Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine is a United States foreign policy position that opposes European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. It holds that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers is a potentially hostile act against the United States.[1] The doctrine was central to American grand strategy in the 20th century.[2]

For the "Fort Monroe Doctrine", see Contraband (American Civil War). For the film, see The Monroe Doctrine (1896 film).

James Monroe, 5th President of the United States
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, author of the Monroe Doctrine

President James Monroe first articulated the doctrine on December 2, 1823, during his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress (though it would not be named after him until 1850).[3] At the time, nearly all Spanish colonies in the Americas had either achieved or were close to independence. Monroe asserted that the New World and the Old World were to remain distinctly separate spheres of influence,[4] and thus further efforts by European powers to control or influence sovereign states in the region would be viewed as a threat to U.S. security.[5][6] In turn, the United States would recognize and not interfere with existing European colonies nor meddle in the internal affairs of European countries.

Because the U.S. lacked both a credible navy and army at the time of the doctrine's proclamation, it was largely disregarded by the colonial powers. While it was successfully enforced in part by the United Kingdom, who used it as an opportunity to enforce its own Pax Britannica policy, the doctrine was still broken several times over the course of the 19th century. By the turn of the 20th century, however, the United States itself was able to successfully enforce the doctrine, and it became seen as a defining moment in the foreign policy of the United States and one of its longest-standing tenets. The intent and effect of the doctrine persisted for over a century after that, with only small variations, and would be invoked by many American statesmen and several American presidents, including Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan.

After 1898, the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted by lawyers and intellectuals as promoting multilateralism and non-intervention. In 1933, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States affirmed this new interpretation, namely through co-founding the Organization of American States.[7] Into the 21st century, the doctrine continues to be variably denounced, reinstated, or reinterpreted.

Seeds of the Monroe Doctrine
Portrait of the Chilean declaration of independence
The Chilean Declaration of Independence on 18 February 1818

Despite the United States' beginnings as an isolationist country, the foundation of the Monroe Doctrine was already being laid even during George Washington's presidency. According to S.E. Morison, "as early as 1783, then, the United States adopted the policy of isolation and announced its intention to keep out of Europe. The supplementary principle of the Monroe Doctrine, that Europe must keep out of America, was still over the horizon".[8]

While not specifically the Monroe Doctrine, Alexander Hamilton desired to control the sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in North America, but this was extended to the Latin American colonies by the Monroe Doctrine.[9] But Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, was already wanting to establish the United States as a world power and hoped that it would suddenly become strong enough to keep the European powers outside of the Americas, despite the fact that the European countries controlled much more of the Americas than the U.S. herself.[8] Hamilton expected that the United States would become the dominant power in the New World and would, in the future, act as an intermediary between the European powers and any new countries blossoming near the U.S.[8]

A note from James Madison (Thomas Jefferson's Secretary of State and a future president) to the U.S. ambassador to Spain, expressed the American federal government's opposition to further territorial acquisition by European powers.[10] Madison's sentiment might have been meaningless because, as was noted before, the European powers held much more territory in comparison to the territory held by the U.S. Although Thomas Jefferson was pro-French, in an attempt to keep the British–French rivalry out the U.S., the federal government under Jefferson made it clear to its ambassadors that the U.S. would not support any future colonization efforts on the North American continent.

The U.S. government feared the victorious European powers that emerged from the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) would revive monarchical government. France had already agreed to restore the Spanish monarchy in exchange for Cuba.[11] As the revolutionary Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) ended, Prussia, Austria, and Russia formed the Holy Alliance to defend monarchism. In particular, the Holy Alliance authorized military incursions to re-establish Bourbon rule over Spain and its colonies, which were establishing their independence.[12]: 153–5 

Great Britain shared the general objective of the Monroe Doctrine, and even wanted to declare a joint statement to keep other European powers from further colonizing the New World. The British feared their trade with the New World would be harmed if the other European powers further colonized it. In fact, for many years after the doctrine took effect, Britain, through the Royal Navy, was the sole nation enforcing it, the U.S. lacking sufficient naval capability.[9] The U.S. resisted a joint statement because of the recent memory of the War of 1812; however, the immediate provocation was the Russian Ukase of 1821[13] asserting rights to the Pacific Northwest and forbidding non-Russian ships from approaching the coast.[14][15]

Doctrine

The full document of the Monroe Doctrine, written chiefly by future-President and then-Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, is long and couched in diplomatic language, but its essence is expressed in two key passages. The first is the introductory statement, which asserts that the New World is no longer subject to colonization by the European countries:[16]

