Hong Kong Basic Law

The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China is a national law of China that serves as the organic law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).[1][2] Comprising nine chapters, 160 articles and three annexes, the Basic Law was composed to implement Annex I of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.[3]: 91 

Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
The cover of the Basic Law, published by the Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau
Overview
JurisdictionHong Kong
Subordinate toConstitution of the People's Republic of China
Created4 April 1990
Date effective1 July 1997
Author(s)Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee
SignatoriesYang Shangkun, President of the People's Republic of China
Hong Kong Basic Law
Chinese香港基本法
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
Traditional Chinese中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法
Simplified Chinese中华人民共和国香港特别行政区基本法
Politics and government
of Hong Kong
Laws
Executive
  • Joint Secretariat for the Advisory Bodies on Civil Service and Judicial Salaries and Conditions of Service
  • University Grants Committee Secretariat
  • Working Family and Student Financial Assistance Agency
Legislature
  • Political camps:
Judiciary
Court of Final Appeal

High Court

District Court

  • Chief District Judge: Justin Ko

Magistrates' Court

  • Chief Magistrate: So Wai-tak

Special courts and tribunals:
Districts
District Officers
Elections
Electoral Affairs Commission

Chief Executive Elections

Legislative elections

District council elections
Foreign relations
Documents

Consular missions in Hong Kong

Hong Kong–China relations

Hong Kong–Taiwan relations
Related topics
flag Hong Kong portal

The Basic Law was enacted under the Constitution of China when it was adopted by the National People's Congress on 4 April 1990 and came into effect on 1 July 1997 when Hong Kong was transferred from the United Kingdom to China. It replaced Hong Kong's colonial constitution of the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions.[4]

Drafted on the basis of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law lays out the basic policies of China on Hong Kong, including the "one country, two systems" principle, such that the socialist governance and economic system then practised in mainland China would not be extended to Hong Kong. Instead, Hong Kong would continue its capitalist system and way of life until 2047.[5] The Basic Law also sets out the sources of law, the relationship between Hong Kong and the Central Government (State Council), the fundamental rights and duties of Hong Kong residents and the branches of local government.

History

Shortly after the Sino–British Joint Declaration was signed, the National People's Congress set up the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) in 1985, setting the basis of the transfer of sovereignty in Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China.[6]: 444  The committee was responsible for writing the draft Basic Law. In June 1985, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) approved the membership of the BLDC, which consisted of 36 members from China and 23 members from Hong Kong,[6]: 444  chaired by Chinese diplomat Ji Pengfei. Twelve of the 23 members from Hong Kong were connected to the city's business and industrial sectors.[7]: 11 [6]: 444 

A Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) consisting of Hong Kong community leaders was also established in 1985 to collect views in Hong Kong on the draft law. Similar to the BLDC, the BLCC was also dominated by business and professional elites.[8]: 174 

The first draft was published in April 1988 followed by a five-month public consultation. The second draft was published in February 1989, and the subsequent consultation period ended in October 1989. The Basic Law was promulgated on 4 April 1990 by the National People's Congress, together with the designs for the Regional Flag and Regional Emblem of the HKSAR.

On 4 June 1989, the BLDC's only two members representing the nascent pro-democracy camp, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, declared that they would suspend their participation after the military crackdown of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.[7]: 23  In September 1989, Lee announced that he would return to the BLDC after being urged to do so by many in Hong Kong.[7]: 23  However, in October, Beijing expelled Lee and Szeto from the BLDC as "subversives".[7]: 15  Lee and Szeto had voiced support for student activists in Beijing and had led the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, an organisation instrumental in assisting political dissidents leave China after the military crackdown on 4 June.[9]: 131–132 

Basic principles

The basic principles of Hong Kong's governance under Chinese sovereignty mirror those in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and most of them are set out in the first chapter of the Basic Law. The NPCSC has identified Articles 1 and 12 as the fundamental provisions of the Basic Law.[10]

Article 1 declares Hong Kong as a part of the People's Republic of China, but it maintains legal and political systems distinct from those in mainland China until 2047.[11] Hong Kong has a high degree of autonomy and maintains its own executive, legislative and judicial branches.[12] Judicial power includes the power of final adjudication, which replaces the colonial judicial recourse of appealing to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom with appeals to the Court of Final Appeal. The Hong Kong national security law incorporated into Annex III of the Basic Law overrides incompatible local ordinances and allows mainland Chinese courts to preside over cases that involve certain national security crimes.

