Thomas C. Kinkaid

Kinkaid hoped his next assignment would be that of naval attaché to London, but that job went to Captain Alan G. Kirk. Kinkaid was offered and accepted the post in Rome instead. He took up his posting there in November 1938. In 1939, he was also accredited with the American embassy in Belgrade.[17] Kinkaid reported that Italy was unprepared for war. Only in May 1940 did he warn that Italy was mobilizing. Soon after, he learned from Count Galeazzo Ciano that Italy would declare war on France and Britain between 10 and 15 June 1940.[18] He provided accurate reports on the damage inflicted by the British in the Battle of Taranto.[19] He returned to the U.S. in March 1941.[20]

Kinkaid now faced the prospect of selection to rear admiral. He knew that captains normally required a certain amount of seagoing command experience to be considered, but because his tour of duty on Indianapolis had been cut short in order to take up the post in Rome, he did not have enough months, and it was unlikely that a billet as captain of a battleship or cruiser would come up in sufficient time before the next round of selections. He discussed the matter with head of the Officers' Detail Section at the Bureau of Navigation, Captain Arthur S. Carpender, an Annapolis classmate who had himself recently been selected for flag rank. Carpender came up with a solution: he recommended Kinkaid for command of a destroyer squadron. This was a seagoing command, although Kinkaid was somewhat senior for it.[21] Good fitness reports as commander of Destroyer Squadron 8, based in Philadelphia, resulted in Kinkaid's promotion to rear admiral in August 1941, despite having no more than two years' worth of total command experience. He became the last of his class to be promoted to flag rank before the United States entered the war. No one ranking lower in the class was promoted to flag rank before retirement.[22]

USS Lexington (center right), afire and under heavy attack, in a photograph taken from a Japanese aircraft

Kinkaid was ordered to relieve Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher as commander of Cruiser Division 6, consisting of the heavy cruisers USS Astoria, Minneapolis and San Francisco. This was part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor. He did not reach his new command until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the U.S. into the war. When he reached Hawaii, Kinkaid stayed with his brother-in-law, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who was married to Kinkaid's sister Dorothy.[23] Kinkaid accompanied Fletcher as an observer during the attempt to relieve Wake Island, and did not formally assume command of the division until 29 December 1941.[24]

The traditional job of cruisers was scouting and screening, but with the loss of most of the battleships at Pearl Harbor these roles largely passed to the aircraft carriers, while the cruisers' main mission became defending the carriers against air attack.[25] Kinkaid's cruisers formed part of Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch's Task Force 11, which was built around the carrier USS Lexington. Task Force 11 rendezvoused with Fletcher's Task Force 17, built around the carrier USS Yorktown, on 1 May 1942. Kinkaid then became commander of the Task Group 17.2, the screening cruisers and destroyers of both carriers.[26] Carrier warfare was in its infancy, and at this stage American carriers neither embarked adequate numbers of fighters, nor skillfully employed what they had. When Task Force 17 was attacked three days later in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the burden of defending the Task Force fell on Kinkaid's gunners. Their task was complicated by the radical maneuvering of the carriers under attack, which made it impossible for the screen to keep station. Despite the gunners' best efforts, both carriers were hit, and Lexington caught fire and sank.[27] For his part in the battle, Kinkaid was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal.[28]

Kinkaid was detached with the cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis and New Orleans, and four destroyers on 11 May 1942 and sailed for Nouméa, while Fletcher took the rest of Task Force 17 to Tongatapu.[29] Kinkaid then headed north to join the Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's Task Force 16.[30] Kinkaid's force became part of its screen which was under the command of Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Shortly after Task Force 16 returned to Pearl Harbor, Halsey was hospitalized with a severe case of dermatitis and, on his recommendation, was replaced as commander of Task Force 16 by Spruance. Kinkaid then became commander of the screen, also known as Task Group 16.2.[31] He was one of only four American flag officers present during the subsequent Battle of Midway.[32] However, he saw little action, as Task Force 16 did not come under attack.[33]