The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

The second key passage, which contains a fuller statement of the Doctrine, is addressed to the "allied powers" of Europe; it clarifies that the U.S. remains neutral on existing European colonies in the Americas but is opposed to "interpositions" that would create new colonies among the newly independent Spanish American republics:[6]

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

Monroe's speech did not entail a coherent and comprehensive foreign policy.[17][18] It was mostly ignored until proponents of the European non-intervention in the Americas tried to craft a cohesive "Monroe doctrine" decades later.[17] It was not until the mid-20th century that the doctrine became a key component of American grand strategy.[17]

Effects
Gillam's 1896 political cartoon, Uncle Sam stands with rifle between the Europeans and Latin Americans.

International response

Because the U.S. lacked both a credible navy and army at the time, the doctrine was largely disregarded internationally.[4] Prince Metternich of Austria was angered by the statement, and wrote privately that the doctrine was a "new act of revolt" by the U.S. that would grant "new strength to the apostles of sedition and reanimate the courage of every conspirator."[12]: 156 

The doctrine, however, met with tacit British approval. They enforced it tactically as part of the wider Pax Britannica, which included enforcement of the neutrality of the seas. This was in line with the developing British policy of laissez-faire free trade against mercantilism. Fast-growing British industry sought markets for its manufactured goods, and, if the newly independent Latin American states became Spanish colonies again, British access to these markets would be cut off by Spanish mercantilist policy.[19]

Latin American reaction

The reaction in Latin America to the Monroe Doctrine was generally favorable but on some occasions suspicious. John A. Crow, author of The Epic of Latin America, states, "Simón Bolívar himself, still in the midst of his last campaign against the Spaniards, Santander in Colombia, Rivadavia in Argentina, Victoria in Mexico—leaders of the emancipation movement everywhere—received Monroe's words with sincerest gratitude".[20] Crow argues that the leaders of Latin America were realists. They knew that the president of the United States wielded very little power at the time, particularly without the backing of the British forces, and figured that the Monroe Doctrine was unenforceable if the United States stood alone against the Holy Alliance.[20] While they appreciated and praised their support in the north, they knew that the future of their independence was in the hands of the British and their powerful navy. In 1826, Bolivar called upon his Congress of Panama to host the first "Pan-American" meeting. In the eyes of Bolivar and his men, the Monroe Doctrine was to become nothing more than a tool of national policy. According to Crow, "It was not meant to be, and was never intended to be a charter for concerted hemispheric action".[20]

At the same time, some people questioned the intentions behind the Monroe Doctrine. Diego Portales, a Chilean businessman and minister, wrote to a friend: "But we have to be very careful: for the Americans of the north [from the United States], the only Americans are themselves".[21]

Post-Bolívar events
Spain fails to reconquer Mexico at the Battle of Tampico in 1829.

In Spanish America, Royalist guerrillas continued the war in several countries, and Spain attempted to retake Mexico in 1829. Only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish rule, until the Spanish–American War in 1898.

In early 1833, the British reasserted their sovereignty over the Falkland islands, thus violating the Monroe Doctrine.[22] No action was taken by the US, and George C. Herring writes that the inaction "confirmed Latin American and especially Argentine suspicions of the United States."[12]: 171 [23] In 1838–50 Argentina was under constant naval blockade by the French navy, which was supported by the British navy, and as such, no action was undertaken by the U.S. to support their fellow Americas nation as Monroe had stated should be done for collective security against European colonial powers.[24][22]

In 1842, U.S. President John Tyler applied the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaii and warned Britain not to interfere there. This began the process of annexing Hawaii to the U.S.[25]

On December 2, 1845, U.S. President James Polk announced that the principle of the Monroe Doctrine should be strictly enforced, reinterpreting it to argue that no European nation should interfere with the American western expansion ("Manifest Destiny").[26]

French intervention in Mexico, 1861–1867

In 1861, Dominican military commander and royalist politician Pedro Santana signed a pact with the Spanish Crown and reverted the Dominican nation to colonial status. Spain was wary at first, but with the U.S. occupied with its own civil war, Spain believed it had an opportunity to reassert control in Latin America. On March 18, 1861, the Spanish annexation of the Dominican Republic was announced. The American Civil War ended in 1865, and following the re-assertion of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States government, this prompted the Spanish forces stationed within the Dominican Republic to extradite back to Cuba within that same year.[27]