Article 5 requires that the socialist system and policies to not be practised in Hong Kong and the capitalist system and way of life before the handover remain for 50 years after the handover, or 2047.[12] The common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subsidiary legislation and customary law that govern certain land rights in the New Territories that were in force before the handover are maintained, except for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the legislature.[12]

Article 12 declares that Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy and comes directly under the Central People's Government.

Private ownership of property is also a right protected in Hong Kong.[12]

Although the Basic Law was drafted to give effect to "One Country, Two Systems", on 10 June 2014, Beijing released a policy report asserting its authority over Hong Kong that started a conflict between "one country" and "two systems" by stating that the interests of China ("one country") should prevail over Hong Kong's constitutional autonomy ("two systems").[13] This ignited criticism from many people in Hong Kong, who said that the Communist leadership was undermining the Basic Law Article 8, in that it was reneging on its pledges to abide by the policy that allows for a democratic, autonomous Hong Kong under Beijing's rule.[14]

Autonomy under Chinese sovereignty

The Basic Law guarantees Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy under Chinese rule, with the exception of foreign affairs and defence which remains the purview of the Central People's Government.[15]

Central government agencies in Hong Kong

Four agencies of the central government operate in Hong Kong. The Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established under Article 13 of the Basic Law and began operating after the handover. The Liaison Office of the Central People's Government replaced in 2000 the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, which served as the de facto diplomatic mission of China to Hong Kong since 1947. The Hong Kong Garrison of the People's Liberation Army began operating after the handover. The Office for Safeguarding National Security was established in June 2020 under the Hong Kong National Security Law.

Article 22 states that "no department of the Central People's Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in accordance with this Law".[16]

In April 2020, the provision sparked a debate after the Liaison Office and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office criticised pro-democratic legislators for delaying the election of the chairperson of the Legislative Council House Committee.[17] Pro-democratic legislators said the offices violated Article 22 by commenting on the election of a chairperson in the local legislature. In response, the Liaison Office said both itself and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office are not subject to Article 22 because they were authorised by central authorities to specialize in handling Hong Kong affairs and not what are commonly meant by "departments under the Central People’s Government".[18][19] On the website of the State Council of China, a.k.a. the Central People's Government, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (国务院港澳事务办公室) and Xinhua News Agency (新华通讯社), whose Hong Kong branch was predecessor to the Liaison Office, are listed among institutions separate from the constituent departments of the State Council (国务院组成部门).[20]

Zhang Xiaoming has also said the Office of the National Security Commissioner is not subject to the restrictions in Article 22.[21]

Effect of national laws

Except the Basic Law and the Constitution,[22]: 124  national laws are not enforced in Hong Kong unless they are listed in Annex III and applied by local promulgation or legislation. When national laws are enacted locally by the Legislative Council, the local version adapts to the context of Hong Kong for the national law to have full effect.[23]: para. 18.2  The NPCSC has the power to amend legislation included in Annex III after consulting its Basic Law committee and the Hong Kong government. Laws in Annex III must be those related to foreign affairs, national defence or matters not within Hong Kong's autonomy.[24]

As of June 2020, Annex III includes laws on the designation of capital, national flag and anthem, territorial claims, nationality, diplomatic privileges and immunity, garrisoning of the People's Liberation Army and crimes involving national security. In May 2020, the National People's Congress announced that the NPCSC would enact a national security law tailored for Hong Kong in response to the 2019–20 Hong Kong protests. The law was added to Annex III and promulgated without being passed in the Legislative Council.[25]

