Getting to Yes

The first principle of Getting to Yes—"Separate the people from the problem"—applies to the interaction between the two parties to a negotiation.[3]^: 19–41 The authors point out that negotiators are people first—people who have different values, cultural backgrounds, and emotions.[3]^: 20–21 The relationship between parties tends to become entangled with the problem that the parties are discussing; therefore, issues of perception, emotion, and communication need to be addressed during a negotiation.[3]^: 23–39

Concerning perception, the authors note that it is important for a negotiator to understand how the other party views an issue. Ways to accomplish this include "Put yourself in their shoes", "Discuss each other's perceptions", and "Face-saving: Make your proposals consistent with their values".[3]^: 24–31

Concerning emotion, the authors encourage negotiators to explore the causes of both their own and the other party's emotions.[3]^: 31–32 Techniques may be needed to defuse anger, such as allowing the other party to voice grievances and to provide an apology as a symbolic gesture.[3]^: 33–35

Concerning communication, the authors point out three common problems and give suggestions to prevent or solve them:[3]^: 35–39

1. Not speaking with the other party in a direct and clear manner;
2. Not actively listening to the other party, but instead only listening to rebut the other party's statements; and
3. Misunderstanding or misinterpreting what the other party has said.

The second principle—"Focus on interests, not positions"—distinguishes the positions that the parties hold from the interests that led them to those positions.[3]^: 42–57 For example, in 1978 Israel and Egypt both held positions about occupying the Sinai Peninsula, but the reasons for the positions were different: Israel was interested in security and Egypt was interested in sovereignty.[3]^: 44 Addressing the underlying interests of the two nations led to the Egypt–Israel peace treaty of 1979.[3]^: 44 The authors recommend that negotiators identify interests, such as the "basic human needs" of "economic well-being" and "control over one's life", behind the parties' positions.[3]^: 45–51 Both parties should then discuss their interests and keep an open mind to the other side of the argument, in order to arrive at options that satisfy their respective interests.[3]^: 52–57

The third principle—"Invent options for mutual gain"—seeks to benefit both parties that are negotiating.[3]^: 58–81 To generate options, the authors suggest that the parties brainstorm separately and possibly together.^: 62–72 The book describes specific techniques to promote effective brainstorming; for example, a "Circle Chart" diagrams the repeated steps of Problem, Analysis, Approaches, and Action Ideas that should occur.[3]^: 68–70 Options can either meet shared interests or meet different interests that are complementary (as in the nursery rhyme "Jack Sprat").[3]^: 72–77 After a suitable option is developed, one side can draft a written agreement to make the decision easy for the other side.[3]^: 78–81

The fourth principle—"Insist on using objective criteria"—encourages parties to "negotiate on some basis independent of the will of either side".[3]^: 82–95 This approach can help produce "wise agreements amicably and efficiently", as in the case of negotiations about the Law of the Sea.[3]^: 84–85 Objective criteria can be based on factors such as market value and precedent.[3]^: 86–87 The three steps for using objective criteria in negotiations are to jointly search for such criteria, to keep an open mind about which criteria should be chosen to be applied, and to never give in to pressure or threats.[3]^: 88–89 The chapter on this principle concludes with an example of objective criteria being used successfully in a negotiation between a person whose car is a total loss and an insurance claims adjuster.[3]^: 93–95

If the other side "has a stronger bargaining position", the authors recommend "Develop Your BATNA—Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement".[3]^: 99–108 The BATNA is "the results you can obtain without negotiating".[3]^: 102 The authors give three suggestions to develop a BATNA that both protects the negotiator from accepting an agreement that should be rejected and improves any agreement that is accepted:[3]^: 105

1. Creating a list of actions one might take if no agreement is reached
2. Transforming some of the more promising ideas into options
3. Selecting the option that appears best

If the other side demands to use positional bargaining, a negotiator may attempt "negotiation jujitsu".[3]^{: 109–130} One method is to ask a third party to mediate. In this "one-text procedure", the third party explores the parties' interests and iteratively develops a solution with them. The author cite the negotiations that led to the 1978 Camp David Accords as an example of the one-text procedure, with the United States drafting agreements between Egypt and Israel.[3]^: 118

The authors point to the outcome of the Munich Agreement in 1938 as an example of a negotiator's failure to address "dirty tricks", in that case Adolf Hitler's negotiating tactics with Neville Chamberlain.[3]^: 131 Instead, the parties should negotiate about the rules of negotiation using the four principles stated earlier in the book.[3]^{: 132–134} This can overcome tactics such as misrepresentation and psychological pressure.[3]^{: 134–145}

The second and third editions contain a chapter after the main text entitled "Ten Questions People Ask About Getting to Yes".[2]^{: 149–187}[3]^{: 151–194} The questions and answers concern "fairness and 'principled' negotiation", "dealing with people", "tactics", and "power".

