Defence Intelligence

Defence Intelligence can trace its history back to 1873 with the formation of the Intelligence Branch of the British War Office, which, in 1888, became the Directorate of Military Intelligence.[4] The Committee of Imperial Defence, established in 1902, had the task of co-ordinating the different armed services on issues of military strategy intelligence assessments and estimates.[5]

During World War I (1914–1918), Military Intelligence (MI) departments, such as MI1 for the secretariat of the Director of Military Intelligence (now GCHQ), were responsible for various intelligence gathering functions. Many of the original MI departments, such as MI4 (Aerial Photography) were renamed or eventually subsumed into Defence Intelligence.[6]

Shortly after the 1945 end of the Second World War, the topographical department of the War Office was transformed into the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), and its director, Sir Kenneth Strong, became a full member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in January 1947.[7] The JIB was structured into a series of divisions: procurement (JIB 1), geographic (JIB 2 and JIB 3), defences, ports and beaches (JIB 4), airfields (JIB 5), key points (JIB 6), oil (JIB 7) and telecommunications (JIB 8).[8]

When the Ministry of Defence (MOD) formed in 1964, Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence and Air Intelligence combined to form the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS).[9] Although the DIS focussed initially on Cold-War issues, more recently its attention has moved to support for overseas operations, to weapons of mass destruction and to international counter-terrorism activities.[10]

In an effort to demonstrate justification for British participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Operation TELIC, use was made of intelligence material and product to compile a dossier officially released into the public domain by the British Prime Minister, Rt Hon Tony Blair. The dossier was compiled by the JIC and published in September 2002 support the case for invasion. Shortly after the dossier was published, Parliament ratified the governments decision to go to war.[11]

A number of weapon specialist staff in the DIAS expressed concern about the wording, related to the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq and the corresponding threat to the UK. Dr Brian Jones, head of the counter-proliferation analysis branch with others complained in writing to the then DCDI (Tony Cragg) that the wording of the dossier was too strong. A particular source of criticism was a claim that Iraq "could" launch Chemical or Biological Weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so, should have been hedged about with caveats. These concerns were overuled by the then CDI Air Marshal Sir Joe French.[12]

Another eminent weapons expert who worked closely with the DIS, Dr David Kelly, following off-the-record briefings to journalists his criticisms of the 45 minute claim, describing it as risible, were broadcast on the BBCs Today programme by Andrew Gilligan. The resulting controversy and release of Kellys name as the source of the report led to his suicide near his home.[13]

The subsequent inquiry, chaired by Lord Hutton, the Hutton Inquiry, into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly resulted in the discussion of these issues in public. It was revealed to the inquiry that the 45 minutes claim was based on "compartmentalized" intelligence which had not been exposed to Dr Jones branch. Jones has subsequently said that it was unlikely that should anyone with WMD expertise had seen the "compartmentalized" report prior to its inclusion in the dossier they would have supported its credibility.[14]

Chemical and Biological munitions were never deployed during the war, and no evidence of WMD was found. It was succeeded by the Butler Review.[15]

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Defence Intelligence has regularly released intelligence information, including information on the course of the war. The Russian government accuses the UK Government of a targeted disinformation campaign.[16] Intelligence information released has included details of anticipated Russian troop movements.[17] Since June 2021, Defence Intelligence has also be reporting on the latest Ukraine offensive.[18]

DCDI manages the intelligence analysis and production directorates of Defence Intelligence. These include directorates for:

• Strategic Assessments (regional and thematic)
• Capability Assessments (weapons systems and platforms)
• Counter Proliferation
• Counter Intelligence

DCDI is responsible for intelligence analysis and production, providing global defence intelligence assessments and strategic warning on a wide range of issues including, intelligence support for operations; proliferation and arms control; conventional military capabilities; strategic warning and technical evaluations of weapons systems. These intelligence assessments draw upon classified information provided by GCHQ, SIS, the Security Service, Allied intelligence services and military collection assets, in addition to diplomatic reporting and a wide range of publicly available or ‘open source’ information such as media reporting and the internet.[10]

DCI3 is responsible for the provision of specialised intelligence, imagery and geographic support services, and for the intelligence and security training of the Armed Forces. In addition to a Head Office policy staff he is responsible for two major groupings within Defence Intelligence:

The JFIG was established in 2012 under the new Joint Forces Command and superseded the Intelligence Collection Group (ICG). Making up the largest sub-element of Defence Intelligence, JFIG is responsible for the collection of signals, geospatial, imagery and measurement and signature intelligence and comprises:[20]

• The National Centre for Geospatial Intelligence (NCGI) formerly known as the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre (DGIFC) and prior to that JARIC (Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre)[21]
• The Defence Geographic Centre (DGC)
• Joint Services Signals Organisation (JSSO)
• Defence HUMINT Unit (DHU)

The National Centre for Geospatial Intelligence (NCGI) is based at RAF Wyton in Cambridgeshire (since moving from RAF Brampton in 2013) and provides specialist imagery intelligence to the armed forces and other UK government customers. They deliver this through the exploitation of satellite imaging systems, as well as airborne and ground-based collection systems. NCGI uses these sources, together with advanced technologies, to provide regional intelligence assessments and support to strategic intelligence projections.[10]

The Defence HUMINT Organisation (DHO) is a Tri-Service organisation that provides specialist support to military operations. The DHO manages strategic aspects of defence human intelligence and is under the command of a Colonel. It draws staff from across the three services.[10]

The Joint Services Signals Organisation (JSSO) conducts research into new communications systems and techniques in order to provide operational support to static and deployed units. The JSSO is based at RAF Digby in Lincolnshire under the command of a Group Captain with some 1,600 staff drawn from all three services.[10] One of its components is JSSO (Cyprus) which runs electronic intelligence gathering activities at Ayios Nikolaos Station in Cyprus.[22]

In 2013, JFIG HQ moved from Feltham in Middlesex to RAF Wyton.[23][24]

The Joint Intelligence Training Group (JITG), at Chicksands, Bedfordshire, provides a single defence focal point for intelligence, security, languages and photography training in the UK, though photography training is carried out at the Defence School of Photography (DSoP) at RAF Cosford.[25] The organisation consists of a headquarters, the Defence College of Intelligence and a specialist operational intelligence capability. JITG is co-located with the headquarters of the British Army's Intelligence Corps.[26][27]