National laws can be applied if they only affect an area in Hong Kong. In 2018, the Hong Kong West Kowloon station of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link was completed to include a section where mainland Chinese officials are allowed to exercise Chinese laws, an arrangement that intended to reduce the time needed for immigration.[26] The effectiveness of Chinese law inside Hong Kong territory was challenged in the same year in the Court of First Instance.[27] The court ruled that the Basic Law is a flexible constitution and as such can be interpreted for the needs of economic integration; the arrangement of having mainland Chinese laws in Hong Kong for the purposes of customs, immigration and quarantine does not contravene the "one country, two systems" principle.[23]: para. 18.3 

National security law

Article 23 requires Hong Kong to enact local national security laws that prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the central government, theft of state secrets and foreign organisations from conducting political activities in Hong Kong. In 2003, the Hong Kong government tabled the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill 2003, which triggered widespread protest. The proposed legislation gave more power to the police, such as not requiring a search warrant to search the home of a suspected terrorist. After the demonstrations and the withdrawal by the Liberal Party of their support for the bill, the government shelved the bill indefinitely.

Fundamental rights and duties

The rights of Hong Kong residents are guaranteed by chapter 3 of the Basic Law. Article 39 also applies provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and international labour conventions that was in force in Hong Kong before the handover.[28] While the most parts of the ICCPR is ratified as the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance in largely identical language,[29]: 527  no equivalent legislation was made to implement the ICESCR.

Civil rights

Hong Kong residents are equal before the law. Hong Kong residents have, among other things, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and of publication; freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of procession, of demonstration, of communication, of movement, of conscience, of religious belief, and of marriage; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike.[28] The freedom of the person of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. No Hong Kong resident can be arbitrarily or unlawfully arrested, detained or imprisoned. Arbitrary or unlawful search of the body of any resident, deprivation or restriction of the freedom of the person are also prohibited. Torture of any resident and arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of the life of any resident shall be prohibited.[28]

In late 2015, five staff members of a bookshop selling books and magazines banned in mainland China disappeared (see Causeway Bay Books disappearances). At least two of them disappeared while in mainland China, one while in Thailand. One member was last seen in Hong Kong, eventually reappearing in Shenzhen, across the Chinese border, without the necessary travel documents. While reaction to the October disappearances was muted, as unexplained disappearances and lengthy extrajudicial detentions are known to occur in mainland China,[30] the unprecedented disappearance of a person from Hong Kong, and the bizarre events surrounding it, shocked the city and crystallised international concern over the possible abduction of Hong Kong citizens by Chinese public security bureau officials and their likely rendition, in violation of several articles of the Basic Law and the one country, two systems principle.[31][32][33] The widespread suspicion that they were under detention in mainland China was later confirmed with apparently scripted video "confessions" and assurances by the men that they were remaining in China of their own accord.[32] In June 2016, one of the five, Lam Wing-kee, revealed in a dramatic press conference that he and the others had been held without due process and that Lee Po had indeed been illegally abducted from Hong Kong, all by a shadowy 'Central Investigation Team' ("中央專案組" or "中央調查組").[34]

Article 95 provides for mutual judicial assistance between Hong Kong and the PRC; however, serious stumbling blocks, such as capital punishment stand in the way of a formal understanding of extradition. Additionally, HKSAR authorities have ruled that Articles 6 and 7 of the PRC Criminal Code does not give Hong Kong sole jurisdiction in criminal matters, particularly when a crime is committed across provincial or SAR borders. The current status quo is that Hong Kong will ask for the return of Hong Kong residents who have committed crimes in Hong Kong and are arrested in the mainland. A mainlander who commits a crime in Hong Kong and flees back to the mainland, however, will be tried in the mainland. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the Central Government has demanded that the trial be held in the mainland. Prominent authorities, such as Albert Chen, a professor, and Gladys Li, chairman of justice of the Hong Kong section of the International Commission of Jurists, feel that this situation has serious ramifications for judicial independence in Hong Kong.

