Zhuge Liang

At the time, the warlord Liu Bei was living in Xinye County as a guest of Liu Biao, the governor of Jing Province. During this time, he met the hermit Sima Hui and consulted him on the affairs of their time. Sima Hui said, "What do Confucian academics and common scholars know about current affairs? Only outstanding talents have the best understanding of current affairs. In this region, there are two of such talents: Crouching Dragon and Young Phoenix." When Liu Bei asked him who "Crouching Dragon" and "Young Phoenix" were, Sima Hui replied, "Zhuge Kongming and Pang Shiyuan."[Sanguozhi zhu 8] Xu Shu, whom Liu Bei regarded highly, also recommended Zhuge Liang by saying, "Zhuge Kongming is the Crouching Dragon. General, don't you want to meet him?"[Sanguozhi 8] When Liu Bei asked Xu Shu if he could bring Zhuge Liang to meet him, Xu Shu advised him to personally visit Zhuge Liang instead of asking Zhuge Liang to come to him.[Sanguozhi 9]

The painting Kongming Leaving the Mountains (detail, Ming dynasty), depicts Zhuge Liang (left, on a horse) leaving his rustic retreat to enter into the service of Liu Bei (right, on a horse)

The Sanguozhi recorded in just one sentence that Liu Bei visited Zhuge Liang three[lower-alpha 3] times and met him.[Sanguozhi 10] The Zizhi Tongjian recorded that the meeting(s) took place in 207.[13] Chen Shou also mentions the three visits in his biographical sketch of Zhuge Liang appended to the memoirs Chen Shou compiled.[Sanguozhi 11]

The Weilüe and Jiuzhou Chunqiu (九州春秋), however, provide a completely different account of how Liu Bei met Zhuge Liang. It mentioned that Liu Bei was at Fancheng (樊城; present-day Fancheng District, Xiangyang, Hubei) at the time, and that Cao Cao had just pacified northern China and was preparing to attack Jing Province. Zhuge Liang went to Fancheng to meet Liu Bei, who treated him like any other ordinary guest because he did not know Zhuge Liang before that, and thought that he was just a typical young scholar. When all the other guests left after the meeting, Zhuge Liang stayed behind. Liu Bei did not ask him if he had something to say, and started playing with a yak tail garment one of the guests had gifted him. Zhuge Liang said, "I heard that you, General, have great ambitions, yet all I see is you playing with that." When Liu Bei heard that, he sensed that Zhuge Liang was no ordinary person so he threw aside the gift and said he was only playing with it as a hobby. Zhuge Liang then asked him if he and Liu Biao could resist an invasion by Cao Cao. When Liu Bei replied that neither him nor Liu Biao was capable of resisting Cao Cao and that he was at a loss on what to do, Zhuge Liang proposed a plan for him. He pointed out that there were large numbers of refugees who migrated south to Jing Province to escape from the chaos in central and northern China, and suggested to Liu Bei to have them registered as new residents so that the Jing Province administration could collect taxes from them and draft them into military service. Liu Bei heeded Zhuge Liang's advice and managed to increase the strength of his forces. From then on, he saw Zhuge Liang as a great talent and started treating him like an honoured guest.[Sanguozhi zhu 9][14]

Pei Songzhi commented that the Weilüe and Jiuzhou Chunqiu accounts contradict Zhuge Liang's own statement in the Chu Shi Biao, which says: "(Liu Bei) visited me thrice in the thatched cottage, (and) consulted me on the affairs of our time."[Sanguozhi 12] This is contradicted in the later Annotations by Pei Songzhi which claim Zhuge Liang visited him first.[Sanguozhi zhu 10]

Yi Zhongtian suggested that both the records in Sanguozhi and Weilüe are the truth. The chronological order should be: Zhuge Liang approached Liu Bei first to demonstrate his wisdom. Liu Bei, having recognised Zhuge Liang's talent, personally visited him three times to have further discussions.[15]^: ch.16

Outline of the Longzhong Plan.

The 14th-century historical novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms gives a romanticised account, spanning two chapters, of how Liu Bei met Zhuge Liang. After Xu Shu recommends Zhuge Liang to him, Liu Bei travels to Longzhong with his sworn brothers Guan Yu and Zhang Fei to find Zhuge Liang. When they reach Zhuge Liang's house (described as a "thatched cottage" 茅廬), a servant tells them that his master is out. Liu Bei then asks the servant to pass a message to Zhuge Liang that Liu Bei came to find him. Later during winter, Liu Bei and his sworn brothers brave heavy snowfall and travel to Longzhong again. Along the way, they meet Zhuge Liang's friends. This time, the servant leads them to his "master", who turns out to be Zhuge Liang's younger brother, Zhuge Jun. Just as they are about to leave, Liu Bei sees an older man approaching and thinks he is Zhuge Liang, but the man introduces himself as Huang Chengyan, Zhuge Liang's father-in-law. When spring arrives, Liu Bei decides to visit Zhuge Liang again, much to the annoyance of his sworn brothers. On this third occasion, Zhuge Liang is at home but is asleep. Liu Bei waits patiently for hours until Zhuge Liang wakes up.[16]

During their private meeting, Liu Bei sought Zhuge Liang's advice on how to compete with the powerful warlords and revive the declining Han dynasty.[Sanguozhi 13] In response, Zhuge Liang presented his Longzhong Plan, which envisaged a tripartite division of China between the domains of Liu Bei, Cao Cao and Sun Quan. According to the plan, Liu Bei should seize control of Jing Province (covering present-day Hubei and Hunan) and Yi Province (covering present-day Sichuan and Chongqing) from their respective governors, Liu Biao and Liu Zhang, and establish a solid foothold in southern and western China. Liu Bei would then form an alliance with Sun Quan, who ruled eastern China, and wage war against Cao Cao, who controlled northern China and the political centre of the Han dynasty in central China.[Sanguozhi 14]

After the meeting, Liu Bei became very close to Zhuge Liang and spent much time with him – much to Guan Yu and Zhang Fei's unhappiness. Liu Bei explained to them, "Now that I have Kongming, I am like a fish that has found water. I hope you'll stop making unpleasant remarks." Guan Yu and Zhang Fei then stopped complaining.[Sanguozhi 15]

