Galápagos syndrome

The term "Galápagos syndrome" was originally coined to refer to Japanese 3G mobile phones, which had developed a large number of specialized features that were widely adopted in the Japanese market, but were unsuccessful abroad.[6][7] While the original usage of the term was to describe highly advanced phones that were incompatible outside of Japanese networks, as the mobile phone industry underwent drastic changes globally, the term was used to emphasize the associated anxiety about how the development of Japanese mobile phones and those in the worldwide economy went along different paths. A derived term is Gara-phone (ガラケー, gara-kei), blending with "mobile phone" (携帯, keitai), used to refer to Japanese feature phones, by contrast with newer smart phones. Takeshi Natsuno, professor at Tokyo's Keio University, explained, "Japan's cellphones are like the endemic species that Darwin encountered on the Galápagos Islands—fantastically evolved and divergent from their mainland cousins."[1] "Japanese phones suffer from 'Galapagos Syndrome'—are too complex to survive abroad."[8]

Across Japan, the majority of the 190,000 ATMs do not accept bank and credit cards that have been issued outside of the country. According to an April 2022 article, only about 20,000 post offices and convenience stores allow retrieving cash using non-Japanese bank cards. The Japanese government has expressed concern about this issue, and as a result the number of ATMs that accept foreign cards is slowly increasing.[9]

In 2004, the wallet phone was introduced in Japan as a means to allow mobile payment alongside numerous other applications. In some ways the wallet phone can be seen as a predecessor of mobile payment tools that were later released on the global market such as Apple Pay or Google Wallet.[10]

Kei cars ("light cars") are small four-wheeled vehicles/cars that have an engine of less than 660cc and enjoy preferential treatment in the form of tax advantages and lower insurance costs. Originally the Japanese government encouraged the use of those "light cars". This category of cars features a number of different car types including sport cars, minivans and commercial vehicles. However, Kei cars are not seen as profitable in export markets and therefore are only part of the Japanese automobile market.[11] Despite no significant global success, major Japanese car manufacturers such as Suzuki, Mitsubishi, Daihatsu and Honda still produce models belonging to the Kei car category.[12] Since the Kei car has a significant portion of Japanese car market, Japanese auto makers cannot ignore them. Although the regulatory differences between Kei cars and 1L cars are quite small, the tax benefit of Kei cars is considerable. Until the tax reform in 2013, the Kei car's vehicle tax rate was a quarter of that of 1L cars (¥7200 to ¥29500). This significantly lower tax rate gathered much criticism from European and US auto makers, and as such the EU, the US, and Toyota do not make Kei cars. In 2013, the Japanese government revised the vehicle tax law. The new vehicle tax law became effective in 2015. With the new vehicle tax law, the Kei car's vehicle tax rate is about 36% of that of 1L cars (¥10800 to ¥29500).

Furthermore, this has led a number of Japanese companies to adapt their business strategies. Hiroshi Mikitani, CEO of e-commerce company Rakuten, sees the exclusive use of Japanese in workplaces at the centre of the problem. Following his belief that "a language will open your eyes to the 'global', and you will break free from this conventional wisdom of a pure Japan",[14] the co-founder and CEO of Rakuten made English the main language to be spoken in the company. Dr. Gerhard Fasol, the only European member of Euro Technology Japan's "Galapagos study group", stated that another reason for the non-success of some innovative Japanese products is Europe's conservative standpoint when it comes to certain standards.[15] In the belief that it will improve international competitiveness Tadashi Yanai, the founder and president of Fast Retailing, has decided to change the way the firm works against classical Japanese business methods. A shift of the production of some textiles out of Japan to Southeast Asia was a move to the low-wage-labour market, that aimed to enable them to compete on price in the international textile market.[16] Another factor which McKinsey & Company points out is the need for Japanese companies to adapt to stronger competition when entering global markets. This should be done by accepting to think in "new and unfamiliar ways about organization, marketing, and strategy", whilst the traditional practices that helped the companies to become a big player in the Japanese market shall be discontinued.[17] Despite the fact that companies have started to address the issue, which could have a link to the total value of exports increasing over the past five years, there are concerns about the future Galápagosization of Japan.[18]