Political rights

Permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have the right to vote and stand for election in accordance with the Basic Law.[35] Provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong when the Basic Law came into effect were allowed to remain in force.[36]

Article 45 stipulates that the Chief Executive shall be selected by election or through local consultations and be appointed by the Central People's Government, with the ultimate aim of selection by universal suffrage upon nomination by a representative committee under democratic procedures."[37][38]: 190  However, Hong Kong has yet to implement universal suffrage for the elections, because the Basic Law states that the electoral method are subject to the "actual situation" of Hong Kong and "the principle of gradual and orderly progress".[39]

Whether the 2007 Chief Executive election and the 2008 Legislative Council elections could be performed by universal suffrage was determined on 26 April 2004, when the NPCSC ruled out the possibility as it deemed Hong Kong not mature enough for such elections.[40]

In 2014, the 31 August Decision by the NPCSC stated that starting from 2017, the selection of the Chief Executive may be implemented by universal suffrage upon nomination of candidates by a broadly representative committee and subject to appointment by the Central People's Government.[41] It went on to state that such a person must love the country and love Hong Kong and that safeguards for this purpose should be provided for by the specific method of universal suffrage, without specifying what the safeguards were to be.[41] The reform proposal encompassing this and other changes was rejected by the Legislative Council on June 18, 2015, after an ill-timed walk-out by many pro-establishment legislators.[42]

Political structure

The courts of Hong Kong are given the power to review acts of the executive or legislature and declare them invalid if they are inconsistent with the Basic Law.

The Chief Executive of Hong Kong can be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government.

The term of the Chief Executive after their predecessor resigns was a question that emerged after Tung Chee-hwa resigned on 10 March 2005. The legal community and the pro-democracy camp said the term of the new Chief Executive should be five years, according to Article 46. However, the Hong Kong government, some Beijing figures and the pro-Beijing camp said that it should be the remaining term of the original Chief Executive, by a technicality in the Chinese version of the Basic Law, introducing the remaining term concept. The Hong Kong government sought an interpretation from the NPCSC on 6 April 2005. The NPCSC ruled on 27 April 2005 that the Annex I of the Basic Law requires that if any Chief Executive should resign on or before 2007, the new Chief Executive should serve out the remainder of his predecessor's term. Hong Kong residents who favour autonomy view the "interpretation" from the Standing Committee as an intrusion into the Hong Kong legal system by the central government in violation of the spirit of the One Country, Two Systems policy, compromising the rule of law.

The Basic Law also guarantees the welfare and benefits of civil servants. According to the Article 100 of the Basic Law, the civil servants may remain in employment with pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before the handover. Article 107 stated the SAR Government should follow the principle of keeping the expenditure within the limits of revenues in drawing up its budget. Whether pay-cuts for civil servants and having a deficit budget are allowed under the Basic Law had been raised. During the economic downturn after 1997, there was a growing fiscal deficit (and, in 2007/08 a record surplus). The government imposed a pay-cut on the Civil Service during the economic downturn, and then sharply increased salaries during the recovery.

External affairs

The Basic Law provides the Hong Kong government limited power to engage in international affairs. Under the name "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong government can enter into bilateral agreements with non-Chinese regions and international organisations related to certain fields, including commerce, trade, communications, culture, tourism and sports.[43] As members of a Chinese delegation, government representatives can also engage in diplomatic negotiations and participate in international organisations and conferences that directly affect Hong Kong.[44]

Interpretation

The Basic Law can be interpreted by Hong Kong courts in the course of adjudication and by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC).[45] As of 7 November 2016, the NPCSC has interpreted the Basic Law on five occasions:

  • Interpretation regarding Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law, adopted on 26 June 1999 with relations to the right of abode;
  • Interpretation regarding Annex I(7) and Annex II(III) to the Basic Law, adopted on April 6, 2004, over the procedure of amending the electoral methods of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council;
  • Interpretation regarding the Second Paragraph in Article 53, adopted on April 27, 2005, regarding the term of office of a new Chief Executive succeeding a resigned predecessor;
  • Interpretation regarding the First Paragraph of Article 13 and Article 19 of the Basic Law, adopted on August 26, 2011, before the Court of Final Appeal hands down its judgment on Democratic Republic of Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC ; and
  • Interpretation of Article 104 of the Basic Law, adopted on 7 November 2016), regarding the requirements of lawful oaths and affirmations surrounding the oath-taking controversy over newly elected LegCo members.[46]