Map of Changban battle

In the autumn of 208,[13] shortly before Liu Biao's death, Cao Cao led his forces on a southern campaign to conquer Jing Province. When Cao Cao's forces reached Jing Province's capital Xiangyang, Liu Biao's younger son Liu Cong, who had succeeded his father as the Governor of Jing Province, surrendered to Cao Cao. Upon receiving news of Liu Cong's surrender, Liu Bei immediately evacuated his base in Fancheng (樊城; present-day Fancheng District, Xiangyang, Hubei) and led thousands of his followers, both military and civilian, on a journey to Xiakou (夏口; in present-day Wuhan, Hubei) to join Liu Biao's elder son Liu Qi. Along the way, Cao Cao's forces caught up with them and defeated them at the Battle of Changban. Along with only a handful of close followers, Liu Bei managed to escape, and upon reaching Xiakou sent Zhuge Liang as his representative to meet Sun Quan and discuss an alliance against Cao Cao.[13][Sanguozhi 16]

Around the time, Sun Quan was in Chaisang (柴桑; southwest of present-day Jiujiang, Jiangxi) and had been closely observing the developments in Jing Province.[Sanguozhi 17] When Zhuge Liang met Sun Quan, he said:

The land is in chaos. General, you raised an army and occupied Jiangdong, while Liu Bei is gathering forces at the south of the Han River. Both of you are preparing to compete with Cao Cao for control over China. As of now, Cao Cao has eliminated internal threats, more or less pacified his lands, and led his forces south to occupy Jing Province. The Empire trembles at his might. A hero without opportunity to display his prowess, Liu Bei has retreated here. I hope that you, General, will carefully assess your strengths and decide your next course of action. If you decide to lead your forces from the Wu and Yue regions to resist the Central States, you should quickly break ties [with Cao Cao]. If you can't resist him, why don't you put down your weapons, remove your armour, position yourself as subordinate, and serve him? General, although by appearances you seem ready to pledge allegiance to Cao Cao, in your heart you still harbour thoughts of freedom. If you can't be decisive at such a crucial moment, it will be no time until you meet with disaster![Sanguozhi 18]

When Sun Quan asked him why Liu Bei did not surrender to Cao Cao,[Sanguozhi 19] Zhuge Liang replied:

Tian Heng was nothing more than a mere warrior from Qi, yet he remained faithful and refused to surrender. Shouldn't we expect more from Liu Bei, scion of the royal house of Han? His heroism and talents are renowned throughout the world. Gentlemen and commoners alike honour and admire him. Like the rivers returning to the sea; like the upheavals in the affairs of our time, this is Heaven's doing. How could he turn his back on that and serve Cao Cao?[Sanguozhi 20]

An enraged Sun Quan then said that he would not allow anyone but himself to rule the territories and people in Wu. When he asked Zhuge Liang how Liu Bei could expect to resist Cao Cao, given his recent defeat at Changban,[Sanguozhi 21] Zhuge Liang replied:

Liu Bei's forces may have suffered a defeat at Changban, but now many of his men who were scattered during the battle are returning to him, along with 10,000 elite marine troops under Guan Yu, combining forces with Liu Qi's army of at least 10,000 from Jiangxia. Cao Cao and his forces have come a great distance and are exhausted. I have heard that his light cavalry travelled over 300 li in twenty-four hours in pursuit of Liu Bei. This fits the saying: "even a powerful arrow at the end of its flight cannot penetrate a piece of Lu silk cloth." Such a battle should be avoided according to military strategy, which says that it "will definitely result in defeat for the commander." The northerners are also not familiar with naval warfare. Although the people in Jing Province have surrendered to Cao Cao, they were forced to submit, and are not truly loyal to him. Now, General, if you are able to send your fierce officers to lead your vast hosts to align goals and combine might with Liu Bei, the defeat of Cao Cao's army is certain. Once defeated, Cao Cao will be forced to return north, and Jing Province and Wu will be sturdy as the legs of a bronze cauldron. The trigger for victory or defeat is your decision today.[Sanguozhi 22]

Yuan Zhun's Yuanzi recorded that when Zhuge Liang was in Chaisang, Zhang Zhao recommended he switch allegiance from Liu Bei to Sun Quan, but Zhuge Liang refused. When Zhang Zhao asked him why, Zhuge Liang said, "[Sun Quan] is a good leader of men. However, from what I observe about his character, he will make good use of my abilities but not to their fullest extent. That is why I don't want to serve under him."[Sanguozhi zhu 11]

Pei Songzhi noted how differently this episode portrayed Zhuge Liang's special and sui generis relationship with Liu Bei, and pointed out that his loyalty to Liu Bei was so firm that nothing would make him switch allegiance to Sun Quan— not even if Sun Quan could make full use of his abilities. Pei Songzhi then cited a similar example of how Guan Yu, during his brief service under Cao Cao, maintained unwavering loyalty to Liu Bei even though Cao Cao treated him very generously.[Sanguozhi zhu 12]

Battle of Red Cliffs, and Cao Cao's retreat. The battlefield location is marked at the site near Chibi City; see Location of Red Cliffs.

After initial advisement against Zhuge Liang's plan for a Sun–Liu alliance, further consultation with his generals Lu Su and Zhou Yu convinced Sun Quan to move forward with it.[17] He ordered Zhou Yu, Cheng Pu, Lu Su and others to lead 30,000 troops to join Liu Bei in resisting Cao Cao's invasion.[Sanguozhi 23] In the winter of 208, the allied forces of Liu Bei and Sun Quan scored a decisive victory over Cao Cao's forces at the Battle of Red Cliffs.[13] Cao Cao retreated to Ye (鄴; in present-day Handan, Hebei) after his defeat.[Sanguozhi 24]

The Former Chu Shi Biao engraved in the Temple of Marquis Wu, Chengdu, Sichuan

In 227, Zhuge Liang ordered troops from throughout Shu to mobilise and assemble in Hanzhong Commandery in preparation for a large-scale military campaign against Cao Wei. Before leaving, he wrote a memorial, called Chu Shi Biao ("memorial on the case to go to war"), and submitted it to the Liu Shan. Among other things, the memorial contained Zhuge Liang's reasons for the campaign against Wei and his personal advice to Liu Shan on governance issues.[Sanguozhi 44] After Liu Shan approved, Zhuge Liang ordered the Shu forces to garrison at Mianyang (沔陽; present-day Mian County, Shaanxi).[Sanguozhi 45]

