Later-no-harm criterion
The later-no-harm criterion is a voting system criterion formulated by Douglas Woodall. Woodall defined the criterion as "[a]dding a later preference to a ballot should not harm any candidate already listed."[1] For example, a ranked voting method in which a voter adding a 3rd preference could reduce the likelihood of their 1st preference being selected, fails later-no-harm.
Name | Comply? |
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Two-round system | Yes |
Single transferable vote | Yes |
Instant-runoff voting | Yes |
Contingent vote | Yes |
Minimax Condorcet | Yes/No |
Anti-plurality | No |
Approval voting | No |
Borda count | No |
Dodgson's method | No |
Copeland's method | No |
Kemeny–Young method | No |
Ranked Pairs | No |
Schulze method | No |
Score voting | No |
Usual judgment | No |
Voting systems that fail the later-no-harm criterion are vulnerable to the tactical voting strategies called bullet voting and burying, which can deny victory to a sincere Condorcet winner. However, the fact that all cardinal voting methods fail the later-no-harm criterion is essential to their favoring consensus options (broad, moderate support) over majoritarian options (narrow, strong support).[2]
Complying methods
The two-round system, single transferable vote, instant-runoff voting, contingent vote, Minimax Condorcet (a pairwise opposition variant which does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion), and Descending Solid Coalitions, a variant of Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions rule, satisfy the later-no-harm criterion.
When a voter is allowed to choose only one preferred candidate, as in plurality voting, later-no-harm can be either considered satisfied (as the voter's later preferences can not harm their chosen candidate) or not applicable.
Noncomplying methods
Approval voting, Borda count, score voting, majority judgment, Bucklin voting, ranked pairs, the Schulze method, the Kemeny-Young method, Copeland's method, and Nanson's method do not satisfy later-no-harm. The Condorcet criterion is incompatible with later-no-harm (assuming the discrimination axiom, according to which any tie can be removed by some single voter changing her rating).[1]
Plurality-at-large voting, which allows the voter to select up to a certain number of candidates, doesn't satisfy later-no-harm when used to fill two or more seats in a single district.
Checking Compliance
Checking for satisfaction of the Later-no-harm criterion requires ascertaining the probability of a voter's preferred candidate being elected before and after adding a later preference to the ballot, to determine any decrease in probability. Later-no-harm presumes that later preferences are added to the ballot sequentially, so that candidates already listed are preferred to a candidate added later.
Examples
Anti-plurality
Anti-plurality elects the candidate the fewest voters rank last when submitting a complete ranking of the candidates.
Later-No-Harm can be considered not applicable to Anti-Plurality if the method is assumed to not accept truncated preference listings from the voter. On the other hand, Later-No-Harm can be applied to Anti-Plurality if the method is assumed to apportion the last place vote among unlisted candidates equally, as shown in the example below.
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Assume four voters (marked bold) submit a truncated preference listing A > B = C by apportioning the possible orderings for B and C equally. Each vote is counted A > B > C, and A > C > B:
Result: A is listed last on 2 ballots; B is listed last on 3 ballots; C is listed last on 3 ballots. A is listed last on the least ballots. A wins.
Now assume that the four voters supporting A (marked bold) add later preference C, as follows:
Result: A is listed last on 2 ballots; B is listed last on 5 ballots; C is listed last on 1 ballot. C is listed last on the least ballots. C wins. A loses.
The four voters supporting A decrease the probability of A winning by adding later preference C to their ballot, changing A from the winner to a loser. Thus, Anti-plurality doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion when truncated ballots are considered to apportion the last place vote amongst unlisted candidates equally. |
Approval voting
Since Approval voting does not allow voters to differentiate their views about candidates for whom they choose to vote and the later-no-harm criterion explicitly requires the voter's ability to express later preferences on the ballot, the criterion using this definition is not applicable for Approval voting.
However, if the later-no-harm criterion is expanded to consider the preferences within the mind of the voter to determine whether a preference is "later" instead of actually expressing it as a later preference as demanded in the definition, Approval would not satisfy the criterion. Under Approval voting, this may in some cases encourage the tactical voting strategy called bullet voting.
