Duncan Cameron (British Army officer)

After the cessation of hostilities in Taranaki, there was an ongoing dispute over a block of land at Waitara but by April 1863, Grey was preparing to return it to Taranaki Māori. Not knowing of Grey's plans, the following month local Māori ambushed British troops at nearby Ōakura, killing nine soldiers. In retaliation, on 4 June 1863, Cameron led a force of 870 troops on a successful assault on a party of about 50 Māori still occupying the contested Tataraimaka block beside the Katikara River, killing 24.[15]

This fresh outbreak of fighting in Taranaki, known as the Second Taranaki War, gave Grey leverage with the Colonial Office as he used it as justification for a request for an increase in the number of British soldiers in the country.[12] In the meantime, he proceeded with the return of Waitara to the Māori, calming tensions in the Taranaki.[16] Cameron and his forces quickly returned to Auckland where, despite his attack on the Tataraimaka block being a minor action, it was portrayed as a major success. Grey now decided to proceed with an invasion of the Waikato to eliminate the Kingite threat.[15]

Cameron, as a result of his experience in the Crimea, was conscious of the importance of sound logistics to support a military campaign.[11] His preparations for the invasion included the organisation of a transport corps and a telegraph line. Steamers were purchased to form a flotilla that would allow Cameron's forces to be supplied via the Waikato River.[12] On 10 July 1863, he established his headquarters at Queen's Redoubt, near what is now Pōkeno. The invasion began on 12 July 1863 when the British forces, numbering 380 men, crossed the Mangatāwhiri Stream and established a redoubt on the opposite bank.[17] Five days later, Cameron, leading a party of 550 men, attacked Māori warriors entrenching at Koheroa, further south of the Mangatāwhiri Stream. The advancing British soldiers faltered in the face of gunfire from the Māori and Cameron had to personally rally and urge his men forward. The Māori, which the British claimed numbered about 300 but in fact were around 150 men, retreated and escaped, leaving 15 dead. Hailed as a great victory, the British falsely claimed 150 Māori had been killed in the attack for the loss of 12 British soldiers killed or wounded.[18] Cameron was recommended for the Victoria Cross for his role in the attack although it was declined.[1]

However, on the same day as the assault carried out at Koheroa, a Māori party attacked a British convoy moving along the Great South Road, killing several men and capturing a number of carts carrying supplies. Further raids and ambushes were carried out by Kingites behind the British lines for the next several weeks and Cameron, concerned about the threat posed to his supply lines, decided it was not possible to continue his advance into the Waikato. Instead, he had to divert much of his forces into the establishment of a series of outposts along his lines of communication.[18] He did attempt an attack on a camp used by the raiding parties but his approach was detected and he and his men had to withdraw. It was not until late October that Cameron could resume his advance.[19] His initial invasion army of around 4,000 men,[18] had more than doubled with reinforcements from overseas. Even though nearly 6,000 men were still occupied in defending his lines of communication, Cameron was able to mobilise an attack force of nearly 2,000 against his next objective, Meremere. He had also received barges, and the armoured gunboats HMS Avon and Pioneer, and this facilitated movement of his force along the Waikato River.[19]

At Meremere, the Kingites occupied a pā (hillfort) surrounded on three sides by swamp, while the fourth side overlooked the Waikato River and thus it was a barricade to further advance south. Using his river flotilla, on 31 October 1863, Cameron landed 600 troops to the rear of Meremere, with orders to entrench themselves. The flotilla returned to Cameron's advanced base camp for a further 600 men to reinforce those already entrenching. He intended to land to the front of Meremere with the remainder of his force.[19] However, the Kingites, numbering between 1,100 and 1,500 Māori,[18] detected the arrival of the British and simply abandoned the pā at Meremere the next day and slipped away through the swamp. The British were able to simply walk in and seize the pā. Officially, the capture of Meremere was a success but in fact, Cameron saw it as a poor reward for the enforced delay it had caused his advance into the Waikato.[19]

A depiction of the Battle of Rangiriri, 20 November 1863, a pen sketch by Charles Heaphy