In 1862, French forces under Napoleon III invaded and conquered Mexico, giving control to the puppet monarch Emperor Maximilian. Washington denounced this as a violation of the doctrine but was unable to intervene because of the American Civil War. This marked the first time the Monroe Doctrine was widely referred to as a "doctrine". In 1865 the U.S. garrisoned an army on its border to encourage Napoleon III to leave Mexican territory, and they did subsequently remove their forces, which was followed by Mexican nationalists capturing and then executing Maximilian.[28] After the expulsion of France from Mexico, William H. Seward proclaimed in 1868 that the "Monroe doctrine, which eight years ago was merely a theory, is now an irreversible fact."[29]

In 1865, Spain occupied the Chincha Islands in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.[22]

In 1862, the remaining British colonies within Belize merged into a single crown colony within the British Empire, and renamed as British Honduras. The U.S. government did not express disapproval for this action, either during or after the Civil War.[30]

President Cleveland twisting the tail of the British Lion; cartoon in Puck by J.S. Pughe, 1895

In the 1870s, President Ulysses S. Grant and his Secretary of State Hamilton Fish endeavored to supplant European influence in Latin America with that of the U.S. In 1870, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded under the proclamation "hereafter no territory on this continent [referring to Central and South America] shall be regarded as subject to transfer to a European power."[12]: 259  Grant invoked the Monroe Doctrine in his failed attempt to annex the Dominican Republic in 1870.[31]

The Venezuelan crisis of 1895 became "one of the most momentous episodes in the history of Anglo-American relations in general and of Anglo-American rivalries in Latin America in particular."[32] Venezuela sought to involve the U.S. in a territorial dispute with Britain over Guayana Esequiba, and hired former US ambassador William L. Scruggs to argue that British behaviour over the issue violated the Monroe Doctrine. President Grover Cleveland through his Secretary of State, Richard Olney, cited the Doctrine in 1895, threatening strong action against Great Britain if the British failed to arbitrate their dispute with Venezuela. In a July 20, 1895 note to Britain, Olney stated, "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."[12]: 307  British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury took strong exception to the American language. The U.S. objected to a British proposal for a joint meeting to clarify the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. Historian George Herring wrote that by failing to pursue the issue further the British "tacitly conceded the U.S. definition of the Monroe Doctrine and its hegemony in the hemisphere."[12]: 307–8  Otto von Bismarck, did not agree and in October 1897 called the Doctrine an "uncommon insolence".[33] Sitting in Paris, the Tribunal of Arbitration finalized its decision on October 3, 1899.[32] The award was unanimous, but gave no reasons for the decision, merely describing the resulting boundary, which gave Britain almost 90% of the disputed territory[34] and all of the gold mines.[35]

The reaction to the award was surprise, with the award's lack of reasoning a particular concern.[34] The Venezuelans were keenly disappointed with the outcome, though they honored their counsel for their efforts (their delegation's secretary, Severo Mallet-Prevost, received the Order of the Liberator in 1944), and abided by the award.[34]

The Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute asserted for the first time a more outward-looking American foreign policy, particularly in the Americas, marking the U.S. as a world power. This was the earliest example of modern interventionism under the Monroe Doctrine in which the USA exercised its claimed prerogatives in the Americas.[36]

Spanish–American War, the result of U.S. intervention in the Cuban War of Independence

In 1898, the U.S. intervened in support of Cuba during its war for independence from Spain. The resulting Spanish–American War ended in a peace treaty requiring Spain to cede Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam to the U.S. in exchange for $20 million. Spain was additionally forced to recognize Cuban independence, though the island remained under U.S. occupation until 1902.[37]

"Big Brother"
American poses with dead Haitian revolutionaries killed by US Marine machine gun fire, 1915.