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This can be seen with the following example with two candidates A and B and 3 voters:
Assume that the two voters supporting A (marked bold) would also approve their later preference B. Result: A is approved by two voters, B by all three voters. Thus, B is the Approval winner.
Assume now that the two voters supporting A (marked bold) would not approve their last preference B on the ballots:
Result: A is approved by two voters, B by only one voter. Thus, A is the Approval winner.
By approving an additional less preferred candidate the two A > B voters have caused their favourite candidate to lose. Thus, Approval voting doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. |
Borda count
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This example shows that the Borda count violates the Later-no-harm criterion. Assume three candidates A, B and C and 5 voters with the following preferences:
Assume that all preferences are expressed on the ballots. The positions of the candidates and computation of the Borda points can be tabulated as follows:
Result: B wins with 7 Borda points.
Assume now that the three voters supporting A (marked bold) would not express their later preferences on the ballots:
The positions of the candidates and computation of the Borda points can be tabulated as follows:
Result: A wins with 6 Borda points.
By hiding their later preferences about B, the three voters could change their first preference A from loser to winner. Thus, the Borda count doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. |
Coombs' method
Coombs' method repeatedly eliminates the candidate listed last on most ballots, until a winner is reached. If at any time a candidate wins an absolute majority of first place votes among candidates not eliminated, that candidate is elected.
Later-No-Harm can be considered not applicable to Coombs if the method is assumed to not accept truncated preference listings from the voter. On the other hand, Later-No-Harm can be applied to Coombs if the method is assumed to apportion the last place vote among unlisted candidates equally, as shown in the example below.
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Assume ten voters (marked bold) submit a truncated preference listing A > B = C by apportioning the possible orderings for B and C equally. Each vote is counted A > B > C, and A > C > B:
Result: A is listed last on 17 ballots; B is listed last on 14 ballots; C is listed last on 19 ballots. C is listed last on the most ballots. C is eliminated, and A defeats B pairwise 33 to 17. A wins.
Now assume that the ten voters supporting A (marked bold) add later preference C, as follows:
Result: A is listed last on 17 ballots; B is listed last on 19 ballots; C is listed last on 14 ballots. B is listed last on the most ballots. B is eliminated, and C defeats A pairwise 26 to 24. A loses.
The ten voters supporting A decrease the probability of A winning by adding later preference C to their ballot, changing A from the winner to a loser. Thus, Coombs' method doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion when truncated ballots are considered to apportion the last place vote amongst unlisted candidates equally. |
Copeland
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This example shows that Copeland's method violates the Later-no-harm criterion. Assume four candidates A, B, C and D with 4 potential voters and the following preferences:
Assume that all preferences are expressed on the ballots. The results would be tabulated as follows:
Result: B has two wins and no defeat, A has only one win and no defeat. Thus, B is elected Copeland winner.
Assume now, that the two voters supporting A (marked bold) would not express their later preferences on the ballots:
The results would be tabulated as follows:
Result: A has one win and no defeat, B has no win and no defeat. Thus, A is elected Copeland winner.
By hiding their later preferences, the two voters could change their first preference A from loser to winner. Thus, Copeland's method doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. |
Dodgson's method
Dodgson's' method elects a Condorcet winner if there is one, and otherwise elects the candidate who can become the Condorcet winner after the fewest ordinal preference swaps on voters' ballots.
Later-No-Harm can be considered not applicable to Dodgson if the method is assumed to not accept truncated preference listings from the voter. On the other hand, Later-No-Harm can be applied to Dodgson if the method is assumed to apportion possible rankings among unlisted candidates equally, as shown in the example below.
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Assume ten voters (marked bold) submit a truncated preference listing A > B = C by apportioning the possible orderings for B and C equally. Each vote is counted A > B > C, and A > C > B:
Result: There is no Condorcet winner. A is the Dodgson winner, because A becomes the Condorcet Winner with only two ordinal preference swaps (changing B > A to A > B). A wins.
