Fred Dallmayr

Dallmayr's brings an original interpretation of Heidegger's works. He was among the first in the English-speaking world to realize that Heidegger's philosophical work “was much broader than the particular Nazi episode.”[5] He has elucidated Heidegger's work in several of his own major works.[6] He uncovered fruitful contributions of Heidegger's work, which are relevant to contemporary social and political thought. He also delineated the contours of an alternative political perspective in Heidegger's thought.

Dallmayr highlights the importance of Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics, especially Cartesian rationalism with its focus on the cogito, which was the root of the split between mind and matter, subject and object, self and other, humans and the world. In contrast to these divisions, Heidegger's definition of human existence as being-in-the-world conceptualizes “world” in its many dimensions as a constitutive feature of existence as such. In opposition to traditional formulations, being could not be grasped as a substance or fixed concept but needs to be seen as a temporal process or happening, an ongoing disclosure (and sheltering) of meaning in which all beings participate.[7]

With Heidegger, Dallmayr goes beyond the self-centered type of existentialism. He interprets Dasein (human existence) in Being and Time[8] as not a self-constituted or a fixed substance, but open-ended and potentially transformative, “a being moved by ‘care’ (Sorge) in an ongoing search for meaning and truth.”[9]

He also explicates Heidegger’s other key concepts, such as letting-be (Seinlassen), event (Ereignis),[10] and dwelling (wohnen), to move his political philosophy beyond the traditional paradigm, rooted in individual subjectivity, toward a view of human beings and society that emphasizes human connectedness and relationality. Above all, he shows that for Heidegger every substance is marked by division, every unity or community by “difference” (Unterschied). The central issue is how togetherness and separation, unity and difference “belong together.”[11]

Dallmayr relates what he learns from Heidegger to political philosophy, asking questions, such as: “What is the status of individualism and of traditional Western humanism?” and “How should one construe the relations between self and other human beings bypassing the options of contractual agreement and simple rational convergence?”[12] He focuses on the status of the individual as political agent; the character of the political community; the issue of cultural and political development or modernization; and the problem of an emerging cosmopolis, or world order, beyond the confines of Western culture.[13]

He articulates from a philosophical perspective the relevance of Heidegger's diagnosis of the condition of contemporary society characterized by mass culture, the depersonalized “they” (das Man), the instrumental reason, oppressive power (Macht) and manipulative domination or machination (Machenschaft). Dallmayr shows the relevance of Heidegger as a thinker who was able to realize the dramatic situation of Western civilization and to see the root causes of its problems, which continued to escalate ever since. The qualitatively new perspective, highlighted by Dallmayr, is that contradictions and perilous tendencies in Western society are now escalating to the level of being global problems, which put us at the precipice of self-destruction—nuclear or ecological.

Dallmayr sees the problems of Western modernity in the monologic mindset, which was rooted in Cartesian ego cogito and became an instrumental rationality coupled with egocentric will to power and domination. He advocates for dialogue in theory and practice, as a means to overcome monologic unilateralism and for establishing the relationships of mutual understanding and collaboration, aiming for peaceful coexistence and justice. He has elucidated the dialogical motifs in the works of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, Gadamer, Karl Jaspers, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Panikkar, among others.

Starting with the etymology of the word “dialogue,” which comes from the Greek and is composed of two parts: “dia” and “logos,” Dallmayr explains that “dia-logue” means that reason or meaning is not the monopoly of one party but emerges in the intercourse or communication between parties or agents. In the twentieth century, the turn towards dialogue can be seen as part and parcel of the so-called linguistic turn. He writes, “Associated prominently with the names of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Bakhtin, this turn has placed into the foreground the necessarily ‘relational’ or dialogical character of human thought and conduct.”[14] In his words, dialogue means to approach alien meanings of life-forms in a questioning mode conducive to a possible learning experience. In the political arena, this turn has led to the re-invigoration of the public sphere and the expansion of the public domain in a global and cross-cultural direction.