Jiang Wei surrenders to Zhuge Liang. Portrait in the Long Corridor of the Summer Palace, Beijing

In the spring of 228, Zhuge Liang ordered Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi to lead a detachment of troops to Ji Valley (箕谷) and pretend to attack Mei County (郿縣; southeast of Fufeng County, Shaanxi) via Xie Valley (斜谷). Their mission was to distract and hold the Wei forces' attention, while Zhuge Liang led the Shu main army to attack Mount Qi (祁山; the mountainous regions around Li County, Gansu). Upon reaching Mount Qi, Zhuge Liang deployed his troops in orderly formations and directed them with clear and strict commands. Three Wei-controlled commanderies – Nan'an (南安; around Longxi County, Gansu), Tianshui, and Anding (安定; around Zhenyuan County, Gansu) – responded to the invasion by defecting to the Shu side. News of the Shu invasion sent shockwaves throughout the Guanzhong region.[Sanguozhi 46]

The Wei government was stunned when they learnt of the Shu invasion and totally unprepared for it because they had lowered their guard against Shu after Liu Bei's death in 223 and had not heard anything from Shu since then. They were even more fearful and shocked when they heard of the three commanderies' defection.[Sanguozhi zhu 17] In response to the Shu invasion, Cao Rui moved from his imperial capital at Luoyang to Chang'an to oversee the defences in the Guanzhong region and provide backup. He sent Zhang He to attack Zhuge Liang at Mount Qi,[Sanguozhi 47] and Cao Zhen to attack Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi at Ji Valley.[Sanguozhi 48]

Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi lost to Cao Zhen at the battle in Ji Valley. Zhuge Liang had given them command of the weaker soldiers while he led the better troops to attack Mount Qi. Nevertheless, Zhao Yun managed to rally his men into putting up a firm defence as they retreated, thus minimising their losses.[Sanguozhi 48] In the meantime at Mount Qi, Zhuge Liang had put Ma Su in charge of the vanguard force to engage the enemy. At Jieting (街亭; or Jie Village, east of Qin'an County, Gansu), Ma Su not only went against Zhuge Liang's instructions, but also made the wrong moves, resulting in the Shu vanguard suffering a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Wei forces under Zhang He. Zhang He also seized the opportunity to attack and reclaim the three commanderies for Wei.[Sanguozhi 49][Sanguozhi 50]

Kongming shedding tears as he subjects Ma Su to execution

Upon learning of the Shu defeats at Ji Valley and Jieting, Zhuge Liang pulled back the Shu forces and retreated to Hanzhong Commandery, where he resettled the few thousand families they captured in the Wei-controlled Xi County (西縣; present-day Li County, Gansu) during the campaign. This happened in the late spring of 228.[24] Zhuge Liang executed Ma Su for disobeying orders and to appease public anger.[Sanguozhi 51] Afterward, he analysed why the campaign failed and told his subordinates:

Our armies at Mount Qi and Ji Valley together were superior to the enemy in numbers, yet we lost the battles. This wasn't because we had insufficient troops, but rather, it was due to one man. Now, we should reduce the number of troops and officers, instil greater discipline in the military, and reflect on our mistakes, so as to adapt and prepare ourselves for the future. If we can't do this, it won't be helpful even if we have more troops! From today, please raise whatever concerns you may have about the State, and point out my mistakes and flaws. We can then be more decisive and be able to defeat the enemy and move closer towards victory and success.[Sanguozhi zhu 18]

He also wrote a memorial to Liu Shan, taking full responsibility for the Shu defeats at Jieting and Ji Valley, acknowledging his mistakes and failure in judgment, and requesting to be demoted by three grades as punishment.[Sanguozhi 52] Liu Shan approved and symbolically demoted him from Imperial Chancellor to General of the Right (右將軍), but allowed him to remain as acting Imperial Chancellor and continue performing the same duties as he did before.[Sanguozhi 53]

Map showing the first and second Northern Expeditions

Between late spring and early winter of 228,[24] Zhuge Liang directed his efforts towards reorganising the Shu military, strengthening discipline, and training the troops in preparation for another campaign.[Sanguozhi zhu 19] During this time, he received news that Shu's ally Wu had defeated Wei at the Battle of Shiting around September 228.[24] From this, he deduced that the Wei defences in the Guanzhong region must be weaker because Wei had mobilised its best troops to the eastern front to fight Wu.[Sanguozhi zhu 20]

In December 228, Zhuge Liang allegedly wrote a second Chu Shi Biao to Liu Shan to urge war against Wei.[Sanguozhi zhu 21] However, historians such as Qian Dazhao (錢大昭) have cast doubts on the authenticity of the second Chu Shi Biao and argued that it is falsely attributed to Zhuge Liang. Among other discrepancies, the second Chu Shi Biao differs sharply from the first Chu Shi Biao in tone, and already mentions Zhao Yun's death when the Sanguozhi recorded that he died in 229.[Sanguozhi 54]

In the winter of 228–229, Zhuge Liang launched the second Northern Expedition and led the Shu forces out of San Pass (north of the Qin Mountains to the south of Baoji, Shaanxi) to attack the Wei fortress at Chencang (陳倉; east of Baoji). Before the campaign, Zhuge Liang already knew that Chencang was heavily fortified and difficult to capture, so when he showed up he was surprised to see that the fortress was additionally very well-defended. In fact, after the first Shu invasion, the Wei general Cao Zhen had predicted that Zhuge Liang would attack Chencang so he put Hao Zhao, a Wei general with a fierce reputation in the Guanzhong region, in charge of defending Chencang and strengthening its defences.[Sanguozhi 55][25]

Zhuge Liang first ordered his troops to surround Chencang, then sent Jin Xiang (靳詳), an old friend of Hao Zhao, to persuade Hao Zhao to surrender. Hao Zhao refused twice.[Sanguozhi zhu 22] Although Hao Zhao had only 1,000 men with him to defend Chencang, he successfully held his ground against the Shu invaders. In the subsequent 20 days of siege, Zhuge Liang used an array of tactics to attack Chencang – siege ladders, battering rams, siege towers and underground tunnels – but Hao Zhao successfully countered each of them in turn.[Sanguozhi zhu 23] After failing to outwit Hao Zhao and take Chencang, and after learning that Wei reinforcements were approaching, Zhuge Liang decided to pull back his troops and return to base.[Sanguozhi zhu 24] Wang Shuang, a Wei officer, led his men to attack the retreating Shu forces, but was killed in an ambush laid by Zhuge Liang.[Sanguozhi 56]

