Salah Abdul Rasool Al Blooshi

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Salah Abdul Rasul Ali Abdul Rahman Al Balushi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on September 23, 2004.[7] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:

1. The detainee traveled from Bahrain to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.
2. Upon arriving in Kandahar, the Detainee spent two weeks in a guesthouse.
3. The detainee's host while staying in Kandahar is a suspected al Qaida recruiter.
4. At the suggestion of the suspected recruiter, the detainee gave his passport to a scholar at a local institute.
5. The scholar to whom the detainee gave his passport is an al Qaida recruiter.
6. An alias used by the detainee, and the name of the person to whom he gave his passport, were found on a lists discovered during searches of suspected al Qaida safe houses in Afghanistan during November 2001.
7. While in a Jalalaba hospital, the detainee met an Egyptian, and then traveled with him to a small village.
8. The Egyptian has been identified as an al Qaida commander and trainer.
9. The Egyptian fought in the front lines with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
10. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities in December 2001 as he fled Afghanistan.

There is no record that captive 227 participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Salah Abdul Rasul Ali Abdul Al Balushi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on January 28, 2005.[10] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Bahrain to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.

b. Connection

1. Upon arriving in Kandahar, the detainee spent two weeks in a guesthouse.
2. The detainee's host while staying in Kandahar is a suspect al Qaida recruiter.
3. At the suggestion of the suspected recruiter, the detainee gave his passport to a scholar at a local institute.
4. The scholar to whom the detainee gave his passport is an Qaida recruiter.
5. An alias used by the detainee, and the name of the person to whom he gave his passport, were found on lists discovered during searches of suspected al Qaida safe houses in Afghanistan during November 2001.
6. While in a Jalalabad hospital, the detainee met an Egyptian, and then traveled with him to a small village.
7. The Egyptian has been identified as an al Qaida commander and trainer.
8. The Egyptian fought in the front lines with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
9. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities in December 2001, as he fled Afghanistan.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

N/A

The Department of Defense did not publish the transcript from captive 227's Board hearing. It did publish a redacted version of a two-page letter from Mark S. Sullivan, one of the lawyers helping him access the US justice system, dated January 19, 2005, entitled: "Administrative Review Board Submission for Salah Abdul Rasul Al Bloushi, ISN # 227."[11] They also published an unsigned note.

Sullivan's letter stated, in part:

There is no reliable evidence that Mr. Al Bloushi is, or has ever been, a threat to the United States or its allies. .. The following factors should be taken into consideration by the ARB with respect to the continued detention of Mr. Al Bloushi: He was not captured on or near any battlefield. Instead, he was taken into custody in Pakistan by the Pakistani authorities. There is no credible evidence that he participated in any hostilities against the US or its allies. ############# ############ ############# ############## ########### ############# ############ ########### ##### ############ ############# ############## ########### ############# ############ ########### ######### ############ ############# ############## ########### ############# ############ ########### ######### This thin reed of speculation and innuendo is hardly sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Al Bloushi is a member or [sic] al Qaida or any other terrorist organization, or to justify his indefinite incarceration.

The unsigned note said:

Classification was derived form classified enclosure + exhibits to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report, which is attached to a memorandum for Director, CSRT entitled: CSRT Record of Proceedings ICO ISN #227, dated 30 Sep 2004

The Gulf Daily News reported, on July 2, 2006, that Colangelo-Bryan summarized the allegations against al Blooshi from his second Administrative Review Board.[3]

1. Specifically, the military asserts that Salah went to Afghanistan long before September 11, 2001, when he heard about Buddhist statues being destroyed at Bamyan.
2. According to the military, Salah went there to make sure that Afghans were Salafi Muslims.
3. The military also says that Salah had 300 Bahraini dinars with him and that he stayed with a friend for two weeks in Kandahar.
4. According to the military, this friend suggested that Salah give his passport to a man who is said to be associated in some way with Al Qaeda.
5. Finally, the military said that Salah became sick for a month in Jalabad and then travelled to Afghan/Pakistani border.

Colangelo-Bryan asked how, even if the allegations were true, they showed that Al Blooshi had ever represented a threat to the USA.

In September 2007, the DoD released a Summary of Evidence memo prepared for Salah Abdul Rasul Ali Abdul Rahman Al Balushi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on January 30, 2006.[12] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee became interested in traveling to Afghanistan after he heard about the destruction of the Buddha statues in the Barnian Province of Afghanistan. The detainee was further convinced after the return of an unidentified group of sheiks. The sheiks initially went to Afghanistan to persuade the Taliban to quit destroying statues, but ended up changing their minds and endorsing the act.
2. The detainee wanted to go to Afghanistan to ensure that the people were real Muslims, meaning if the people were Salafi Muslims
3. The detainee traveled to the Baluchistan Province in Pakistan via Karachi, Pakistan on 25 July 2001 and stayed with a friend for three weeks. Afterwards, he traveled to Afghanistan around August 2001 via Quetta, Pakistan.
4. The detainee stated he paid for his trip to Afghanistan with 300 Bahraini Dinars and money he saved while attedning Jaammat Islamia University in Medina, Saudi Arabia. In addition, the detainee received approximately 84 Bahraini Dinars per month as a stipend from the university. The detainee was a student at the university for approximately one year prior to his departure for Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Upon arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee spent two weeks in the house of an acquaintance.
2. At the suggestion of the acquaintance who he lived with in Kandahar, the detainee gave his passport to a scholar at a local institute.
3. The scholar was identified as an initial al Qaida screener. He was particularly known for talking a lot about jihad. The scholar was a helper, a coordinator, and he was the one responsible for travel.
4. The detainee's name was found on a list of captured Mujahidin on a computer, which was associated with an operative and was seized during raids with a foreign governmental agency on 1 March 2003.
5. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida members.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claims he became sick in Jalalabad and spent a month in a hospital. After being released from this hospital, the detainee traveled with a man to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
2. The detainee claims to have a learning disability, which makes it very difficult for him to remember details or events.
3. On 18 August 2005, the detainee was not willing to cooperate and refused to discuss his case.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

c. The detainee denied using any type of Taliban communication equipment.

d. An individual asked the detainee to join the Taliban. The detainee stated he did not wish to join the Talivan and told the individual the same.

e. The detainee was confronted concerning an unknown number that he had in his Casio watch. The detainee stated his watch was incapable of number storage and, as a result, did not have any information on the number.

In early September 2007, the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon R. England, the Designated Civilian Official.[13][14] The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on June 15, 2006.

His Board concluded that he "...continues to be a threat to the United States and its allies."