With the ageing and shrinking Japanese population, the fact that fewer and fewer students study abroad to acquire a more internationally oriented university education is reason for concerns over the future of the Japanese economy. Furthermore, there is a conception that the younger generation could enhance the Galápagos effect due to a lack of interest in international education and work placements.[19] Kiyoshi Takeuchi, sociology professor at the Sophia university, describes the young generation to have less "ambition and motivation" as a result from the fear that a wrong move could have negative effects.[20]

• Stephen Ezell and Robert D. Atkinson describe a similar phenomenon pointing out associated threats this could mean for the Chinese economy. The selling of a product in China could become more expensive for foreign producers due to the fact that they now have to incorporate the Chinese technology standards into their firm. In theory, this could be beneficial for domestic producers. However, this could also lead to an isolation of the respective domestic producers due to less international competitiveness. "China has made the development of indigenous technology standards ... a core component of its industrial development strategy. ... But, by using indigenous rather than global technology standards for ICT products, China risks engendering a 'Galapagos Island' effect that isolates Chinese ICT products, technologies, and markets."[21][22]

• Mark Leonard describes threats of how, against the predictions he made in 2005 in his book Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century, the political development of the European Union happened isolated and differently than in any other political system in the world. "Europe might now be facing its own 'Galápagos moment.' ... It may be that Europe’s postmodern order has become so advanced and particular to its environment that it is impossible for others to follow. It evolved in a protective ecosystem, shielded from the more muscular, "modern" world where most people live."[23]

• The United States was slow to adopt the EMV standard for credit and debit cards (as opposed to swiped magnetic stripe cards), which have been widely-adopted elsewhere, with merchants citing the cost of upgrading hardware and other systems to support it. Work to encourage transition began in 2015 following a series of high-profile retail data breaches involving credit card data, as well as increased frustration by travelers who found themselves increasingly inconvenienced when travelling abroad where they have phased out the magnetic stripe or where automated kiosks abroad would not accept non-EMV chipped cards. Payment providers implemented deadlines under which liability for fraud would shift to merchants if they did not begin accepting EMV payments by a specific date. As of April 2016, 70% of U.S. consumers had EMV cards, and around half of merchants were EMV compliant as of December 2016. However, the rollout has faced challenges, including merchants with EMV-compatible hardware that do not support EMV transactions due to a lack of certification or software support, and complaints that chip-based transactions took more time to process than swipe cards.[24][25][26][27]
• According to a March 2008 Financial Times article, American-made cars suffered from the Galapagos Syndrome, as they evolved separately from those of the global marketplace.[28]
• US cities' transit fare methods predominately being flat rate is also an example of Galapagos Syndrome. By being flat rate, the transit fare collection system naturally becomes "proof-of-payment" or "single tap on entry", limiting transit users data collection which as a consequence, limits the ability of transit operators to have the necessary available data to make needed improvements to transit scheduling. For example, if there is only tap on entry, the maximum data that can be collected is how many people get on at a particular bus stop or train station at what time, but it lacks any collection or analytical data of how far riders travel, what destinations are more used by riders and at what particular time between points A and B may need more routine services. In addition, this also increases costs in the long run as each transit jurisdiction has to have their own customized system which is incompatible with other cities, such as how the TAP in Los Angeles is incompatible with the ClipperCard in San Francisco, or PRONTO Card in San Diego, despite being in the same state. In contrast, most European cities uses a zone-based fare system, and Asian cities use a distance-based fare system, inevitably requiring the system to have a tap on entry and a tap upon exit, which allows more data to be collected and analyzed more accurately, such as how far transit riders travel, and allows for more interchangeable internal systems that can be used across multiple cities, such as the way the T-Money used in Seoul can also be used in Busan and Daegu, the Suica used by JR East is interoperable with the PASMO of Tokyo's subways and private transit systems and is also mutually interoperable with the ICOCA in Osaka, Kitaca of Hokkaido, etc.