Map showing the Battle of Jianwei

In the spring of 229, Zhuge Liang launched the third Northern Expedition and ordered Chen Shi to lead Shu forces to attack the Wei-controlled Wudu (武都; around present-day Cheng County, Gansu) and Yinping (陰平; present-day Wen County, Gansu) commanderies. The Wei general Guo Huai led his troops to resist Chen Shi. He retreated when he heard that Zhuge Liang had led a Shu army to Jianwei (建威; in present-day Longnan, Gansu). The Shu forces then conquered Wudu and Yinping commanderies.[Sanguozhi 57][24]

When Zhuge Liang returned from the campaign, Liu Shan issued an imperial decree to congratulate him on his successes in defeating Wang Shuang during the second Northern Expedition and capturing Wudu and Yinping commanderies during the third Northern Expedition. He also restored Zhuge Liang to the position of Imperial Chancellor.[Sanguozhi 58]

Around May 229,[24] Sun Quan, the ruler of Shu's ally state Wu, declared himself emperor and put himself on par with Liu Shan of Shu. When the news reached the Shu imperial court, many officials were outraged as they thought that Sun Quan had no right to be emperor, and so they urged the Shu government to break ties with Wu.[Sanguozhi zhu 25] Although Zhuge Liang agreed that Sun Quan lacked legitimacy, he considered that the Wu–Shu alliance was vital to Shu's survival and long-term interests because they needed Wu to help them keep Wei occupied in the east while they attacked Wei in the west. After concluding that Shu should maintain the Wu–Shu alliance and refrain from criticising Sun Quan,[Sanguozhi zhu 26] he sent Chen Zhen on a diplomatic mission to Wu to recognise Sun Quan's claim to the throne and congratulate him.[Sanguozhi zhu 27]

In August 230,[24] Cao Zhen led an army from Chang'an to attack Shu via the Ziwu Valley (子午谷). At the same time, another Wei army led by Sima Yi, acting on Cao Rui's order, advanced towards Shu from Jing Province by sailing along the Han River. The rendezvous point for Cao Zhen and Sima Yi's armies was at Nanzheng County (南鄭縣; in present-day Hanzhong, Shaanxi). Other Wei armies also prepared to attack Shu from the Xie Valley (斜谷) or Wuwei Commandery.[Sanguozhi 59]

When he heard of Wei recent movements, Zhuge Liang urged Li Yan to lead 20,000 troops to Hanzhong Commandery to defend against the Wei invasion which he reluctantly accepted after much persuasion.[Sanguozhi 60] As Xiahou Ba led the vanguard of this expedition through the 330 km Ziwu Trail (子午道), he was identified by the local residents who reported his presence to the Shu forces. Xiahou Ba barely managed to retreat after reinforcements from the main army arrived.[Sanguozhi zhu 28]

Zhuge Liang also allowed Wei Yan to lead troops behind the ennemy lines towards Yangxi (陽谿; southwest of present-day Wushan County, Gansu) to encourage the Qiang people to join Shu Han against Wei. Wei Yan greatly defeated Wei forces led by Guo Huai and Fei Yao.[Sanguozhi 61] Following those events, the conflict became a prolonged stalemate with few skirmishes. After more than a month of slow progress and by fear of significant losses and waste of resources, more and more Wei officials sent memorials to end the campaign. The situation wasn't helped by the difficult topography and constant heavy rainy weather lasting more than 30 days. Cao Rui decided to abort the campaign and recalled the officers by October 230.[24][Sanguozhi 62]

Map showing the Battle of Mount Qi and Battle of Wuzhang Plains

In 230,[26] Zhuge Liang launched the fourth Northern Expedition and attacked Mount Qi (祁山; the mountainous regions around present-day Li County, Gansu) again. He used the wooden ox, a mechanical device he invented, to transport food supplies to the frontline.[Sanguozhi 63] The Shu forces attacked Tianshui Commandery and surrounded Mount Qi, which was defended by the Wei officers Jia Si (賈嗣) and Wei Ping (魏平).[Jin Shu 1] At Mount Qi, Zhuge Liang managed to convince Kebineng, a Xianbei tribal leader, to support Shu in the war against Wei. Kebineng went to Beidi Commandery (北地郡; around present-day central Shaanxi) and rallied the locals to support Shu.[Sanguozhi zhu 29]

At the time, as Grand Marshal Cao Zhen was ill, Cao Rui ordered the general Sima Yi to move to Chang'an to supervise the Wei defences in the Guanzhong region against the Shu invasion. After making preparations for battle, Sima Yi, with Zhang He, Fei Yao, Dai Ling (戴陵) and Guo Huai serving as his subordinates, led Wei forces to Yumi County (隃麋縣; east of present-day Qianyang County, Shaanxi) and stationed there.[Jin Shu 2] He then left Fei Yao and Dai Ling with 4,000 troops to guard Shanggui County (上邽縣; in present-day Tianshui, Gansu), while he led the others to Mount Qi to help Jia Si and Wei Ping.[Sanguozhi zhu 30]

When Zhuge Liang learnt of the Wei forces' approach, he split his forces into two groups – one group to remain at Mount Qi while he led the other group to attack Shanggui County. He defeated Guo Huai, Fei Yao and Dai Ling in battle and ordered his troops to collect the harvest in Shanggui County. In response, Sima Yi turned back from Mount Qi, headed to Shanggui County, and reached there within two days. By then, Zhuge Liang and his men had finished harvesting the wheat and were preparing to leave.[Jin Shu 3] Zhuge Liang encountered Sima Yi at Hanyang (漢陽) to the east of Shanggui County, but they did not engage in battle: Zhuge Liang ordered his troops to make use of the terrain and get into defensive positions; Sima Yi ordered his troops to get into formation, while sending Niu Jin to lead a lightly armed cavalry detachment to Mount Qi. The standoff ended when Zhuge Liang and the Shu forces retreated to Lucheng (鹵城), took control of the hills in the north and south, and used the river as a natural barrier.[Sanguozhi zhu 31][Jin Shu 4]

