Roméo Dallaire

In late 1993, Dallaire received his commission as the Force Commander of UNAMIR, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. Rwanda was in the middle of a civil war between the extremist Hutu government and a small Tutsi rebel faction. UNAMIR's goal was to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The Hutus worked through the Rwandan army and then-president of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, and the Tutsis through the rebel commander Paul Kagame, who is the president of Rwanda today. When Dallaire arrived in Rwanda, his mandate was to supervise the implementation of the Accords during a transitional period in which Tutsis were supposed to be given positions of power within the Hutu government.

There were early signs that something was amiss when, on January 22, 1994, a French DC-8 aircraft landed in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, loaded with ammunition and weapons for the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). (FAR was the Hutu army under Habyarimana's control.) Dallaire was unable to seize the weapons, as this would have violated his UN mandate. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army told Dallaire that since the munitions were ordered before Arusha, the UN was not allowed to detain the shipment, and displayed paperwork showing that the weapons had been sent by Belgium, Israel, France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Egypt. In addition to the arms deliveries, troops from the Rwandan government began checking identity cards which identified individuals as Hutus or Tutsis. These cards would later allow Hutu militias to identify their victims with accuracy.

On the night of 6 April 1994, an airplane carrying Habyarimana was shot down over Kigali Airport. The President of Burundi was also on board. Coincidentally, wreckage from the crash landed in Habyarimana's own backyard. Following the airplane crash, Hutu extremists, with help from the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Armed Forces, blamed the assassination on the Tutsis and used this as a pretext for systematic execution of the Tutsis faction, as well as many of the moderate elected officials of the new government. Dallaire immediately ordered ten Belgian soldiers to protect the new prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, but Madame Agathe and her husband were killed, and later the next day, the Belgian soldiers were found dead.

The ten Belgian UN Paracommandos had been intercepted by the Rwandan government forces (FAR), taken to a military camp as hostages, and murdered there. Passing the entrance of the camp on his way to a meeting of the FAR commanders, Gen. Dallaire caught a glimpse of some bodies on the ground. In a 2007 trial in Belgium, the Rwandan camp commander charged with the peacekeepers' murder testified that he had warned Gen. Dallaire that they were going to be killed, and that Dallaire had promised to send help. Storming Camp Kigali was beyond the means of his meagre force, however, and instead, he forbade the other Belgian troops to take action.[7] Colonel Luc Marchal, commander of UNAMIR forces in the Kigali sector, has defended this decision on the grounds that to attack would have put the ill-equipped UNAMIR forces in an adversarial role against the Rwandan military, escalated the situation, and endangered their lives and those of the 331 unarmed UN observers.[8] In the 2007 trial of the Rwandan officer Bernard Ntuyahaga on charges of allowing the massacre to take place, Belgian Investigating judge Damien Vandermeersch cited among other "obstacles to his work, the refusal of the United Nations to allow him to hear from General Romeo Dallaire."[9] But Dallaire had testified extensively before the ICTR in 2004 about the peacekeepers and other matters, all of which was a matter of public record available to Judge Vandermeersch, and in which a decision was pending. Colonel Théoneste Bagosora was later convicted by ICTR in December 2008 of being responsible for the peacekeeper's murders.[10]

Seeing the situation in Rwanda deteriorating rapidly, Dallaire pleaded for logistical support and reinforcements of 2,000 soldiers for UNAMIR; he estimated that a total of 5,000 well-equipped troops would give the UN enough leverage to put an end to the killings. The UN Security Council refused, partly due to US opposition. US policy on interventions had become skeptical following the death of several U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia the year before; this new policy was outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 25 by President Clinton. The Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR further to 270 troops . Since the UN mandate had not changed, the Belgian troops started evacuating, and the Europeans withdrew. (Sources : see Belgian press articles) As the Belgians departed on 19 April, Dallaire felt an acute sense of betrayal; 'I stood there as the last Hercules left...and I thought that almost exactly fifty years to the day my father and my father-in-law had been fighting in Belgium to free the country from fascism, and there I was, abandoned by Belgian soldiers. So profoundly did I despise them for it...I found it inexcusable.'[11]

Following the withdrawal of Belgian forces, whom Dallaire considered his best-trained[12] and best-equipped, Dallaire consolidated his contingent of Pakistani, Canadian, Ghanaian, Tunisian, and Bangladeshi soldiers in urban areas and focused on providing areas of "safe control" in and around Kigali. Most of Dallaire's efforts were to defend specific areas where he knew Tutsis to be hiding. Dallaire's staff—including the U.N.'s unarmed observers—often relied on its U.N. credentials to save Tutsis, heading off Interahamwe attacks even while being outnumbered and outgunned. Dallaire's actions are credited with directly saving the lives of 32,000 Tutsis and Hutus.

