Bosnia and Herzegovina–Croatia relations

The 2001 agreement on Yugoslavia's succession issues foresaw a follow-up bilateral agreement on the restitution of specific properties of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territory of Croatia, which include petrol stations, hotels (such as the Hidrogradnja complex in Baška Voda[11]), and assets at the ports of Sibenik and Ploče, for a total worth estimated at 10 billion euros. 64 such assets have been registered by the Republika Srpska entity, and 78 by the Federation entity; there is no State-level single registry. Negotiations for a bilateral agreement lasted until 2012, when they were discontinued due to Croatia's unwillingness to agree with Republika Srpska's request for a right to perpetual ownership of the properties. In 2018, Croatia adopted a law on state property management, allowing the rental of such properties with concessions for up to 30 years. This raised concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[12][13]

The cooperation between the two countries' prosecutors' offices need to be strengthened in order to deliver tangible results in the fight against impunity for war crimes; Croatia has de facto stopped cooperating with BiH on war crimes cases where the accused are Croats.

As of May 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia have not signed a treaty of mutual extradition of the countries' citizens, owing to many convicted people fleeing to the other country and attaining dual citizenship to be virtually immune to extradition. These people have included Ognjen Šimić, a surgeon from Rijeka convicted to nine years in prison for accepting bribes; Ante Jelavić, a former president of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted in Croatia to 9.5 years for alleged abuse of position at the Bank of Herzegovina in Mostar; and others. According to Bosnia and Herzegovina government, fourteen people sentenced in Bosnia and Herzegovina live self-exiled as Croatian citizens. As of 2009, the two countries were working on an agreement that would allow imprisoning such escapees for their sentences within their current country of residence without their consent (the status quo version requires consent of the escapee, which is usually not given).[14][15]

The two countries have several small disputed sections of the boundary, the most prominent of which is the one related to maritime access.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia agreed on a border demarcation treaty in 1999. The treaty was signed by the two former presidents, Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman, but it was never ratified by the respective parliaments, therefore it never entered into force. Croatia continues to administer areas that the deal assigns to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement foresees a definition of the two countries' territory, in the area of the Pelješac peninsula which is slightly different from what is shown on maps, since Croatia agreed to recognise the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina over two small rock islands (Mali Školj and Veliki Školj) and the tip of the peninsula of Klek near Neum.[16]

Sections of the Una River and villages at the base of Mount Plješevica are in Croatia, while some are in Bosnia, which means that there would have to be nine border crossings on a single route. Lack of action on this problem impedes any serious development in the region. The Zagreb–Bihać–Split railway line is still closed for major traffic due to this issue.[17]

The border on the Una River between Hrvatska Kostajnica on the northern, Croatian side of the river, and Kostajnica on the southern, Bosnian side, is also being discussed. A river island between the two towns is under Croatian control, but is claimed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. A shared border crossing point has been built and has been functioning since 2003, and is used without hindrance by either party.

Borders of Bosnia Herzegovina (solid line) near Neum as modified (dashed line) according to the 1999 agreement.

The Herzegovinian municipality of Neum in the south makes the southernmost part of Croatia (Dubrovnik–Neretva County) an exclave. In 1999, a border agreement between former Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović moved the Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina border near Neum from the very coast (during SFR Yugoslavia era and confirmed by the Badinter Arbitration Committee) further into the sea waters of the Mali Ston Bay, placing two Croatian islands (Mali and Veliki Škoj, incidentally translated into English as Little and Big Island) under Bosnia-Herzegovina sovereignty. Six years later, the Croatian government called for the ratification of this agreement; however, as of 2007, it was not ratified.[18][19] The two countries negotiated Neum Agreement and Ploče Agreement defining special arrangements for Croatian transit traffic through Neum and Bosnia and Herzegovina access to the port of Ploče to compensate for non-contiguity of Croatian territory between Ploče and Dubrovnik and lack of a seaport in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[20][21]

Pelješac Bridge prior to opening

Croatia has opted to build a bridge to the Pelješac peninsula to connect the Croatian mainland with the exclave as part of the A1 motorway Zagreb–Dubrovnik. On 7 June 2017, the European Commission approved the Croatian Major Project "Road to South Dalmatia" which aims at connecting the southern Dalmatian peninsula of Peljesac with the mainland and thus connect Dubrovnik-Neretva County with the rest of the country. This territory is now separated from the rest of Croatia by around 9 km large corridor of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The project has a total cost of € 526 million with a total eligible cost of € 420 million and an ERDF co-financing of € 357 million.

Croatia claims that the bridge is located exclusively within Croatian territory and Croatian territorial waters and that it is thus entitled under the international law of the sea to construct the bridge without requiring any consent from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia also expressed commitment to fully respect the international rights enjoyed by other countries in the Pelješac peninsula, including the right of innocent passage enjoyed by all countries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to have unrestricted access to the high seas. Croatia recalled that the foreseen height of the bridge (55 m, 180 ft) will allow the totality of the current Bosnian shipping to use the existing navigational route to transit under the bridge, and that in case any ship taller than 55 meters (180 ft) would need to call on a port in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it could dock instead at the Croatian Ploče port, in line with the 1995 Free Transit agreement.

