German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The Council (Stiftungsrat) is SWP's highest supervisory and decision-making body. It has three “benches”:[4]

1. “the Bundestag bench”, consisting of one representative of each parliamentary party (currently 4).
2. “the Government bench”: at least seven representatives of the federal government at the suggestion of the head of the Chancellery (currently 8).
3. “the private bench”: at least seven eminent figures from academia, business and public life (currently 8).

Additionally, there are a president and two vice-presidents. The president and one of the vice-presidents also have to be eminent figures from academia, business or public life; the other vice-presidency is reserved for the head of the Chancellery. While the Chancellery supervises the organization of SWP, the Federal Government does not control its Council. It can neither assume the Council's leadership nor dominate voting majorities: no single “bench” can reach a simple majority by itself. Moreover, the election of members requires a two-thirds majority. The statutes thus deliberately compel the various representatives on the SWP Council to work together.[4]

The President of SWP Council is Nikolaus von Bomhard; his vice-presidents are Helge Braun and Angelika Niebler. The chair of the research advisory committee is Christopher Daase (Frankfurt University).[5]

• 1998–2005: Christoph Bertram
• 2005–2020: Volker Perthes[6]
• 2020–present: Stefan Mair[7]

As part of the project “The Day After”, the SWP together with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) gave Syrian intellectuals and representatives of various Syrian political movements the opportunity to discuss their ideas for the political, constitutional and economic development of Syria following a hypothetical replacement of Bashar al-Assad's government. In 2011–2012, many governments and observers alike were convinced that the uprising in Syria might well lead to the overthrow of the president, as it had in Tunisia and Egypt. The results of the project were made public in Syria and internationally via the report “The Day After. Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria”.[8] The project did not address ideas, plans or preparations for an overthrow or regime change. A number of Syrians subsequently founded an NGO called The Day After[9] to publicise and discuss the results among Syrians, and to contribute to the post-war order through projects in transitional justice mechanisms, document security and national heritage protection.

A paper co-produced with the German Marshall Fund entitled “New Power, New Responsibility” (November 2012 – September 2013) called on Germany to assume more responsibility for dealing with “those who disrupt the international order”. It argued that Germany and the EU need to show more willingness to act on international security issues, recommending inter alia that “Europe and Germany need to develop formats for NATO operations that make them less dependent on US support. This will require increased military deployment and stronger political leadership. Above all, Europe must take greater security precautions in its own neighbourhood: that is its own responsibility and no-one else’s. Germany will have to make a contribution that is commensurate with its weight.”[10] The paper attracted much attention and is said to have exerted substantial influence on prominent members of the German government. Peace activists, however, were sharply critical.[11] During the presentation of the new White Book by Federal Defence Minister von der Leyen, Volker Perthes emphasised that Germany was “a responsible middle power” and needed to “safeguard and transmit the European and global order along with other states”.[12]

See also: List of participants in the project “New Power – New Responsibility”.

In November 2010 and January 2011 WikiLeaks published memos by US Embassy staff in Berlin on two events in December 2009[14] and January 2010[15] in which SWP director Volker Perthes had participated. Inter alia, the events addressed transatlantic differences of opinion on how to deal with Iran. At the January 2010 event, Perthes raised the question of whether the US was also considering non-belligerent or non-military means of preventing a potential nuclear “breakout” on the part of Iran. The question was based on the assumption that such programmes (cyber-attacks or other forms of sabotage which could render parts of the nuclear programme inoperative without starting or provoking a war) already existed. Perthes had also voiced this assumption in an article published on Open Democracy in January 2010.[16] It was proved correct by reports showing that the Stuxnet attack must have started at least half a year before the January 2010 conversation at the US Embassy.[17]

In a The Guardian interview about the January 2010 event at the US Embassy, Perthes said he had suggested that “unexplained occurrences” or “computer failures” were preferable to military strikes. And that military strikes or military escalation with Iran definitely needed to be avoided.[18]

According to a report by German news outlet Spiegel Online, authorities suspect Russian hacking group known as "Fancy Bear" or "APT28" was behind a December 2016 attack on SWP.[19]