Korea Liaison Office

In August 1950, By this point, it had around 1,000 to 6,000 members.[13]

In September 1950, KLO took part in Operation Trudy Jackson for Incheon Landing.

After the Chinese People's Volunteer Army joined the war in October 1950, UN Forces began a chaotic retreat South. During this period, United Nations Command turned towards intelligence organizations, including the KLO, for intelligence. But the KLO did not have any agents in the area, nor did it have radios. In desperation, the KLO airdropped twelve two-man teams with smoke grenades to signal where enemy troops were present. Only a few smoke signals were seen, and none reported the presence of enemies.

On December 20, the Army activated the 442nd Counterintelligence Corps detachment, which assumed operational control over the KLO and division-level TLOs. The 442nd was able to procure boats for the KLO.[14]

In January 1951, FECOM tasked Colonel John H. McGee of the Eighth Army with reorienting the KLO towards more tactical instead of intelligence operations.[3][15] To this end, the Eight Army began establishing Tactical Liaison Offices (TLO) in various locations.[3] These TLO offices trained operatives who initially largely conducted offensive operations, although they moved more towards intelligence roles in the later parts of the war.[3]

In July 1951, the various sides began discussing an armistice. These talks eventually led to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement and the end of active combat in the Korean War.

On July 26, the US Army reorganized its intelligence organizations and deactivated the Far East Command Liaison Group (FEC/LG). This brought an end to the KLO, although many of its personnel, operations, and assets were transferred to the 8240th Army Unit under the new Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea (FEC/LD (K))[16]

By the fall, many of the former KLO's tactics were improved upon. The FEC/LD (K) and Eighth Army established long-term positions behind enemy lines. There, agents communicated via radio and received supplies from airdrops. The two organizations also established bases on islands along the west coast of Korea, where they would launch "Salamander operations": the use of boats to deploy and retrieve agents. They also continued Aviary operations, although they adopted the tactic of deploying agents close to enemy lines, and having them disguised as North Korean soldiers. These factors significantly improved the success rate of missions.[16]

On December 10, 1951, a new theater-level organization for intelligence operations was created: the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK). As part of this, the FEC/LD/K was given more partisan and psychological warfare missions. It was also expanded; it went from 150 personnel in February 1952 to 450 in summer 1953. By this point, they had 2,100 agents, with seventeen positions in the North.[17]

However, according to military historian John Patrick Finnegan, their agents in the North produced limited results, and nothing indicates that they ever supplied significant intelligence on enemy plans. Despite this, their intelligence was highly valued, as the Army had significantly fewer prisoners of war to rely on for information by this point.[18]

The U.S.'s inability to predict both the North's invasion and the Chinese entrance into the Korean War has remained a subject of academic analysis for decades.[19][12] Finnegan argues that the KLO and FECOMLDK produced intelligence of "highly mixed value" and that it was merely seen as better than having no intelligence operations, although their work improved after the stalemate. He also notes that, unlike in the European theater of World War II, Koreans had little experience with modern intelligence operations, and received extremely little training before deployment. In addition, translators (in both Korean and Chinese) had long been in significantly short supply even before the war.[20]

Many agents were not paid wages,[13][9] and the ones that did received very low pay.[21] Families of deceased agents were also not paid any compensation,[13][9] and agents who died while serving did not receive honors or recognition from the South Korean government.[9] This issue was brought to national attention in 2000, when it was presented to the National Assembly.[9] In 2004, veterans of the KLO petitioned the U.S. government for compensation, but their request was rejected on the grounds that they were not legally considered members of the U.S. Armed Forces. In January 2004, the South Korean government passed a law to compensate South Korean agents, but the KLO veterans were exempted from this, as they were considered agents of the United States.[13]

Finally, in April 2021, the South Korean government passed the Act to Compensate Irregular Servicemen During the Korean War. Under this, around 4,800 groups of surviving veterans or their families would each receive ₩10 million ($8,900), and deceased veterans would be honored. The delayed timing and amount of money provided were both criticized. By this point, around 100 veterans were still alive, with many well over 80 years old.[9][22]