The construction of the bridge has also been opposed by various political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly Bosniak, as they deem it would complicate the country's access to international waters.[22] Bosnian authorities initially opposed the building of the bridge, originally planned to be only 35 meters (115 feet) high, because it would have made it impossible for large ships to enter the harbor of Neum.[23] Although Neum harbor is not currently fit for commercial traffic, and most of the trade to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina goes through the Croatian port of Ploče, the Bosnian government declared that a new one might be built in the future, and that the construction of the bridge would compromise this ambition.[24][25]

On 17 October 2007, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted an official position stating that "Bosnia and Herzegovina opposes the construction of the [Pelješac] bridge until the issues related to the determination of the sea borderline between the two countries are resolved" and asking Croatia not to undertake any unilateral actions concerning the construction of the bridge. Bosnian MP Halid Genjac has stated that such official position has never been reverted and is thus still in force, while no official Bosnian body has given its express consent to the construction of the bridge. He argued that “the claims that Croatia is building a bridge on its territory are incorrect because the sea waters beneath the Peljesac bridge are not and cannot be Croatian or internal waters, but international waters stretching from the territorial waters of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the open sea,” Genjac argued.[16][26]

The bridge and its access roads opened for traffic on 26 July 2022.

In 2018, Croatia objected to the election of Željko Komšić as Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was elected mainly by the Bosnian Muslim voters. The Croatian Parliament adopted a Resolution on the situation of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This resolution was deemed by the Office of the High Representative as in violation of Croatia's obligations of non-interference under the Dayton Agreement.

Croatia’s conveyed the view that the election of Komsić should never happen again, as it is seen as undermining "the equality of constituent nations" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, between the three main ethnic groups of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Croatia also continues to voice its support for constitutional and electoral reforms that would enable Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to have legitimate representatives in the legislative and executive bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the upper house of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the vast majority of the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina lives, and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Travnik's gymnasium is a classic example of the "Two schools under one roof" system. The right side of the building hosts the Croatian-curriculum high school and was renovated with funds from the Republic of Croatia. The left side of the building hosts the Bosnian-curriculum high school and is dilapidated. The courtyard is separated by a fence.

Croatia is a sponsor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's segregated school system, exemplified by the "two schools under one roof". Children from two ethnic groups, Bosniaks and Croats, attend classes in the same building, but physically separated from each other and taught separate curricula.[27] Children from one ethnic group often enter the school through one door, while children from other ethnic group through another. In the Federation entity of BiH, 57 schools operated in this way in the year 2010.[28] By 2018, 56 such schools remained.[29] This phenomenon of ethnic separation is attributed to the Croat–Bosniak War (1992–1994) and the creation of Herzeg-Bosnia on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia continues to finance the system of separate Croatian-curriculum public schools in BiH.[29]

Since 2018, increased migratory flows pose challenges at the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular along the region of Una-Sana Canton. Since January 2018, around 32,000 migrants have entered BiH, out of them around 7,200 are estimated be in BiH currently. Civil society and international organisations has reported violent collective expulsion (pushbacks) of migrants and asylum seekers back into Bosnia and Herzegovina.[30] Croatian authorities have rejected these accusations. The Croatian Ombudsman has, however, raised serious concerns on the activities of Croatian police at the border with BiH.

Bosnia and Herzegovina objects to Croatia's plans to build a radioactive waste disposal site across the border in Trgovska Gora, Dvor (former Cerkezovac barracks).[31]

Croatia complains about the cross-border impact of pollution from the fuel refinery in Brod (BiH), owned by Russian state-owned company Zarubezhneft. After an explosion incident on 9 October 2018 that left one person dead and ten injured, the refinery ceased operations.[32] The company has not announced its shutdown, but the refinery remains closed down as of 2022.[33]

As Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia each share the largest part of their border with the other (932 kilometers or 579 miles), they have participated in numerous joint ventures aimed at providing a regional economic uplift. One of such projects is the widening of Pan-European Corridor Vc (E73) to freeway standards.[5] Although extending to the Adriatic Sea all the way from Budapest, the capital of Hungary, Corridor Vc (in Bosnia and Herzegovina designated as A1) is purported to bear most importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina as its longest turnpike (at 340 kilometers or 210 miles) and a national project of sorts.[34] It passes through Croatia at two stretches: one in eastern Slavonia near Osijek and Đakovo (A5) and the other at the coast near Ploče and Metković (A10). Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have so far co-operated in building a bridge over Sava River near Svilaj, Croatia, which connects the northern end of Corridor Vc to the southern end of Croatian A5.[5]

Exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina amount to 14.4% of Croatia's total, while as of 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fifth largest trade partner of Croatia. This makes Croatia both the largest importer and exporter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is the second largest buyer of Croatian goods. With 343 million convertible marks (US$237 million) of invested foreign capital, Croatia is the largest investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, topping nearby Slovenia (BAM 302 million; US$208 million) and neighboring Serbia and Montenegro (BAM 122 million; US$84 million). In 2007, the trade between the two countries amounted to 2,517 million US dollars (BAM 3.64 billion; HRK 13.63 billion), a 32% increase from the past year.[35][36]

The third telecommunication company of Bosnia and Herzegovina, HT Eronet, is owned 50.1% by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 39% by Hrvatski Telekom. Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović had been charged with abuse of power and authority during the privatization of Eronet in 1999, but was acquitted by the FBiH Supreme Court in April 2013. The company is considered to be under heavy political influence by the HDZ BiH party and a source of patronage. A due diligence by international advisors was requested by the IMF as a prior action in 2016,[37] and completed only in early 2019.[38]

A bilateral agreement on cooperation in the EU accession process was signed in 2016.