Saint-Sylvestre coup d'état

President David Dacko

In 1958, after the French Fourth Republic began to consider granting independence to most of its African colonies, nationalist leader Barthélemy Boganda met with Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle to discuss terms for the independence of Oubangui-Chari, a French colonial territory which later became the Central African Republic (CAR).[1] De Gaulle accepted his request, and on 1 December 1958, Boganda declared the establishment of the autonomous CAR, with full independence to follow soon.[2] He became the autonomous territory's first Prime Minister. However, he was killed in a plane crash on 29 March 1959, while en route to the capital, Bangui.[3] National elections held on 5 April, which were handily won by Boganda's party, Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN).[4]

Dacko, with the backing of the French High Commissioner, the Bangui Chamber of Commerce, and Boganda's widow, offered himself as a candidate to lead the Council of Government. Goumba was hesitant to divide the populace, and after a month in power conceded the presidency to Dacko.[5] Dacko became consumed with administrative work and, though he had initially retained Goumba as Minister of State, dismissed him after several months. In 1960 Goumba founded a new political party, the Democratic Evolution Movement of Central Africa (MEDAC), and claimed it carried the ideals of Boganda and MESAN. Frightened by its rapid growth, Dacko declared his intent to revive MESAN.[6] The Central African Republic received its full independence from France on 13 August 1960.[7] Dacko pushed several measures through the Assembly which invested him as President of the Republic and head of state, and gave the government wide authority to suppress political opposition.[8] By 1962 he had arrested Goumba and declared MESAN the sole party of the state.[9] Goumba was eventually given a moderate sentence and subsequently permitted to move to France to complete his education.[10]

On 1 January 1962, Dacko's cousin, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, left the French Army and joined the military forces of the CAR with the rank of battalion commandant.[11] Dacko appointed him Chief of Staff of the Central African Army on 1 December 1964.[12]

Bokassa sought recognition for his status as the army's leader; he frequently appeared in public wearing all his military decorations, and in ceremonies often tried to sit next to President Dacko to hint at his importance in the government. Bokassa constantly involved himself in heated arguments with Jean-Paul Douate, the government's chief of protocol, who admonished him for not following the correct order of seating at presidential tables. At first, Dacko found his cousin's antics for power and recognition amusing.[13] Despite the recent rash of African military coups, Dacko publicly dismissed the possibility that Bokassa would someday try to take control of the country. At a state dinner, he said, "Colonel Bokassa only wants to collect medals and he is too stupid to pull off a coup d'état".[14] Other members of Dacko's cabinet saw Bokassa as a major threat to the regime. Jean-Arthur Bandio, the minister of interior, recommended that Bokassa be brought into the cabinet, which he hoped would both satisfy the colonel's desire for recognition and break his connections with the army. To prevent the possibility of a military coup, Dacko created the gendarmerie, an armed police force of 500, headed by Jean Izamo, and a 120-member presidential security guard, led by Prosper Mounoumbaye.[13]

Dacko's government faced a number of problems during 1964 and 1965: the economy experienced stagnation, the bureaucracy started to fall apart, and the country's boundaries were constantly breached by Lumumbists from the south and Sudanese militants from the east. Under pressure from radicals in MESAN and in an attempt to cultivate alternative sources of support and display his independence in foreign policy, Dacko established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in September 1964. A delegation led by Meng Yieng and agents of the Chinese government toured the country, showing Communist propaganda films. Soon after, the PRC gave the CAR an interest-free loan of one billion CFA francs; however, the aid failed to prevent the prospect of a financial collapse for the country.[15][lower-alpha 2] Another problem which plagued the government was widespread corruption.[17] Bokassa felt that he needed to take over the CAR government to remove the influence of Communism and solve all the country's problems. According to Samuel Decalo, a scholar on African government, Bokassa's personal ambitions likely played the most important role in his decision to launch a coup against the government.[18]

Dacko sent Bokassa to Paris as part of a delegation for the Bastille Day celebrations in July 1965. After attending a 23 July ceremony to mark the closing of a military officer training school he had attended decades earlier, Bokassa planned to return to the CAR. However, Dacko had forbidden his return, and Bokassa spent the next few months trying to obtain the support of friends in the French and Central African armed forces for his return. Dacko eventually yielded to pressure and allowed Bokassa back in October.[15][lower-alpha 3]

Tensions between Dacko and Bokassa increased. In December, Dacko approved a budget increase for Izamo's gendarmerie, but rejected the budget proposal for Bokassa's army.[20] The budget debate was fractious, and led to a rupture in relations between Izamo and Bokassa.[21] At this point, Bokassa told friends he was annoyed by Dacko's treatment and was "going for a coup d'état".[14] Dacko planned to replace Bokassa with Izamo as his personal military adviser, and wanted to promote army officers loyal to the government, while demoting Bokassa and his close associates. He hinted at his intentions to elders of the Bobangui village, who informed Bokassa of the plan in turn. Bokassa realized he had to act against Dacko quickly, and worried that his 500-man army would be no match for the gendarmerie and the presidential guard. He was also concerned the French would intervene to aid Dacko, as had occurred after the 23 February 1964 coup d'état in Gabon against President Léon M'ba. After receiving word of the coup from the country's vice president, officials in Paris sent paratroopers to Gabon in a matter of hours and M'ba was quickly restored to power.[20] Meanwhile, Izamo made plans to kill Bokassa and overthrow Dacko.[12]

