Alexander Graf von Hoyos

As chef de cabinet, Hoyos was at the centre of decision-making at Ballhausplatz, following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. Together with Count Forgách, who served as Second Section Chief and was another prominent member of the Young Rebels, he quickly became one of the most vocal pro-war diplomats during the ensuing July Crisis.[6]

It was Viktor Naumann, a Berlin journalist's idea to contact a junior Ballplatz official in Vienna on 1 July 1914. Hoyos had been sent to Berlin 1908-9 to win German approval of the annexation of Bosnia. Naumann was well-connected, enticing Hoyos to believe he could influence the Wilhelmstrasse. He was told of Germany's diplomatic prowess convinced that Britain would not intervene in his mission. So he was surprised to learn Germany found "the necessity of taking action against Serbia", but this was not confirmed by an absent Secretary of State.[7] Hoyos quickly advocated a firm, tough and confrontational approach putting himself at Berchtold's disposal. During the ensuing days a general consensus of war with Serbia was achieved in Vienna, where Conrad expected the Kaiser's backing. Before the assassination, a memorandum calling for a more aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans had been prepared in the Ballplatz. This one was now revised under the Hoyos guidance towards counselling a military solution. In addition, a letter from Emperor Franz Joseph I to the Kaiser in the same spirit was drafted.[8]

In order to ascertain the position of its ally Berchtold decided on 4 July to send his chef de cabinet to Berlin to bypass the Ambassador at Berlin Count Szögyény-Marich, whom he considered "too aged and unimaginative for such an important task".[9] The following day, a Sunday morning Hoyos arrived in Berlin with the memorandum and the Emperor's letter to secure Szogyeny's support.[10] While Szögyény-Marich met the Kaiser for lunch at Potsdam, Hoyos met the Under Secretary of State Zimmermann (as Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow had just married and was away on his honeymoon). In the evening, Szögyény-Marich cabled about the Kaiser's pledge of "full German backing". Hoyos had received a similar message from Zimmermann during his meeting. The following day the two diplomats met with Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann, and the Kaiser's commitments were confirmed. Austria-Hungary had thus received the famous "blank cheque" for dealing with Serbia.[11] Upon his return to Vienna on 7 July, Hoyos reported back to the Ballplatz with Bethmann Hollweg's oral promise of support.[12] He acted as secretary during the meeting of the Common Ministerial Council the same day as well as on 19 July, when agreement was found on the last details about the note to Serbia.[13]

While it is beyond doubt that Hoyos and others in the Austro-Hungarian leadership not only foresaw but wanted war during the July Crisis, it has, however, been much debated among historians as to whether they fully understood the scale of such a war. Some have argued that they considered a Russian intervention as unlikely and that the intention was a limited war, known as localisation between Serbia and Austria. While others have pointed to numerous remarks made during the course of July that undertaking action against Serbia would lead to a European war.[14] It is reasoned that Russian intervention was not taken into much consideration. One can, for example, find little if any records of the issue being discussed in the minutes that Hoyos wrote from the two meetings of the Common Imperial Ministerial Council in July.[15] However, on the 16 July 1914, Friedrich von Pourtalès, the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, falsely told the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazonov, that Austria was not planning on any measure that might cause a war in the Balkans, so no Russian complaints were made.[16] This in itself undermined the rationale that Austro-Hungary did not consider that a world war was impossible. In fact, by deliberately misrepresenting the existence and planning of a presentation to Serbia of an ultimatum containing “unacceptable demands”, the Austro-Hungary state implicitly knew that a world war would be inevitable, hence the deception during the July Crisis (See 'Contents':- 6 Preparations for the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum).

After the war had begun, Hoyos was relegated to a minor role, but he remained as chef de cabinet until January 1917, when he was demoted to serve in Norway as minister at the newly opened legation at Christiania (now Oslo). After the fall of the Habsburg empire, Hoyos retired from public service.[17]

Through his daughter Mélanie, he was a grandfather of Countess Vendeline von Bismarck-Schönhausen, Countess Barbara von Bismarck-Schönhausen, Count Andreas von Bismarck-Schönhausen, and his descendants include Stephanie zu Guttenberg.[22]