Now assume that the ten voters supporting A (marked bold) add later preference B, as follows:
Result: B is the Condorcet Winner and the Dodgson winner. B wins. A loses.
The ten voters supporting A decrease the probability of A winning by adding later preference B to their ballot, changing A from the winner to a loser. Thus, Dodgson's method doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion when truncated ballots are considered to apportion the possible rankings amongst unlisted candidates equally. |
Kemeny–Young method
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This example shows that the Kemeny–Young method violates the Later-no-harm criterion. Assume three candidates A, B and C and 9 voters with the following preferences:
Assume that all preferences are expressed on the ballots. The Kemeny–Young method arranges the pairwise comparison counts in the following tally table:
The ranking scores of all possible rankings are:
Result: The ranking C > A > B has the highest ranking score. Thus, the Condorcet winner C wins ahead of A and B.
Assume now that the three voters supporting A (marked bold) would not express their later preferences on the ballots:
The Kemeny–Young method arranges the pairwise comparison counts in the following tally table:
The ranking scores of all possible rankings are:
Result: The ranking B > C > A has the highest ranking score. Thus, B wins ahead of A and B.
By hiding their later preferences about B and C, the three voters could change their first preference A from loser to winner. Thus, the Kemeny-Young method doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. Note, that IRV - by ignoring the Condorcet winner C in the first case - would choose A in both cases. |
Majority judgment
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Considering, that an unrated candidate is assumed to be receiving the worst possible rating, this example shows that majority judgment violates the later-no-harm criterion. Assume two candidates A and B with 3 potential voters and the following ratings:
Assume that all ratings are expressed on the ballots. The sorted ratings would be as follows:
Result: A has the median rating of "Fair" and B has the median rating of "Good". Thus, B is elected majority judgment winner.
Assume now that the voter supporting A (marked bold) would not express his later ratings on the ballot. Note, that this is handled as if the voter would have rated that candidate with the worst possible rating "Poor":
The sorted ratings would be as follows:
Result: A has still the median rating of "Fair". Since the voter revoked his acceptance of the rating "Good" for B, B now has the median rating of "Poor". Thus, A is elected majority judgment winner.
By hiding his later rating for B, the voter could change his highest-rated favorite A from loser to winner. Thus, majority judgment doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. Note, that this only depends on the handling of not-rated candidates. If all not-rated candidates would receive the best-possible rating, majority judgment would satisfy the later-no-harm criterion, but not later-no-help. If instead majority judgment ignored unrated candidates and computed the median solely from the values that the voters expressed, a voter in a later-no-harm scenario could only help candidates for whom the voter has a higher honest opinion than the society has. |
Minimax
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This example shows that the Minimax method violates the Later-no-harm criterion in its two variants winning votes and margins. Note that the third variant of the Minimax method (pairwise opposition) meets the later-no-harm criterion. Since all the variants are identical if equal ranks are not allowed, there can be no example for Minimax's violation of the later-no-harm criterion without using equal ranks. Assume four candidates A, B, C and D and 23 voters with the following preferences:
Assume that all preferences are expressed on the ballots. The results would be tabulated as follows:
Result: C has the closest biggest defeat. Thus, C is elected Minimax winner for variants winning votes and margins. Note, that with the pairwise opposition variant, A is Minimax winner, since A has in no duel an opposition that equals the opposition C had to overcome in his victory against D.