The Kingites had established a pā at Rangiriri, overlooking the Waikato River and 13 miles (21 km) upstream from Meremere. The defensive position included not only the pā forming the central redoubt, but also trenches and ramparts extending to the river and 1,000 yards (0.91 km) to nearby Lake Waikare. About 500 Māori were present at Rangiriri although this was insufficient for a proper defence. However, the pā was well engineered, a fact conceded by Cameron after the resulting Battle of Rangiriri.[20] On the afternoon of 20 November, Cameron attacked the front of the Māori position with a force of 900 men on 20 November while 320 men of the 40th Regiment of Foot, supplemented by 200 British Navy personnel, landed to the rear to prevent any retreat. The attack was preceded with an artillery bombardment from the cannon of the gunboats and three 6-pound Armstrong guns and while the defences on the riverside of the central pā was captured, the central redoubt and ramparts to the east, extending to Lake Waikare, were still held by the Māori. Cameron ordered further assaults later in the day but these were all beaten off and the British had to dig in for the evening. During the night, King Tāwhiao, the leader of the King Movement, Wiremu Tamihana and the mortally wounded chief Pene Te Wharepu, along with 200 warriors, were able to escape to the east. At dawn the next day, the remainder of the garrison surrendered to become prisoners.[21] It was later claimed that the white flag hoisted to mark the surrender of the garrison was in fact intended to simply open negotiations but the British soldiers moved into the pā and demanded the weapons of the Māori.[22] Although a victory for Cameron, who was later made a Knight of the Order of the Bath for his success,[1] his forces had incurred losses of 130 men killed or wounded[23] while the Māori suffered around 35 killed with 180 others made prisoner. Some colonists saw this as a poor reward for Rangiriri.[24]

Cameron now led his force further into the Waikato heartland, seizing Ngāruawāhia, the small town at the confluence of the Waikato and Waipā Rivers that was the capital of King Tawhaio, on 8 December and raising the British flag there. The taking of the town was unchallenged; it had been abandoned while tentative terms for an end to the war were offered to, and subsequently rejected by, Grey.[25] Cameron proceeded down the Waipā River, aiming for the valuable farming land around Te Awamutu.[26] By late January 1864, he sighted Māori fortifications at Paterangi; these included four pā.[27] Realising that these would be difficult to seize without significant risk to his force, he decided to bypass the fortifications and draw out its garrison into more favourable terrain for the British.[28] He mounted a nighttime march with 1,200 soldiers on 20 February, getting past the Paterangi defences undetected and moving into a largely unoccupied Te Awamutu at 7:00 am the next day.[29]

Beyond the town, 3 miles (4.8 km) away, was the settlement of Rangiaowhia. Cameron opted to advance against this settlement as well. It was lightly defended, with many women and children present, and 24 Māori were killed or wounded and another 33 taken prisoner.[29] However, the commander of the Colonial Defence Forces, Colonel Marmaduke Nixon, was shot and later died of his wounds.[30] The British then withdrew to Te Awamutu. On 22 February, the Māori garrison at Paterangi moved out with at least 700 heading for Rangiaowhia. Reaching an old pā site at Hairini, on the road to Rangiaowhia, the Māori began entrenching themselves here. Supported with two 6-pound Armstrong guns, Cameron decided to attack before they could complete their defences. His attack was a success, with at least 30, possibly even up to 70 or 80, killed out of around 400, for the loss of just two British soldiers. Paterangi was occupied by the British to deny it to the Māori.[29] Cameron was later criticised for the Rangiaowhia attack; it was not a fighting pā and the Kingites considered the action contrary to established conduct of warfare.[31] There were also accusations that one or more whare to which some had fled during the Rangiaowhia attack had been set on fire with them inside and that one man attempting to surrender was shot.[32] The following day, Cameron led his troops in the sacking of the nearby village of Kihikihi, the home of Rewi Maniapoto, a prominent Māori chief in the King Movement. Like Rangiaowhia, Kihikihi was productive farmland for the Kingites and its loss to the Māori was significant.[30]

