would be lost when the Perths left service between 1999 and 2001.[6][7] The frigate upgrade was only intended as a stop-gap (only four ships were upgraded, and all four were due to decommissioning during the mid-2010s), and by 2000, the Australian Defence Force had begun a project to replace the three Perth-class destroyers.[6][7] The acquisition of the dedicated air warfare destroyers was initially identified as Project SEA 1400, then redesignated Project SEA 4000.[6]

The main role of the air warfare destroyer is air defence of a naval task group, in addition to assets ashore and operating in the littoral.[7] Although specifically designed for air warfare, the AWDs also had to be capable of facing other threats and were to be fitted with ship-to-ship missiles, a gun for naval gunfire support of soldiers ashore, and anti-submarine capability through sonar systems and above-water-launched torpedoes.[7] The ships had to be able to operate a helicopter for both surveillance and combat duties.[7]

In 2004, the Department of Defence identified that the future air warfare destroyer class would be built around the United States Navy's Aegis Combat System.[8] The use of Aegis was formally approved in April 2005, and Raytheon Australia was brought into the AWD project with the responsibility of integrating the Aegis system into the selected design, along with modifications to accommodate RAN-preferred electronic warfare equipment, underwater sensors, and weapons.[7][8] In May 2005, the ASC shipyard at Osborne, South Australia, was identified as the primary shipbuilder for the project.[7] In late 2005, the AWD Alliance was formed to organise and implement the project.[7] The Alliance is a consortium including the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), ASC's project-dedicated subsidiary, and Raytheon.[7]

The two competing designs for the Australian AWD project: Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Donald Cook leading Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate Álvaro de Bazán in 2005

After receiving tenders from Blohm + Voss, Navantia, and Gibbs & Cox, among others, the Australian government identified Gibbs & Cox's Evolved Flight II Arleigh Burke-class destroyer as the preferred design in August 2005.[8][9] The Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate, designed by Navantia, was identified as the official alternative, and both designs began further testing and modification as part of a two-year selection process.[8][9] The two ship designs were equivalent in many areas, including length, speed and weapons outfit, although the Arleigh Burke class was larger with a displacement 2,200 tons greater than the Spanish frigate, and had superior capabilities in regards to range (700 nautical miles (1,300 km; 810 mi) greater), helicopter operations (two embarked helicopters instead of one), primary armament is not comparable (1 × 29-cell, 1 × 61-cell (90 total cells) Mark 41 Vertical Launch System compared to a 48-cell launcher), and close-defence (with a second close-in weapons system).[10] The Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Russ Shalders, believed the American design would provide the RAN with a greater long-term capability, as there was greater scope for upgrades and modifications later in the ships' careers.[11] Despite the American destroyer being the preferred option, the conclusion of the selection process in late June 2007 saw Navantia's Álvaro de Bazán design selected: the Spanish ships were considered a less-risky design as, unlike the Evolved Arleigh Burkes (which at this point only existed as an on-paper design), vessels of the Spanish design had been built and were operational.[8] The Álvaro de Bazán derivatives were predicted to be in service four years earlier than the American-designed ships, and would cost A$1 billion less to build, with further financial and technical benefits in ordering the AWDs and the Canberra-class landing helicopter dock ships from the same supplier.[8]

The contract for the ships was signed on 4 October 2007.[7] The A$8 billion three-ship deal included the option to order a fourth ship at a later date.[12] This option was due to expire in October 2008.[12] The Australian government sought to extend the offer into early 2009, so as to review the recommendations of the Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 white paper due for completion at the end of 2008, and to enquire about acquiring a fourth Aegis system from the USN, before ordering or cancelling the fourth destroyer.[12] The Navy League of Australia has consistently supported the acquisition of a fourth AWD.[13] According to the Navy League, building a fourth destroyer would be relatively cheap (money for design and other 'start-up' costs would have already been spent) and improve RAN capabilities (by offering increased flexibility and redundancy, particularly in the event of a Falklands War-like armed conflict).[13][14] Along with the Navy League, the Australian defence industry has supported a fourth destroyer, to keep workers employed for longer while reducing the gap to the next major defence construction projects (the Collins-class replacement and the Anzac-class replacement).[13][14][15]

The Australian Minister for Defence announced on 20 January 2006 that the Air Warfare Destroyers will be named HMAS Hobart (DDG 39), HMAS Brisbane (DDG 41), and HMAS Sydney (DDG 42).[16][17] The Navy League of Australia suggested several possible names for a possible fourth destroyer; one was to name the ship Melbourne; another involved taking the Adelaide name from the second Canberra-class landing helicopter dock ship, and renaming the larger vessel Australia.[14][18]

In April 2022, Navantia Australia made an unsolicited bid to build an additional three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers for the Royal Australian Navy due to possible delays to the Hunter Class Frigate program.[19]

HMAS Hobart, left, and HMAS Brisbane at ASC Osborne in June 2016.