Dallaire gave the major force contributors different evaluations for their work. In his book, he gave the Tunisian and Ghanaian contingents high praise for their valiant and competent work. Ghana lost three peacekeepers. On the other hand, he criticized the Bangladeshi contingent for being poorly trained and poorly equipped. He was especially critical of the Bangladeshi contingent's leadership because of their incompetence and lack of loyalty to the mission and UN chain of command.

As the massacre progressed and press accounts of the genocide grew, the U.N. Security Council backtracked on its position and voted to establish UNAMIR II, with a strength of 5,500 men in response to the French plan to occupy portions of the country. (The so-called Operation Turquoise, the presence of French troops, was initially opposed by Dallaire because the French had a history of backing the Hutus and the Rwandan Armed Forces, and thus their presence would be opposed by Kagame and the rebel RPF.) It was not until early July, when RPF troops under Kagame swept into Kigali that the genocide ended. By August, the French had handed their portion of the country to the RPF, giving Kagame effective control of all of Rwanda.

As revealed through testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the genocide was brutally efficient, lasting for a total of 100 days and leading to the murder of between 800,000 and 1,171,000 Tutsi, Hutu moderates and Twa. Over two million people were displaced internally or in neighbouring countries. The Genocide ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front gained control of Rwanda on July 18, 1994, though recrimination, retribution, and criminal prosecutions continue to the present day.

Dallaire has been criticised by retired Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie for having failed to put his soldiers first when during the developing crisis in Rwanda 10 Belgian paratroopers were hacked to death when Dallaire chose to put his mission first and failed to mount a rescue of the Belgians under his command.[13]

Furthermore, it has been alleged by the families of the murdered troops that Dallaire failed to intervene while passing just 20 yards from the embattled paratroopers. Dallaire has refused to answer questions regarding the event.[14] Dallaire has voluntarily avoided travelling to Belgium to testify in a Belgian Senate Commission investigating the deaths of the Belgian troops. Belgian authorities have stated that they would seek a penal indictment over his role in the deaths of the Belgian paratroopers.[15]

Ron Coleman, a retired Canadian colonel, has gone so far as linking Dallaire's depression with the inability to make command decisions which resulted in the death of a Rwandan informer as well as impairing decision-making which could, according to some, have prevented genocide.[16]

Dallaire was later severely criticized by the Belgian parliamentary commission for his role leading to the torture and murder of ten members of the 2nd Commando Battalion and their protected charge. While Lieutenant Lotin and his men were being tortured and murdered, Dallaire passed by within 60 metres. Seeing the Belgium soldiers, Dallaire did not intervene. In his answer to the martial council he would later say, "I did not know whether they were dead or injured."[17] He went on to meet officers of the Rwanda army at the Military School, but did not mention the event. The company of the Bangladeshi Battalion which had the task of Quick Reaction Force was ill-prepared and did not leave their barracks. After those events Belgium withdrew its forces from Rwanda. Dallaire considered them to be his best-trained[18] and best-equipped forces.

The commission of inquiry of the Belgian Senate in 1998 severely condemned Dallaire's actions during those days. According to the parliamentary commission, Dallaire adopted an overly reserved attitude in the months before the genocide, undermining the credibility of UNAMIR in the eyes of the Rwandans. Furthermore, Dallaire's actions were considered to be “imprudent and unprofessional to have the Belgian escorts provided on 7 April with so few military precautions”. In addition, the commission stated it "did not understand why general Dallaire, who had noted the blue beret bodies in the Kigali camp, did not communicate this immediately to the FAR's high-ranking officers at the meeting of the École supérieure and did not demand the urgent intervention of those Rwandan officers present. This appears to reflect considerable indifference on his part. Moreover, general Dallaire also neglected to inform his sector commander about what he had seen and to give the necessary instructions".[19][17]

The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, during an interview, states that "...Dallaire was insulting in his comments and whose cowardice was demonstrated by a lack of responsibility when the situation required leadership on his part".[20]

Dallaire signing copies of his book Shake Hands with the Devil.