Of the five interpretations to date, only one interpretation was sought by the Court of Final Appeal (CFA). The interpretation was requested in the 2011 case of Democratic Republic of Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC and it concerned the jurisdiction of Hong Kong courts over acts of state, among other matters. The Government of Hong Kong sought two NPCSC interpretations on Basic Law provisions regarding the right of abode and the term of office of a new Chief Executive after his predecessor has resigned before the end of his term, in 1999 and 2005 respectively. The NPCSC had also interpreted the Basic Law twice on its own initiative, without being requested by any branch of government in Hong Kong. The first of the two occurred in 2004, and concerned the amendment of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council election methods for 2007 and 2008 respectively. The second was issued in November 2016 on the substantive requirements of lawful oaths and affirmations as stipulated in Article 104 of the Basic Law. As interpretations by the NPCSC are not retroactive,[47] an interpretation on the Basic Law does not affect cases that have already been adjudicated.

The basic principles for interpreting the Basic Law are described in Article 158 and case law. According to Article 158(1), the NPCSC has the power of final interpretation. This is consistent with the NPCSC's general power to interpret Chinese national laws as provided by Article 67(4) of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.[48]: 222  As a national law, the Basic Law was drafted in Chinese, and its Chinese version takes precedence over the official English version when discrepancies arise.[49]: 408  Before interpreting the Basic Law, the NPCSC must consult its subcommittee, the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.[50]

Hong Kong courts may also interpret the Basic Law when adjudicating cases, when the provisions addressed are within Hong Kong's autonomy.[47] Hong Kong courts can also interpret provisions on matters the Central People's Government is responsible for or those related to the relationship between the Central government and Hong Kong, provided that the case is being heard by the CFA, that the interpretation will affect the judgments of the case, and that the CFA has sought a binding NPCSC interpretation on the matter.[47]

To decide whether an NPCSC interpretation should be sought, the CFA applies a two-stage approach based on Article 158(3) formulated in Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration. The first stage concerns the "classification condition", which is satisfied if the provision to be interpreted concerns either affairs within the responsibility of the Central People's Government or the relationship between the Central Authorities and Hong Kong.[51]: 32–33  Provisions satisfying the classification condition are "excluded provisions", suggesting that they cannot be interpreted by the CFA. When the court needs to refer to an excluded provision to construe a non-excluded provision, the CFA is not required to request an NPCSC interpretation on the excluded provision. Instead, the CFA applies the "predominant test", in which the court asks which provision is predominantly the one needed to be interpreted in the present adjudication.[51]: 33  The second test concerns whether the "necessity condition" is satisfied. The condition is satisfied when the court needs the excluded provision to be interpreted and that the interpretation will affect the judgment on the case.[51]: 30–31 

Hong Kong courts use the purposive approach to interpret the Basic Law. Since Hong Kong's legal system is separate from that of mainland China, its courts are bound to adopt the common law approach to interpretation.[48]: 222  The courts construe the Basic Law's language to consider the provisions' context and purpose by finding its legislative intent;[48]: 223–224  the legislator's intent alone is not considered the legislative intent.[48]: 223  Ambiguities are resolved by accounting for the principles and purposes stated in the Chinese Constitution and other materials.[51]: 28  Yet, the courts treat the Basic Law as a "living instrument" that adapts to changing needs and circumstances.[51]: 28 [52]: 125  While Hong Kong courts account for the historical context of the Basic Law, they also consider "new social, political and historical realities".[53]: 563 

Disputes from interpretation

The interpretation of the Basic Law by the Hong Kong courts and the NPCSC is politically contentious. Albert Chen has described NPCSC interpretations as the "major cause of constitutional controversies" since the handover.[45]: 632 

