Holly Martin Smith

Holly Martin Smith (also known as Holly S. Goldman) is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. Her publications focus on questions in normative ethics, moral responsibility and structural questions common to normative theories.[1]

Holly Martin Smith
Alma materUniversity of Michigan
InstitutionsRutgers University, University of Arizona, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, University of Michigan at Flint, University of Pittsburgh
Main interests
Biomedical ethics, consequentialism, moral responsibility, normative ethics

A recipient of the Carl and Lily Pforzheimer Foundation Fellowship at the National Humanities Center (2013–14),[2] she held an American Association of University Women Postgraduate Fellowship (1975–76) and a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for Independent Study (1982-83.)[3]

Between 1985 and 2006 she held a series of increasingly responsible academic administrative positions, first at the University of Arizona, including Head, Department of Philosophy (1985–90), Vice Provost for Academic Affairs (1991-June 1993), and Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences (1993-July 2001); and then at Rutgers University-New Brunswick from 2001 to 2006: Executive Dean Faculty of Arts and Sciences and Dean of the Graduate School-New Brunswick.[4] Active in national academic administrative organizations, she served as President of the Council of Colleges of Arts and Sciences, a national organization of arts and sciences deans, during 2000–01.[5]

Life and career

Smith received her early education in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Attending Wellesley College on a National Merit Scholarship, she received her B.A. as First Trustee Fellow in 1966, followed by an M.A. (1970) and a Ph.D. (1972) in Philosophy from the University of Michigan.[4] Smith taught at Tufts University (1970–71), The University of Michigan at Flint (1971–72), The University of Pittsburgh (1972–73), The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor (1973-80), The University of Illinois at Chicago Circle (1980–83), The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Visiting Associate Professor, 1981–82), and The University of Arizona (1983-2001). From 2001 she has served as Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University-New Brunswick.[4]

Her husband Alvin I. Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers.[6] Her sister Sherri Smith, a prominent fiber artist, is Catherine B. Heller Collegiate Professor at the University of Michigan.[7]

Research

Smith's philosophical work falls into four main areas: biomedical ethics (with an emphasis on reproductive ethics); consequentialism (the theory that the moral status of our acts depend on the value of the acts consequences); moral responsibility; and normative ethics concerns that transcend particular normative theories.[4]

Reproductive ethics

Smith defended a liberal perspective, arguing that the fetus has no natural right to the use of its mother's body during pregnancy,[8] and that it has no right to "rescue" by the mother.[9]

Consequentialism

Smith focused on forms of rule utilitarianism, arguing, contra David Lyons,[10] that act utilitarianism and full compliance forms of rule utilitarianism do not always prescribe the same actions, and maintaining that the project of finding an appropriate definition for "consequences" within rule utilitarianism had been misconceived and was doomed to failure.[11]

Moral responsibility

Smith explored how to assess an agent's degree of credit or blameworthiness for an action when the agent acts from a mixture of good and bad motives.[12] She worked on the question of whether an agent is blameworthy for a wrongful act done in culpable ignorance.[13] Her most noted paper is "Culpable Ignorance," which was named by The Philosopher's Annual as one of the ten best articles in 1983.[13][14] It analysed in detail the terms of the debate between those who argue that a person is blameworthy for an action performed in culpable ignorance, versus those who hold that while a person is blameworthy for the initial dereliction of failing to acquire information, that does not taint a subsequent action, done in culpable ignorance, that is itself done from acceptable motives.

Smith concluded that the only defense for the position—a controversial one in law and philosophy[15]—is one that holds people blameworthy for the unlucky consequences of their actions.

Later she explored the implications of cognitive and social psychology for questions about moral responsibility, arguing that agents should not be held responsible for emotional reactions and behavior that issue from cognitive processes involving automatic (Kahneman/Tversky's System 1) responses to environmental stimuli.[16]

Actualism

Much of Smith's work focused on questions about right and wrong that are common to many distinct ethical theories, including both consequentialist theories and deontological ones (the moral status of an act depends on features of an act other than its consequences, such as whether or not it involves telling a lie or breaking a promise). Her paper "Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection"[17] helped launch a debate now known as the debate between Actualism and Possibilism by arguing for the first time in favor of Actualism.[18] Possibilists believe that whether or not the agent ought to perform an immediate action depends on whether performing it would enable the ideal course of action in the future. Actualists believe that whether or not an agent ought to perform the action depends on what performing that action would actually lead her to do in the future.

The issue is illustrated by an example from Smith/Goldman's later paper "Doing the Best One Can".[19] A graduate student asks faculty member S for comments on a paper he plans to present at a job interview. If S agrees and comments on the paper, the student will improve the paper substantially, have a highly successful interview, and receive an offer for a three-year job. If S accepts the task but fails to comment on the paper in time, the student will make no revisions, have a dismal interview, and receive no job offer. If S declines to provide comments, the student will elicit comments from a less expert faculty member, make less helpful revisions on the paper, have a moderately successful interview, and receive a one-year job offer. Clearly S's accepting the task would enable her to follow the ideal course of action, namely reading and commenting on the paper in a timely way, resulting in the student's receiving a three-year job. However, in reality if S accepted the task, she would actually fail to comment on the paper in time, either because she would misunderstand the deadline, or because of her time-consuming administrative chores. In this case the student would receive no job offer. Possibilism recommends that S agree to comment, that would support her intent to follow the best course of action. Actualism takes a more realistic stance: it recommends that S decline since that would lead to a better outcome. Smith argues this case requires the same reasoning as a prudential decision, such as deciding to drive carefully to avoid a crash.