Although his subordinates repeatedly urged him to attack the enemy, Sima Yi was hesitant to do so after seeing the layout of the Shu camps in the hills. However, he eventually relented when Jia Si and Wei Ping mocked him and said he would become a laughing stock if he refused to attack.[Sanguozhi zhu 32] Sima Yi then sent Zhang He to attack the Shu camp in the south, guarded by Wang Ping, while he led the others to attack Lucheng head-on.[Sanguozhi zhu 33] In response, Zhuge Liang ordered Wei Yan, Wu Ban and Gao Xiang to lead troops to engage the enemy outside Lucheng. The Wei army lost the battle, along with 3,000 troops and some equipment.[Sanguozhi zhu 34]

Despite his victory, Zhuge Liang could not make use of the momentum to launch a major offensive on the enemy because his army was running low on supplies. Sima Yi launched another attack on the Shu camps and succeeded in breaking through Zhuge Liang's defences. The Book of Jin recorded that as Zhuge and the Shu army retreated under the cover of night, Sima Yi led his forces in pursuit and inflicted over 10,000 casualties on the enemy.[Jin Shu 5] This account from the Book of Jin is disputed by historians[Jin Shu 6][27] and is not included in the 11th-century monumental chronological historical text Zizhi Tongjian.

In any case, according to Records of the Three Kingdoms and Zizhi Tongjian, Zhuge Liang retreated to the Shu because of lack of supply, not defeat,[Sanguozhi 64][28] Zhang He led his troops to attack the retreating Shu forces but fell into an ambush and lost his life.[Sanguozhi 64]

An illustration from a Qing dynasty edition of the historical novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms showing the wooden oxen and flowing horses (木牛流馬) used by the Shu army to transport supplies.

In the spring of 234, Zhuge Liang led more than 100,000 Shu troops out of Xie Valley (斜谷) and camped at the Wuzhang Plains on the south bank of the Wei River near Mei County (郿縣; southeast of present-day Fufeng County, Shaanxi). Aside from using the flowing horse to transport food supplies to the frontline, he implemented a tuntian plan by ordering his troops to grow crops alongside civilians at the south bank of the Wei River. He also forbid his troops from taking the civilians' crops.[Sanguozhi 65]

In response to the Shu invasion, the Wei general Sima Yi led his forces and another 20,000 reinforcements to the Wuzhang Plains to engage the enemy. After an initial skirmish[Jin Shu 7] and a night raid on the Shu camp,[Jin Shu 8] Sima Yi received orders from the Wei emperor Cao Rui to hold his ground and refrain from engaging the Shu forces. The battle became a stalemate. During this time, Zhuge Liang made several attempts to lure Sima Yi to attack him. On one occasion, he sent women's ornaments to Sima Yi to taunt him. An apparently angry Sima Yi sought permission from Cao Rui to attack the enemy, but was denied. Cao Rui even sent Xin Pi as his special representative to the frontline to ensure that Sima Yi followed orders and remained in camp. Zhuge Liang knew that Sima Yi was pretending to be angry because he wanted to show the Wei soldiers that he would not put up with Zhuge Liang's taunting, and to ensure that his men were ready for battle.[Jin Shu 9][Sanguozhi zhu 35]

During the stalemate, when Zhuge Liang sent a messenger to meet Sima Yi, Sima Yi asked the messenger about Zhuge Liang's daily routine and living conditions. The messenger said that Zhuge Liang consumed three to four sheng of grain a day and that he micromanaged almost everything, except trivial issues like punishments for minor offences. After hearing this, Sima Yi remarked, "How can Zhuge Kongming expect to last long? He's going to die soon."[Jin Shu 10][Sanguozhi zhu 36]

In the first anecdote, Guo Chong claimed that Zhuge Liang incurred much resentment from the people when he implemented harsh and draconian laws in Yi Province (covering present-day Sichuan and Chongqing). Fa Zheng, an adviser to Liu Bei, tried to dissuade Zhuge Liang from doing so as he believed that the harsh and draconian laws would drive a wedge between the people of Yi Province and Liu Bei's government. He further pointed out that the government lacked popular support and political legitimacy at the time because some people saw Liu Bei as a foreign invader who occupied Yi Province by military force. Fa Zheng then urged Zhuge Liang to relax the laws and give the people some "breathing space".[Sanguozhi zhu 46] In response, Zhuge Liang argued that harsh laws were necessary to restore law and order in Yi Province and help Liu Bei's government consolidate its control over the territories and people. He blamed Liu Yan's 'soft' rule and Liu Zhang's incompetence for allowing corruption and decadence to become deeply entrenched in Yi Province. He also argued that the best way to set things right was to restore law and order and to regulate the distribution of honours and privileges among the population.[Sanguozhi zhu 47]

Pei Songzhi pointed out three problems in this anecdote. First, when Fa Zheng and Liu Bei were still alive, Zhuge Liang was never in a position powerful enough for him to implement such a policy; he would have to be the Governor of Yi Province (益州牧) to do so, but he only became Governor of Yi Province (in addition to other appointments) during Liu Shan's reign. Second, as Zhuge Liang is known for being a respectful, humble and faithful subject, it seemed totally out of place for him to advocate such a policy and make such a crude response to Fa Zheng. Third, good governance, which Zhuge Liang is known for, is not normally associated with harsh laws.[Sanguozhi zhu 48]

In the second anecdote, Guo Chong claimed that Cao Cao once sent an assassin to kill Liu Bei. When the assassin first met Liu Bei, he could only speak to Liu Bei from a distance, so he thought of a way to attract Liu Bei's attention and get up close. He started analysing the situation in Cao Cao's domain and presented ideas to Liu Bei on how to attack it. Liu Bei found his ideas interesting and asked him to come closer. Just then, Zhuge Liang came into the meeting room and caused the assassin to panic. He noticed the assassin's facial expression and found him suspicious. The assassin then excused himself, saying that he needed to use the latrine, Liu Bei told Zhuge Liang, "I found an extraordinary man who can be a good assistant to you." When Zhuge Liang asked who it was, Liu Bei said, "The man who just went to the latrine." Zhuge Liang took a deep breath and said, "Just now, I saw a look of fear and panic on his face. His avoidance of eye contact and his body language show that he has something evil on his mind. He must be an assassin sent by Cao Cao." Liu Bei immediately ordered the assassin's arrest but the assassin had already fled.[Sanguozhi zhu 49]