Bokassa found substantive support from his co-conspirator, Captain Alexandre Banza, who was commander of the Camp Kassaï military base in northeast Bangui, and, like Bokassa, had served in the French army in posts around the world. Banza was an intelligent, ambitious and capable man who played a major role in planning the coup.[20] By late December, rumours of coup plots were circulating among officials in the capital.[22] Dacko's personal advisers alerted him that Bokassa "showed signs of mental instability" and needed to be arrested before he sought to bring down the government,[20] but Dacko did not act upon such advice.[22]

Map of the Central African Republic

Early in the evening of 31 December 1965, Dacko left the Palais de la Renaissance to visit one of his ministers' plantations southwest of the capital.[20] Izamo phoned Bokassa to invite him to a New Year's Eve cocktail party. Bokassa had been warned that this was a trap to arrest him, and instead requested that Izamo first go to Camp de Roux to sign some papers that needed to be reviewed before the year ended.[23] Izamo reluctantly agreed and traveled in his wife's car to the camp,[24] arriving at about 19:00.[23] Upon arrival, he was confronted by Banza and Bokassa, who informed him of the coup in progress. When asked if he would support the coup, Izamo said no, leading Bokassa and Banza to overpower him and hold him in a cellar. At 22:30, Captain Banza gave orders to his officers to begin the coup: one of his captains was to subdue the security guard in the presidential palace, while the other was to take control of Radio-Bangui to prevent communication between Dacko and his followers.[24]

Shortly after midnight on 1 January 1966, Bokassa and Banza organized their troops and told them of their plan to take over the government. Bokassa claimed that Dacko had resigned from the presidency and given the position to his close advisor Izamo, then told the soldiers that the gendarmerie would take over the CAR army, which had to act now to keep its position. He then asked the soldiers if they would support his course of action; the men who refused were locked up. At 00:30, Bokassa and his supporters left Camp de Roux to take over the capital. They encountered little resistance and were able to take Bangui.[24] A nightguard was shot and killed at the radio station after attempting to hold off soldiers with a bow and arrows.[25] Troops also secured the residences of the government ministers, pillaged them, and took the ministers to a military camp.[23] Bokassa and Banza then rushed to the Palais de la Renaissance, where they tried to arrest Dacko, who was nowhere to be found. Bokassa began to panic, as he believed the president had been warned of the coup in advance, and immediately ordered his soldiers to search for Dacko in the countryside until he was found.[24] To forestall a potential intervention by French troops stationed in Fort-Lamy, Chad, the putschists blocked the runway at Bangui Airport with trucks and barrels. A roadblock was also erected in the capital, and a French national was killed while trying to pass through it.[16]

Dacko was not aware of the events taking place in the capital. After leaving his minister's plantation near midnight, he headed to Simon Samba's house to ask the Aka Pygmy leader to conduct a year-end ritual. After an hour at Samba's house, he was informed of the coup in Bangui. According to Titley, Dacko then left for the capital, in hopes of stopping the coup with the help of loyal members of the gendarmerie and French paratroopers.[26] Others like Thomas E. O'Toole, professor of sociology and anthropology at St. Cloud State University, believed that Dacko was not trying to mount a resistance, instead he was planning on resigning and handing power over to Izamo.[27][lower-alpha 4] According to Pierre Kalck, Dacko was attempting to flee to his native district.[23] In any case, Dacko was arrested by soldiers patrolling Pétévo Junction, on the western border of the capital. He was taken back to the presidential palace, where Bokassa hugged the president and told him, "I tried to warn you—but now it's too late". President Dacko was taken to Ngaragba Prison in east Bangui at around 02:00. In a move that he thought would boost his popularity in the country, Bokassa ordered prison director Otto Sacher to release all prisoners in the jail. Bokassa then took Dacko to Camp Kassaï at 03:20, where the president was forced to resign from office. Later, Bokassa's officers announced on Radio-Bangui that the Dacko government had been toppled and Bokassa had taken over control.[26] In the morning, Bokassa addressed the public via Radio-Bangui (in French):

Central Africans! Central Africans! This is Colonel Bokassa speaking to you. Since 3:00 am this morning, your army has taken control of the government. The Dacko government has resigned. The hour of justice is at hand. The bourgeoisie is abolished. A new era of equality among all has begun. Central Africans, wherever you may be, be assured that the army will defend you and your property ... Long live the Central African Republic![26]

