Mikhail Borodin

Following Sun Yat-sen's request for help from the Comintern, Borodin was ordered to lead a contingent of Soviet advisors to Guangzhou, where Sun had established a revolutionary government in the aftermath of the Constitutional Protection Movement.[21] Borodin understood no Chinese; English was to be the medium of discussion between the two. At this time, he was accompanied by Ho Chi Minh, the future Vietnamese communist leader, who then served as his secretary.[22] Borodin was known for speaking with a clear midwestern American accent that offered no indication of his Russian origin, allowing him to easily communicate with the largely anglophone and American-educated leadership of the Kuomintang (KMT).[23][24]

Greeted upon his arrival in Guangzhou by Eugene Chen, with whom he later became close, Borodin found that Sun's government was teetering on the brink of collapse. Faced with rampant corruption, anti-Bolshevik feeling in parts of the KMT, and the ever-present threat of the warlords and the Beijing-based Beiyang government, Borodin was tasked with reforming the Kuomintang into a potent revolutionary force.[25]

Borodin in Nanchang, 1926

He negotiated the First United Front between Sun's KMT and the nascent Chinese Communist Party (CCP), convincing that party, which consisted of only about 300 members at that time,[26] that the alliance was in its long-term interest, as it would facilitate the organisation of both urban and rural workers. Under Borodin's tutelage, both parties were reorganised on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, and training institutes for mass organisation were established, such as the Peasant Training Institute, where the young Mao Zedong served, and the Whampoa Military Academy, which trained officers for the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He arranged shipments of Soviet arms and shrewdly kept a balance between the middle-class elements of the KMT and the more radical CCP.[27][28]

When the forces of rebel general Chen Jiongming threatened Sun's base in Guangzhou in November 1923, Borodin proposed a mobilisation of the masses in defence of the city.[29] To accomplish this, he suggested a promise of redistribution of landlord property to the local peasantry, an eight-hour working day for urban labourers, and a minimum wage. Sun rejected land reform because of strong opposition from some of his allies, though agreed to the proposals in principle, and offered a 25% rent reduction instead.[29][30] In the event, Sun's military forces were able to drive the rebels away, and the rent reduction proposal was never implemented.[29]

In 1924, KMT leaders gradually grew weary of the influence of the Communist Party. When Borodin was confronted on this subject, he stated that continued Soviet aid was linked to co-operation with the communists. Leading figures in the CCP, including Mao Zedong, however, came to advocate an end to co-operation. Borodin made clear to them that their continued participation in the United Front was both necessary and expected.[31] When a group of American supporters of the KMT attempted to warn Sun of the danger of the growing Soviet influence in his party, asking, in a subtle anti-semitic attack, whether Sun knew Borodin's real name, Sun replied that it was "Lafayette".[32][33] In the latter part of 1924, Borodin travelled to meet the "Christian General" Feng Yuxiang, whom he attempted to bring into the Kuomintang fold. Feng and Borodin got along well, and although Feng did not join the KMT at this juncture, he did allow KMT propagandists and agitators to embed with his army, bolstering its cause.[34]

After Sun's death in 1925, the growth of a radical peasant and worker movement continued to be encouraged by the CCP, but was opposed by many in the KMT.[35] The leftist wing of the KMT was strengthened by the Canton–Hong Kong strike, which broke out amidst anti-imperialist fervour after the British-run police force of the Shanghai International Settlement opened fire on Chinese protestors on 30 May 1925.[36] Borodin wrote that: "[the Canton–Hong Kong strike] was really not an economic strike. It was the quintessence of the anti-imperialist movement and the most militant expression of that movement. That it concentrated on Great Britain was not a matter of specific policy. Had it been Formosa or the Philippines it would have been directed against Japan or America. It was a political strike pure and simple".[36] Against this backdrop of rising leftist influence, in November 1925, a faction of anti-communist KMT members called the "Western Hills Group" met near Beijing, where they issued a declaration terminating Borodin's relationship with the KMT, and expelling all communists from the party. This pronouncement had no effect, and Chiang Kai-shek wrote an open letter defending Borodin, the communists, and the KMT's relationship with the Soviet Union.[37]

