Operation Bajrang

Operation Bajrang (28 November 1990 – 20 April 1991) was a military operation, conducted by the Indian army, in Assam, against the militant organization, United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).

Operation Bajrang
Part of Indian military operations against North-eastern militants

Army Aviation helicopter during the operation
Date28 November 1990 – 20 April 1991 (1990-11-28 – 1991-04-20)
Location
Assam
27.7214°N 95.1569°E / 27.7214; 95.1569
Result Operation was not successful[1][2][3][4]
Belligerents
India Indian Army ULFA
Commanders and leaders
India Lieutenant general Ajai Singh[5][6] Paresh Baruah
Strength
30,000[7][8][9] 1,250[10]

Its primary objective was to flush out ULFA militants. It was launched without good intelligence, specific knowledge of the terrain, and other geographic advantages of the state. The army started the operation from the ULFA camps, but it wasn't successful, as the camps were deserted. Thus the operation did not succeed, and it was suspended after six months.

During the operation, there were numerous instances of army atrocities, including rape, torture, and killing of civilians, which was unearthed by several human rights organizations. The main outcome of the operation was that it forced the ULFA to leave their Central Headquarter (CHQ) and their General Headquarter (GHQ).

Background

During the Assam Movement, there was an uprising of nationalism in Assam with the outcome of the formation of several militant outfits including ULFA. The ULFA emerged as a powerful militant organization in North-east India within a decade of its formation in 1979. It also came to light that the organization was getting support from the then State Home Minister Bhrigu Phukan.[11] Enjoying a soft-eye of the AGP government (1985-1990), the organization became strong with a large recruitment drive and the killing of many Congress leaders, police officers, and civilians.[12] The organization also killed former state Chief Minister and Governor of Mizoram Hiteswar Saikia's brother Rohiteswar Saikia along with his security personnel and the driver on 23 July 1990.[13] The organization gunned down the Superintendent of police of Dibrugarh district Daulat Singh Negi on 29 July 1990, which lowered the morale of the police.[14] ULFA also developed its connection with the Sri-Lankan militant outfit Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).[15] The killing of Surrendra Paul,[16] brother of Lord Swraj Paul,[17] created massive pressure on Janata Dal government led by Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar. The Asom Gana Parishad led state government was held responsible for the poor law and order situation.[18] The then BJP president and MP L K Advani demanded the dismissal of the Assam government and sought Army action against the ULFA in parliament debate.[19][20] The Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar had to take the decision to dismiss the Assam government and order Army action against the ULFA.[21][22]

On 27 November 1990 the Government of India dismissed the AGP led Government of Assam under Article 356 of the Indian constitution, imposed President's Rule on Assam. The Indian government also banned the militant outfit ULFA classifying it as a terrorist organisation and launched Operation Bajrang against the ULFA.[23][24][25]

The Indian government also imposed Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), and Assam Disturbed Areas Act, which gave complete power to the army.[26][27]

The operation

The operation was started on the night of 27 November 1990. The army started the operation in the dense forest of Lakhipathar (in Tinsukia district) where the ULFA had their Central Headquarter (CHQ) and General Headquarter (GHQ) in the forests of Charaipung (in Sivasagar district),[28] and continued operation in all districts of Assam.[29] In the operation, 15 brigades of the army were used,[30] but the army started the operation without proper intelligence and planning.[31][32] In the operation, the Army Aviation helicopters were also used to reconnoiter the dense forests of Lakhpathar and Charaipung.[33] But the information about the operation was leaked to the ULFA Commander-in-chief Paresh Baruah, who had a strong intelligence network.[34] Baruah then ordered to evacuate all the camps two days before the operation was started.[35] The ULFA made a setup for the army with landmines and booby traps in the camps of Lakhipathar and Charaipung before the camps were emptied and left with a few junior cadres to strike back.[36]

With a few junior ULFA cadres left in the camps of Lakhipathar and Charaipung, the army faced gunfights for a few days and captured the camps of Lakhipathar and Charaipung. The army had to lose some of their jawans including Vijay Singh and Swarn Singh, while ULFA lost Krishna Chetia,[37] a close cadre of Paresh Baruah. Some army personnel were also killed in landmine explosions.[38] A total of fourteen landmines exploded on the day of the entry of the army, but there are no confirmed official records available about army casualties.[39]

During the operation, the ULFA-LTTE link was also exposed as an LTTE militant Dinesh Kumar visited the Lakhipathar camp,[40] and the landmines found in Lakhipathar were similar to those used by LTTE during that period.[41] The LTTE facilitated ULFA with guerrilla training in Jaffna, in early 1990 and provided weapons and explosives.[42][43]

