Byzantine army (Palaiologan era)

The Byzantine army continued to use the same military terms with regards to numbers of troops and officers as did the Komnenian army.[2] However, there were fewer territories to raise troops from. In Anatolia, the local support for the Ottoman conquerors grew daily, whilst in Greece the ravaging by the Crusader states, by Serbia, by Bulgaria, and earlier on by the Angevin Empire ended the region's prominence as a source of Byzantine levies. After 1204, no single Byzantine field army numbered more than 5,000 men.[3] Around 1261, the central army consisted of 6,000 men, while the number of total field troops never exceeded 10,000 men.[4][5] The total number of troops under Michael VIII was about 20,000 men; the mobile force numbered 15,000 men, while the town garrisons totaled 5,000 men.[1] However, under Andronicus II the more professional elements of the army was demobilized in favor of poorly trained and cheaper militia soldiers. The Emperor decreased the entire army's strength to 4,000 men by 1320, and a year later the Empire's standing army dropped to only 3,000 cavalry.[5][6] Even though the Empire had shrunk considerably by the time of Andronicus III's reign, he succeeded in assembling an army of 4,000 men for his campaign against the Ottomans.[7] By 1453, the Byzantine army had fallen to a regular garrison of 1,500 men in Constantinople.[8] With a supreme effort, Constantine XI succeeded in assembling a garrison of 7,000 men (included 2,000 foreigners) to defend the city against the Ottoman army.[9]

Byzantine troops continued to consist of cavalry, infantry and archers. Since Trebizond had broken away, Cumans and Turks were used for cavalry and missile units. In the Palaiologan era, the main term for a standing regiment was the allagion. Palace and imperial guard units included the Varangian Guard, the obscure Paramonai and the Vardariotai.

After Constantinople was retaken, Michael VIII army's continuous campaigning in Greece ensured that the Nicaean army, an offshoot of the expensive but effective Komnenian army remained in play. Under Andronicus II however, the army was reduced to destructively low numbers – mercenary troops were disbanded to save money[10] and to lower taxes upon the disgruntled population. Instead the use of poorly equipped and ill-disciplined militia soldiers saw the replacement of the vitally important expert soldiers. The results were obvious; Byzantine losses in Asia Minor occurred primarily under Andronicus II.

In 1302 the center of military expenditure shifted back again towards mercenaries, notably the Catalan Company, but after their leader was murdered the company returned to Thrace and Greece where they overthrew the Crusader Duchy of Athens and seriously undermined Greek rule so that on both sides of the Bosporus the Empire suffered. Even so, mercenaries continued to be used after Andronicus II's reign. Ironically Andronicus' successor's policy of using many foreign fighters worsened Byzantium's fortunes in the same way that Andronicus had done so with their disbandment. The use of Serbs, Bulgarians and Turks of Aydın and of the Ottomans opened Byzantium up to more foreign incursions. The deployment of up to 20,000 Turkish soldiers from the Ottoman realm to assist her nominal Greek ally only eased future conquests of the area.[11]

Since Byzantium became increasingly incapable in raising a "loyal" Greek army, foreigners such as the Knights of Rhodes, Venetians, Genoans and Italians were added to Byzantium's fighting forces. Since the Imperial treasury was bankrupt after c 1350, these foreign fighters fought only for political reasons and often in civil wars, rather than to strengthen Byzantium's position.

Michael VIII Palaiologos was anxious to establish an alliance with the Mongols, who themselves were highly favourable to Christianity, many of them being Nestorian Christians. He signed a treaty in 1263 with the Mongol Khan of the Golden Horde, and he married two of his daughters (conceived through a mistress, a Diplovatatzina) to Mongol kings: Euphrosyne Palaiologina, who married Nogai Khan of the Golden Horde, and Maria Palaiologina, who married Abaqa Khan of Ilkhanid Persia. In 1282, Nogai Khan provided Michael VIII with 4,000 Mongols whom he sent against Thessaly.[16] His alliance with the Mongols would also benefit his son Andronicus II; in 1305 Ilkhan Oljeitu promised Andronicus II 40,000 men, and in 1308 dispatched 30,000 men to recover many Byzantine towns in Bithynia.[17]

Byzantine book illumination depicting archers and cataphracts (mid-14th century)

Weapons amongst the Byzantine army varied greatly, as did the composition of the army. Shields and spears were as always the most common weapon.

The crossbow was adopted by the Byzantine infantry in the 13th century,[18] although the Cypriote rebel Isaac Komnenos is recorded to have used crossbowmen as early as 1191.[19] Associated primarily with western Europeans, the crossbow or tzangra remained of secondary relevance and was mostly restricted to naval combat and sieges.[20] Soldiers wearing this weapon were known as tzangratoroi. Despite their relative rarity,[21] John Kantakouzenos approvingly referred to their efficiency in siege battles, while a new military office was also created, the stratopedarches ton tzangratoron.[22]

Gunpowder weapons were spreading in the Balkans from the second half of the 14th century and were well established by the 15th, but the Byzantines failed to adopt them on a larger scale because of the lack of money. While the sources are limited and the terminology is often unclear, the only gunners fighting for Byzantium seem to have been Genoese mercenaries. Gunpowder artillery in the form of primitive bombards is attested for the sieges of 1422 and 1453. Indeed, the city had an own arsenal of bombards, although its walls proved incapable of sustaining their recoil, especially that of the largest ones.[23] Additionally, their effectiveness was limited by a lack of understanding of their proper deployment[24] as well as a shortage of gunpowder and ammunition. As there is no evidence that the Byzantines ever manufactured cannons themselves it seems most likely that they were imported from Italy.[25]

Ruined fortifications of Mystras, Laconia

Byzantine military strategy relied heavily on fortifying towns and cities. Walls consisted of stonework with layers of thick bricks in between, perhaps allowing for absorption of an attack.[12] Later, as artillery became increasingly more effective, sloped walls came into play. The walls would be augmented by towers, evenly spaced out and running the length of the walls. The walled towers were designed to cover the entire town.

Supplying towns and forts became Byzantium's worst problem and, though the Turks initially lacked the expertise to take walled towns, they could not be defeated on land nor their blockade broken. Cities such as Nicaea and Nicomedia fell after a few years or more. Even so, this was a longer period of time than the Crusaders in the Levant were able to hold out where impressive forts such as Krak des Chevaliers surrendered relatively quickly. Worse still were the Crusader forts in the Aegean, which often surrendered to the Byzantines and the Turks without a fight.[12]

The Byzantine army regained an increasingly offensive role against the crusaders in the mid to late 13th century but many fortifications regained by the Byzantines fell out of use;[26] a lack of manpower and multiple pressing fronts relegated these castles to abandonment. Some of the castles captured in Greece were used to control the local hostile Greek, Albanian, Vlach or other tribal peoples that opposed Frankish rule and since the Byzantines were both Greek and Orthodox, the threat that the Crusaders had to contend with existed on a lesser scale for the Byzantines, giving them another reason not to repair them.[27] Constantinople's fortifications remained formidable, but repairing them proved impossible after 1370 due to the destructive nature of an ongoing civil war. By the time the Byzantines emerged from it, they were forced to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan, who threatened military action if any repairs were made to the millennium-old Walls of Constantinople. Heavily outnumbered, the walls of the capital provided the defenders in 1453 with 6 weeks of defense.