Borodin making a speech in Wuhan, 1927

The following year, however, Borodin gradually came into conflict with Chiang, who was vying for the position of Sun's successor. Borodin initially opposed Chiang's planned Northern Expedition to reunify China, and grew concerned about Chiang's growing standing in the NRA.[38] When Borodin went north in another attempt to bring Feng Yuxiang and his Guominjun into the Kuomintang in early 1926, Chiang began preparations to consolidate his position in Guangzhou.[39] Borodin's fears were then realised in March 1926, when Chiang launched the "Canton Coup" purge of hardline leftists who opposed the launch of the expedition.[38]

Following the purge, Borodin returned from the north on Chiang's request, began negotiations, and reached a narrow compromise to hold the First United Front together. On Joseph Stalin's suggestion, Borodin agreed to continue Soviet aid to the KMT, and to support the Northern Expedition, which began in July 1926.[40] At a Comintern conference in November 1926, Stalin explained his continued support for the KMT, saying that "The exit of Chinese communists from the Kuomintang would be the gravest error", going on to argue that the CCP needed to work through the new government, forming a bridge between the state and the peasantry. Borodin agreed, noting that the purpose of the Northern Expedition was "not the establishment of a proletarian state, but the creation of conditions which would give an impetus to the mass movement". In Borodin's view, the goal of the China mission was to facilitate a bourgeois-democratic revolution led by an alliance of workers, peasants, petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie, so as to create the conditions necessary for a future proletarian revolution.[41] With tensions between the left and right threatening to break into armed conflict in Guangzhou, Borodin became convinced that it was necessary to expand the base of the anti-imperialist movement, providing adequate space for both factions. For this reason, he had agreed to support the Northern Expedition.[42]

Borodin and a group of Soviet military advisers led by Vasily Blyukher (known by the alias "Galen") were responsible for planning the expedition.[43] Whilst Chiang Kai-shek had been named commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, he was not personally involved in the planning phase of the operation. Having studied the history of the mid-19th century Taiping Rebellion, Borodin decided that the expedition should head inland toward Hankou, an industrial and commercial centre with a large worker class, so as to avoid conflict with British and Japanese interests in the Shanghai area.[41] As the expedition progressed, Borodin moved together with the KMT government from Guangzhou to Hankou, which was merged with two other cities to form Wuhan. Chiang, who refused to move his headquarters from Nanchang to Wuhan, gradually came into conflict with the leftist-dominated KMT government from December 1926,[44] and Borodin publicly disavowed him the following month.[45]

During his time in Wuhan, Borodin advocated a strategy of directing anti-imperialist feeling against Britain specifically, rather than other colonial powers such as America and France.[46] A series of anti-British demonstrations carried out under Borodin's advice in December 1926–January 1927 led to the occupation of the concessions at Hankou and Jiujiang by NRA troops, forcing the British to agree to their return to Chinese jurisdiction in an agreement negotiated by Eugene Chen.[46]

In a startling turn of events, Borodin's wife Fanya was captured by White Russian mercenaries employed by warlord Zhang Zongchang whilst travelling on board the ship Pamyat Lenina between Shanghai and Wuhan on 28 February 1927, after which she was held hostage in Jinan, Shandong.[47][48] Borodin's anxieties heightened even further in April 1927, when Chiang initiated a new purge of KMT leftists and communists, known as the "Shanghai Massacre". Borodin and the communists gave their backing to the left-wing KMT government in Wuhan led by Wang Jingwei and Eugene Chen against Chiang's rival Nanjing government. KMT attacks on communists and peasant leaders would continue, however, and even Wuhan army leader Tang Shengzhi's forces harassed local communist groups, preventing their access to Wuhan's armouries.[49][50]

Borodin's activities were brought into the British political limelight during the Arcos Affair of May 1927. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin stated in parliament that his government had decrypted a telegram dated 12th November 1926 from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet envoy in Beijing. The telegram read:[51]

"I herewith communicate department's decision for your execution.