Each destroyer will have a length overall of 147.2 metres (483 ft), a maximum beam of 18.6 metres (61 ft), and a draught of 5.17 metres (17.0 ft).[7] At launch, the ships will have a full-load displacement of 6,250 tonnes (6,150 long tons; 6,890 short tons).[20] The Hobarts have been designed to allow for upgrades and installation of new equipment, with a theoretical maximum displacement of 7,000 tonnes (6,900 long tons; 7,700 short tons).[20]

The Hobarts use a more powerful propulsion system than their Spanish predecessors.[8] The combined diesel or gas turbine (CODOG) propulsion arrangement consists of two General Electric Marine model 7LM2500-SA-MLG38 gas turbines, each generating 17,500 kilowatts (23,500 hp), and two Caterpillar Bravo 16 V Bravo diesel engines, each providing 5,650 kilowatts (7,580 hp).[7] These drive two propeller shafts, fitted with Wärtsilä controllable pitch propellers.[7] The ships' maximum speed is over 28 knots (52 km/h; 32 mph), with a range of over 5,000 nautical miles (9,300 km; 5,800 mi) at 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph); although not fast enough to keep pace with an American carrier battle group, the RAN is happy with the speed/range tradeoff, as endurance is more important for Australian operating conditions.[7] For in-harbour manoeuvring, each destroyer is fitted with a bow thruster.[7]

The standard ship's company is 186-strong, plus 16 additional personnel to operate and maintain the ship's helicopter.[7] Additional accommodation increases the maximum potential complement to 31 officers and 203 sailors.[7] Onboard electricity requirements (the hotel load) are supplied by four MTU prime mover diesel motors connected to Alconza alternators.[7]

Sensors and systems

HMAS Hobart's mast and upper superstructure, showing many of the ship's sensors

The Hobarts are built around the Aegis combat system, specifically the Aegis Baseline 7.1 Refresh 2 version.[7] The system has been 'Australianised' to be more capable in regard to non-aviation threats.[7] The system feeds into the Australian Tactical Interface; six multi-function consoles that are capable of handling the destroyer's sonar, electronic warfare, and close-defence functions in addition to Aegis.[7] The main radar system is the Lockheed Martin AN/SPY-1D(V) S-band radar.[7] The combination of the AN/SPY-1D(V) radar, Aegis system, and Standard 2 missile will allow each destroyer to fire on enemy aircraft or missiles over 150 kilometres (93 mi) away.[28]

In addition to the main radar, the Hobarts will be fitted with a Northrop Grumman AN/SPQ-9B X-band pulse Doppler horizon search radar, a Raytheon Mark 99 fire-control system with two continuous wave illuminating radars for missile direction, and two L-3 Communications SAM Electronics X-band navigation radars.[7] The ships are fitted with an Ultra Electronics Sonar Systems' Integrated Sonar System, which includes a hull-mounted sonar and a towed variable depth sonar built up from a quad directional active-passive receive array, a passive torpedo detection array and a high-powered towed sonar source. Other sensors include an Ultra Electronics Series 2500 electro-optical director, a Sagem VAMPIR IR search and track system, and Rafael Toplite stabilised target acquisition sights for each ship's Typhoons.[7]

Electronic warfare sensors consist of the ITT EDO Reconnaissance and Surveillance Systems ES-3701 electronic support measures (ESM) radar, a SwRI MBS-567A communications ESM system, an Ultra Electronics Avalon Systems multipurpose digital receiver, and a Jenkins Engineering Defence Systems low-band receiver.[7] Countermeasures include four launchers for Nulka decoy missiles, plus four six-tube launchers for radio frequency, infrared, and underwater acoustic decoys.[7]

Communications equipment includes HF, VHF, and UHF radios, Link 11 and Link 16 tactical data exchange uplinks, ASTIS MCE (Advanced SATCOM Terrestrial Infrastructure System Maritime Communications Elements) terminals, and Inmarsat equipment.[7]

Each ship is assembled from 31 pre-fabricated modules or 'blocks', averaging 200 tonnes (200 long tons; 220 short tons) in weight and 15 by 12 by 9 metres (49 by 39 by 30 ft) in size.[31] The nine blocks making up the forward superstructure of each destroyer, containing the most sensitive or classified equipment, are manufactured by ASC's shipyard at Osborne, South Australia, where the final assembly of each destroyer will occur.[7][12][31] The other 22 blocks for each ship were subcontracted out.[12] On 9 May 2009, two companies were selected to fabricate the additional blocks: NQEA Australia (building the twelve blocks of each ship's hull) and Forgacs Group (building the ten aft superstructure blocks per ship).[31][32] However, during June, NQEA advised the AWD Alliance that the shipbuilder was undergoing restructuring and may have difficulty in meeting its contracted obligations.[32] The Department of Defence went into negotiations with NQEA and BAE Systems Australia (which had been shortlisted during the initial subcontractor selection process), and at the end of June, transferred all of NQEA's work to BAE.[32]