Dallaire at Darfur rally

Upon his return to Canada from UNOMUR and UNAMIR, Dallaire was appointed to two simultaneous commands in September 1994: Deputy Commander of Land Force Command (LFC) in Saint-Hubert, Quebec and Commander of 1 Canadian Division. In October 1995, Dallaire assumed command of Land Force Quebec Area.

In 1996, Dallaire was promoted to Chief of Staff and to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) Group at NDHQ . In 1998 he was assigned to Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources - Military) and in 1999 was appointed Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff on Officer Professional Development.

Dallaire suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder and, in 2000, attempted suicide by combining alcohol with his anti-depressant medication, a near fatal combination which left him comatose.[21] Dallaire is an outspoken supporter of raising awareness for veterans' mental health.

In January 2004, Dallaire appeared at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to testify against Colonel Théoneste Bagosora. (The testimony was critical to the outcome of the trial, and in December 2008 Bagosora was convicted of genocide and for the command responsibility of the murders of the 10 Belgian Peacekeepers. The trial chamber held that: "it is clear that the killing of the peacekeepers formed part of the widespread and systematic attack",[10] while at the same time holding that: "the evidence suggests that these killings were not necessarily part of a highly coordinated plan."[22]) He later worked as a Special Advisor to the Canadian Government on War Affected Children and the Prohibition of Small Arms Distribution, as well as with international agencies with the same focus, including child labour. He is a great proponent of the concept of Institutionalism, and, in 2004–2005, he was a fellow at the Carr Center For Human Rights Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He endorses the Genocide Intervention Network.

Dallaire was appointed to the Canadian Senate by Prime Minister Paul Martin on March 24, 2005. He sits as a Liberal, representing the province of Quebec. Dallaire noted that his family has supported both the Liberal Party of Canada and the Quebec Liberal Party since 1958. He was a strong supporter of Michael Ignatieff's unsuccessful 2006 bid for the leadership of the federal Liberal Party.

In 2007, Dallaire called for the reopening of Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, saying "The possibility of starting a new program at the college — a military Cegep that would allow all officer cadets to spend two years in Saint-Jean before going to Kingston, instead of studying only in Kingston — is being considered. In the spirit of progress, would it be possible to support a principle as basic as the freedom of francophones in the Canadian Armed Forces by establishing a Cegep-style francophone bilingual military college."[23]

Concordia University announced on September 8, 2006, that Dallaire would sit as Senior Fellow at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS), a research centre based at the university's Faculty of Arts & Science.[24] Later that month, on September 29, 2006, he issued a statement urging the international community to be prepared to defend Bahá'ís in Iran from possible atrocities.[25]

Senator Dallaire has worked to bring an understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder to the general public. He was a visiting lecturer at several Canadian and American universities. He was a Fellow of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He pursued research on conflict resolution and the use of child soldiers. He has written several articles and chapters in publications on conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance and human rights. He is currently writing a book about the use of child soldiers.

Dallaire and his wife, Elizabeth, have three children: Willem, Catherine and Guy.

Dallaire is the inspiration for the song Kigali by Canadian singer-songwriter, Jon Brooks. The song appears on his album Ours And The Shepherds, which is about Canadian war stories and the problems faced by returning soldiers. His first verse is taken directly from Dallaire's book.

Also, Romeo Dallaire is the title of a folk song written by Canadian folk songwriter Andy McGaw. McGaw's song points squarely at the indifference and failure of the United Nations surrounding the Rwanda genocide.

Chorus of McGaw's song:

Thank you for callin' the United Nations

We can't take your call right now cause we're all on vacation

If you need support hug your teddy bear

If your in big trouble boys better say your prayers

Dallaire is the subject of the song Run Romeo Run on the 2006 album The Great Western by Welshman James Dean Bradfield.

• The Last Just Man (Canada, 2001, directed by Steven Silver)
• Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda
• Shake Hands With the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire
• Shake Hands with the Devil (2007 film)

• 4237 Dr. Adrian Preston & Peter Dennis (Edited) "Swords and Covenants" Rowman And Littlefield, London. Croom Helm. 1976.
• H16511 Dr. Richard Arthur Preston "Canada's RMC - A History of Royal Military College" Second Edition 1982
• H1877 R. Guy C. Smith (editor) "As You Were! Ex-Cadets Remember". In 2 Volumes. Volume I: 1876–1918. Volume II: 1919–1984. RMC. Kingston, Ontario. The R.M.C. Club of Canada. 1984

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