The "Big Brother" policy was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine formulated by James G. Blaine in the 1880s that aimed to rally Latin American nations behind US leadership and open their markets to US traders. Blaine served as Secretary of State in 1881 under President James A. Garfield and again from 1889 to 1892 under President Benjamin Harrison. As a part of the policy, Blaine arranged and led the First International Conference of American States in 1889.[38]

"Olney Corollary"
Main article: Olney interpretation

The Olney Corollary, also known as the Olney interpretation or Olney declaration was United States Secretary of State Richard Olney's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine when the border dispute for Guayana Esequiba occurred between the British and Venezuelan governments in 1895. Olney claimed that the Monroe Doctrine gave the U.S. authority to mediate border disputes in the Western Hemisphere. Olney extended the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, which had previously stated merely that the Western Hemisphere was closed to additional European colonization. The statement reinforced the original purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, that the U.S. had the right to intervene in its own hemisphere and foreshadowed the events of the Spanish–American War three years later. The Olney interpretation was defunct by 1933.[39]

Canada

In 1902, Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier acknowledged that the Monroe Doctrine was essential to his country's protection. The doctrine provided Canada with a de facto security guarantee by the United States; the US Navy in the Pacific, and the British Navy in the Atlantic, made invading North America almost impossible. Because of the peaceful relations between the two countries, Canada could assist Britain in a European war without having to defend itself at home.[40]

"Roosevelt Corollary"
Main article: Roosevelt Corollary
1903 cartoon: "Go Away, Little Man, and Don't Bother Me". President Roosevelt intimidating Colombia to acquire the Panama Canal Zone.

The Doctrine's authors, chiefly future-President and then Secretary-of-State John Quincy Adams, saw it as a proclamation by the U.S. of moral opposition to colonialism, but it has subsequently been re-interpreted and applied in a variety of instances. As the U.S. began to emerge as a world power, the Monroe Doctrine came to define a recognized sphere of control that few dared to challenge.[4]

Before becoming president, Theodore Roosevelt had proclaimed the rationale of the Monroe Doctrine in supporting intervention in the Spanish colony of Cuba in 1898. The Venezuela Crisis of 1902–1903 showed the world that the U.S. was willing to use its naval strength to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small states in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts, in order to preclude European intervention to do so.[41] The Venezuela crisis, and in particular the arbitral award, were key in the development of the Corollary.[41]

In Argentine foreign policy, the Drago Doctrine was announced on December 29, 1902, by the foreign minister of Argentina, Luis María Drago. The doctrine itself was a response to the actions of Britain, Germany, and Italy, which, in 1902, had blockaded Venezuela in response to Venezuelan government's refusal to pay its massive foreign debt that had been acquired under previous administrations before President Cipriano Castro took power. Drago set forth the policy that no European power could use force against an American nation to collect debt owed. President Theodore Roosevelt rejected this policy as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, declaring, "We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself".[12]: 370 

Instead, Roosevelt added the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, asserting the right of the U.S. to intervene in Latin America in cases of "flagrant and chronic wrongdoing by a Latin American Nation" to preempt intervention by European creditors. This re-interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine went on to be a useful tool to take economic benefits by force when Latin nations failed to pay their debts to European and US banks and business interests. This was also referred to as the Big Stick ideology because of the oft-quoted phrase from President Roosevelt, "speak softly and carry a big stick".[4][12]: 371 [42] The Roosevelt corollary provoked outrage across Latin America.[43]

The Roosevelt Corollary was invoked to intervene militarily in Latin America to stop the spread of European influence.[42] It was the most significant amendment to the original doctrine and was widely opposed by critics, who argued that the Monroe Doctrine was originally meant to stop European influence in the Americas.[4] Christopher Coyne has argued that the addition of the Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine began the second phase of "American Liberal Empire" and "can be understood as a foreign policy declaration based on military primacy." It initiated a tectonic shift in the political and economic relations between the United States and Latin America, and with European governments.[44] Other critics have argued that the Corollary asserted U.S. domination in the area, effectively making them a "hemispheric policeman".[45]

Lodge Corollary

The so-called "Lodge Corollary" was passed[46] by the U.S. Senate on August 2, 1912, in response to a reported attempt by a Japan-backed private company to acquire Magdalena Bay in southern Baja California. It extended the reach of the Monroe Doctrine to cover actions of corporations and associations controlled by foreign states.[47]

Clark Memorandum

The Clark Memorandum, written on December 17, 1928, by Calvin Coolidge's undersecretary of state J. Reuben Clark, concerned U.S. use of military force to intervene in Latin American nations. This memorandum was officially released in 1930 by the Herbert Hoover administration.

The Clark memorandum rejected the view that the Roosevelt Corollary was based on the Monroe Doctrine. However, it was not a complete repudiation of the Roosevelt Corollary but was rather a statement that any intervention by the U.S. was not sanctioned by the Monroe Doctrine but rather was the right of the U.S. as a state. This separated the Roosevelt Corollary from the Monroe Doctrine by noting that the Monroe Doctrine only applied to situations involving European countries. One main point in the Clark Memorandum was to note that the Monroe Doctrine was based on conflicts of interest only between the United States and European nations, rather than between the United States and Latin American nations.

