Lex Vatinia

The lex Vatinia (probably passed in May or early June 59 BC)[1][2][3] also known as the lex Vatinia de provincia Caesaris[4] or the lex Vatinia de imperio Caesaris,[5] was legislation which gave Gaius Julius Caesar governorship of the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years.[6][7][3] It was named after and proposed, in the Tribal Assembly, by plebeian tribune Publius Vatinius.[8] Along with the provinces, it also gave him the three legions already present there and the privilege of naming his own legates.[9] Caesar also received Titus Labienus as legatus cum imperio in the law; Labienus' appointment may have been, according to Syme, a sign of friendship between Pompey and Caesar.[10]

Caesar seemed to want to use the law to prepare for a war of choice against the kingdom of Dacia.[11] However, after the unexpected death of the governor of Transalpine Gaul, and at the proposal of Pompey and Piso,[6] the senate also added to Caesar's assigned provinces the further Gaul as well, giving him another legion.[8] According to Cicero and Suetonius, the senate's assignment was done out of fear that if they did not do so, a tribune would introduce and the people would pass further legislation assigning the province as well.[12]

Impact

The army assigned to Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul and the provinces close to it would prove both useful in Caesar's civil war and, in the immediate term, for the protection of Caesar's legislative programme against repeal.[13] The law – importantly – gave Caesar, as governor of the provinces, a chance to show his martial quality with great potential for military glory. To that end, he campaigned extensively in Germany, Britain, and Gaul; the selection of the provinces also helped in that the provincial populations were flush with Roman citizens who could be recruited for Caesar's campaigns.[8]

Caesar's position in Transalpine Gaul was annually reviewed by the senate.[14] When the five year term expired, Caesar met with Pompey, Crassus, and others at the so-called Luca Conference where they renewed their political alliance and pushed through legislation to extend Caesar's Gallic commands in their entirety.[15]

The granting of a proconsulship in Gaul also gave Caesar legal immunity against prosecution by his political enemies and a number of armies.[16] While Caesar did not appear to desire a war against his countrymen upon his prorogation pro consule to Gaul and Illyricum, the following Gallic Wars and his subsequent personal popularity, led to a confrontation with the senate and Caesar's decision to go to war to protect his personal interests.[16][17][18]

See also

References
  1. Taylor 1968, p. 173.
  2. Drougla 2015, p. 306.
  3. Jameson 1970, p. 645.
  4. Jehne, Martin (2017). "Why the anti-Caesarians failed: political communication on the eve of the civil war". In Rosillo-Lopez, Christina (ed.). Political communication in the Roman World. Brill. p. 210. ISBN 9789004350847.
  5. Taylor, Lily Ross (1951). "On the Chronology of Caesar's First Consulship". American Journal of Philology. 72 (3): 254–268. doi:10.2307/292075. ISSN 0002-9475. JSTOR 292075.
  6. von Ungern-Sternberg, Jurgen (2014). "The Crisis of the Republic". In Flower, Harriet (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 91. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521807948. ISBN 9781139000338.
  7. Drogula 2015, p. 371.
  8. Chrissanthos, Stefan (2019). The Year of Julius and Caesar: 59 BC and the Transformation of the Roman Republic. Baltimore: JHU Press. p. 73. ISBN 978-1-4214-2969-4. OCLC 1057781585.
  9. Taylor 1968, p. 182.
  10. Drogula 2015, p. 336.
  11. Drogula 2015, p. 316.
  12. Drogula 2015, p. 316. Citing Cic. Att. 8.3.3; Suet. Iul. 22.1.
  13. Taylor 1968, p. 188. Quoting Syme, Ronald (1944). "Review of Caesar der Politiker und Staatsman". The Journal of Roman Studies. 34: 98. doi:10.2307/296786. ISSN 0075-4358. JSTOR 296786. S2CID 162600706.
  14. Jameson 1970, p. 646.
  15. Gruen, Erich S. (1969). "Pompey, the Roman Aristocracy, and the Conference of Luca". Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 18 (1): 100. ISSN 0018-2311. JSTOR 4435061.
  16. Bucher, Gregory S (2011). "Caesar: the view from Rome". The Classical Outlook. 88 (3): 82–87. ISSN 0009-8361. JSTOR 43940076.
  17. Ehrhardt, C. T. H. R. (1995). "Crossing the Rubicon". Antichthon. 29: 30–41. doi:10.1017/S0066477400000927. ISSN 0066-4774. S2CID 142429003.
  18. Morstein-Marx, Robert (2007). "Caesar's Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His "Ratio Absentis" in the Approach to the Civil War". Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 56 (2): 159–178. doi:10.25162/historia-2007-0013. ISSN 0018-2311. JSTOR 25598386. S2CID 159090397.

Sources

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