Dianrong

Dianrong (Simplified Chinese: 点融网 | pinyin: Diǎnróng Wǎng) is an online marketplace lending company headquartered in Shanghai, China. Named the “Lending Club of China”, the company was founded in 2012 by Soul Htite, co-founder and former CTO at Lending Club, who joined efforts with Kevin Guo, a PE fund partner and a lawyer from Shanghai to create a company similar to Lending Club in China.[2]

点融网 Dianrong
TypePrivate
IndustryPersonal finance, software, fintech
Founded2012
FounderSoul Htite and Kevin Guo
HeadquartersShanghai, China[1]
Area served
Worldwide
ProductsPeer-to-peer lending
Number of employees
Over 3500
Websitedianrong.com

History

In 2012, the co-founder of Lending Club and its former CTO, Soul Htite, came from the United States to China and brought Lending Club's technological know-how with him. He met finance lawyer Kevin Guo, and together they created Dianrong.com.[1][3]

Overview

As of 2013, Dianrong specialized in small consumer and business loans, ranging in size from 2,500 to 500,000 RMB for personal loans and 50,000 to 2,000,000 RMB for small business loans. Interest rates, loan tenure and fees were based on credit history, income, debt to income ratio, and loan purpose. Tenure varied from 1 month to 24 months, although some 36 month loans had been issued.[1]

As of 2014, origination fees varied from 1% to 5%. Personal loans generally had higher origination fees. Interest rates varied from 9.49% to 23.99%.[4]

As of 2013, people who wanted to receive loans, and people who wanted to offer loans, could each log into the website, and were obligated to provide certain information. People wanting to offer loans provide information about how much risk they are willing to take and when they want to receive returns, and the software presents loan requestors who fit that profile.[5]

Regulation & risk

As of 2014, pooling and allocating investor funds was unlawful in the PRC. Consequently, online lending platforms had to function strictly as intermediaries between those buying notes and those borrowing money. Violations of these rules appeared to be widespread.[6][7]

In 2013, Dianrong.com's default rate was about 1%.[8]

Dianrong.com and the Chinese P2P industry

The peer-to-peer lending industry in China is very small compared to traditional lending, but is growing rapidly. The market was estimated at $30 million in 2009 and is projected to grow to $7.8 billion by 2015.[9]

Industry churn was severe in 2013. More than 70 companies folded or went bankrupt during the year; 58 in the fourth quarter alone.[10][11][12] Even with this thinning of the ranks, there are still approximately 1,000 peer-to-peer companies in the Chinese market, "80 [to] 90 percent" of which "might go bust".[9]

In December 2018, the impact of the market and mainly regulatory changes[13] also affected Dianrong, which led to cash-flow issues resulting in layoffs and office closures.[14] Some employees complained in February 2019 that they have not received salaries for past two months.[15]

See also

References
  1. 房旭 (July 15, 2013). "点融网创始人：将交易权交还给借贷者". 福布斯中文网 (Forbes China). Archived from the original on 16 July 2013.
  2. Emma Lee (Jun 29, 2015). "More Challenging, Greater Impact: Lending Club/Dianrong Founder On China". technode.
  3. "点融网创始人校园行北大站：互联网金融何去何从". 金融界. April 14, 2014. Retrieved April 18, 2014.
  4. 陈红霖 (January 2014). "鼻祖来了". 环球企业家. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  5. "退潮才知谁裸泳，点融网实现稳健收益". 中金在线. June 6, 2013. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  6. "Xinhua Insight: Rapid expansion of China's P2P lending spells trouble". Xinhua. March 28, 2014. Archived from the original on June 7, 2015. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  7. Li Xiaoxiao, Yang Lu (July 4, 2013). "Central Bank Raises the Red Flag over P2P Lending Risks". Caixin Online. Archived from the original on 29 July 2013.
  8. 于美红 (March 5, 2014). "中国版"Lending Club"点融网：P2P里的"好学生"". 投资界. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  9. Simon Rabinovitch (January 12, 2014). "Reversal of fortune in China's peer-to-peer lending boom". The Financial Times. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  10. "P2P Questions in China Indicate Need for Regulation". Crowdfunding Insider. April 6, 2014. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  11. Sara Hsu (February 12, 2014). "China's Poor P2P Lending Models". The Diplomat. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  12. Hu Yuanyuan (January 9, 2014). "Renrendai received $130m capital injection in 2013". China Daily. Retrieved April 16, 2014.
  13. Liu, Alfred (January 2, 2019). "China P2P Lending Crackdown May See 70% of Firms Close". Bloomberg. Retrieved 2019-02-23.
  14. "点融网工资都发不出来了，恶心死了-平台投诉-网贷天眼". www.p2peye.com. Retrieved 2019-02-23.
  15. "DianRong having financial issues - FinteChina". www.fintechina.blog. Retrieved 2019-02-23.
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