A mass grave of more than fifty bodies was found in the Lakhipathar camp[44] of persons who were executed by the ULFA in the camp as capital punishment. One of those bodies was of All Tai Ahom Student Union (ATASU) leader Dimbeswar Gogoi. Some other bodies were of Congress(I) member Rana Goswami, and Special branch's Inspector of police Giausddin Ahmed.[45][39]

  • As per the Indian Army claim, 48 ULFA militants were arrested, 174 weapons seized, and one Maruti Gypsy car and one Motorcycle recovered during the operation.[46]
  • As per the India Today report, in the operation, 15 activists (including sympathizers and civilians) were killed, seized 1208 weapons, and ₹50 million (US$630,000), and over 2000 suspected militants were arrested.[47] In another report, India Today stated that between November 1990 and March 1991, the ULFA killed 97 people including Assam Pradesh Congress(I) Committee's General Secretary Manabendra Sarma. The report also cited that a team of the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights (CPDR), visiting the state, found clear evidence of 58 atrocities, including rape and torture.[48]
  • According to journalist B. G. Verghese, ₹50 million (US$630,000) and 32 gold bars were recovered during Operation Bajrang.[49]
  • According to author Ved Prakash, in Operation Bajrang 209 militants were captured, and the army recovered cash of ₹48 million and huge quantities of arms.[50]
  • Scholar and author Hiren Gohain, visiting the areas of operation, cited the army's actions as brutalization.[51]

Though ULFA had to lose their Lakhipathar and Charaipung camps,[52] the army failed to nab any of the top leaders of ULFA, resulting in the operation as failed with the army's atrocities.[53][54]

On 8 January 1991, the then Governor of Assam Devi Das Thakur announced that the Indian government is open for a lateral talk with the ULFA. Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar too announced the same in Rajya Sabha, and, in February 1991, the ULFA declared a unilateral ceasefire.[39][55]

As the state election was in the door, ULFA assured that they won't disrupt the election, and Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar suspended the operation.[56][57] On 20 April, Operation Bajrang was called off and the army was returned to barracks,[6] and the army was withdrawn on May 16.[58] The operation was finally suspended with effect from June 26.[59]

Human rights violation by Indian Army

Rapes

Human Rights organization Amnesty International asserted that, during operation Bajrang, villagers of Assam were terrorized as the Indian army committed violence of rape, murder, and illegal arrests.[60] Numerous rape cases by the Indian army were reported during Operation Bajrang.[61][62][63] There were also parliamentary debates in the Rajya Sabha of India about the rapes committed by the Indian Army during Operation Bajrang.[64] But no army personnel ever had to face any trial as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act provides the power to the army as "Army officers have legal immunity for their actions. There can be no prosecution, suit or any other legal proceeding against anyone acting under that law. Nor is the government's judgment on why an area is found to be disturbed subject to judicial review."[65][66]

Killing and arrest of civilians

Amnesty International also asserted that a total of 12 civilians were killed in army custody,[67] over 100 Habeas corpus petitions were filed at the Gauhati High Court between 27 November 1990 to March 1991 seeking the whereabouts of the people who were illegally detained by the Army, and 1846 people were arrested by the army and more than 1000 people were arrested by the police in suspect of ULFA militants.[68] Mumbai based human rights organisation the Committee for Protection of Human Rights (CPDR) also found army atrocity evidence by visiting 6 districts of the state.[69]

Aftermath

After Operation Bajrang was called off, the Assam Legislative Assembly election was held, Congress(I) won the election and Hiteswar Saikia became the Chief Minister of the state.[70][71]

Following the suspension of Operation Bajrang, the state government announced a "surrender scheme" that offered Rs 50,000 cash, loans up to Rs 2 Lakh, and jobs for the qualified.[72] Also, following political controversy over Operation Bajrang, Governor Devi Das Thakur resigned in March and Loknath Mishra took charge as the Governor of Assam.[73]

During the operation, most of the senior leaders escaped to their Bangladesh's camp in Sherpur, but Sunil Nath and Paresh Baruah stayed in Assam to continue the militancy activities.[74] After the suspension of Operation Bajrang, the ULFA started revamping the organization with killing, extortion, and kidnapping.[75][76]

In 2013, KPS Gill, who served as the Director general of police of Assam and Punjab, opined that Operation Bajrang was not necessary as it created mistrust between Security forces and civil society and also took lives of many innocent people.[77][78]