Assume now that the four voters supporting A (marked bold) would not express their later preferences over C and D on the ballots:
The results would be tabulated as follows:
Result: Now, A has the closest biggest defeat. Thus, A is elected Minimax winner in all variants. ConclusionBy hiding their later preferences about C and D, the four voters could change their first preference A from loser to winner. Thus, the variants winning votes and margins of the Minimax method doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. |
Ranked pairs
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For example, in an election conducted using the Condorcet compliant method Ranked pairs the following votes are cast:
B is preferred to A by 51 votes to 49 votes. A is preferred to C by 49 votes to 26 votes. C is preferred to B by 26 votes to 25 votes. There is no Condorcet winner; A, B, and C are all weak Condorcet winners and B is the Ranked pairs winner. Suppose the 25 B voters give an additional preference to their second choice C. The votes are now:
C is preferred to A by 51 votes to 49 votes. C is preferred to B by 26 votes to 25 votes. B is preferred to A by 51 votes to 49 votes. C is now the Condorcet winner and therefore the Ranked pairs winner. By giving a second preference to candidate C the 25 B voters have caused their first choice to be defeated, and by giving a second preference to candidate B, the 26 C voters have caused their first choice to succeed. Similar examples can be constructed for any Condorcet-compliant method, as the Condorcet and later-no-harm criteria are incompatible. Minimax is generally classed as a Condorcet method, but the pairwise opposition variant which meets later-no-harm doesn't actually satisfy the Condorcet criterion. |
Score voting
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This example shows that Score voting violates the Later-no-harm criterion, and how in theory the tactical voting strategy called bullet voting could be a response. Assume two candidates A and B and 2 voters with the following preferences:
Assume that all preferences are expressed on the ballots. The total scores would be:
Result: B is the Score voting winner.
Assume now that the voter supporting A (marked bold) would not express his later preference on the ballot:
The total scores would be:
Result: A is the Score voting winner.
By withholding his opinion on the less-preferred B candidate, the voter caused his first preference (A) to win the election. This both proves that Score voting is not immune to strategic voting (as no system is), and shows that Score voting doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. It should also be noted that this effect can only occur if the voter's expressed opinion on B (the less-preferred candidate) is higher than the opinion of the electorate about that later preference is. Thus, a later-no-harm scenario can only turn a candidate into a winner if the voter likes that candidate more than the rest of the electorate does. |
Schulze method
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This example shows that the Schulze method doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. Assume three candidates A, B and C and 16 voters with the following preferences:
Assume that all preferences are expressed on the ballots. The pairwise preferences would be tabulated as follows:
Result: B is Condorcet winner and thus, the Schulze method will elect B. Hide later preferencesAssume now that the three voters supporting A (marked bold) would not express their later preferences on the ballots:
The pairwise preferences would be tabulated as follows:
Now, the strongest paths have to be identified, e.g. the path A > C > B is stronger than the direct path A > B (which is nullified, since it is a loss for A).
Result: The full ranking is A > C > B. Thus, A is elected Schulze winner.
By hiding their later preferences about B and C, the three voters could change their first preference A from loser to winner. Thus, the Schulze method doesn't satisfy the Later-no-harm criterion. |
Criticism
Woodall, author of the Later-no-harm writes:
[U]nder STV the later preferences on a ballot are not even considered until the fates of all candidates of earlier preference have been decided. Thus a voter can be certain that adding extra preferences to his or her preference listing can neither help nor harm any candidate already listed. Supporters of STV usually regard this as a very important property,[3] although it has to be said that not everyone agrees; the property has been described (by Michael Dummett, in a letter to Robert Newland) as "quite unreasonable", and (by an anonymous referee) as "unpalatable".[4]
References
- Douglas Woodall (1997): Monotonicity of Single-Seat Election Rules, Theorem 2 (b)
- Hillinger, Claude (2005). "The Case for Utilitarian Voting". SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.732285. ISSN 1556-5068. S2CID 12873115. Retrieved 2022-05-27.
- The Non-majority Rule Desk (July 29, 2011). "Why Approval Voting is Unworkable in Contested Elections - FairVote". FairVote Blog. Retrieved 11 October 2016.
- Woodall, Douglas, Properties of Preferential Election Rules, Voting matters - Issue 3, December 1994
- D R Woodall, "Properties of Preferential Election Rules", Voting matters, Issue 3, December 1994
- Tony Anderson Solgard and Paul Landskroener, Bench and Bar of Minnesota, Vol 59, No 9, October 2002.
- Brown v. Smallwood, 1915