The constitutional powers of the Hong Kong judiciary was first contested in HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan,[54] which was decided by the Court of Appeal 28 days after the handover. The applicants argued the Provisional Legislative Council established unilaterally before the handover was unlawful, and the laws it enacted were void. The court dismissed this argument. Among other reasons, the court held that as a local court it had no power to review an act of a sovereign authority.[45]: 633  The court reasoned that since Article 19 of the Basic Law did not expand its judicial powers and it had no power to review the validity of a sovereign act under colonial rule, it did not hold such power after the handover.[45]: 633  While Justice Gerald Nazareth agreed with the majority decision, he questioned whether the constitutional order of China and that of the United Kingdom were analogous. He also noted the Chinese constitution was not reviewed in detail during the trial.[54]: 352–353  Johannes Chan commented that the lack of judicial review power to review acts of Parliament reflected parliamentary supremacy, a doctrine borne out of unwritten constitutional systems.[55]: 376  Since China has a written constitution and the Basic Law describes the relationship between Hong Kong and the central government unlike the colonial Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions, Chan questioned whether parliamentary supremacy fully applies in Hong Kong after 1997.[55]: 377 

In the Ng Ka Ling case, the CFA tried to assert it has powers to review acts of the National People's Congress (NPC) or the NPCSC to determine whether they are consistent with the Basic Law.[45]: 635 

The Hong Kong government later sought an interpretation of Articles 22 and 24 from the NPCSC to avoid a potential influx of over a million mainland Chinese migrants (according to government estimates) into Hong Kong. This has triggered a debate on judicial independence in Hong Kong.

Amendment

Article 159 sets out the amendment process, and gives the National People's Congress the sole power to amend it. Amendments can be proposed by either the NPCSC, the State Council, or Hong Kong. For Hong Kong to propose amendments, the amendments first need the support of two-thirds of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, two-thirds of the deputies representing Hong Kong in the National People's Congress, and the approval of Hong Kong's Chief Executive. All proposals needs to be reviewed by the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and no amendments can "contravene the established basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong".[56]

It might be argued that interpretations of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress are effectively “amendments” to the Basic Law. The Hong Kong Court has nonetheless found NPCSC interpretations to have "supplementary” legislative effects in a manner consistent with Chinese jurisprudence. Similarly, the NPCSC's interpretive power could be used to modify a nearly unrestricted range of local laws without recourse by either the HKSAR courts or Government.[57]

Annexes I and II

According to Annexes I and II of the Basic Law adopted in April 1990, amendments could be made to the methods for selecting the Chief Executive and forming the Legislative Council for the terms subsequent to the year 2007 with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive. Amendments should then be reported to the NPCSC for approval or for the record.

In the NPCSC interpretation to the Basic Law adopted on April 6, 2004, the NPCSC stipulated the “five steps” of initiating political reform under Annexes I and II of the Basic Law:[58]

  • the Chief Executive submit a report on whether there is a need to amend the methods for selecting the CE for forming LegCo the Chairman of NPCSC;
  • the NPCSC make a decision approving or vetoing amendments to electoral methods of the CE or LegCo;
  • the HKSAR Government submit a motion concerning amendments of Annexes I and II to LegCo;
  • LegCo approve of the motion concerning amendments with a two-thirds majority of all the members, and the CE give formal assent; and
  • the NPCSC approve and file for record amendments to Annexes I and II.

Under the NPCSC's 2021 amendment of Annexes I and II, the NPCSC now exercises the power to amend Annexes I and II of the Basic Law. The “five steps” of initiating political reform by the HKSAR were no longer in force.

