Ehime Maru and USS Greeneville collision

Soon after the incident occurred, Japanese Premier Yoshirō Mori was informed of the accident as he was playing golf in Japan. Acknowledging the message, Mori resumed his round of golf, ending it an hour and a half after the first message, an action for which he was later much criticized, owing in part to the use of stock photographs taken the previous summer showing Mori enjoying his round of golf.[28]

Since the collision involved a commercial vessel, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had jurisdiction to conduct the investigation into the accident. An NTSB official, along with several USN and USCG officers, questioned Waddle and Pfeifer about the incident as soon as Greeneville moored at Pearl Harbor. That same day, Admiral Konetzni removed Waddle as captain of Greeneville and reassigned him to his staff pending the outcome of the accident investigation.[29]

U.S. Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the time of the incident

Two days after the sinking, on 11 February, U.S. President George W. Bush apologized for the accident on national television, stating, "I want to reiterate what I said to the prime minister of Japan: I'm deeply sorry about the accident that took place; our nation is sorry."[30] Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also publicly apologized. The U.S. ambassador to Japan, Tom Foley, personally apologized to both Premier Mori and to the Emperor of Japan. The public apologies to the Japanese from the highest American officials caused resentment among some American veterans of the Pacific War and their families, as well as among Asian victims of Imperial Japanese aggression and occupation. Richard Cohen wrote a column in The Washington Post, saying "We've Apologized Enough to Japan", denounced the "hypocrisy" of Japan's recent gestures of compensation and remorse to some of Japan's World War II victims, which he said were offered "grudgingly", while noting that the U.S. had apologized profusely for the accidental collision.[31][32]

On 11 February, during an "extremely emotional exchange", the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, personally apologized to families of the Ehime Maru's victims, who had arrived in Hawaii the day before. Several of the family members asked that Ehime Maru be raised from the ocean floor. Waddle had asked to accompany Fargo to apologize to the victims' families as well, but the COMSUBPAC public affairs office told him that he could not. The next day, the family members were taken by boat to view the accident site.[33]

The perceived lack of remorse by Waddle, and reports in the Japanese media that Greeneville had made no effort to assist Ehime Maru's survivors as they waited for almost one hour for rescue angered many Japanese citizens, especially the family members of the missing. One Japanese family member publicly referred to Waddle as, "the most terrible criminal of them all".[34] Another family member, referring to Waddle said, "If you're a man, you should fall on your knees and ask for our pardon!"[35] In response, Waddle delivered letters of apology to the Japanese consulate in Hawaii for delivery to the victims' families during the last week of February.[36]

Japanese government officials publicly expressed concern about the reports that civilians had been at Greeneville's controls during the collision. Japan's foreign minister, Yōhei Kōno, complained that U.S. officials had not provided details of the civilians' involvement, stating, "I cannot help but say it is an extremely grave situation if it were the case that the participation of civilians in the submarine's surfacing maneuver led to the accident."[37]

In February 2001, vice chief of naval operations Admiral William Fallon was given Presidential special envoy status and dispatched to Japan to apologize for the collision.[38] Fallon, along with Ambassador Tom Foley, met with family members of the victims at the Ambassador's official residence in Tokyo and in the Ehime Maru's home port of Uwajima, Ehime Prefecture, bowing deeply and expressing regret on behalf of the United States and President George W. Bush.[39] His deferential show of contrition to the families, performed in front of news cameras, was widely credited with ameliorating a situation that had the potential to damage US-Japan relations.[40][41]

Greeneville in drydock at Pearl Harbor on 21 February 2001

Greeneville suffered some damage in the collision. Beginning at the 31-foot (9 m) mark on the submarine's rudder, surface tiles had been sheared off, exposing bare metal, and there were several dents on the rudder's leading edge, one of which had punctured the metal skin. A 24-foot (7 m) section of acoustic hull surface treatment tiles below the sail had also been sheared off.[9]