Organizational and individual negotiators have applied the principles of Getting to Yes. In 2001, the health insurance company Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (later Florida Blue) formed a department to implement principled negotiation.[12] The purpose was to address the problems of increasing competition, rising healthcare prices, and increased customer expectations.[12]^: 109 For instance, the company used principled negotiation to form a joint venture with its competitor Humana.[12]^{: 110–112} Applying principled negotiation techniques occurred more naturally at the executive level than at lower levels of management.[12]^: 112

In social work, principled negotiation can be used to advocate for a client's interests.[13] For example, a social worker may need to negotiate with a government social services agency to obtain services for a client.[13]^{: 508–511} In the field of psychology, principled negotiation has formed the basis for educational exercises about critical thinking.[14]

A 2008 review of literature concluded that the book's ideas could be applied to cross-cultural negotiations "if interests are defined to include cultural interests".[15] For example, when negotiating with people in China, a negotiator should be aware of the Thirty-Six Stratagems which may be employed.[15]^{: 436–444}

Gerald M. Steinberg in a 1982 review criticized Fisher and Ury for "describ[ing] the world as it should be, and not as it is".[16] For instance, in practice it can be difficult to find mutually agreeable objective criteria in a negotiation.[16] Furthermore, Fisher and Ury assume that negotiating parties are "unitary actors", but negotiations often involve "complex collective entities, such as states".[16]

James J. White, a professor of law at the University of Michigan, suggested in 1984 that Getting to Yes is not scholarly or analytical and relies on anecdotal evidence, and that "the authors seem to deny the existence of a significant part of the negotiation process, and to oversimplify or explain away many of the most troublesome problems inherent in the art and practice of negotiation".[17]^: 115 In particular, the book does not discuss in enough detail distributive bargaining, in which a gain for one party is a loss for the other.[17]^: 119 Fisher responded that the book is intended to give advice, and that "distributional problems" can be reconceptualized as "shared problems".[17]^: 121 Nevertheless, Fisher reported that when teaching a negotiation course he tore a copy of the book in half to emphasize that it was imperfect.[17]^: 120

Carrie Menkel-Meadow noted in 1984 that legal negotiators might adopt some of Fisher and Ury's ideas by using a problem solving approach instead of an adversarial approach.[18] Nevertheless, she felt that ideas such as "separate the people from the problem" would not apply.[18]^{: 837, 841} In 2006, Menkel-Meadow praised Getting To Yes for inspiring a "rich research and teaching agenda", but also claimed that the factors leading to successful versus failed negotiations are still unclear.[19]^: 500

In a 1985 article, William McCarthy described eight areas in which he agreed with the book, but also listed reservations and disagreements.[20] The reservations included the authors' emphasis on long-term relationships (when immediate actions are sometimes required); the assumption that trust is unnecessary in negotiation; and the suggestion to "avoid starting from extremes".[20]^: 61–63 The main disagreement was that the book did not consider the need of a negotiator to prevail when a negotiation involves a power struggle.[20]^: 63–65 Fisher replied that he agreed with some of McCarthy's criticisms, for example that "Getting to YES probably overstates the case against positional bargaining".[21]

A 1996 paper argued that the book's distinction between "interests" and "positions" was problematic.[22] There can be a difference between objective interests (that help an individual) and subjective interests (that the individual perceives to be helpful, but that may not be).[22]^: 307 A negotiating party's public position may be different from that the course of action that the party will actually pursue.[22]^{: 308–309} If a party's interest is in maintaining internal unity, it may adopt a position that preserves that unity, thus causing an overlap between position and interest.[22]^{: 313–314}

A 1997 feminist analysis of the book's recommendations appeared in the Otago Law Review.[23] It maintained that the book is written from a male perspective, and that some of its advice may not be appropriate for female negotiators.[23]^{: 141–143}

The author of a 2003 examination of the history of alternative dispute resolution felt that Getting to Yes is a "classic text".[24]^: 693 Nevertheless, the book failed to realistically account for competition among negotiating parties and failed to consider complex personal dynamics during negotiations.[24]^{: 694, 772} A 2013 Forbes article asserted that the techniques in the book do not work for three reasons: people do not trust other people, people are not rational, and people do not enjoy negotiating.[25]

A 2012 commentary noted that Australian practice guidelines for lawyers supported interest-based negotiation of the type described in Getting to Yes, but that such a negotiation style is not always more ethical than positional negotiation.[26] It is possible for both types of negotiation to be unethical.[26]^: 145 Instead, it is ethical for a lawyer to be able to adjust negotiation strategies to provide effective advocacy for a client.[26]^{: 154–155} The need for flexibility in negotiation styles was echoed in a 2015 paper calling principled negotiations a "false promise".[27]

Chris Voss, a former FBI agent, mentioned Getting to Yes in his 2016 book Never Split the Difference.[28] He called Fisher and Ury's book "a groundbreaking treatise"[28]^: 11 and wrote "I still agree with many of the powerful bargaining strategies in the book".[28]^: 13 But he criticized their methods as inadequate for hostage negotiations such as the Waco siege: "I mean, have you ever tried to devise a mutually beneficial win-win solution with a guy who thinks he's the messiah?"[28]^: 14 Voss presented alternative techniques for such situations, including "the flip side of Getting to Yes": getting to "no".[28]^: 20