Quasitransitive relation

A binary relation T over a set X is quasitransitive if for all a, b, and c in X the following holds:

${\displaystyle (a\operatorname {T} b)\wedge \neg (b\operatorname {T} a)\wedge (b\operatorname {T} c)\wedge \neg (c\operatorname {T} b)\Rightarrow (a\operatorname {T} c)\wedge \neg (c\operatorname {T} a).}$

If the relation is also antisymmetric, T is transitive.

Alternately, for a relation T, define the asymmetric or "strict" part P:

${\displaystyle (a\operatorname {P} b)\Leftrightarrow (a\operatorname {T} b)\wedge \neg (b\operatorname {T} a).}$

Then T is quasitransitive if and only if P is transitive.

Preferences are assumed to be quasitransitive (rather than transitive) in some economic contexts. The classic example is a person indifferent between 7 and 8 grams of sugar and indifferent between 8 and 9 grams of sugar, but who prefers 9 grams of sugar to 7.[1] Similarly, the Sorites paradox can be resolved by weakening assumed transitivity of certain relations to quasitransitivity.

• A relation R is quasitransitive if, and only if, it is the disjoint union of a symmetric relation J and a transitive relation P.[2] J and P are not uniquely determined by a given R;[3] however, the P from the only-if part is minimal.[4]
• As a consequence, each symmetric relation is quasitransitive, and so is each transitive relation.[5] Moreover, an antisymmetric and quasitransitive relation is always transitive.[6]
• The relation from the above sugar example, {(7,7), (7,8), (7,9), (8,7), (8,8), (8,9), (9,8), (9,9)}, is quasitransitive, but not transitive.
• A quasitransitive relation needn't be acyclic: for every non-empty set A, the universal relation A×A is both cyclic and quasitransitive.
• A relation is quasitransitive if, and only if, its complement is.
• Similarly, a relation is quasitransitive if, and only if, its converse is.

• Intransitivity
• Reflexive relation

• Sen, A. (1969). "Quasi-transitivity, rational choice and collective decisions". Rev. Econ. Stud. 36 (3): 381–393. doi:10.2307/2296434. JSTOR 2296434. Zbl 0181.47302.
• Frederic Schick (Jun 1969). "Arrow's Proof and the Logic of Preference". Philosophy of Science. 36 (2): 127–144. doi:10.1086/288241. JSTOR 186166. S2CID 121427121.
• Amartya K. Sen (1970). Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Holden-Day, Inc.
• Amartya K. Sen (Jul 1971). "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference" (PDF). The Review of Economic Studies. 38 (3): 307–317. doi:10.2307/2296384. JSTOR 2296384.
• A. Mas-Colell and H. Sonnenschein (1972). "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions" (PDF). The Review of Economic Studies. 39 (2): 185–192. doi:10.2307/2296870. JSTOR 2296870. S2CID 7295776. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-04-12.
• D.H. Blair and R.A. Pollak (1982). "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules". Econometrica. 50 (4): 931–943. doi:10.2307/1912770. JSTOR 1912770.
• Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Apr 2005). Rational Choice on Arbitrary Domains: A Comprehensive Treatment (PDF) (Technical Report). Université de Montréal, Hitotsubashi University Tokyo.
• Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro (Mar 2009). "Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations" (PDF). Social Choice and Welfare (Technical Report). Université de Montréal, Waseda University Tokyo. 39 (2–3): 323–334. doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0600-z. S2CID 38375142. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-04-12.
• Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kōtarō (2010). Consistency, choice and rationality. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674052994.
• Alan D. Miller and Shiran Rachmilevitch (Feb 2014). Arrow's Theorem Without Transitivity (PDF) (Working paper). University of Haifa.