Greeneville was repaired in a drydock at Pearl Harbor at a cost of US$2 million.[42] After the repairs were completed on 18 April 2002, the submarine resumed operational status.[43]

In addition to the NTSB investigation, the USN also initiated their own investigation on 10 February. USN Admiral Charles Griffiths was assigned to direct the investigation. Griffiths' team completed a preliminary inquiry report and submitted it to Admiral Fargo on 16 February. The next day, Fargo announced that the USN would convene a court of inquiry, the USN's highest form of administrative hearing.[44]

A USN court of inquiry is similar to a grand jury investigation in civil court. The court has subpoena power and provides legal safeguards for the affected parties, such as the right to be represented by counsel. The court is a military investigative process and as such has no judge. Instead, three admirals comprise the court and make a report based on the evidence presented in the inquiry. Testimony and other evidence presented in the court can later be used in court-martial proceedings.[45]

USN Admiral (then Vice Admiral) John B. Nathman, who chaired the court of inquiry into the Ehime Maru accident

The inquiry panel into the accident consisted of Vice Admiral John B. Nathman and Rear Admirals Paul F. Sullivan and David M. Stone. At Fargo's invitation the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) sent Rear Admiral Isamu Ozawa to participate in the inquiry as a non-voting adviser. The three named "affected" parties of the inquiry were Waddle, Pfeifer, and Coen, who were present in the hearing room throughout the inquiry.[46] Commander Mark Patton, a classmate of Waddle at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, twenty years ago, was quoted as saying "The general opinion on the waterfront was that it was important that he stand up and take responsibility. We wanted to see that happen. It was important for the public to see that happen. And he did that very well." [5]

The court of inquiry began on 5 March 2001. Representing Waddle as counsel was Charles Gittins, who arrived in Hawaii on 4 March. Family members of the Ehime Maru victims were seated directly behind Waddle in the hearing room and throughout the inquiry frequently reacted very emotionally and vocally to evidence presented during the hearings.[47]

The court called numerous witnesses, including Griffiths, Brandhuber, and Ōnishi. Ōnishi testified that large waves swept him overboard and far from his sinking ship, preventing him from assisting the rest of Ehime Maru's crew as they clung to the sinking ship. Afterwards, Waddle approached Ōnishi and apologized for the accident.[48]

Waddle also apologized to several groups of Ehime Maru family members on 8 and 16 March. One of them, Naoko Nakata, wife of one of the missing crewmembers, asked Waddle to "please tell the truth in court".[49] Soon thereafter, Waddle also apologized again during an interview with a Japanese television network.[50]

Rear Admiral Albert H. Konetzni testified during the inquiry that Waddle and his crew had rushed into Greeneville's final maneuvers without taking enough time to ensure that no other vessels were in the vicinity. In a statement that was widely reported in the media, Konetzni looked at Waddle and said, "I'd like to go over there and punch him for not taking more time".[51]

Seacrest was given testimonial immunity in exchange for his testimony. Pfeifer and Coen submitted unsworn statements to the court and, therefore, did not have to face cross-examination.[52]

Waddle requested immunity in exchange for his offer to testify, but Fargo denied the request, stating that Waddle's testimony was not "essential" in determining the facts of the case. In spite of the denial of immunity, Waddle elected to testify for the court. Waddle stated later that he felt he needed to testify because he had promised some of the Ehime Maru family members that he would do so, he had heard that Greeneville's crew expected him to, and he wanted to get his side of the story into the record.[53]

Diagram of Greeneville's control room shows the locations of the 32 people in the room at the time of the emergency ballast blow maneuver. The darker marks represent the locations of the DV civilians.