References
  1. Baruah 2009, pp. 951–974.
  2. PKA 1995, p. 143.
  3. UCP 2001, p. 873.
  4. Behera 2008, p. 70.
  5. Alagappa 2001, p. 100.
  6. Sinha 2007, p. 296.
  7. Ghosh 2001, p. 146.
  8. UCP 2001, p. 76.
  9. Yadav, Anil (30 August 2017). "Book excerpt: The ULFA tea estate extortion that led to Operation Bajrang in 1990". Hindustan Times. Retrieved 1 June 2022.
  10. Kumar 2014, p. 211.
  11. Ghosh 1997, p. 77.
  12. Bhattacharyya, Rajeev (21 May 2022). "Assam 'Moles' Killed: ULFA & Security Forces Have a History of 'Spy Games'". The Quint.
  13. Kumar 1991, p. 141.
  14. LivingMedia 1990, p. 31.
  15. "LTTE not only armed, trained ULFA too: Former rebel". Sri Lanka Army. Archived from the original on 18 August 2022. Retrieved 18 August 2022.
  16. Khullar 2014, p. 103.
  17. Sharma, Pankar Kumar; Saha, Sambit (25 May 2012). "Ulfa chief acquitted in Surrendra Paul case". The Telegraph. Retrieved 25 May 2022.
  18. Bhūshaṇa 2004, p. 240.
  19. Kiruṣṇā Ān̲ant 2010, p. 372, 373.
  20. PLSN 1992, p. 126.
  21. Gogoi 2016, Chpt. 10.
  22. PST 2000, p. 343.
  23. Ghosh 1995, p. 247.
  24. Das 2007, p. 24.
  25. Baruah 1994, pp. 863–877.
  26. Medhi 1996, p. 26.
  27. ICM 1999, p. 113.
  28. Baweja & Yusufzai 2002, p. 84.
  29. IuMS 1997, p. 114.
  30. Kartha 1999, p. 257.
  31. Sarkar 1998, p. 108.
  32. Chima 2015, p. 50.
  33. Gates & Roy 2016, p. 53.
  34. Narahari 2002, p. 69.
  35. Kaur 2013, p. 365.
  36. ICM 1999, p. 4.
  37. Raghavan & Shorey 2002, p. 80.
  38. Pattnaik & Kabi 2015, p. 67.
  39. Pisharoty 2019, chpt. 6.
  40. IDSA 1995, p. 1374.
  41. Datta 1993, p. 51.
  42. "ULFA-LTTE links come to light". The New Indian Express. 21 October 2009. Retrieved 18 August 2022.
  43. Karim 1993, p. 65.
  44. LCSS 1992, p. 15.
  45. Gogoi 2016, p. 171.
  46. Das 1994, p. 79.
  47. Ahmed, Farzand (15 October 1991). "Various army operations launched against ULFA". India Today.
  48. Ahmed, Farzand (31 March 1991). "Three months after army moved in, Operation Bajrang makes little headway and ULFA remains potent force". India Today. India Today. Retrieved 2 June 2022.
  49. Verghese 1996, p. 59.
  50. Prakash 2008, p. 119.
  51. Gohain 2006, p. 4537.
  52. Datta 1993, p. 54.
  53. EPW 1993, pp. 193, 194.
  54. Das 2003, p. 46.
  55. Deka 1994, p. 183.
  56. Szajkowski & Terranova 2004, p. 172.
  57. LoR 1992, p. 38615.
  58. "The army and after". The Indian Express. 17 September 1991. p. 8.
  59. "Operation Bajrang suspended". The Indian Express. 26 June 1991. p. 9.
  60. Amnesty 1993, p. 25.
  61. Dobhal & Jacob 2012, p. 126.
  62. Chadha 2005, p. 248.
  63. LDC 1991, p. 36.
  64. CSSRSS 1991, p. 75.
  65. PMFA 2001, p. 210.
  66. Roy 2001, p. 25.
  67. Amnesty1992, p. 48.
  68. Amnesty1992, p. 25.
  69. Sathyamurthy 1994, p. 120.
  70. Jagmohan 2008, p. 64.
  71. Prakash 2008, p. 142.
  72. Raghavan 2013, p. 142.
  73. LoR 1993, p. 38615.
  74. Marwah 1997, p. 307.
  75. Hazarika 1995, p. 211.
  76. Sinha 2007, p. 295.
  77. Tezpur, HT Correspondent (17 November 2013). "Operation Bluestar was not necessary: Gill". Hindustan Times. Retrieved 1 June 2022.
  78. Malik, Aman; Roche, Elizabeth; Verma, Ragini (2 June 2014). "The army mishandled Operation Blue Star: KPS Gill". Mint. Mint. Retrieved 1 June 2022.

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Journals
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