Field deputy (Dutch Republic)

The Field Deputies had their origins in the Eighty Years' War and had accompanied Maurice of Nassau and Frederick Henry on most of their campaigns. The two Stadtholders had been obliged to formulate their plans for military campaigns in consultation a committee of the States-General known as the 'secrete besogne'. This committee had to look out for the interests of the Dutch Republic. In times when the relationship between Stadholder and States General was good cooperation worked fine, but in times of political conflict friction could arise between the deputies and the Stadtholder.[6]

In 1672, at the beginning of the Franco-Dutch War, Johan de Witt, under pressure from the Orangists, had given William III of Orange command of the Dutch States Army. However, the not yet 22-year-old Captain-General of the Union was forced to act with some deputies in the field behind him. The States General was the highest military authority and without the approval of the deputies placed with him as their proxies, William could not take any decision.[7] The same year, however, William sent them home again, as he wanted to act autonomously as commander. He tolerated their presence again only when their duties were limited to financial and logistical matters.[8]

At the beginning of the War of Spanish Succession, the situation changed. William III had by now died and although the Dutch Republic had many capable and experienced generals, no one was considered qualified enough for supreme command in the Low Countries. The Duke of Marlborough was instead appointed commander-in-chief of the joint Anglo-Dutch army. The trust William III had placed in him and the expectation that the appointment would ensure close cooperation between London and The Hague were the deciding factors.[9]

However, Marlborough was considered a lightweight in the Netherlands.[9] He had never before commanded a large army[10] and comparatively limited military experience. Moreover, he was a foreigner and the States General wanted to prevent British political and military interests from being prioritised over those of the Dutch Republic.[9] The States-General thus put severe limits on his power, which were defined in 12 articles.[11][12] The most notable articles stated that:

1. (Article 2) Marlborough was only allowed to command the Dutch troops that were part of the combined field army.
2. (Article 3) Marlborough always had to formulate his operational plans in consultation with the highest Dutch general,[lower-alpha 1] who was also authorised to ask his subordinates for advice.
3. (Article 4) Marlborough had to take all his decisions in agreement with the Dutch commander and the field deputies.
4. (Article 6) Marlborough was not allowed to give orders to the Dutch troops independently of the Dutch senior officers.[11][12]

A separate instruction instructed the deputies in general terms to watch over the sovereignty of the Republic.[11] They thus possessed considerably more authority through these instructions and even sat with decisive veto in the army war council.[2]

Their role has often been the subject of historiographical debates. Anglo-American historians have historically blamed Marlborough's inability to deliver more battles on Dutch obstruction. Both Dutch generals and the field deputies have been harshly criticised for their reputed frequent vetoes of Marlborough's plans.[10] The historian C. T. Atkinson describes the field deputies as a serious handicap to Marlborough, while George Edmundson writes that Marlborough's bold and well-laid plans were again and again hindered and thwarted by the timidity and obstinacy of the civilian deputies who were placed by the States-General at his side.[14][15] Some historians, however, have other views. B. H. Liddell Hart, for example, argued that it were not the deputies but mainly the Dutch generals who were in Marlborough's way.[14] Jamel Ostwald instead sympathised with the Dutch perspective and validates their concerns, writing:[10]

Portrait of Sicco van Goslinga, one of the more notable field deputies.[8]

We should also note the Anglocentric dismissal of valid Dutch concerns. The Dutch have been criticized for avoiding battle, but they had reason to be cautious. After several previous close calls (e.g., Nijmegen 1702), they knew that losing a battle close to their homeland was dangerous without the protection of their barrier fortresses. Their predicament, generally acknowledged if only parenthetically, was exacerbated by the fact that Marlborough's skill as a general was at the start unknown, since he had never before commanded a large army. Nor did the Flanders engagements of the Nine Years' War support Marlborough's contention that battles could be decisive. How surprising is it then that the Dutch were not willing to let an Englishman risk Dutch troops in a battle that might lead to the occupation of Dutch territory? Instead the Dutch used sieges to regain their barrier, a goal which hardly demanded a risky battle.[10]

He and Dutch historian Olaf van Nimwegen also highlight the important role they played in the logistics of the Allied army and in various other ways.[10][16] Deputy A. Van Rechteren-Almelo, for example, played an important role during the march leading up to the Battle of Blenheim. He made sure that on the 450-kilometer-long march, the Allies would nowhere be denied passage by local rulers, nor would they need to look for provisions, horsefeed or new boots. He also saw to it that sufficient stopovers were arranged along the way to ensure that the Allies arrived at their destination in good condition.[17] Although the field deputies were often not military men, some, like Jacob Hop and Sicco van Goslinga, directly commanded troops in battle. Hop did so at the Battle of Ekeren, while Van Goslinga directly commanded troops at the battles of Oudenarde and Malplaquet.[4][5]