After the battle, Spruance became chief of staff to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) and Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA). In Halsey's continued absence, Kinkaid became commander of Task Force 16, built around the carrier USS Enterprise, although he was not an aviator, and his experience with carriers had been restricted to commanding their screens at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway.[34] In early July, Kinkaid was briefed by Nimitz about plans for a landing in the Solomon Islands, codenamed Operation Watchtower.[35] For this operation, Kinkaid's Task Force 16 would be one of three carrier task forces under Fletcher's overall command. To protect his flagship, Enterprise, Kinkaid had the battleship USS North Carolina, heavy cruiser USS Portland, antiaircraft cruiser USS Atlanta, and five destroyers.[36] The addition of the new battleship and its twenty 5 in (130 mm)/38 caliber dual-purpose guns greatly strengthened Task Force 16's antiaircraft defenses.[37]

Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid on board his flagship, USS Enterprise, 22 July 1942.

The American landing on Guadalcanal evoked a furious reaction from the Japanese, who sent their fleet to reinforce the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal. Fletcher's carriers had the mission of protecting the sea lanes to the Solomons. The two carrier forces clashed in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.[38] Kinkaid disposed his carrier task force in a circular formation, with Enterprise at the center, the cruisers at 10 and 2 o'clock and the battleship aft at 6 o'clock. This proved to be a mistake. With a top speed of 27 kn (31 mph; 50 km/h), the battleship fell behind the carrier when the latter accelerated to 30 kn (35 mph; 56 km/h) while under attack, depriving itself of the protection of the battleship's guns. Enterprise came under direct attack by Japanese aircraft, taking three bomb hits that killed 74 of its crew. Extraordinary efforts permitted the carrier to continue operating aircraft,[39] but it was forced to return to Pearl Harbor for repairs.[40] In his report after the battle, Kinkaid recommended that the number of fighters carried by each carrier be further increased.[41] For his part in the battle, he was awarded his second Distinguished Service Medal.[28]

Task Force 16 returned to the South Pacific in October 1942, just in time to take part in the decisive action of the campaign, the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, when the Japanese Army and Navy made an all-out effort to recapture the airfield of Guadalcanal.[42] In addition to Enterprise, Kinkaid's force included the battleship South Dakota, heavy cruiser Portland, anti-aircraft cruiser San Juan, and eight destroyers.[43] Fortunately, both Enterprise and South Dakota had been fitted with the new Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns.[44] In the three early carrier battles, Kinkaid had been a subordinate commander. This time, he was in overall command, in charge of Task Force 61, which included both his own Task Force 16 and Rear Admiral George D. Murray's Task Force 17, built around the aircraft carrier USS Hornet.[45] The battle unfolded badly. Hornet was sunk, and Enterprise, South Dakota and San Juan were severely damaged.[46] Aviators like Murray and John H. Towers blamed Kinkaid, as a non-aviator, for the loss of Hornet. It became a black mark on Kinkaid's record.[47] The Japanese had won another tactical victory, but Kinkaid's carriers had gained the Americans precious time to prepare and reinforce.[48]

Kinkaid as Commander, North Pacific Force, reading in his quarters on Adak, Aleutian Islands, 14 May 1943.

On 4 January 1943, Kinkaid became Commander of the North Pacific Force (COMNORPACFOR) following the failure of his predecessor, Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, to work harmoniously with the U.S. Army.[49] Command relationships in the North Pacific were complicated. Naval forces came under Fletcher's Northwestern Sea Frontier. The troops in Alaska, including Brigadier General William O. Butler's Eleventh Air Force, were commanded by Major General Simon B. Buckner, Jr., who was answerable to the head of the Western Defense Command, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt. Kinkaid's command was responsible for coordinating these forces and retaking the Aleutian Islands captured by the Japanese.[50] He found the Army eager to cooperate, but encountered more difficulty with Rear Admiral Francis W. Rockwell, the commander of the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, and later the IX Amphibious Force. Rockwell was an Academy classmate of Kinkaid's, who was senior to him in rank, and convinced that he would both plan and command the amphibious phase of the operation rather than Kinkaid.[51]

