Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya

As the regime of Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre declined during the 1980s, Islamism began gaining strength throughout Somali society through numerous Islamic organizations. While many of the new Islamist groups had similar broad objectives, they often differed in approaches and methods. All the movements had initially agreed that propagating 'the Islamic Awakening' in Mosques and school was the best way to start transforming Somali society. The government saw these movements as a serious threat and issued bans, forcing them to continue work discreetly.[1]

Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya had formed out of a merger of two Islamist groups during the early 1980s.[1][4] Most members of the organization were students, teachers and professionals.[2]

As the decade went on tensions between Islamist movements and the government began building. As a result of crackdowns and executions many Islamic students and religious scholars fled abroad, primarily to Arab states.[1] As the weakness of the state became apparent, Al-Itihaad went public for the first time in 1989.[2] Despite tensions with the government, Somali Islamist group relied on peaceful methods and none of the organizations took up arms until the collapse of the state in 1991.[5] Numerous senior officers of the Somali National Army joined the AIAI post-1991, and consequently the organization had many informants in other Somali factions.[6]

Members of the organization did not anticipate the collapse of the government and had expected for a democracy to take Barres place.[5] As all out war began in 1991, a faction within Al-Itihaad began pushing to take up arms against the factions that had overthrown the government. This led to significant debates within the Islamist factions over what course of action to take.[5] Many members of AIAI believed that a protracted strategy of focusing on social programs should be emphasized instead of attempting to achieve their goals via armed struggle.[6]

In 1992, AIAI entered combat for the first time when it fought against the forces of the United Somali Congress led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid during the Battle of Arare Bridge. AIAI forces were defeated and withdrew south to Ras Kamboni and north to Bosaso. That same year the organization would take control of the port city of Bosaso. For the short period that AIAI controlled the city, it reportedly left a generally positive impression on the general population due to being less corrupt in its administration than the SSDF.[5]

By 1992 the organization had become the most visible Islamist faction in Somalia. AIAI focused its recruiting effort urban and semi-educated youth, as opposed to other Islamist factions that emphasized focused on nomadic populations.[6]

In September 1993, the Pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat reported that several Somali Islamic factions, including Al-Itihaad, who had previously remained neutral in the war, had tacitly allied with Aidid's Somali National Alliance against UNOSOM II and US forces.[7] When the conflict had begun in June 1993 AIAI and other Islamic factions had divided over whether not to fight foreign troops because Aidid had previously been a major threat to them.[8] As civilian casualties began mounting in July and August these groups, including AIAI, began to launch attacks on UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu after sunset. Independent sources in Mogadishu, corroborated by Al-Hayat, indicated that the majority of night military operations throughout 1993 were coordinated by a variety of Somali Islamic groups within the city, most prominently Ai-Itihaad.[7][9] While Aidid did not overtly claim responsibility for these night operations, Al-Hayat noted that he was 'delighted' by AIAI's support and that he further sought to project the appearance of being the orchestrator for propaganda purposes.[10]

In 1994 Al-Itihaad effectively captured the Gedo region of Somalia. For several months they controlled the region and in that time they created a secure environment. The rising strength of AIAI led to military confrontations with the Somali National Front (SNF), which was backed by the Ethiopian military. Ethiopia deployed troops and air power to assist the SNF against AIAI. This resulted in many Islamists who were not associated with Al-Itihaad to join the fight alongside them. Several Somali scholars produced fatwas calling on Somalis to fight the Ethiopian troops.[5]

Funded by wealthy Saudis, al-Itihaad had extensive connections with the Somali expatriate community in Kenya, in particular the Eastleigh district of Nairobi and the predominantly Muslim coastal regions. At its height, the AIAI militia numbered over 1,000.[11]

Despite this initial widespread support for AIAI, the rank and file of the organization became mired in heated debates over the issue of taking up arms against other Somali factions. Some members of AIAI renounced the use of violence against Somalis all together and left the organization, and others who remained expressed unease over confrontations with other Somali factions. This debate forced Al-Itihaad to reconsider its strategy.[5]

By 1994, al-Itihaad had established itself in the Somali Region of Ethiopia. According to a report by the Emergency Unit for Ethiopia of the UNDP, al-Itihaad were most active in the area between Kebri Dahar, Danan, Kelafo and Degehabur. Some elements were reported to be active near Danot, Nusdariiq and 'Adow. Although they had support amongst the Ogaden, at the time their activities were not tolerated by the Isaaq and Dhulbahante clans.[12] An Ogaden wing of AIAI developed and registered itself as a political party in Ethiopia. The organization began fighting alongside the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) when Addis Ababa banned the party.[13]

Al-Itihaad sent a delegation to the Peace and Unity Conference of the Somali Nation, which was held February 1995 at Kebri Dehar, at which they made pledges which would cause the organisation to effectively cease to exist as a political and military force within the Ogaden.[14] Despite this promise al-Itihaad continued to engage in violent actions after this congress. One was the attempted assassination of then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Abdul Majid Hussein in 1996.[15] Another was in March of that year, when they raided areas in the Jigjiga Zone controlled by the Abskuul clan, apparently in collaboration with disaffected members of this clan. Established local security forces cleared al-Itihaad infiltrators from the Jigjiga Zone, and the defeated remnants retreated to disputed border areas between the Somali and Oromia regions, which has served as a refuge for them, as well as for Oromo fundamentalist rebel groups.[16]

In 1997 Al-Itihaad collectively decided to abandon the idea of using force in order to change the status quo due to internal fissures and military setbacks. Despite this major policy shift the organization still endorsed fighting against Ethiopia due to its perceived colonization of the Ogaden region.[5] That same year the organization effectively became non-existent[13] and split into three distinct centres, Mogadishu, Bosaso and Haregisa.[3] Following the organizations renunciation of armed struggle in 1997, many former AIAI members joined civil society organizations dedicated to public health and education.[13]

On 7–8 March 1999, Ethiopia claimed it had made a cross-border incursion into Balanbale searching for members of AIAI who had reportedly kidnapped a person and stolen medical supplies, and denied reports of looting. Allegations from that time also claim Ethiopia was the supplier of various Somali warlords, while Eritrea was arming other warlords.[17][18]

An article published in the San Francisco Chronicle on 16 December 2001 quoted unnamed intelligence officials who claimed AIAI was extensively connected to al-Barakat.[24] The San Francisco Chronicle called al-Barakat a Somali-based business conglomerate and money transfer organisation. They quoted former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill who called al-Barakat as one of the "financiers of terrorism". The 9/11 Commission report subsequently cleared al-Barakat of involvement in financing the 9/11 hijackers, the 9/11 Commission determined that the 9/11 hijackers received their remote funds transfers through US financial institutions, not Islamic financial institutions.[28]