Quidditism

In metaphysics, quidditism is the perspective implied by the belief that nomological roles do not supervene on causal properties.[1] Quidditism endorses the existence of quiddities (the existence of "whatness" of properties) and is typically characterized in opposition to causal essentialism.[2]

Notes
  1. Lyre, Holger (2012), "Structural Invariants, Structural Kinds, Structural Laws." In: Dieks D., Gonzalez W., Hartmann S., Stöltzner M., Weber M. (eds.), Probabilities, Laws, and Structures. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol. 3. Dordrecht: Springer, p. 178.
  2. Wang, Jennifer, "The Nature of Properties: Causal Essentialism and Quidditism", Philosophy Compass, 11(3), March 2016, pp. 171–172.


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