See also

References
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  2. Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration, FACV 14/1998 (29 January 1999), at para. 63; judgment text also available from HKLII
  3. Lo, Stefan H. C.; Cheng, Kevin Kwok-yin; Chui, Wing Hong (2020). "Sources of Law". The Hong Kong Legal System (2nd ed.). Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90–136. doi:10.1017/9781108634687. ISBN 9781108721820.
  4. Chan, Johannes (2015). "From Colony to Special Administrative Region". In Chan, Johannes; Lim, C.L. (eds.). Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (2nd ed.). Sweet & Maxwell. p. 9. ISBN 978-9-626-61673-4.
  5. Basic Law, Article 5
  6. Cheng, Joseph Y. S. (1 July 1989). "The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong". International Affairs. 65 (3): 443–462. doi:10.2307/2621722. JSTOR 2621722.
  7. Lo, Shiu Hing (June 1992). "The Politics of Cooptation in Hong Kong: A Study of the Basic Law Drafting Process". Asian Journal of Public Administration. 14 (1): 3–24. doi:10.1080/02598272.1992.10800260.
  8. Chu, Yik-yi (2000). "The failure of the united front policy: The involvement of business in the drafting of Hong Kong's Basic Law, 1985–1990". Asian Perspective. 24 (2): 173–198. ISSN 0258-9184. JSTOR 42704264.
  9. Chang, Parris H. (January 1992). "China's Relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan". The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 519: 127–139. doi:10.1177/0002716292519001010. JSTOR 1046758. S2CID 145325099.
  10. Article 2, Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
  11. Articles 5 and 8, Basic Law.
  12. "Chapter I: General Principles". Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 11–14. July 2006.
  13. "Full Text: The Practice of the "One Country, Two Systems" Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region". Xinhua News Agency. Archived from the original on 18 June 2014.
  14. Wong, Alan (11 June 2014). "Beijing's 'White Paper' Sets Off a Firestorm in Hong Kong". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 18 June 2014. Retrieved 23 June 2014.
  15. Basic Law, Articles 13 and 14.
  16. "Chapter II Relationship between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region". Full Text of the Constitution and the Basic Law.
  17. Ho, Kelly (14 April 2020). "Hong Kong democrats reject Beijing's warning over legislative stalling tactics as 'interference'". Hong Kong Free Press. Retrieved 13 May 2020.
  18. "Liaison Office 'not subject to Article 22'". RTHK. Hong Kong. 17 April 2020. Retrieved 17 April 2020.
  19. "香港中联办发言人：所谓"中央干预香港内部事务"是对基本法的故意曲解" [Liaison Office spokesperson: So-called "central government interfering Hong Kong's internal affairs" is an intentional misinterpretation of the Basic Law]. 中央人民政府驻香港特别行政区联络办公室 [Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]. 17 April 2020. 国务院港澳办和香港中联办是中央授权专责处理香港事务的机构，不是基本法第二十二条所指的一般意义上的“中央人民政府所属各部门” [Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and the Liaisonn Office are organs authorized by the central government to specialize in handling Hong Kong affairs, not what are commonly meant by "departments belonging to the Central People's Government" referred to by Article 22 of the Basic Law].
  20. "国务院组织机构" [Organization of the State Council]. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府门户网站 [Web Portal of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China]. Retrieved 11 November 2020.
  21. Ng, Teddy; Ng, Joyce; Mai, Jun; Cheung, Tony (1 July 2020). "National security law upholds 'one country, two systems' in Hong Kong: Beijing". South China Morning Post. South China Morning Post. Retrieved 1 July 2020.
  22. Zhu, Jie; Zhang, Xiaoshan (2019). "On Shaping and Consolidating the Basic Law Identification". Critique of Hong Kong Nativism: From a Legal Perspective. Singapore: Springer. pp. 113–127. doi:10.1007/978-981-13-3344-6_8. ISBN 978-981-13-3344-6. S2CID 159132732.
  23. Ramsden, Michael; Hargreaves, Stuart (2018). Bokhary, Kemal (ed.). Hong Kong Basic Law Handbook (2nd ed.). Sweet & Maxwell.
  24. Basic Law, Article 18
  25. Cheung, Gary (21 May 2020). "Beijing loses patience and pushes ahead with Hong Kong national security law". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 23 May 2020.
  26. Pomfret, James (4 September 2018). "Unscheduled departure: China's legal reach extends to Hong Kong rail station". Reuters. Retrieved 24 May 2020.
  27. Leung Chung Hang Sixtus v President of Legislative Council [2019] 1 HKLRD 292.