World War II

After World War II began, a majority of Americans supported defending the entire Western Hemisphere against foreign invasion. A 1940 national survey found that 81% supported defending Canada; 75% Mexico and Central America; 69% South America; 66% West Indies; and 59% Greenland.[48]

The December 1941 conquest of Saint Pierre and Miquelon by the forces of Free France from out of the control of Vichy France was seen as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine by Secretary of State Cordell Hull.[49]

Latin American reinterpretation

After 1898, jurists and intellectuals in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, especially Luis María Drago, Alejandro Álvarez and Baltasar Brum, reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine. They sought a fresh continental approach to international law in terms of multilateralism and non-intervention. Indeed, an alternative Spanish American origin of the idea was proposed, attributing it to Manuel Torres.[50] However, American leaders were reluctant to renounce unilateral interventionism until the Good Neighbor policy enunciated by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. The era of the Good Neighbor Policy ended with the ramp-up of the Cold War in 1945, as the United States felt there was a greater need to protect the western hemisphere from Soviet influence. These changes conflicted with the Good Neighbor Policy's fundamental principle of non-intervention and led to a new wave of US involvement in Latin American affairs. Control of the Monroe doctrine thus shifted to the multilateral Organization of American States (OAS) founded in 1948.[7]

In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invoked the Monroe Doctrine at the 10th Pan-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, denouncing the intervention of Soviet Communism in Guatemala. President John F. Kennedy said at an August 29, 1962 news conference:

The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western Hemisphere [sic], and that is why we oppose what is happening in Cuba today. That is why we have cut off our trade. That is why we worked in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist menace in Cuba. That is why we will continue to give a good deal of our effort and attention to it.[51]

Cold War
The U.S.-supported Nicaraguan contras

During the Cold War, the Monroe Doctrine was applied to Latin America by the framers of U.S. foreign policy.[52] When the Cuban Revolution (1953–1959) established a communist government with ties to the Soviet Union, it was argued that the Monroe Doctrine should be invoked to prevent the spread of Soviet-backed communism in Latin America.[53] Under this rationale, the U.S. provided intelligence and military aid to Latin and South American governments that claimed or appeared to be threatened by communist subversion (as in the case of Operation Condor).

In the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, President John F. Kennedy cited the Monroe Doctrine as grounds for the United States' confrontation with the Soviet Union over the installation of Soviet ballistic missiles on Cuban soil.[54]

The debate over this new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine burgeoned in reaction to the Iran–Contra affair. It was revealed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been covertly training "Contra" guerrilla soldiers in Honduras in an attempt to destabilize and overthrow the Sandinista revolutionary government of Nicaragua and its president, Daniel Ortega. CIA director Robert Gates vigorously defended the Contra operation in 1984, arguing that eschewing U.S. intervention in Nicaragua would be "totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine".[55]

Kerry Doctrine
Further information: Foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration § Americas

President Barack Obama's Secretary of State John Kerry told the Organization of American States in November 2013 that the "era of the Monroe Doctrine is over."[56] Several commentators have noted that Kerry's call for a mutual partnership with the other countries in the Americas is more in keeping with Monroe's intentions than the policies enacted after his death.[57]

America First

President Donald Trump implied potential use of the doctrine in August 2017 when he mentioned the possibility of military intervention in Venezuela,[58] after his CIA Director Mike Pompeo declared that the nation's deterioration was the result of interference from Iranian- and Russian-backed groups.[59] In February 2018, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson praised the Monroe Doctrine as "clearly … a success", warning of "imperial" Chinese trade ambitions and touting the United States as the region's preferred trade partner.[60] Pompeo replaced Tillerson as Secretary of State in May 2018. Trump reiterated his commitment to the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine at the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018.[61] Vasily Nebenzya criticised the US for what the Russian Federation perceives as an implementation of the Monroe Doctrine at the 8452nd emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on January 26, 2019. Venezuela's representative listed 27 interventions in Latin America that Venezuela considers to be implementations of the Monroe Doctrine: 20–21  and stated that, in the context of the statements, they consider it "a direct military threat to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela".: 47  Cuba's representative formulated a similar opinion, "The current Administration of the United States of America has declared the Monroe Doctrine to be in effect..." : 28 [62]