Pei Songzhi pointed out the problems in this anecdote. If this incident really happened, the assassin must be a great talent to be able to attract Liu Bei's attention and, in Liu Bei's opinion, worthy enough to serve as an assistant to Zhuge Liang. However, this was unlikely because assassins were typically rough and boorish men ready to sacrifice their lives to accomplish their mission. Besides, it did not make much sense for a man of such talent to be an assassin when he could be better off as an adviser to any of the great warlords. Moreover, as Cao Cao was known for respecting and cherishing talents, it was unlikely that he would willingly sacrifice someone of such talent by sending him on a risky mission. Furthermore, given the significance of this incident, it should be recorded in history, but there is no mention of it in the official histories.[Sanguozhi zhu 50]

Zhuge Liang against Sima Yi with his sons Sima Zhao and Sima Shi, as depicted in the artwork Ruse with an Empty City

Guo Chong's third anecdote concerns Zhuge Liang's alleged use of the Empty Fort Strategy against Sima Yi at Yangping (陽平).[Sanguozhi zhu 51]

In the fourth anecdote, Guo Chong claimed that when Zhuge Liang returned to Chengdu after the first Northern Expedition, he received many compliments from his colleagues for his successes in capturing a few thousand Wei families and making Jiang Wei defect to Shu. However, to their surprise, Zhuge Liang solemnly replied, "All the people under Heaven are people of the Han Empire. Now, the Han Empire isn't revived yet and the people are still suffering from war. It will be my fault even if only one person dies due to war. I dare not accept compliments built on people's miseries." The people of Shu then realised that his goal was to vanquish Wei rather than simply expanding Shu's borders through conquests.[Sanguozhi zhu 52]

Pei Songzhi pointed out that Zhuge Liang's goal of achieving a complete victory over Wei was already well known before he went on the first Northern Expedition, so it seemed very odd for Guo Chong to say that the people of Shu only realised it after Zhuge Liang came back from the first Northern Expedition. He also noted that the first Northern Expedition was an overall failure so the "successes" mentioned in this anecdote neither made sense nor were worthy of compliments. The reasons he gave were as such: Shu lost two battles against Wei in the first Northern Expedition and ultimately failed to conquer the three commanderies; Wei had nothing to lose from the defection of Jiang Wei, who at the time was a relative nobody; and the capture of the few thousand Wei families was insufficient to make up for the casualties the Shu forces suffered at Jieting and Ji Valley.[Sanguozhi zhu 53]

In the fifth anecdote, Guo Chong claimed that during the fourth Northern Expedition, when Zhuge Liang led Shu forces to attack Mount Qi, the Wei emperor Cao Rui decided to launch a counterattack on Shu, so he personally led his forces to Chang'an. He then ordered Sima Yi and Zhang He to lead 300,000 elite Wei soldiers from Yong and Liang provinces on a covert operation deep into Shu territory and launch a stealth attack on Jiange (劍閣; in present-day Jiange County, Sichuan), a strategic mountain pass. Around the time, Zhuge Liang had set up a rotating shift system, in which at any time 20 percent of his troops (about 80,000 men) would be stationed at Mount Qi, while the remaining 80 percent would remain behind. As the Wei forces approached Mount Qi and prepared to attack the Shu positions, Zhuge Liang's subordinates urged him to stop the rotating shift system and concentrate all the Shu forces together to resist the numerically superior Wei forces. Zhuge Liang replied, "When I lead the troops into battle, I operate on the basis of trust. Even the ancients felt it was a shame for one to betray others' trust in him in order to achieve his goals. The soldiers who are due to return home can pack up their belongings and prepare to leave. Their wives have been counting the days and looking forward to their husbands coming home. Even though we are in a difficult and dangerous situation now, we shouldn't break our earlier promise." When the homebound soldiers heard that they were allowed to go home, their morale shot up and they became more motivated to stay back and fight the Wei forces before going home. They talked among themselves and pledged to use their lives to repay Zhuge Liang's kindness. Later, during the battle, they fought fiercely and killed Zhang He and forced Sima Yi to retreat. Zhuge Liang won the battle because he successfully gained the trust of the Shu soldiers.[Sanguozhi zhu 54]

Pei Songzhi pointed out that this anecdote contradicted the accounts from historical records. During the fourth Northern Expedition, Cao Rui was indeed at Chang'an, but he did not personally lead Wei forces into battle. As for the part about Cao Rui ordering Sima Yi and Zhang He to lead a 300,000-strong army to attack Jiange, Pei Songzhi argued that it never happened because it was extremely unlikely for such a large army to pass through the Guanzhong region, bypass Zhuge Liang's position at Mount Qi, and enter Shu territory completely undetected. He also found the part about the rotating shift system untrue because it was impossible for a Shu expeditionary force to enter Wei territory and remain there for so long, much less set up a rotating shift system.[Sanguozhi zhu 55]

After Liu Bei's death, Liu Shan ascended to the throne of Shu Han. He granted Zhuge Liang the title "Marquis of Wu District" (武鄉侯) and created an office for him as a Chancellor. Not long later, Zhuge Liang was appointed Governor of Yi Province – the region which included most of Shu Han's territory.

Being both the Chancellor (directly managing the bureaucrat officers) and provincial governor (directly managing the common people) meant that both the magistrates and common people – all civil affairs in Yi Province – were in the hands of Zhuge Liang. Having an independent Chancellery Office with attached independent subordinates meant that Zhuge Liang's authority was relatively independent of the emperor's authority. In other words, just as attested in Sanguozhi, all of Shu Han's affairs, trivial or vital, were directly handled by Zhuge Liang, and the emperor Liu Shan was just a nominal leader. Moreover, the emperor himself was strictly educated and supervised by Zhuge Liang. This situation was maintained until Liang's death.

There are many attempts who tried to explain why Zhuge Liang refused to return the authority to Liu Shan. Yi Zhongtian proposed three reasons:[15]^: ch.37

1. Zhuge Liang supported the model of the emperor only indirectly lead the country and have a Chancellor to handle the affairs in his name, similar to the situation during the Western Han. In his opinion, if the emperor directly handled the affairs, then there would be no one to blame if problems occurred, but a Chancellor could bear responsibility and punishment for failure.
2. Zhuge Liang stubbornly thought that Liu Shan was not experienced enough to directly handle the state affairs, considered too important to risk error.
3. The situation of Shu Han was indeed very complicated at that time which required extremely well-planned solutions. An inexperienced Liu Shan could not handle such challenging problems, but Zhuge Liang could.