After hearing testimony from 31 witnesses, the court completed its hearings on 20 March. None of the civilian DVs were asked to testify. The inquiry report was submitted to Fargo on 20 April.[54]

The court made several findings, including that Waddle failed to take positive action in response to the non-availability of the AVSDU, nine of the 13 watchstations in and around the control room were manned by substitute personnel, and that one of the sonar operators was unqualified to stand watch.[55] The court also issued numerous opinions, including that the accident was caused by "a series and combination of individual negligence(s) onboard Greeneville," "artificial urgency" by Waddle to rush the submarine through its demonstration schedule as it began to run late, failure to follow standard procedures, the abbreviated periscope search, distractions and obstruction caused by the presence of the civilian guests, crew training deficiencies, overconfidence and complacency, and Waddle's not paying enough attention to ship contact information. The court found that, although Brandhuber was the senior officer present on Greeneville, Waddle as captain was solely responsible for the safe navigation of the submarine. The inquiry report went into great detail on the purpose and rules surrounding the USN's DVE program.[56]

The court recommended against court-martial for the officers involved because of an absence of any "criminal intent or deliberate misconduct." Instead, the court recommended non-judicial punishment for Waddle and Seacrest and administrative action for Brandhuber, Pfeifer, Coen, Greeneville's chief of the boat MMCM/SS Douglas Coffman, and sonar supervisor STS1/SS Edward McGiboney. The court recommended that the USN DVE program continue.[57]

Relatives of Ehime Maru's crewmembers were angry that none of the USN personnel involved would be court-martialed and that Waddle could remain in the USN and would retain his retirement pension. Ryosuke Terata, father of one of the missing students, said with regard to Waddle, "If (he were) in Japan, he would be fired and indicted on charges such as professional negligence resulting in death."[58]

On 23 April, Waddle received an admiral's mast (a form of USN non-judicial punishment) from Fargo at the USN Pacific Fleet headquarters in Pearl Harbor. Fargo pronounced Waddle guilty of dereliction of duty and improper hazarding of a vessel. He fined Waddle a half-month's pay for two months (fine delayed for six months, and waived after the six months with good behavior), gave him a verbal reprimand, and "made clear that [Waddle's] resignation was expected".[59] Coen also received an admiral's mast in which he was "counseled for failing to execute his duties to ensure the safe navigation of the ship and to properly supervise watch personnel in the control room".[9] Seacrest was admonished at a captain's mast, and Brandhuber, Pfeifer, Coffman, and McGiboney received formal administrative admonishments. The masts and administrative admonishments were documented and placed in the servicemembers' military records, perhaps affecting their future chances for promotions and assignments. Waddle, who had been working at a Navy desk job since being relieved of command,[60] formally retired from the USN on 1 October 2001.[61] Waddle did receive interviews from several private corporations who "put more value in the way Waddle handled himself during the grueling, 12-day court of inquiry than they did in any sort of blame for the collision.".[60] After 10 months of unemployment, Waddle worked as a project manager for an energy company in North Carolina and, in July 2004, started his own business as a consultant, executive coach, and public speaker.[62]

On 16 February 2001, the USN Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) and Submarine Development Squadron 5 (SUBDEVRON 5), using the Scorpio remotely piloted underwater vehicle (ROV), located Ehime Maru in 2,000 feet (610 m) of water on the ocean bottom (21°04.95′N 157°49.58′W). During the next two weeks, the USN used the Scorpio and the Deep Drone ROVs to search the ocean bottom around Ehime Maru for the remains of any of its missing crewmembers, without success.[63]

Divers inspect the wreckage of Ehime Maru off Oahu, 5 November 2001

After assessing the technical feasibility and environmental effect of raising Ehime Maru from the ocean bottom, the U.S. government, in June 2001, decided to proceed with recovering the ship from the ocean floor. The USN contracted the Dutch company Smit International[64] and Crowley Maritime Corp., headquartered in Washington state, to salvage the wreck of Ehime Maru. After consultation between the contractors, representatives from the Japanese government, and U.S. government officials, the decision was made not to raise Ehime Maru all the way to the surface but to lift and carry it underwater to shallow water near Oahu. Once there, divers could enter the ship. The operation would be the first to lift something of that size from such a depth. USN Rear Admiral William Klemm directed the recovery operation.[65]