Information

Smith also considered the question of how to use moral theories in actual decision-making, especially given agent's lack of enough information about the world to ascertain accurately which action their favored moral theory implies. Thus the intent to avoid adultery may be thwarted by not knowing that a partner is actually married. And someone trying to follow W. D. Ross's prima facie duty to keep promises may fail should she forget the promise. Smith repeatedly explored these "epistemic" problems[20] and argued that the solution depends on recognizing that moral theories must be supplemented by a hierarchy of decision rules that prescribe acts as "subjectively right" to agents who are uncertain what the moral theory itself recommends. Smith was awarded a National Humanities Center Fellowship during 2013–14 to complete a book manuscript on this cluster of epistemic challenges to using morality to make decisions.

Recognition

Smith's article "Culpable Ignorance"[13] was selected by The Philosopher's Annual as one of the ten best articles to appear in print in 1983.[14] Fellowships supporting her research[4] included:

  • Danforth Graduate Fellowship (1966–71),[21]
  • American Association of University Women Postgraduate Fellowship (1975–76);[22]
  • National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for Independent Study (1982–83),[3]
  • Council for Philosophical Studies Institute on Moral Problems in Medicine Fellowship;
  • Visiting Fellowship from the School of Philosophy, Research School of the Social Sciences, The Australian National University (Summer 2011);[23]
  • Carl and Lily Pforzheimer Foundation Fellowship, National Humanities Center (2013–14).[2]

While dean she was elected to the Presidency of the Council of Colleges of Arts and Sciences (2000–01).[5] She served as chair of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Program Committee, 1989–90,[24] and is a member of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Editorial Board as subject co-editor for Normative Ethics (from August 2013).[25]

Selected publications
  • "Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXV (October 1976), 449-487 (published under the name Holly S. Goldman).
  • "Doing the Best One Can," in Values and Morals, eds Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Reidel, 1978), 186-214 (as Holly S. Goldman).
  • "Culpable Ignorance," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCII (October, 1983), 543–571.
  • "Making Moral Decisions", Nous, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (March 1988), 89-108.
  • "Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit," Ethics, Vol. 101 (January 1991), 279–303.
  • "A Paradox of Promising," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 106, No. 2 (April 1997), 153–196.
  • "Subjective Rightness", in Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (Summer 2010), 64-110.
  • "Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance", Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2011), 115–146.
  • "The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs," in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1 – 25.
  • "The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting", forthcoming in Ethics.

References
  1. See Google Scholar.
  2. Fellows and Their Projects, 2013-2014 Archived 2014-06-30 at the Wayback Machine, National Humanities Center.
  3. NEH Grants.
  4. Holly Martin Smith page at Rutgers
  5. Past CCAS Presidents - Council of Colleges of Arts and Sciences
  6. "Goldman, Alvin", biography at Rutgers School of Arts and Sciences; Alvin I. Goldman page at Rutgers.
  7. "Sherri Smith, Catherine B. Heller Collegiate Professor, School of Art & Design", Stamps School of Art and Design, University of Michigan; Sherri smith webpage.
  8. "Whose Body Is It, Anyway?" in James Thomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6 (Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1992), 73-96.
  9. "Fetal-Maternal Conflicts," in In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg, edited by Allen Buchanan and Jules Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 324-343; and "Intercourse and Moral Responsibility for the Fetus," in Abortion and the Status of the Fetus, Vol. XIII of the series, "Philosophy of Medicine," eds William B. Bondeson, H. Tristram Englehardt, Stuart Spicker, and Daniel H. Winship (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, Massachusetts: D. Reidel, 1983), 229-245.
  10. David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).
  11. "David Lyons on Utilitarian Generalization", Philosophical Studies, Vol. 26 (October 1974), 77-94 (as Holly S. Goldman); and "Measuring the Consequences of Rules", Utilitas, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 2010, 413–433.
  12. "Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit", in Ethics, Vol. 101 (January 1991), 279-303.
  13. "Culpable Ignorance", The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCII (October 1983), pp. 543-571; "Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance", Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2011), 115-146; and "The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting," forthcoming in Ethics.
  14. The Philosopher's Annual, Vol. VI, from the literature of 1983.
  15. Daniel Statman, Moral Luck (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993).
  16. "Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance", Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2011), 115-146; "Dual-Process Theory and Moral Responsibility," forthcoming in Michael McKenna, Angela Smith, and Randolph Clarke (eds), The Nature of Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press).
  17. "Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection", The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXV (October, 1976), 449-487 (as Holly S. Goldman).
  18. Holly S. Goldman, "Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection", The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXV (October 1976), n. 16, p. 246.
  19. "Doing the Best One Can," in Values and Morals, eds Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), 186-214. Published under the name Holly S. Goldman.
  20. "Making Moral Decisions", Nous, Vol. XXII, No.1 (March 1988), 89-108; "Two-Tier Moral Codes", Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 7 (Autumn 1989), 112-132; "Deciding How To Decide: Is There a Regress Problem?" in Michael Bacharach and Susan Hurley (eds), Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, 194-219; "Subjective Rightness", in Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (Summer 2010), 64-110; "The Prospective View of Obligation", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, February 2011; "Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance", Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2011), 115-146; "Using Moral Principles to Guide Decisions", Philosophical Issues, Vol. 22, Action Theory (2012), 369-86; "The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs," in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. I (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 1–25; "The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting", forthcoming in Ethics.
  21. Danforth Foundation (St. Louis, Mo.) Danforth Foundation annual report (1962-1969). St. Louis Public Library.
  22. Washington: American Association of University Women. AAUW Journal, v. 55, no. 2-v. 71, no. 5 (January 1962-April 1978). Library of Congress 1756.A2 A5.
  23. RSSS Visiting Fellows – Research School of Social Sciences – ANU
  24. Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. Program of the Sixty-Fourth Annual Meeting Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 63, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 3-55.
  25. Editorial Board (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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