Yi Province's wealthy families, unchecked by previous governors, freely exploited the common people and lived in extravagance. As a result, poverty was widespread, and economic–political reform was the most important concern for Zhuge Liang. A robust economic foundation was also necessary to enhance the people's loyalty to Shu Han regime and properly support the future's expeditions against Cao Wei. Therefore, Zhuge Liang made it clear that the core value of his policy was to stabilize and improve the life of the people.[33]

Zhuge Liang's new policies were enacted during the reign of Liu Bei and continued in the time of Liu Shan. He purged corrupt officials, reduced taxes, and restricted the aristocracy's abuse of power against the common people. Corvée labour and military mobilization were also reduced and rescheduled to avoid the disruption of agriculture activities, and Cao Cao's tuntian system of state-run agricultural colonies was implemented extensively to increase food production output. Agriculture dykes were significantly rebuilt and repaired, including the eponymous Zhuge dyke north of Chengdu. Thanks to the reforms, Shu Han agriculture production grew significantly, sufficient to sustain an active military.

Salt manufacture, silk production, and steelmaking – three major industries in Shu – also attracted Zhuge Liang's attention. Liu Bei, following the proposal of Zhuge Liang, created specialized bureaus for managing salt and steel manufacture, initially directed by Wang Lian and Zhang Yi, respectively. A specialized silk management bureau was also established, and silk production experienced significant growth, leading to Chengdu being nicknamed "the city of Silk". Over the lifetime of the Shu Han state, it accumulated 200,000 pieces of silk in the national treasury. Sanguozhi reported that salt production in Shu Han was highly prosperous and generated significant income to the government. Fu Yuan, a well-known local metalsmith, was appointed to a role in metallurgy research by Zhuge Liang, and managed to improve the techniques in crafting steel weapons for the Shu Han army.

Due to political turmoil, monetary systems at the end of the Han dynasty were in severe turbulence. When establishing themselves in the Yi Province, Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang, following the advice of Liu Ba, enacted successful monetary reforms. The new Shu Han currency was not only smoothly circulated within its borders, but also popular in the neighboring Jing province. Meanwhile, similar policies of Cao Pi, Cao Rui, and Sun Quan were marred by difficulties and achieved limited success.[34]

Zhuge Liang strongly supported the rule of law in Shu Han. Yi Zhongtian commented that "Rule of Laws" together with "Nominal rule of the Monarch and direct rule of the Chancellor" are two important legacies of Zhuge Liang which were unfortunately forgotten by many people.[15]^: Epilogue

After Liu Bei took over Yi province, Zhuge Liang, together with Fa Zheng, Liu Ba, Li Yan and Yi Ji, wrote the legal codes for Shu Han.[Sanguozhi 81]

In order to curb the corruption and attendant decadence of the local Yi aristocracy, Zhuge Liang enacted a Legalist policy with strict but fair and transparent laws, and restricted the power of wealthy families. Zhuge Liang was willing to punish high-ranked magistrates such as Li Yan, his own close associates such as Ma Su, and even willing to demote himself to keep legal order. However he also refrained from abusing punishment and required extreme caution in law enforcement. Xi Zuochi praised Zhuge Liang's policy of legal rule, that "since the era of Qin and Han there had been no one as equal." Even punished magistrates like Li Yan and Liao Li highly regarded Zhuge Liang and strongly believed that he would re-employ them after the punishment was enough.[Sanguozhi 82][33]

Zhuge Liang also promoted moral conduct and himself led a strict and stoic life as a model. He did not own excessive assets, refrained from luxurious spending, and relied mainly on government salary. Shu Han's magistrates, like Deng Zhi, Fei Yi, Jiang Wei, Zhang Yi also followed suit, strictly abiding by the legal and moral codes, enabling the Shu government to maintain a high level of transparency and integrity.[33] Yi Zhongtian praised Shu Han as the best model of "rational rule" amongst the Three Kingdoms, and it is the incorruptibility and transparency of Zhuge Liang and his associates that kept Shu Han from collapsing under a heavy burden of expenditure.[15]^: ch.42,48

Not everybody was happy with such Legalist policies. Guo Chong's characterised Zhuge Liang's policy "cruel" and "exploitative", claiming "everybody from the noble to the commoner" was upset. Pei Songzhi disagreed with such comments, considering Zhuge Liang's law enforcement appropriate and rejecting claims of exploitation.[Sanguozhi zhu 58] Guo Chong's perspective also contradicted Chen Shou's comment that "nobody was upset despite the strict laws". Yi Zhongtian commented that both contradictory assessments were correct, as Shu people were happy about Zhuge Liang's fairness and transparency, but some of them were also upset about his strictness. Moreover, Zhuge Liang's fairness and legal rule inevitably suppressed the local aristocracy, preventing them from abusing their power and manipulate politics and public opinion. That is the reason why many of the local Shu intellegistia tacitly endorsed the invasion of Wei against Shu, although they also respected Zhuge Liang.[15]^{: ch.42,48, Epilogue} This is supported by contemporary sources, including Zhang Wen[Sanguozhi 83] and Sun Quan. Yuan Zhun of the Jin dynasty also highly appraised Zhuge Liang's administration skills and popularity,[Sanguozhi zhu 59] where people would still sing praises to Zhuge Liang decades after his death.[Sanguozhi zhu 60]

Zhuge Liang greatly appreciated talent, hence he paid strong attention to education in order to cultivate and recruit more talented magistrates for the Shu Han government. He established the position Aide of Learning Encouragement (勸斈從事), held by many prominent local intelligentsia such as Qiao Zhou, who held this post for a very long time and was very influential. Chen Shou was one of his students. Later Zhuge Liang established a Great Education Residence (太斈府), a training facility using Confucian literature as textbooks. He also created many "reading book residences" both in Chengdu and in his encampments during the northern expeditions; such facilities functioned as places where talented people could be discovered and recruited. Yao Tian, Shu Han's governor of Guanghan district, managed to recommend many talented people to the government, to Zhuge Liang's lavish praise.[35]

Zhuge Liang also established "Discussion Bureau" mechanism to gather all the discussions of a certain policy, encourage magistrates to accept the criticisms of their subordinates, and utilize the talents of all employees to reach the best decision. Zhuge Liang adopted a meritocratic promotion system, promoting and assessing people based on deeds and abiliy rather than fame or background.[35]

Zhuge Liang was believed to be the inventor of the Chinese steamed bun, the land mine and a mysterious but efficient automatic transportation device (initially used for grain) referred to as the "wooden ox and flowing horse" (木牛流馬), which is sometimes identified with the wheelbarrow.