Using the Phoenix III ROV, contractors, beginning on 20 July 2001, first removed Ehime Maru's mast and other items on the ship's decks that could interfere with the lifting operation. Assisted by technical experts from Japan, including one from the company that built Ehime Maru, the Rockwater II contract diving support vessel prepared the ship for lifting beginning the first week of August. After some difficulty, Ehime Maru was lifted off the ocean floor by Rockwater II on 5 October and moved slowly to a location closer to shore. On 14 October the wreck was set down in 115 ft (35 m) of water one statute mile (1.6 km) south of Honolulu International Airport's reef runway.[66]

On 15 October, the first team of USN divers from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit ONE (MDSU-1) began assessing the sunken vessel. Working in low- to zero-visibility conditions, 66 MDSU-1 and 30 Japanese JMSDF divers from the submarine rescue ship JS Chihaya conducted 526 dives over 29 days, searching the wreck. Ōnishi, relatives of some of the missing crewmembers, and several Japanese government officials observed the operation from the dive support ships. The divers recovered the bodies of eight of the nine missing people (three crewmembers, four students, and the two teachers), many personal effects, and several items unique to the ship, such as its nameplate, bell, anchors, and helm.[67]

Relatives of Ehime Maru crewmembers participate in a final ceremony for the ship aboard the JS Chihaya on 25 November 2001

After the recovery was complete, on 25 November, Ehime Maru was lifted, towed back out to sea suspended about 90 feet (27 m) below the towing barge, and scuttled in 6,000 feet (1,800 m) of water 12 nautical miles (22 km) south of Barbers Point.[68][69] The event was witnessed by three of Ehime Maru's victims' families on board Chihaya. The total cost of the salvage operations was about $60 million.[70]

On 10 April 2002, the USN signed an agreement to pay the Ehime Prefectural Government US$11.47 million in compensation for the sinking of Ehime Maru. Some $8.87 million was to help pay to replace the ship, and the remainder was to pay for counseling and financial aid for the survivors as well as to pay for a memorial ceremony for the victims.[71]

On 14 November 2002, the USN agreed to pay $13.9 million in compensation to 33 of the 35 families of victims or injured survivors. The remaining two families accepted a $2.6 million settlement from the USN on 31 January 2003. Before accepting the settlement, the two families had asked for face-to-face apologies from the USN and Waddle, a full investigation into the collision, a reasonable compensation offer, and a promise from the USN to help prevent similar accidents in the future.[72] Masumi Terata, whose teenage son Yusuke died in the accident, said that she was happy that the settlement was behind them, but added that, "My true feeling is that if possible, I want to see my son one more time."[73]

On 14 December 2002, Waddle, accompanied by Charles Gittins, traveled to Japan to apologize personally to the victims' families. On 15 December, Waddle visited the Ehime Maru memorial at Uwajima Fisheries High School and placed a wreath of white lilies before a monument to the dead, bowed in silence and then read the victims' names aloud. No local officials were present during Waddle's visit, citing statements from some victims' families that they did not want Waddle to visit. Later that day, Waddle met with some of the families of the victims and with some of the survivors. The next day, in Tokyo, Waddle met with Masumi Terata. Speaking of her meeting with Waddle, Terata stated, "I am first and foremost the family member of a victim and Mr. Waddle is first and foremost a victimizer. But when I saw Mr. Waddle as a person who was crying and apologizing, I thought he was apologizing from the heart."[74]

In a press conference on 17 December, Gittins criticized the USN for their continued insistence that Waddle not come to Japan to visit the victims' families. Said Gittins, "For the life of me, I cannot understand why the Navy did not want Scott to come meet with the families and do what is morally right and what is understood in Japanese culture to be the right thing to do". Gittins added that he had received emails from the USN as recently as the week before urging Waddle not to make the visit. Gittins stated that the reason that it took two years for Waddle to make the visit to Japan was because Waddle was forbidden to do so while he was still in the USN and because of financial constraints and fear of litigation after his retirement.[75]