1. Until a Soviet representative is appointed to Peking [Beijing], Comrade Borodin is to take his orders direct from Moscow.
2. The Far Eastern Bureau to be informed that all its decisions and measures regarding questions of the general policy of the Kuomintang in China and of military political work must be agreed on with Comrade Borodin. In the event of differences of opinion arising on these questions they must be referred to Moscow for investigation. Borodin and the Far Eastern Bureau must keep Moscow's representatives in Peking informed of all their decisions and moves with regard to these questions.
3. Comrade Borodin's appointment as official Soviet representative in Canton [Guangzhou] is considered inadvisable. Borodin is to remain (in charge) of the work in the provinces under Canton rule, and an official representative to the Canton Government is to be appointed".

According to Baldwin, this contradicted February 1927 statements by Soviet representatives in London to the effect that Borodin "was a private citizen in service of the Chinese government", and "that the Soviet government were not answerable for his actions".[52] Baldwin declared that: "The denials of any responsibility for Borodin's actions...were therefore untrue and were made only in the hope of deceiving His Majesty's Government and the British public while under their cloak Borodin was, in fact, carrying on his anti-foreign and anti-British activities as the authorised agent of the Soviet Government and by their orders".[53] Borodin's orchestration of anti-British demonstrations and his role in the occupation of the British concessions had brought him notoriety in London; his connection to Soviet government was made public in an attempt to justify the police raid on the All Russian Co-operative Society, and as a pretext for severance of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. Indeed, Britain cut ties later that May.[54]

On 1 June 1927, Stalin sent a secret telegram to Borodin and M. N. Roy, who was also in Wuhan, ordering the mobilisation of an army of workers and peasants.[55][56] The telegram was discussed at a meeting of the CCP politburo, where it was decried by both Borodin and CCP leaders as an impractical "fairy tale from overseas". Borodin, who was more familiar with Stalin's inner workings, interpreted the instructions as a ploy to relinquish blame for their inevitable failure, whilst Roy thought they signalled a long-awaited quickening of the Chinese revolution. Without consulting anyone, Roy decided to show the telegram to Wang, who was alarmed by its contents.[56][57]

Instead of reassuring Wang, the revelation of the telegram's message drove him to the right, upon which he decided to purge the communists from his administration and reconcile with Chiang Kai-shek. Borodin, along with all other Soviet representatives, was ordered to leave China in July 1927.[58] He refused to leave, however, until his wife, still imprisoned in Jinan, was freed, and was in the meantime harboured by T. V. Soong in his family's house. The Japanese, who considered Shandong within their sphere of influence, bribed a judge to release Fanya on 12 July.[59][60] Formally seen off by the leaders of the Wuhan government, Mikhail left Wuhan by private train on 27 July. He was accompanied on his journey by Sun Yat-sen's widow Soong Ching-ling, Eugene Chen's son Percy Chen, and other Russian and Chinese revolutionary figures.[58][59][60] "The revolution extends to the Yangtze River", Borodin told a reporter as they began their journey, "if a diver were sent down to the bottom of this yellow stream he would rise again with an armful of shattered hopes".[61] He went on to say "When the next Chinese general comes to Moscow and shouts 'Hail to the world revolution', better send at once for the GPU. All that any of them want is rifles".[62] Whilst Fanya made her own way out of country, Borodin, with a bounty on his head, travelled first to Zhengzhou, where he was received by Feng Yuxiang, and then continued through Gansu and across Mongolia to Russia. Though they took different routes, both Mikhail and Fanya arrived in Moscow around the same time in October 1927.[59]