Hobart under construction in April 2015

In October 2010, the 20-by-17-metre (66 by 56 ft) central keel block manufactured by BAE for Hobart was found to be distorted and incompatible with other hull sections.[33] The cause of the fabrication errors is unknown: BAE blamed incorrect drawings from designer Navantia, while the AWD Alliance claimed the other two shipyards have not experienced similar problems, when in fact they had,[34][35][36] and suggested first-of-kind manufacturing errors were made by BAE.[33][37] However, a report in 2014, by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) confirmed that 'errors resulting from a sub-standard technology transfer procedure (passing on specific techniques relative to the design) & drawings that were not localised by designer Navantia' were to blame.[38] The delay in reworking the keel block was predicted to set construction back by at least six months.[33] Other major issues during Hobart's construction included the need to replace 25% of the internal pipework due to faulty manufacture, and the initial rejection of the ship's mainmast block because of defects in the cabling and combat system equipment.[34][35] Brisbane's construction has been marred by numerous defects requiring rework.[35]

Hobart alongside HMAS Darwin in December 2017

In late May 2011, the government announced that the delay in building Hobart had increased to between one and two years, and would attempt to reduce the workload on BAE (which is also responsible for superstructure work on the Canberra-class amphibious ships) by redistributing up to 13 of the 24 hull blocks the company was slated to build for the first two ships to the other two shipyards.[39][40] In addition, the three blocks containing each destroyer's hull-mounted sonar are being assembled by Navantia in Spain and the United Kingdom, with the possibility another two hull blocks could be assigned to the Spanish shipyard.[39][40] An additional nine-month delay was announced in September 2012; this was intended to create a better transition of labour from the destroyers to following shipbuilding projects (replacements for the Collins-class submarines and the Anzac-class frigates), and achieve some savings in the federal budget.[41][42]

A March 2014 report by the ANAO heavily criticised the DMO and the AWD Alliance for underestimating the risks in redesigning the ships for Australian operations, and building them in shipyards with no recent warship construction experience.[34] The ANAO report also criticised designer Navantia and the shipyards involved in block construction over poor drawings, repeated errors, and bad building practices.[34] As a result of further delays and growing costs, the Hobart-class destroyer project was added to the government's "Projects of Concern" list in June 2014.[43] Follow-up government reports identified unrealistic time and cost estimates as additional factors.[36] The overarching alliance concept has been repeatedly denounced, with no effective management structure or entity in charge, (allowing for repeated blame-passing between the individual alliance partners, Navantia, and the subcontracted shipyards), and the DMO locked in a contradictory role (simultaneously acting as supplier, build partner, and customer).[34][35][36]

Brisbane moored alongside in Sydney just prior to her commissioning in October 2018

Hobart's keel was laid down on 6 September 2012, and the ship was launched on 23 May 2015, with 76% of construction complete.[42][44][45] Brisbane was laid down on 3 February 2014, and by October 2015 was 68% complete.[46][47] Sydney was laid down on 19 November 2015 (two weeks after the Adelaide-class frigate of the name was decommissioned, and on the anniversary of the loss of the second Sydney during World War II), with block fabrication due to complete in early 2016.[48][49]

Originally, the Hobart-class destroyers were to be operational between December 2014 and June 2017.[7] In September 2012, the ongoing delays prompted revision of the entry-to-service dates to March 2016, September 2017, and March 2019.[42] In May 2015, the DMO announced additional schedule slippage, with Hobart to be handed over to the RAN in June 2017, Brisbane due in September 2018, and Sydney by December 2019.[36][50] The original contract cost was about A$7.9 billion for the three ships.[1][12] By March 2014, the project was running A$302 million over budget.[34] By May 2015, this had increased to A$800 million, with a predicted minimum cost overrun by project end of A$1.2 billion.[36][50]

In February 2018, the Hobart-class was removed from the "Projects of Concern" list, after long-term reform arrangements were put in place.[51] In May 2018, the third and final Hobart-class ship, Sydney, was launched.[52]

It has been announced that the three ships of the class will be upgraded at the cost of AU$5.1 billion. This includes the upgrade of the Aegis Weapon System to Baseline 9 or 10, the possible replacement of the current AN/SPY-1D(V) radar with a more powerful radar and the integration of new missiles, namely the SM-6 surface to air missile, Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile, and the Naval Strike Missile.[53][54][55]

