Transcognition

Transcognition is the ability to employ one's cognitive faculties to undermine values by attacking their presuppositions and using one's non-cognitive attitude to create new values.[1][2] These new values are attempts by which we try to render our world estimable.[3] This transcognitive approach was first formulated by philosopher John T. Wilcox in his study 'Truth and Value in Nietzsche' (1974).[1] Transcognition is not to be confused with technocognition, an interdisciplinary approach to counter misinformation in a post-truth world.[4]

Transcognitive approach

In his study, Truth and Value in Nietzsche, Wilcox critically examines the issue of the relation of Friedrich Nietzsche's epistemological thinking and Nietzsche own values, in particular the extent to which, and the ways in which, Nietzsche regarded his own values as objective.[1][2] This issue is called the 'problem of epistemic privilege'.[5] To try and solve the problem, Wilcox identified a plethora of contradictions in Nietzsche's work. He divides these contradictions into two categories: the non-cognitive statements and the cognitive statements. The non-cognitive category consists of those statements which hold that values are not objective, but to be understood in terms of the beholder.[1][6] This redefinition of non-cognitivism aligns with Nietzsche's perspectivism.[7] Wilcox defines the cognitivist category as follows: those statements that can be objectively known.[1][6] According to Wilcox, Nietzsche can be regarded as both a cognitivist and a non-cognitivist, in reference to the passages and quotations that were found in Nietzsche's legacy.[1][2] As to how a unification between the cognitive and non-cognitive category could be established, Wilcox remains inconclusive. He explains: "Nietzsche had the rudiments of several solutions, but nothing definitive."[2][6] A redefinition of cognitivism by means of 'truth-value gaps' may hold the key to further solving the problem of epistemic privilege.[8]

See also

References
  1. Wilcox, John T. (1974). Truth and Value in Nietzsche. University of Michigan Press. pp. 12, 201.
  2. Laderoute, Karl W. L. (2013). Nietzsche on Truth and Knowledge. p. 23.
  3. Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. (2012). Nietzsche and Non-cognitivism. In Roberson, Simon & Janaway, Christopher (2012). Nietzsche, Naturalism & Normativity. Oxford University Press. pp. 111-132.
  4. Lewandowsky, Stephan; Ecker, Ullrich K.H. and Cook, John (2017). Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era. ScienceDirect.
  5. Stellino, Paul (2015). Problems of Nietzschean metaethics. pp. 175-190.
  6. Lightbody, Brian (2010). Philosophical Genealogy I: An epistemological reconstruction of Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method. Peter Lang Publishing Inc. Vol. 1. pp. 63-64.
  7. Nehamas, Alexander (2000). The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 145, 148.
  8. Gustafson, Matt (2016). Moral Error Theory. Colorado State University. p. 16.
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