  28. "Chapter III: Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents". Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 23–29. July 2006. Archived from the original on 28 September 2008. Retrieved 1 August 2010.
  29. Panditaratne, Dinusha (2015). "Basic Law, Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR". In Chan, Johannes; Lim, C.L. (eds.). Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (2nd ed.). Sweet & Maxwell. pp. 521–564. ISBN 978-9-626-61673-4.
  30. "Hong Kong unsettled by case of 5 missing booksellers". The Big Story. Associated Press. 3 January 2016. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 10 January 2016.
  31. "Disappearance of 5 Tied to Publisher Prompts Broader Worries in Hong Kong". The New York Times. 5 January 2016.
  32. Ilaria Maria Sala (7 January 2016). "Hong Kong bookshops pull politically sensitive titles after publishers vanish". The Guardian.
  33. "Unanswered questions about the missing booksellers". EJ Insight. 5 January 2016.
  34. All in it together: The bookseller’s ordeal in China could happen to any of us, HKFP, 20 June 2016
  35. Article 26, Basic Law.
  36. Article 21, Hong Kong Bill of Rights.
  37. "Full Text of the Constitution and the Basic Law - chapter (4)". The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. 17 July 2020. Retrieved 29 March 2021. Article 45. The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government. The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures. The specific method for selecting the Chief Executive is prescribed in Annex I: Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
  38. Chen, Albert H.Y. (2016). "The Law and Politics of the Struggle for Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong, 2013–15". Asian Journal of Law and Society. 3 (1): 189–207. doi:10.1017/als.2015.21.
  39. Articles 45(2) and 68(2), Basic Law.
  40. Leung, Ambrose (27 April 2004). "HK lacks maturity for direct elections, state officials rule". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 15 October 2020.
  41. "Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 (Adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People's Congress on 31 August 2014)" (PDF). The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. 31 August 2014. Retrieved 29 March 2021.
  42. 政改否決：建制派拉隊離場 東網3分鐘實錄 [Electoral Reform Rejected: Pro-establishment camp walk-out 3-minute live recording by On.cc]. On.cc 東網. 18 June 2015. Retrieved 30 March 2021. 其後，林突然站起，呼籲建制派議員walk out(離開議事廳)，期望透過點算法定人數，爭取時間，讓劉皇發能及時趕回投票。民建聯即響應拉大隊離場，新民黨及大部分工聯會議員見狀亦跟隨離開，惟同屬工聯會的陳婉嫻(嫻姐)，以及自由黨議員卻仍然坐於座位上，未有跟隊。 [Afterwards, Lam suddenly stood up and called for pro-establishment legislators to walk out, hoping to gain some time from a quorum roll call and that Lau Wong-fat could return in time to cast his vote. The DAB followed and departed in large numbers, along with the New People's Party and most of the HKFTU legislators; only Chan Yuen-han of HKFTU and legislators of the Liberal Party remained.]
  43. Basic Law, Article 151.
  44. Basic Law, Articles 150 and 152.
  45. Chen, Albert H. Y. (2006). "Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong". Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal. 15 (3): 627–682.
  46. Ramsden, Michael; Hargreaves, Stuart (2019). Hong Kong Basic Law Handbook (2nd ed.). Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuter.
  47. Basic Law, Article 158(3).
  48. Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211.
  49. Chan, Johannes (2007). "Basic Law and Constitutional Review: The First Decade" (PDF). Hong Kong Law Journal. 37 (2): 407–447.
  50. Basic Law, Article 158(4).
  51. Ng Ka Ling & Others v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4.
  52. W v Registrar of Marriages [2013] 3 HKLRD 90 (CFA).
  53. Leung Sze Ho Albert v Bar Council of Hong Kong Bar Association [2016] 5 HKLRD 542 (CA).
  54. HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan, David & Others [1997] HKLRD 761 (CA).
  55. Chan, Johannes (1997). "The Jurisdiction and Legality of the Provisional Legislative Council". Hong Kong Law Journal. 27 (3): 374–387.
  56. "Chapter VIII Interpretation and Amendment of the Basic Law". Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee. Archived from the original on 20 February 2020. Retrieved 28 May 2020.
  57. Ramsden & Hargreaves 2019.
  58. "Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding Annex I (7) and Annex II (III) to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China". Hong Kong e-Legislation. Retrieved 3 February 2022.
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