• Aegis Combat System
• List of naval ship classes in service
• List of active Royal Australian Navy ships

Journal articles

• Andrew, Gordon (September 2010). "AWD, Hobart, MFU or DDGH – What's in a name?". Semaphore. 2010 (7). Retrieved 22 May 2015.
• Brown, Nick (28 June 2007). "Spanish designs are Australia's choice for warship programmes". International Defence Review.
• Grevatt, Jon (30 June 2009). "NQEA loses block-building deal for Australian destroyers". Jane's Navy International.
• Grevatt, Jon (26 October 2010). "AWD Alliance admits destroyer contract hit by construction 'difficulties'". Jane's Defence Industry.
• Gulber, Abraham (October 2009). "Growth in Strength: The Hobart class AWD". The Navy. 71 (4): 4–8.
• Kerr, Julian (25 September 2008). "Australia seeks to extend AWD options". Jane's Defence Weekly.
• Pengelley, Rupert (26 September 2011). "Aussie rules: air warfare destroyers push boundaries". Jane's Navy International.
• Shackleton, David (February 2007). "Choices and consequences: choosing the AWD design". Australian Defence Magazine: 20–24.
• "Time to bring back the Pride". The Navy. 69 (4): 2. October 2007.
• Thornhill, Roger (October 2006). "The Case for the Fourth Air Warfare Destroyer". The Navy. 68 (4): 9–14.
• Thornhill, Roger (July 2009). "Force 2030: The Defence White Paper". The Navy. 71 (3): 8–13.

News articles

• Australian Associated Press (22 November 2006). "Ballistic missile system 'moving closer'". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 16 December 2011.
• Australian Associated Press (3 February 2014). "Adelaide keel ceremony for destroyer". Ninemsn. Archived from the original on 21 February 2014. Retrieved 7 February 2014.
• Cullen, Simon (6 September 2012). "Work on $8bn destroyer fleet delayed". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 8 September 2012.
• Greene, Andrew (9 May 2015). "Companies building multi-billion-dollar warships feared defects would damage their reputations, leaked documents show". Radio National. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
• Kerin, John (3 December 2012). "Fourth destroyer still an option: Smith". The Australian Financial Review. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
• McPhedran, Ian (6 March 2014). "Navy warships project heading for cost blowout". News.com.au. News Corp Australia. Archived from the original on 23 January 2015. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
• McPhedran, Ian (3 May 2015). "Destroyer project now three years behind schedule". News.com.au. News Corp Australia. Archived from the original on 5 November 2015. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
• "HMAS Hobart construction costs overrun by $870m, says AWD Alliance". Naval-technology.com. Kable. 15 October 2015. Retrieved 22 October 2015.
• "Air Warfare Destroyer project: HMAS Hobart launched, SA Premier calls on Government to trust workers with next generation submarines". Radio Australia. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 23 May 2015. Retrieved 23 May 2015.
• "Changes to Air Warfare Destroyer Construction Program". News and Events. Royal Australian Navy. 26 May 2011. Archived from the original on 1 June 2011. Retrieved 7 June 2011.
• Sheridan, Greg (22 May 2015). "Warships cost blows out to $9bn". The Australian. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
• Starick, Paul (21 May 2015). "First look aboard Adelaide-built air warfare destroyer, the Hobart". News.com.au. News Corp Australia. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
• Stewart, Cameron (26 October 2010). "$8bn navy flagship founders after construction bungle". The Australian. pp. 1–2. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
• Stewart, Cameron (27 May 2011). "Overdue and over budget: $8bn destroyer plan in crisis". The Australian. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
• Stewart, Cameron (31 May 2011). "BAE shipyard to blame for destroyer delays: Defence". The Australian. p. 6.
• Walters, Patrick (13 March 2007). "Navy wants upgrade capacity for destroyers". The Australian. Archived from the original on 12 December 2008. Retrieved 16 December 2011.

Press releases

• "Preferred designer chosen for AWD contract" (Press release). Department of Defence. 16 August 2005. Archived from the original on 16 May 2011. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
• "Next generation of naval ships to reflect a rich history of service" (Press release). Department of Defence. 20 January 2006. Retrieved 30 September 2010.
• "Air Warfare Destroyer added to Projects of Concern list" (Press release). Department of Defence Ministers. 4 June 2014. Archived from the original on 7 June 2015. Retrieved 22 May 2015.

Websites

• "Project Overview". Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance. Retrieved 16 December 2011.
• "The Hobart Class – Characteristics". Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance. Retrieved 16 December 2011.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Hobart class destroyer.

• Royal Australian Navy DDG
• Defence Materiel Organisation – SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer
• Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance Archived 19 July 2008 at the Wayback Machine