The War Department's original plan was to attack the main force on Kiska Island, but it took Kinkaid's suggestion to bypass Kiska in favor of an assault on the less heavily defended Attu Island.[52] Kinkaid moved his headquarters to Adak to be with those of Buckner and Butler, and at Buckner's suggestion established a joint mess where their two staffs ate meals together. However, the amphibious planning was done in San Diego by Rockwell and his U.S. Marine Corps advisor, Brigadier General Holland M. Smith.[53] The Battle of Attu was only the third American amphibious operation of the war, and was carried through to a costly success under difficult conditions. The slow rate of progress ashore caused Kinkaid to relieve the Army commander, Major General Albert E. Brown and replace him with Major General Eugene M. Landrum.[54] In June 1943, Kinkaid was promoted to vice admiral, thereby removing any lingering doubts about who was in charge,[1] and awarded his third Distinguished Service Medal.[55] He now prepared Operation Cottage, the much larger invasion of Kiska. This was carried out as planned, but the invaders found that the Japanese had already evacuated the islands.[56] In September 1943, Kinkaid was replaced by Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher.[57]

Kinkaid (left center) with General MacArthur (center) on the flag bridge of USS Phoenix during the pre-invasion bombardment of Los Negros Island.

In November 1943, Kinkaid replaced Carpender as Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, and the Seventh Fleet, known as "MacArthur's Navy". General Douglas MacArthur had twice requested Carpender's relief, and Kinkaid's record working with the Army in Alaska made him a logical choice. Australian newspapers hailed the appointment of a "fighting admiral", but neither MacArthur nor the Australian government had been consulted about the appointment, which was made by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest King. This was a violation of the international agreement that had established the Southwest Pacific Area. The Navy Department then announced that the replacement of Carpender with Kinkaid was merely a proposal, and MacArthur and the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, were asked if Kinkaid was acceptable. They agreed that he was.[58] In his new role, Kinkaid had two masters. As commander of the Seventh Fleet, he was answerable to King, but as Commander Allied Naval Forces, Kinkaid was answerable to MacArthur. Operations were conducted on the basis of "mutual cooperation" rather than "unity of command", and relations between the Army and Navy were not good. Kinkaid was not the most senior naval officer in the theater, for the Royal Australian Navy's Admiral Sir Guy Royle and the Royal Netherlands Navy's Admiral Conrad Helfrich were both senior to him.[59]

Kinkaid (right) with Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey (left)

Despite the unpromising relationship with the army, Kinkaid's most troublesome subordinate was a U.S. Navy officer, as had been the case with Rockwell in the Aleutians. This time, the subordinate was Rear Admiral Ralph W. Christie, the commander of Task Force 71, the Seventh Fleet's submarines. Christie commonly greeted a returning submarine at the pier and awarded decorations on the spot. This practice bypassed military and naval award boards, and annoyed Kinkaid because confirmation of sinkings was accomplished by Ultra, and news of awards given so quickly could constitute a security breach. Kinkaid gave Christie and his other subordinates orders forbidding pierside awards, and the award of army medals to navy personnel.[60] In June 1944, Christie accompanied a war patrol on Commander Samuel D. Dealey's submarine USS Harder. Afterward, Christie met with MacArthur and related the events of the war patrol to the general, who decided to award Dealey the Distinguished Service Cross and Christie the Silver Star.[61] When Harder was lost with Dealey and all hands on its next patrol, Christie recommended Dealey for the Medal of Honor. Kinkaid turned down the recommendation on the grounds that Dealey had already received the Distinguished Service Cross for the same patrol. Angered, Christie sent a dispatch to Kinkaid in an easily decipherable low-order code that criticized him and urged him to reconsider.[62] Upset by both Christie's attitude and his losses, which included Dealey and Kinkaid's nephew, Lieutenant Commander Manning Kimmel on USS Robalo in July 1944, Kinkaid requested Christie's relief. On 30 December 1944, Christie was replaced by Captain James Fife Jr.[63]

