Government Junta of Bolivia (1943–1944)

By late 1942, the conservative government of President Enrique Peñaranda had become increasingly unpopular. The continued escalation of opposition ultimately resulted in the Catavi massacre in which anywhere from 19 to 400 striking miners were shot by the military on 21 December 1942.[4] The massacre was the breaking point in the deteriorating relations between the government and the left-wing opposition led by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement. In response, the MNR aligned itself with the RADEPA military lodge, formed from left-wing young officers sympathetic to the Military Socialist governments of David Toro and Germán Busch. Almost exactly a year after the massacre at Catavi, on 20 December 1943, the MNR and RADEPA launched a coup d'état which ousted President Peñaranda from office.[5]

Following the coup, a civil-military junta was established, composed of representatives of RADEPA and the MNR. The leader of the latter group was Víctor Paz Estenssoro who served as the main MNR representative in the junta through his position as Minister of Finance. Meanwhile, the journalist Augusto Céspedes served as the Secretary-General of the Junta. Other MNR militants were appointed to key ministerial positions within the new administration.[6] While the MNR maintained an influential role in the junta administration, the presidency of the junta came under the control of Colonel Gualberto Villarroel of RADEPA. The portfolios of Government and National Defense were also given to RADEPA military officers Alberto Taborga and José Celestino Pinto.[7]

An immediate crisis facing the newly installed junta was that of the reaction of the United States to the new government. The U.S. had enjoyed good relations with Peñaranda who had brought the country into World War II on the Allied side and had pledged the country's valuable tin resources to the war effort. While Paz Estenssoro assured that "the new Government does not alter Bolivia's international position at the side of the United Nations," the State Department nevertheless immediately suspended diplomatic relations and refused to recognize the legitimacy of the junta.[8][9]

The U.S. suspected the MNR of fascist sympathies, with Ambassador Pierre de Lagarde Boal reporting that he believed it probable that the MNR had received military and financial support from German and Japanese firms in La Paz as well as from Argentina.[10] On 10 January, Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a memorandum to the other Latin American republics outlining the MNR as a "pro-fascist political party" and RADEPA as a group of "young army officers [...] under Nazi influence." It further reported that "Members of the Junta receive financial support from pro-Nazi sources. [...] Three million bolivianos were secured from German and Argentine sources for the revolt." As such by 28 January 1944, all 19 governments (except Argentina) participating in consultation regarding the new regime had refused to recognize the junta.[11]