In early March, Cameron went to Auckland to consult with Grey and the government for the next steps in the campaign and it was decided to continue with the strategy of depriving the Kingites of supplies. To this end, Cameron, moved most of his army towards Maungatautari leaving a garrison for redoubts being built at Kihikihi, Rangiaowhia, and Te Awamutu, where a strike force of 900 men under Colonel Robert Carey was also based.[33] In the meantime, Maniapoto started construction of a pā at Ōrākau, which was 3 miles (4.8 km) from Kihikihi.[34]

The pā, with its garrison of around 300 Māori, including around 250 warriors, had yet to be completed when British forces attacked on 31 March,[34] having detected its presence the previous day. The initial assaults mounted by Carey's strike force were repelled but were able to surround the pā. This prevented Māori reinforcements, newly arrived from Maungatautari, from entering the pā.[35] Carey, realising an opportunity to inflict a serious blow to the Kingites was possible, requested reinforcements from Cameron, who dispatched 370 soldiers to Ōrākau, now under bombardment while a sap was dug by engineers in order to breach the pā defences. Cameron arrived at the battle site in the morning of 2 April with more reinforcements. Carey was preparing for a further frontal assault but Cameron put a halt to this and issued terms to the defenders of the pā. This was declined despite an invitation from Cameron, impressed with the resiliency of the defenders, to send out the 50-odd women and children present.[36] By now the defenders lacked food, water and ammunition and that afternoon proceeded with a breakout from the southeast corner of the pā. The British lines at this point were thinly held by the 40th Regiment, and the majority of the Māori were able to escape into the surrounding swamp.[37] They were hotly pursued by the British soldiers as well as local militia and numerous Māori were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. In total, around 80 to 150 Māori were killed at Ōrākau for the loss of only 16 British soldiers with a further 53 wounded.[38] However, while most media of the time reported the Battle of Ōrākau as a victory for the British,[39] as did the Kingites, Cameron saw it as a missed opportunity to inflict a decisive victory in the Waikato.[40]

Cameron now returned to Maungatautari, where the Māori had established a defence line of several pā. He moved his forces up to face the Te Tiki o te Ihingarangi pā. It was strongly built and defended; Cameron understood this and chose to simply wait out the defenders rather than engage in a frontal attack. Having exhausted their supplies, it was abandoned by the Māori within a few days, on 5 April.[40] Cameron had intended to move to winter quarters following his move against Maungatautari due to the expected difficulty in maintaining supply lines over the winter months.[33] Accordingly, he withdrew his main force back to Auckland, leaving garrisons in place to secure the key gains of the campaign.[41] The Kingites were now south of the Puniu River, which became a boundary between what became known as the King Country and the territory captured by the British.[42] It would transpire that there would be no further fighting in the Waikato.[41]

A local tribe, Ngai-te-Rangi, had begun construction of Gate Pā, close to Camp Te Papa, set up by the British at Tauranga. The camp was established earlier in the year as a means of preventing reinforcements travelling from the East Cape to join up with Waikato Māori and had already been subject to raids by the tribe. The camp commandant requested reinforcements so that an attack could be mounted. Cameron, now back in Auckland with the bulk of his army, realised that with Te Papa being close to a harbour, he was readily able to transport enough manpower and artillery to allow a sufficient concentration for a decisive battle. Seizing his opportunity, he arrived at Te Papa on 21 April 1864 and his attack force followed a few days later.[43]

Cameron with a group of soldiers of the Colonial Defence Force on the morning of 29 April 1864, prior to the attack on Gate Pā. Cameron is standing at right, leaning against the centre of the wheel of the gun carriage

On 27 April, Cameron mounted a reconnaissance of Gate Pā and determined that it was formed of two redoubts, garrisoned by about 235 warriors. He moved up his attacking force of about 1,700 men, plus a large artillery train which started bombarding the walls of the Māori position, and the pā was surrounded by the afternoon of 29 April, with a major breach in the walls.[44] He had already sent 730 men of the 68th Regiment of Foot behind the pā to cut off any retreat.[45] He then ordered 300 men of the 43rd Regiment of Foot and marines of the Royal Navy to exploit the breach but the attempt to do so was beaten back with the attacking soldiers engaged in a full scale retreat.[44] On seeing the attacking force fleeing the battle, Cameron attempted to rally them[46] but was unable to do so and retreated to his tent to brood.[44]

