Cabinet wars

Cabinet wars, derived from the German expression Kabinettskriege (German: [kabiˈnɛtsˌkʁiːɡə], singular Kabinettskrieg), is a historical term to describe the shift from the regular, limited, aristocratic conflicts of the eighteenth century to total war following the French Revolution.[1] Historians define cabinet wars as a period of small conflicts not involving standing armies, but with a growing military class arising to advise monarchs.[2] The term derived from the council these cabinets provided during the period of absolute monarchies from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia to the 1789 French Revolution. These cabinets were marked by diplomacy and a self-serving nobility.[3][4]

History

Cabinet wars marked the period of limited conflicts between monarchs from 1648 to 1789. These conflicts define a transition from princely wars (Fürstenkriege) to state wars (Staatenkriege) and Volkskriege, or wars of the people or nation in the mid-nineteenth century such as the French Revolution.[5] Cabinet wars were often more regulated, fought over lesser stakes, and revolved around noble territorial disputes and emerging state borders.[6]

Cabinet wars, as historically defined, link the evolution of the state with evolution of modern warfare.[7] These conflicts were marked by mercenary forces from different countries who did not identify with an abstract notion of the nation, rather than national standing militaries.[8][9]

The contrast between Kabinettskriege, cabinet wars, and Staatenkriege, or state wars, was popularized by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder[10] who oversaw the modernization of the Prussian and Ottoman militaries. This classifications of three types of modern war: cabinet war, people's war and guerrilla war built off of Karl von Clausewitz' two types of war.[11]

This classification of cabinet wars stems from the analysis of warfare after the Napoleonic wars by Clausewitz[12] and other military writers of the time. Debate centered around the question of whether wars should be all encompassing, or more limited in nature. In On War (1832) Clausewitz suggested a third type of war of limited strategy. Over time the classification became adopted in the lexicon of military historians.

Historians generally mark the end of the cabinet wars period with the beginning of the use of conscription and the levée en masse.[13]

Characteristics

Cabinet wars were not just bracketed by the Thirty Years' War and the French Revolution; they were marked by specific characteristics. Historians note the following features:

  • Limited in scope – The goals of the war often revolved around maintaining a balance of power or small territorial gains amongst noble families.[14]
  • Limited military – Engagements were often with smaller professional armies and the battles fought by commanders limited in decisive commitment of arms. The cabinet wars marked the transition of mercenaries to professional soldiers.[15]
  • Limited religious goals – The wars before the Thirty Years' War often turned on religious conflict. Until the rise of nationalism, cabinet war battles did not rely on religion, idolatry, or symbolism.
  • Limited outcomes – Cabinet wars did not reshuffle the balance of power in Europe nor replace heads of states.[16]

References
  1. Hewitson, Mark (2013). "Princes' Wars, Wars of the People, or Total War? Mass Armies and the Question of a Military Revolution in Germany, 1792–1815". War in History. 20 (4): 452–490.
  2. Hewitson, Mark (2017). The People's Wars: Histories of Violence in the German Lands,. Oxford University Press.
  3. James, Leighton (2013). itnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in German Central Europe. Springer.
  4. Förster, Stig (1982). "Facing 'people's war': Moltke the elder and Germany's military options after 1871". The Journal of Strategic Studies. 10 (2): 209–230.
  5. Hewitson, Mark (2013). "Princes' Wars, Wars of the People, or Total War? Mass Armies and the Question of a Military Revolution in Germany, 1792–1815". War in History. 20 (4): 452–490.
  6. Lacey, James. "The Return of the Cabinet Wars". MCU Research. Open Hive.
  7. Leonhard, Jörn. "Nation-building, war experiences, and European models The rejection of conscription in Britain". In Zürche, Erik-Jan (ed.). Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500-2000. Amsterdam University Press.
  8. Wullschleger, Marion (2022). "Far from Armageddon: Austria-Hungary's officers and their visions of a general European War before 1914". War in History. 29 (3): 563–583.
  9. Leonhard, Jörn. "Nation-building, war experiences, and European models The rejection of conscription in Britain". In Zürche, Erik-Jan (ed.). Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500-2000. Amsterdam University Press.
  10. Hubbard, James (1890). "Warlike Europe". The North American Review. 151 (404): 125–127.
  11. Nothhaft, Howard; Schölzel, Hagen. "Reading Clausewitz: The Strategy Discourse and its Implications for Strategic Communication". The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication: 42–57.
  12. Eftimova Bellinger, Vanya. "When Resources Drive Strategy: Understanding Clausewitz/Corbett's War Limited by Contingent". Military Strategy Magazine. Retrieved 2023-05-20.
  13. Anderson, Frank Maloy (1904). The Constitutions and other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France, 1789–1901. Minneapolis, Minnesota: H. W. Wilson Co.
  14. Blanning, Timothy (2007). The Pursuit of Glory: Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe,1648-1815. Penguin.
  15. Mears, John (1988). "The Thirty Years' War, the "General Crisis," and the Origins of a Standing Professional Army in the Habsburg Monarchy". Central European History. 21 (2): 122–41.
  16. Blanning, Timothy (2007). The Pursuit of Glory: Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe,1648-1815. Penguin.
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