Although he is often credited with the invention of the repeating crossbow that is named after him and called the "Zhuge Crossbow" (諸葛弩), this type of semi-automatic crossbow is an improved version of a model that first appeared during the Warring States period. There is debate over whether the original Warring States period bow was semi-automatic, or rather shot multiple bolts at once. Nevertheless, Zhuge Liang's improved model could shoot farther and faster.[36]

Zhuge Liang is also credited with constructing the Stone Sentinel Maze, an array of stone piles that is said to produce supernatural phenomena, near Baidicheng. An early type of hot air balloon used for military signalling, known as the Kongming lantern, is also named after him.[37] It was said to have been invented by Zhuge Liang when he was trapped by Sima Yi in Pingyang. Friendly forces nearby saw the message on the lantern paper covering and came to Zhuge Liang's aid. Another belief is that the lantern resembled Zhuge Liang's headdress, so it was named after him.[38]

Some books popularly attributed to Zhuge Liang can be found today, for example the Thirty-Six Stratagems and Mastering the Art of War (not to be confused with The Art of War attributed to Sun Tzu). Supposedly, his mastery of infantry and cavalry formation tactics based on the classic I Ching, was unrivalled. His memorial Chu Shi Biao, written prior to the Northern Expeditions, provided a salutary reflection of his unswerving loyalty to the state of Shu.[39] The memorial moved some readers to tears. In addition, he wrote Admonition to His Son (諸葛亮誡子書) in which he reflected on his humility and frugality in pursuit of a meaningful life.[40]

Zhuge is also the subject of many Chinese literary works. Poems by the prolific and highly regarded Tang dynasty poet Du Fu were written in memory of him, whose legacy of unwavering dedication seems to have been forgotten in Du's generation, judging by the description of Zhuge's neglected temple. Two such pieces were written as part of Du Fu's acclaimed "Kuizhou poems".[41]

Another poem of Du Fu was also written to praise Zhuge Liang at his Baidicheng temple.

Du Fu's quatrain "Eightfold Battle Formation" (八陣圖) about Zhuge Liang's Stone Sentinel Maze, is collected in the Three Hundred Tang Poems.

The phrase "Han and bandits do not stand together" (simplified Chinese: 汉贼不两立; traditional Chinese: 漢賊不兩立; pinyin: Hàn zéi bù liǎng lì) from the Later Chu Shi Biao is often used to draw a line in the sand and declare a situation where one cannot stand with evil. Notably, this phrase was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's favorite quote to invoke to justify his anti-communist ideology.

Another phrase "deference and prudence, to a state of depletion, are never finished until death" (simplified Chinese: 鞠躬尽瘁，死而后已; traditional Chinese: 鞠躬盡瘁，死而後已; pinyin: jū gōng jìn cuì, sǐ ér hòu yǐ) from the Later Chu Shi Biao is often used to describe commitment and perseverance to strive to the utmost.

One famous line of poetry, "Who is the first, awakened from the Great Dream? As always, I'm the one who knows." (simplified Chinese: 大梦谁先觉？平生我自知.; traditional Chinese: 大夢誰先覺？平生我自知.; pinyin: dà mèng shuí xiān jué ? píng shēng wǒ zì zhī), was also attributed to Zhuge Liang.

When Zhuge Liang fell critically ill during the Battle of Wuzhang Plains, he attempted a ritual to extend his lifespan by twelve years. However, he failed when the ritual was disrupted by Wei Yan, who rushed in to warn him about the enemy's advance.[45] Before his death, Zhuge Liang also passed his 24 Volumes on Military Strategy (兵法二十四篇) to Jiang Wei,[46] who would continue his legacy and lead another eleven campaigns against the Cao Wei state.

Notable actors who have portrayed Zhuge Liang in film and television include:

• Adam Cheng in The Legendary Prime Minister – Zhuge Liang (1985)
• Li Fazeng in Zhuge Liang (1985)
• Tang Guoqiang in Romance of the Three Kingdoms (1994)
• Pu Cunxin in Three Kingdoms: Resurrection of the Dragon (2008)
• Takeshi Kaneshiro in Red Cliff (2008–09)
• Lu Yi in Three Kingdoms (2010)
• Raymond Lam in Three Kingdoms RPG (2012)
• Wang Luoyong in The Advisors Alliance (2017)

Zhuge Liang appears as a playable character in various video games based on the 14th-century historical novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, most notably Koei Tecmo's Dynasty Warriors series, Romance of the Three Kingdoms series, Warriors Orochi series, Dynasty Tactics series, Kessen II and Sangokushi Koumeiden. He also appears in other games such as Capcom's Destiny of an Emperor, Firaxis Games's Civilization IV and Civilization V, as well as Destiny of Spirits and the mobile games Puzzle & Dragons and Fate/Grand Order.

In the collectible card game Magic: The Gathering, there is a card named Kongming, "Sleeping Dragon" in the Portal Three Kingdoms and Commander (2013 Edition) sets.

Zhuge Liang is also featured in the Qun Xiong Zheng Ba (群雄争霸) and Ao Shi Tian Xia (傲视天下) sets of the collectible card game Generals Order.

Zhuge Liang is also a main character in the card game Legends of the Three Kingdoms.

The young Zhuge Liang is a member of the League of Infinity in the superhero pastiche Supreme by Alan Moore.

In the manhwa Faeries' Landing, the protagonist of the story is a high school student named Ryang Jegal, whose life is turned upside-down by a fairy and her heavenly (and not-so-heavenly) peers. Ryang Jegal, or Jegal Ryang in the proper Asian sequence, is the Korean translation of "Zhuge Liang".

The Japanese manga and anime series Ya Boy Kongming! portrays Zhuge Liang reincarnated into present-day Japan and assisted Eiko Tsukimi to become a successful singer by becoming her "tactician" and subsequently became a part-time bartender at the BB Lounge.

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