On March 3, 2019, National Security Advisor John Bolton invoked the Monroe Doctrine in describing the Trump administration's policy in the Americas, saying "In this administration, we're not afraid to use the word Monroe Doctrine...It's been the objective of American presidents going back to President Ronald Reagan to have a completely democratic hemisphere."[63][64]

Criticism

Historians have observed that while the Doctrine contained a commitment to resist further European colonialism in the Americas, it resulted in some aggressive implications for American foreign policy, since there were no limitations on the US's own actions mentioned within it. Historian Jay Sexton notes that the tactics used to implement the doctrine were modeled after those employed by European imperial powers during the 17th and 18th centuries.[65] American historian William Appleman Williams, seeing the doctrine as a form of American imperialism, described it as a form of "imperial anti-colonialism".[66] Noam Chomsky argues that in practice the Monroe Doctrine has been used by the U.S. government as a declaration of hegemony and a right of unilateral intervention over the Americas.[67]

See also

References
  1. Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Monroe doctrine: meanings and implications." Presidential Studies Quarterly 36.1 (2006): 5–16 online Archived September 25, 2022, at the Wayback Machine
  2. Sexton, Jay (2023). "The Monroe Doctrine in an Age of Global History". Diplomatic History. doi:10.1093/dh/dhad043. ISSN 0145-2096.
  3. "Monroe Doctrine". Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed.). 2002.
  4. New Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 8 (15th ed.). Encyclopædia Britannica. p. 269. ISBN 1-59339-292-3.
  5. "Monroe Doctrine". HISTORY. Retrieved December 2, 2021.
  6. "The Monroe Doctrine (1823)". Basic Readings in U.S. Democracy. United States Department of State. Archived from the original on January 8, 2012.
  7. Scarfi, Juan Pablo (2014). "In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933". Diplomatic History. 40 (2): 189–218. doi:10.1093/dh/dhu071.
  8. Morison, S.E. (February 1924). "The Origins of the Monroe Doctrine". Economica (10): 27–51. doi:10.2307/2547870. JSTOR 2547870.
  9. "Monroe Doctrine, 1823". Office of the Historian. United States Department of State. April 6, 2016. Retrieved March 26, 2016.
  10. Nerval, Gaston (1934). Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine. New York: The Macmillan Company. p. 33.
  11. Boyer, Paul S., ed. (2006). The Oxford Companion to United States History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 514. ISBN 978-0-19-508209-8.
  12. Herring, George C. (2008). From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195078220.
  13. For the text of the Ukase of 1821, see: "Imperial Russian Edicts Relating to the Russian–American Company". Fur-Seal Arbitration: Appendix to the Case of the United States Before the Tribunal of Arbitration to Convene at Paris Under the Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and Great Britain, Concluded February 29, 1892. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1892. p. 16.
  14. Kennedy, David M.; Cohen, Lizabeth; Bailey, Thomas Andrew (2008). The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, Volume I. Cengage Learning. p. 267. ISBN 9780547166599.
  15. Miller, Robert J.; Furse, Elizabeth (2006). Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny. Westport, CT: Praeger. p. 136. ISBN 9780275990114.
  16. Monroe, James. "The Monroe Doctrine". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved November 2, 2011.
  17. Sexton, Jay (2023). "The Monroe Doctrine in an Age of Global History". Diplomatic History. doi:10.1093/dh/dhad043. ISSN 0145-2096.
  18. Riguzzi, Paolo (2023). "Mexico and the Monroe Doctrines, 1863–1920: From Appropriation to Rejection". Diplomatic History. doi:10.1093/dh/dhad049. ISSN 0145-2096.
  19. Hobson, Rolf (2002). Imperialism at Sea. Vol. 163. Brill Academic Publishers. p. 63. ISBN 978-0-391-04105-9. Retrieved October 12, 2009.
  20. Crow, John A. (1992). "Areil and Caliban". The Epic of Latin America (4th ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 676. ISBN 0-520-07723-7.
  21. Uribe, Armando, El Libro Negro de la Intervención Norteamericana en Chile. México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1974.
  22. Castro-Ruiz, Carlos (1917). "The Monroe Doctrine and the Government of Chile". American Political Science Review. 11 (2): 231–238. doi:10.2307/1943985. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 1943985. S2CID 147341271.
  23. Howe, Daniel (2007). What Hath God Wrought. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 115. ISBN 978-0-19-507894-7.
  24. "What is the Monroe Doctrine?". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
  25. Debra J. Allen (2012). Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy from the Revolution to Secession. Scarecrow Press. p. 270. ISBN 9780810878952.
  26. no by-line. "James K. Polk: Reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved July 28, 2016. In his message to Congress of December 2, 1845, President Polk reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine in terms of the prevailing spirit of Manifest Destiny. Whereas Monroe had said only that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonialism, Polk now stated that European nations had better not interfere with projected territorial expansion by the U.S.
  27. "Annexation by Spain, 1861–65". U.S. Library of Congress.
  28. M. M. McAllen, Maximilian and Carlota: Europe's Last Empire in Mexico (2014)
  29. Maass, Richard W. (2020). The Picky Eagle: How Democracy and Xenophobia Limited U.S. Territorial Expansion. Cornell University Press. p. 154. ISBN 978-1-5017-4875-2.