Other forces under Kinkaid's command included the cruisers of Task Force 74 under Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley, Task Force 75 under Russell S. Berkey, and Task Force 76, the VII Amphibious Force, under Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey.[64] The main role of the Seventh Fleet was supporting MacArthur's drive along the northern coast of New Guinea with a series of 38 amphibious operations, usually directed by Barbey.[65] Kinkaid accompanied MacArthur for the landing in the Admiralty Islands, where the two men came ashore a few hours after the assault troops.[66] With 215 vessels involved, Operations Reckless and Persecution in April 1944 together constituted the largest operation in New Guinea waters.[67] It was followed in quick succession by four more operations, at Wakde, Biak, Noemfor and Sansapor.[68]

For MacArthur's long-awaited return to the Philippines in October 1944, the Seventh Fleet was massively reinforced by Nimitz's Pacific Fleet. Kinkaid commanded the assault personally, with Barbey's VII Amphibious Force as Task Force 78, joined by Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson's III Amphibious Force from the Pacific Fleet as Task Force 79. Kinkaid was also given Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf's Task Force 77.2, a bombardment force built around six old battleships that had survived the attack on Pearl Harbor, and Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague's Task Force 77.4, a force of escort carriers.[69] However, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 38, the covering force of the fast carriers and battleships, remained part of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, which was not under MacArthur or Kinkaid's command.[70]

Kinkaid watches landing operations in Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, from the bridge of his flagship, USS Wasatch, 9 January 1945

Classmates: James L. Kauffman (left), and Kinkaid, both newly promoted pin the insignia of their new rank, each on the other, at their Philippine headquarters, 6 April 1945.

Halsey's orders, which gave priority to the destruction of the Japanese fleet, led to the most controversial episode of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Four Japanese task forces converged on Kinkaid's forces in Leyte Gulf: a carrier task force under Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, from the north; a force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita through the Sibuyan Sea; and two task forces commanded by Vice Admirals Shōji Nishimura and Kiyohide Shima, which approached via the Surigao Strait.[71] Carrier aircraft from Task Force 38 engaged Kurita in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, and forced him to withdraw.[72] In a controversial decision, Halsey concluded that Kurita was no longer a threat and headed north after Ozawa's force but, due to a misunderstanding, Kinkaid believed that Halsey was still guarding the San Bernardino Strait. Kinkaid deployed all available Seventh Fleet vessels in the Surigao Strait under Oldendorf facing Nishimura and Shima.[73]

In the Battle of the Surigao Strait that night, Kinkaid engaged the Japanese with his PT boats and Oldendorf's destroyers, cruisers and battleships. Oldendorf was able to "cross the T" of the enemy fleet. It was the last occasion in history where battleships fought each other. Of Nishimura's two battleships and five lesser ships, only the destroyer Shigure survived;[74] Kinkaid's PT force lost only PT-493, with 3 killed and 20 wounded.[75] In Oldendorf's task force, only the destroyer Albert W. Grant was hit, mostly by friendly fire.[76] Total Allied casualties were 39 men killed and 114 wounded.[77]

However, the victory was marred when Kurita's force doubled back and engaged Sprague's escort carriers in the Battle off Samar the next day. Oldendorf's force headed back but Kurita withdrew after sinking an escort carrier, two destroyers and a destroyer escort.[78] After the war, Halsey defended his actions in his memoirs.[79] Kinkaid's position was that:

Of course it would have been sound practice and better to have an overall commander of naval forces.... However, the Third Fleet and the Seventh Fleet each had an assigned mission which, if fulfilled, would have resulted in the destruction of the Japanese fleet then and there. The question of an overall commander at the scene of action would have been purely academic. Most surely Nimitz's orders to Halsey did not contemplate the withdrawal of covering forces at the height of battle. "Divided Command" is not the key to what happened at Leyte. "Mission" is the key.[80]

Following the demise of Japanese naval power in the region, Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet supported the land campaigns in the Philippines and the Borneo.[81] Kinkaid was promoted to admiral on 3 April 1945.[82] After the Pacific War ended in August 1945, the Seventh Fleet assisted in landing troops in Korea and northern China to occupy these areas and repatriate Allied prisoners of war. Kinkaid elected not to land troops at Chefoo as originally instructed because the city was in the hands of the Communist Eighth Route Army; Qingdao was substituted instead.[83] He was awarded the Legion of Merit by the theater commander in China, Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, and the Grand Cordon of the Order of Precious Tripod by the Chinese government.[84]