Dallmayr believes in the fundamental character of dialogue and its indispensability for a proper human interaction. He emphasizes Gadamer’s idea that every inter-personal encounter and every interpretation of texts involves dialogue in search for the meaning, and that the ethical precondition to genuine dialogue is to have good will and the recognition of the other as equal. As Dallmayr pointed out in an interview with Ghencheh Tazmini, “Genuine dialogue requires not only talking but a great deal of listening”.[15] He stresses the importance of an authentic dialogue and elaborates on Panikkar's conception of “dialogical dialogue” and interreligious dialogue.[16]

His appreciation of the dialogical trends in Western thought served as “possible springboards to broader, cross-cultural or trans-cultural explorations.”[17] Dallmayr broadened his intercultural horizon through engagement in dialogue with the philosophical traditions of India, China, and the Islamic world. His encounters with Eastern philosophical cultures resulted in a transformative turn in Dallmayr's philosophical path. This strengthened his critical views of Eurocentric self-enclosure, anthropocentrism, and cognitive self-sufficiency. At the same time, it deepened his appreciation of the best in Europe's philosophical traditions. This helped to the development of his intercultural philosophy.

Dallmayr is engaged in rethinking some of the central concepts of Western political philosophy.[18] He challenges the predominance of a “subjectivity” and anthropocentric individualism, articulating alternative post-individualist or post-egocentric conceptions of selfhood and of politics as relational praxis. He elaborates on the post-anthropocentric and relational conception of the political community, viewing it as a differentiated wholeness combining both freedom and solidarity.

He contributes to the development of “critical phenomenology.” In Kenneth Colburn Jr's words, “Fred Dallmayr is without doubt one of the leading theoretical phenomenologists of our time in the social sciences.”[19] Phenomenology tries to relate the subject and the world of phenomena through an act of focused intention, and when combined with the resources of critical theory, it produces a critical phenomenology of politics. In it, phenomenology orients toward concrete human experience, while critical theory focuses on critiquing the effects of domination and exploitation in that experience.[20]

According to Farah Godrej, “Dallmayr is widely acknowledged to be one of the primary forces behind the inauguration of this field of cross-cultural theory, also called ‘comparative political theory.’”[21] Applying his intercultural perspective, he has written extensively on political thought in India, in the Far East, and in Muslim countries.[22] His approach retains a connection with critical theory, involving thinkers such as Gandhi, Edward Said, Enrique Dussel, and Tzvetan Todorov.

Dallmayr analyses the philosophical-theological works of some twentieth-century philosophers and theologians, including Tillich, Thomas Merton, and Panikkar, highlighting the commonalities in their thought.[23] All three insisted on the need for radical “metanoia,” meaning a “turn around or Kehre” or spiritual “conversion of heart.”[24] They aimed for a holistic recovery from modern fragmentation, and sought to connect—in fruitful tension—the sacred with the secular, theology with philosophy, Christian teachings with the humanities, and the theoretical understanding with social praxis. Tillich, Merton, and Panikkar are exemplars of openness to intercultural and interreligious dialogue. Dallmayr examines their intensive interest in Zen Buddhism as distinct cases of the Christian-Buddhist encounter during the past half century: the intersection of Tillich's dialectical theology with Japanese Buddhist thought; the dialogue of Thomas Merton's trans-individualism with Zen Buddhism; and the encounter of Raimon Panikkar's Vedantic thoughts with the Buddhist “silence of God.”

Dallmayr pays special attention to the intercultural-interreligious and spiritual dimensions of Panikkar's works. His nondualistic views are congenial to those of Panikkar, who expresses nondualism in using the Indian notion of Advaita and who sees our age “as capable to moving beyond the ‘Western dilemma’ of monism/dualism or immanence/transcendence.”[25] Dallmayr, being critical of both an agnostic immanentism lacking spirituality and a radical transcendentalism indifferent to social-ethical problems, sees in Panikkar’s holism a third possibility, pointing to the potential overcoming of the “transcendence-immanence” conundrum.

Dallmayr points out the connection between personal freedom and the caring for others. For human beings who are free from selfish egocentrism, it is natural to nurture the perfect virtue of compassion (karuna) and to be engaged in caring praxis. He writes, “The Buddha’s own praxis, anchored in his freedom, by no means seeks to advance his own status or influence; his karuna resides in ‘the superabundance of his state of ‘grace.’”[26] What saves us is “the refusal to entertain any doctrine or ideology that pretends to deliver authoritative ‘knowledge’ of God.’”[27] The Buddha’s teaching is directed to a “profound freedom” or total liberation from both external coercion and interior will to power, which, in turn, “paves the way toward a released humanity no longer entrapped in aggressive individual or collective identities.”[28]