  30. Byrne, James Patrick; Coleman, Philip; King, Jason Francis (2008). Ireland and the Americas. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 9781851096145.
  31. Ulysses Simpson Grant; John Y. Simon, Editor (1998). The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant: November 1, 1870 – May 31, 1871. SIU Press. p. 286. ISBN 9780809321971. {{cite book}}: |author2= has generic name (help)
  32. Humphreys, R. A. (1967). Anglo-American Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895: Presidential Address to the Royal Historical Society December 10, 1966. pp. 131–164. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  33. "Bismarck and the Monroe Doctrine". Chicago Tribune. October 20, 1897. Retrieved August 16, 2016.
  34. Schoenrich (1949:526)
  35. King (2007:260)
  36. Ferrell, Robert H. "Monroe Doctrine". ap.grolier.com. Archived from the original on March 21, 2008. Retrieved October 31, 2008.
  37. Smith, Joseph (2014). The Spanish–American War 1895–1902: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-83742-3.
  38. Lens, Sidney; Zinn, Howard (2003). The Forging of the American Empire: From the Revolution to Vietnam, a History of U.S. Imperialism. Human Security Series (Illustrated ed.). Pluto Press. p. 464. ISBN 0-7453-2100-3.
  39. Young, George B. (1942). "Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary". Political Science Quarterly. 57 (2): 247–280. doi:10.2307/2143553. JSTOR 2143553.
  40. Dziuban, Stanley W. (1959). "Chapter 1, Chautauqua to Ogdensburg". Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939–1945. Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army. pp. 2–3. LCCN 59-60001. Archived from the original on May 7, 2019. Retrieved December 2, 2016.
  41. Matthias Maass (2009), "Catalyst for the Roosevelt Corollary: Arbitrating the 1902–1903 Venezuela Crisis and Its Impact on the Development of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine", Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 20, Issue 3, pages 383–402
  42. Roosevelt, Theodore (December 6, 1904). "State of the Union Address". TeachingAmericanHistory.org. Archived from the original on June 13, 2010. Retrieved December 20, 2008.
  43. Thomas Leonard; et al. (2012). Encyclopedia of U.S. – Latin American Relations. SAGE. p. 789. ISBN 9781608717927.
  44. Coyne, Christopher J. (2022). In Search of Monsters to Destroy : The Folly of American Empire and the Paths to Peace. Independent Institute. pp. 14–15. ISBN 9781598133479.
  45. Lerner, Adrienne Wilmoth (2004). "Monroe Doctrine". Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security. This tertiary source reuses information from other sources but does not name them.
  46. "Senate Vote #236 in 1912".
  47. New York Times Current History: the European war, Volume 9. 1917. pp. 158–159.
  48. "What the U.S.A. Thinks". Life. July 29, 1940. p. 20. Retrieved November 10, 2011.
  49. "Over by Christmas." The Liberation of Saint Pierre and Miquelon
  50. Chandler, Charles Lyon (July 1914). "The Pan American Origin of the Monroe Doctrine". American Journal of International Law. 8 (3): 515–519. doi:10.2307/2187493; García Samudio, Nicolás (1941). "La misíon de don Manuel Torres en Washington y los orígenes suramericanos de la doctrina Monroe". Boletín de Historia y Antigüedades (in Spanish). 28: 474–484; criticized by Whitaker, Arthur P. (1954). The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. p. 27.
  51. "352 – The President's News Conference August 29, 1962 response to Q[21.]". Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
  52. Dominguez, Jorge (1999). "US–Latin American Relations During the Cold War and its Aftermath" (PDF). The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda. Institute of Latin American Studies and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin Americas Studies. p. 12. Retrieved August 4, 2010.
  53. "Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 15". NSC–IG/ARA. July 5, 1969. Retrieved August 4, 2010.
  54. "The Durable Doctrine". Time. September 21, 1962. Archived from the original on March 6, 2009. Retrieved July 15, 2009.
  55. Smith, Gaddis (1995). The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993. New York: Hill & Wang. p. 201. ISBN 978-0-8090-1568-9.
  56. Johnson, Keith (November 18, 2013). "Kerry Makes It Official: 'Era of Monroe Doctrine Is Over'". Wall Street Journal.
  57. Keck, Zachary (November 21, 2013). "The US Renounces the Monroe Doctrine?". The Diplomat. Retrieved November 28, 2013.
  58. "Trump Says He Is Considering Military Action in Venezuela". VOA News. August 11, 2017.
  59. "CIA Director Pompeo: Venezuela's Situation Continues to Deteriorate". VOA News. August 13, 2017.
  60. Gramer, Robbie (February 2, 2018). "Tillerson Praises Monroe Doctrine, Warns Latin America of 'Imperial' Chinese Ambitions". Foreign Policy. The Slate Group.
  61. "Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY". whitehouse.gov. September 25, 2018 – via National Archives.
  62. "S/PV.8452 Security Council: Seventy-fourth year: 8452nd meeting". United Nations. January 26, 2019. p. 12.
  63. "John Bolton: 'We're not afraid to use the word Monroe Doctrine'". March 3, 2019. Retrieved March 4, 2019.
  64. "What is the Monroe Doctrine? John Bolton's justification for Trump's push against Maduro". The Washington Post. March 4, 2019.
  65. Preston, Andrew; Rossinow, Doug (November 15, 2016). Outside In: The Transnational Circuitry of US History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190459871.
  66. Sexton, Jay (March 15, 2011). The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 2–9. ISBN 9781429929288.
  67. Chomsky, Noam (2004). Hegemony Or Survival. Henry Holt. pp. 63–64. ISBN 978-0-8050-7688-2. Retrieved December 20, 2008.

