Nuclear latency

Nuclear latency or a nuclear threshold state is the condition of a country possessing the technology to quickly build nuclear weapons, without having actually yet done so.[1] Because such latent capability is not prescribed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this is sometimes called the "Japan Option" (as a work-around to the treaty), as Japan is considered a "paranuclear" state, being a clear case of a country with complete technical prowess to develop a nuclear weapon quickly,[2][3] or as it is sometimes called "being one screwdriver's turn" from the bomb, as Japan is considered to have the materials, expertise and technical capacity to make a nuclear bomb at will.[4][5][6][7][8][9] However, nuclear latency does not presume any particular intentions on the part of a state recognized as being nuclear-latent.[10]

Nuclear hedging

Nuclear latency can be achieved with solely peaceful intentions, but in some cases nuclear latency is achieved in order to be able to create nuclear arms in the future, which is known as "nuclear hedging".[11] While states engaging in nuclear hedging do not directly violate the NPT, they do run the risk of potentially encouraging their neighboring states, particularly those they have had conflicts with, to do the same, spawning a “virtual” arms race to ensure the potential of future nuclear capability.[11] Such a situation could rapidly escalate into an actual arms race, drastically raising tensions in the region and increasing the risk of a potential nuclear exchange.[11]

Determining peacefulness of a nuclear program

In a paper written following the establishment of the JCPOA, a Counselor of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, John Carlson, outlined several criteria for use in helping to determine whether a state’s nuclear program was run solely with peaceful intentions, or if the state was engaging in nuclear hedging:[11]

  1. Production of nuclear materials significantly beyond what could feasibly be needed in order to maintain a state’s current nuclear reactors. This includes both the processes of the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium.[11]
  2. Retaining stores of nuclear materials which can be used in weapons construction beyond the amount that could reasonably be slated for use in civilian purposes, such as research or power generation.[11]
  3. Noncompliance or lack of proper cooperation with the IAEA, or grievous disregard for reasonable safeguards.[11]
  4. Construction of facilities and infrastructure which is more reasonably oriented toward the production of nuclear weapons than for civil purposes, such as reactors that produce extremely large quantities of plutonium.[11]
  5. Production of technologies which are primarily oriented toward the creation of nuclear weapons, such as the explosive lenses required to build an implosion-type weapon.[11]
  6. Production or development of systems designed to allow for the deliverance of nuclear payloads, such as long-range ballistic missiles.[11]
  7. A supposedly civilian nuclear energy program having heavy involvement with the state’s military, an indication that the state’s military is likely seeking to obtain nuclear materials.[11]
  8. Making use of black market sources in order to obtain nuclear materials, technology used for reprocessing or enrichment, technology used in the production of nuclear arms or delivery systems, or the purchase of nuclear delivery systems outright.[11]
  9. The state being in a location in which it has a history of severe conflicts in its relationships with several neighboring states.[11] This gives the state a reason to desire nuclear arms as a potential deterrence of its neighboring adversaries.

Nuclear-latent powers

There are many countries capable of producing nuclear weapons, or at least enriching uranium or manufacturing plutonium. Among the most notable are Japan, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia.[12] In addition, South Africa has successfully developed its own nuclear weapons, but dismantled them in 1989. Following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement some consider Iran a nuclear threshold state.[13] Taiwan and South Korea have both been identified as "insecure" nuclear threshold states—states with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option—since the publishing of a Mitre Corporation report in 1977.[14] US intelligence also believes Taiwan has designed devices suitable for nuclear testing.[15]

The number of states that are technically nuclear-latent has steadily increased as nuclear energy and its requisite technologies have become more available to a variety of states.[10]

References
  1. Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H. (June 14, 2007). "Capability versus intent: The latent threat of nuclear proliferation". The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Archived from the original on 2013-10-10. Retrieved 2009-08-04.
  2. Cole, Juan (2009-10-07). "Does Iran really want the bomb? Perhaps what Iran wants is the ability to produce a nuclear weapon fast, rather than have a standing arsenal". Salon. Archived from the original on 2009-10-11. Retrieved 2009-10-07.
  3. "Hypothesis: Iran Seeks the 'Japan Option'". Slate. 2009-10-07. Archived from the original on 2009-10-11.
  4. Demetriou, Danielle (20 April 2009). "Japan 'should develop nuclear weapons' to counter North Korea threat". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 15 January 2020. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  5. Sakamaki, Sachiko (28 May 2009). "North Korean Atomic Tests Lift Lid on Japan's Nuclear 'Taboo'". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 16 September 2015. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  6. John H. Large (May 2, 2005). "THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND JAPAN)" (PDF). R3126-A1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-07-10.
  7. "Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2010: Recap of Seminar Four". CSIS. Archived from the original on 7 August 2010. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  8. Brumfiel, Geoff (November 2004). "Nuclear proliferation special: We have the technology". Nature. 432-437. 432 (7016): 432–7. Bibcode:2004Natur.432..432B. doi:10.1038/432432a. PMID 15565123. S2CID 4354223.
  9. Chester Dawson (28 October 2011). "In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
  10. Pilat, Joseph F. (October 2, 2014). "Exploring Nuclear Latency | Wilson Center". Wilson Center. Archived from the original on 2021-05-14. Retrieved 2021-05-02.
  11. Carlson, John (November 19, 2015). ""Peaceful" Nuclear Programs and the Problem of Nuclear Latency | NTI". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original on 2021-05-03. Retrieved 2021-05-02.
  12. "Nuclear Weapons Archive, 7.5 nuclear capable states".
  13. The Nuclear Agreement with Iran, One Year On: An Assessment and a Strategy for the Future Archived 2017-08-14 at the Wayback Machine, INSS, Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, July 2016
  14. Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power Issues, and Choices (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 284.
  15. "The 22 September 1979 Event" (PDF). Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. National Security Archive. December 1979. p. 5 (paragraph 4). MORI DocID: 1108245. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2014-10-24. Retrieved 2006-11-01.

Additional resources

For more on the proliferation and debates surrounding nuclear weapons and their latency, visit the Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project website: http://wilsoncenter.org/program/nuclear-proliferation-international-history-project.

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