A depiction of the British attack at Gate Pā, 29 April 1864

Although the pā was abandoned overnight, the garrison was able to slip away practically unmolested. With losses of over 100 killed and wounded, the Battle of Gate Pā was a major defeat for Cameron. Already criticised for his overly cautious approach to the campaign in the Waikato, Cameron's conduct of the battle came under question. He struggled to explain the poor performance of the troops making the attack, but noted the losses among the officers may have affected the rank and file.[47] In fact, the attackers had been deceived by a lack of defensive fire from the pā and once drawn in, were set upon by well-concealed warriors.[48]

Cameron met with Grey on 12 May and shortly afterwards decided to cease offensive engagements in Tauranga. He returned to Auckland with the bulk of his forces, citing unfavourable weather as an excuse. He left the local commander, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Greer, with instructions to maintain a defensive posture while Grey, stunned at the outcome of the battle, negotiated terms with Ngai-te-Rangi for an end to hostilities in the area. Within a few weeks, Greer, while conducting defensive patrols in accordance with Cameron's directives, inflicted a defeat on a large force of Māori attempting to establish defensive positions at Te Ranga, 4 miles (6.4 km) from Te Papa.[49] The majority of the Ngai-te-Rangi tribe surrendered shortly afterwards on relatively favourable terms, thus ending the fighting in Tauranga. This prompted the Colonial Government to urge Cameron to resume his offensive operations but he declined to do so, disillusioned about the prospects of a successful outcome to a military campaign.[50] Although the British did not destroy the King Movement, the defeats at Te Ranga and Orakau effectively ended the fighting in the Waikato[51] and the tribes there would eventually cede their land to the colonial government.[52]

As the Tauranga Campaign wound down, fighting flared up again in the Taranaki and in the Wanganui.[53] Both Grey and the colonial government, considering this a further attempt at Māori independence, wanted to suppress this latest outbreak. At this time, the British forces were beginning the process of withdrawing from New Zealand, transferring responsibility for the colony's internal security to its own military. This added impetus to the colonial government's need to take action in the Taranaki while British soldiers were still available.[54]

With reservations, Cameron agreed to mount a campaign in the Wanganui.[55] However, he saw this conflict as unnecessary, and nothing more than a desire by the Colonial Government for more Māori land[56] and believed that British soldiers should not be used to achieve this.[55] Furthermore, he considered that he would need at least two years to achieve success and reinforcements for his existing army would be required.[10] He commenced the campaign on 24 January 1865, moving with 1,200 soldiers from Wanganui 15 miles (24 km) northward across southern Taranaki to Nukumaru. Here, his force resisted attacks from a large force of over 400 Māori warriors. After two days, having killed 14 soldiers for the loss of 23 warriors, the Māori withdrew. They moved to a robust pā at Weraroa, expecting Cameron to come after them. Despite urging from Grey to do so, he refused, fully aware of the futility of frontal attacks on pā. Instead, he moved further north leaving a garrison and a series of redoubts facing the Weraroa pā. On 13 March, he encountered a force of 200 warriors from the Ngati Ruanui tribe and soundly beat them on open ground at Te Ngaio. At the end of March, he reached the Waingongoro River and halted his advance there, 60 miles (97 km) from Wanganui.[54]

By now relations between Cameron and Grey had broken down over the former's refusal to attack the Weraroa pā.[1] There were already tensions between the two as a result of Cameron's reports to the War Office often being at odds with Grey's own sometimes deliberately misleading communications to London.[57] Cameron's campaign was heavily criticised by colonists as being slow, but this opinion lacked awareness of the need to ensure the security of his lines of communication along his advance.[58] Even the Māori were contemptuous, apparently giving him the nickname The Lame Seagull for the pace of his advance.[59] Cameron, having already resigned his command on 7 February 1865,[1] left for Auckland in April[10] and departed the country on 1 August 1865.[1]