In reflecting on the meaning of spirituality, as it has been expressed in various religious traditions, Dallmayr mentions as the core feature of religion and spiritual experience “the transgression from self to other, from ‘immanence’ to (some kind of) ‘transcendence.’” Spirituality should “participate in this transgressive or transformative movement,” to be a vessel for “navigating the straits between immanence and transcendence, between the human and the divine.” Spirituality is commonly associated with a certain kind of responsiveness “inside” human beings, a kind of human “inwardness.” Religion cannot simply be an external form but has to find some kind of personal “resonance” among people today: “the heart (the heart-and-mind) might be described as the great ‘resonance chamber’ constantly open or attuned to new religious of mystical experiences.”[29]

Dallmayr is critical of the form of democracy currently found in the Western countries, which is characterized as liberal, laissez-faire, or minimalist, because the primary emphasis is on the liberty of individuals or groups to pursue their particular self-interests, while the role of “the people” as a government is minimalized and solely characterized by competitive elections with “slim procedural formalities serving as fig leaves to cover prevailing modes of domination.”[30] He applies the ideas of dialogue to the conception of democratic politics as relational praxis, guided by ethical principles and “love of equality.” He challenges democracy that emphasizes the pursuit of individual or collective self-interest, insisting that more ethical conceptions are possible, that different societies should nurture democracy with their own cultural resources, and that a world has to promote “a fair relationality or qualitative equality between citizen, but also between West and non-West.”[31]

He adopts Derrida's conceptualization of “democracy to come” and further develops his own version of it, which is characterized as relational, enabling potentiality, ethical, and apophatic. He views democracy as a “promise,” meaning that it is not presently an actuality, but it latently exists as a possibility or potentiality, the realization of which requires a process of striving, ethical cultivation, and self-transformation. Democracy is not a finished condition but an open-ended potentiality and creativity.

Dallmayr explores democratic traditions not only in the West, but also in India, China, and the Middle East. He discusses efforts to build democracy in regions. He examines the relation between democracy and Islam. He discusses Gandhian and Confucian perspectives on democracy as possible correctives to liberal and minimalist democracy. Gandhi's notions of self-governance (swaraj), nonviolence, and the struggle for justice allow for the practice of relational care and respect.[32] Accordingly, Dallmayr presents a vision of democracy as popular self-rule in which civic education, ethical cultivation, and self-transformation make possible a nondomineering political agency.

Stephen Schneck, characterizing Dallmayr's views of the “civilizing process,” writes: “Not enmity, conflict, and the ‘clash’ cited by so many as the way to a new world arrangement; Dallmayr instead proposes ‘space’ for mutual world-disclosure through dialogue and discursive openness.”[33] Dallmayr refers to cosmopolis as “an emerging global city or community.”[34] He expresses dissatisfaction with some of the interpretations of cosmopolitanism: empirical, focused on economic and technological globalization, while hiding ethical deficits; and normative, which refer to international law and a legal world order, but which ignore local and regional contexts. He favors instead an approach that gives primacy to practice, “pointing to the need for concrete engagements across national, cultural, and religious boundaries” for “the building of a pluralistic and dialogical cosmopolis.”[35]

He views cosmopolitanism not just in legal and institutional terms but in a broader cultural and philosophical sense. It presents an alternative to the status quo. He again finds useful insights in Heidegger's conception of temporality, meaning that human being-in-the-world is constantly “temporalized” in the direction of future possibilities. He also refers to John Dewey’s pragmatism, Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, hermeneutics, and some other sources. Based on these, he develops his conception of “a ‘becoming cosmopolis’ beckoning from the future as a possibility and a promise.”[36]

Dallmayr contributes to the development of a “new cosmopolitanism,” as reflexive, critical, democratic, rooted, dialogical, intercultural, and transformative. He develops his conception of cosmopolis in dialogue with the ideas of such theorists of cosmopolitanism as Karl-Otto Apel, Daniele Archibugi, Seyla Benhabib, Richard A. Falk, Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, Habermas, David Held, James Ingram, Martha Nussbaum, and Walter Mignolo, among others. At the same time, his conception of cosmopolis has some distinctive characteristics that are related to his interpretation of being-in-the-world, care, relationality, democratic politics as relational praxis, world maintenance, and spirituality.