After the sinking of Ehime Maru, many Japanese people, including government officials, questioned why civilians were allowed in Greeneville's control room during maneuvers that could place other, uninvolved, vessels at risk. Also, the Japanese expressed concern that the United States Navy did not immediately take full responsibility for the accident, appeared at first to try to conceal information about the DVE program, and did not court martial Waddle or have him personally apologize immediately after the accident.[76] The subsequent effort by the U.S. government to retrieve the victims' remains from the sunken wreck, numerous apologies from U.S. government representatives and Waddle, and the compensation paid to the Ehime government and to the victims' families appear to have assuaged much of the anger directed toward the U.S. government and military. Many Japanese, both government and private citizens, however, continue to demand the U.S. government to make more effort to reduce or eliminate serious accidents and crimes involving U.S. military personnel.[76][77]

Although the United States and Japan have been strong allies since the end of World War II, the accident involving Ehime Maru showed that the relationship is not always completely harmonious, especially with regard to incidents in which U.S. military personnel or assets injure or kill Japanese citizens or damage their property. In response to crimes committed by U.S. servicemembers against Japanese citizens, such as the 1995 Okinawan rape incident, Japanese citizens and some Japanese government officials have questioned the equality of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan and the issue of responsibility and accountability by the U.S. government concerning the actions of its military members in Japan. In addition, the Japanese have questioned the U.S. commitment to safe operations of its military assets in light of several accidents, including aircraft crashes and other ship collisions that have injured or killed Japanese citizens.[78]

The Ehime Maru memorial located in Kakaako Waterfront Park near Honolulu, Hawaii

Acting on a request from the Japanese government, the State of Hawaii established a non-profit group, the Ehime Maru Memorial Association, on 11 November 2001, to coordinate the activities of placing an Ehime Maru memorial at a site in Hawaii. The monument to the ship was completed on 9 February 2002, at Kakaako Waterfront Park near Honolulu. Each year since the accident, memorial ceremonies have been held on 9 February at Uwajima Fisheries High School in Ehime and at the Ehime Maru monument in Hawaii.[79][80][81][82]

Shipbuilders in Imabari, Ehime Prefecture, began construction on a new Ehime Maru on 17 April 2002. Upon completion, the new ship sailed to Hawaii, arriving on 17 June 2003. In a ceremony at the Ehime Maru monument, the principal of Uwajima Fishery at the time of the disaster, Kazumitsu Joko (上甲一光 Jōkō Kazumitsu), read a message from Moriyuki Kato, the governor of Ehime Prefecture, addressed to the Hawaiian people. The message stated, in part, "Since the Ehime Maru tragic accident two years ago, the people of Hawaii have shown compassion and warm support."[83]

The NTSB released its report on the accident on 19 October 2005.[84] The NTSB report largely confirmed the USN's inquiry findings, including that Waddle was primarily responsible for the collision. The NTSB report, however, was more critical of the distractions caused by the DV civilians on Greeneville that contributed to the accident. The report concluded that the USN had recognized the "detrimental operating conditions" aboard Greeneville and had taken "additional measures to address the safety of operations" on submarines, including additional restrictions on DVE visitors.[85]

On the 20th anniversary of the incident in February 2021, former commander Scott Waddle published an open letter of apology.[86]

• INS Vindhyagiri (F42)
• List of submarine incidents since 2000
• USS Hartford and USS New Orleans collision
• USS Fitzgerald and MV ACX Crystal collision, 2017
• Daigo Fukuryū Maru
• 1959 Okinawa F-100 crash
• 1964 Machida F-8 crash
• 1977 Yokohama F-4 crash
• FV Antares

• Media related to Ehime Maru incident at Wikimedia Commons
• Collision between the U.S. Navy Submarine USS Greeneville and Japanese Motor Vessel Ehime Maru – National Transportation Safety Board
• The counter-measure headquarters to a sinking accident of a training vessel of Uwajima Fisheries High School – Ehime prefectural government official website
• Archived 17 August 2020 at the Wayback Machine Memorandum for the record