Officially, eight people died in fighting during the coup, including former Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Dejean.[23] Afterwards, Bokassa's officers went around the country, arresting Dacko's political allies and close friends, including Simon Samba, Jean-Paul Douate and 64 presidential security guards, who were all taken to Ngaragba Prison.[29] Prosper Mounoumbaye, the director of the presidential security, fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Weeks later, he was detained by the Congolese authorities and handed over to Bokassa on 23 January 1966. At Camp Kassaï, he was beaten and tortured to death, in full view of Bokassa, Banza and Dacko. Jean Izamo met a similar fate: he was transferred to Ngaragba Prison on 10 January, but was tortured to death by the month's end. President Dacko's life was spared, as Bokassa wanted international recognition for his government and France had threatened to cut off aid to the CAR if Dacko was killed. Bokassa had Dacko detained in a small room at Camp Kassaï, where he was cut off from communication with the outside world and placed on a highly restrictive diet. On 1 February, he was taken to Camp de Roux, where he remained in isolation.[25]

In the meantime, Bokassa engaged in self-promotion before the media, showing his countrymen his French army medals, and displaying his strength, fearlessness and masculinity.[30] In an attempt to preserve calm, he ordered all civil servants to return to their work under threat of dismissal.[31] He formed a new government called the Revolutionary Council, invalidated the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly, calling it "a lifeless organ no longer representing the people".[30] In his address to the nation, Bokassa claimed that the government would hold elections in the future, a new assembly would be formed, and a new constitution would be written. He also told his countrymen that he would give up his power after the communist threat had been eliminated, the economy stabilized, and corruption rooted out.[32] President Bokassa allowed MESAN to continue functioning, but barred all other political organizations from the country. In the coming months, Bokassa imposed a number of new rules and regulations: men and women between the ages of 18 and 55 had to provide proof that they had jobs, or else they would be fined or imprisoned; begging was banned; tom-tom playing was allowed during the nights and weekends; and a "morality brigade" was formed in the capital to monitor bars and dance halls. Polygamy, dowries and female circumcision were all abolished. Bokassa also opened a public transport system in Bangui and subsidized the creation of two national orchestras.[33]

Despite the positive changes in the country, Bokassa had difficulty obtaining international recognition for his new government.[25] He tried to justify the coup by explaining that Izamo and communist Chinese agents were trying to take over the government and that he had to intervene to save the CAR from the influence of communism. He alleged that Chinese agents in the countryside had been training and arming locals to start a revolution, and on 6 January 1966, he expelled Chinese representatives from the country and severed diplomatic relations with China.[34] Bokassa also stated that the coup was necessary in order to prevent further corruption in the government.[35]

Bokassa first secured diplomatic recognition from President François Tombalbaye of neighboring Chad, whom he met in Bouca, Ouham. After Bokassa reciprocated by meeting Tombalbaye on 2 April 1966 along the southern border of Chad at Fort Archambault, the two decided to help one another if either was in danger of losing power. Soon after, other African countries began to diplomatically recognize the new government. At first, the French government was reluctant to support the Bokassa regime.[35] The French Foreign Ministry drafted a statement of condemnation, but its release was demurred by other officials who considered Bokassa to be a Francophile. The French government eventually told its embassy officials in Bangui to work with Bokassa but refrain from treating him as a head of state.[16] Banza went to Paris to meet with French officials to convince them that the coup was necessary to save the country from turmoil. Bokassa met with Prime Minister Georges Pompidou on 7 July 1966, but the French remained noncommittal in offering their support. After Bokassa threatened to withdraw from the franc monetary zone, President Charles de Gaulle decided to make an official visit to the CAR on 17 November 1966. To the Bokassa regime, this visit meant that the French had finally accepted the new changes in the country.[35]

• Bokassa, Jean-Bédel (1985), Ma vérité (in French), Paris: Carrére Lefon
• Decalo, Samuel (March 1973), "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 11 (1): 105–127, doi:10.1017/S0022278X00008107, S2CID 154338499
• Kalck, Pierre (1971), Central African Republic: A Failure in De-Colonisation, translated by Barbara Thomson, London: Pall Mall Press, ISBN 0-269-02801-3
• Kalck, Pierre (2005), Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic (3rd English ed.), Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, ISBN 0-8108-4913-5
• Lee, J. M. (1969), African Armies and Civil Order, New York: Praeger, OCLC 23680
• Marcum, Anthony S.; Brown, Jonathan N. (March 2016). "Overthrowing the "Loyalty Norm": The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999". The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 60 (2): 256–282. doi:10.1177/0022002714540469. JSTOR 24755911. S2CID 155388146.
• O'Toole, Thomas E. (September 1998), "Review: Brian Titley. Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa", African Studies Review, African Studies Association, 41 (2): 155–157, doi:10.2307/524838, JSTOR 524838, S2CID 149558813
• Péan, Pierre (1977), Bokassa Ier (in French), Paris: Editions Alain Moreau, OCLC 4488325
• Titley, Brian (1997), Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, ISBN 0-7735-1602-6