Further reading
  • "Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 54: 1–129. 1914. ISSN 0002-7162. JSTOR i242639. 14 articles by experts
  • Bemis, Samuel Flagg. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (1949) online
  • Bingham, Hiram. The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth (Yale University Press, 1913); a strong attack; online
  • Bolkhovitinov, Nikolai N., and Basil Dmytryshyn. "Russia and the Declaration of the non-colonization principle: new archival evidence." Oregon Historical Quarterly 72.2 (1971): 101–126. online
  • Bryne, Alex. The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century (Springer Nature, 2020).
  • Gilderhus, Mark T. (2006) "The Monroe Doctrine: meanings and implications." Presidential Studies Quarterly 36.1 (2006): 5–16. Online Archived September 25, 2022, at the Wayback Machine
  • May, Ernest R. (1975). The Making of the Monroe Doctrine. Harvard UP. ISBN 9780674543409.
  • May, Robert E. (2017) "The Irony of Confederate Diplomacy: Visions of Empire, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Quest for Nationhood." Journal of Southern History 83.1 (2017): 69-106. excerpt
  • Meiertöns, Heiko (2010). The Doctrines of US Security Policy: An Evaluation under International Law. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-76648-7.
  • Merk, Frederick (1966). The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843–1849. New York, Knopf.
  • Murphy, Gretchen (2005). Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire. Duke University Press. Examines the cultural context of the doctrine. excerpt
  • Nakajima, Hiroo. "The Monroe Doctrine and Russia: American views of Czar Alexander I and their influence upon early Russian-American relations." Diplomatic History 31.3 (2007): 439–463.
  • Perkins, Dexter (1927). The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–1826. 3 vols.
  • Poston, Brook. (2016) "'Bolder Attitude': James Monroe, the French Revolution, and the Making of the Monroe Doctrine" Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 124#4 (2016), pp. 282–315. online
  • Rossi, Christopher R. (2019) "The Monroe Doctrine and the Standard of Civilization." Whiggish International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 2019) pp. 123–152.
  • Sexton, Jay (2011). The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in 19th-Century America. Hill & Wang. 290 pages; competing and evolving conceptions of the doctrine after 1823. excerpt

Primary sources
  • Alvarez, Alejandro, ed. The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New World (Oxford University Press, 1924) includes statements from many countries online.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.