Valin v Langlois

When Canada was created in 1867, the House of Commons initially relied on the pre-Confederation laws from each of the provinces to deal with controverted elections.[1] Those laws followed the precedent of the British House of Commons: following a general election, the Speaker of the House of Commons would establish a committee of members of the Commons to hear and decide election petitions.[2]^: 10–13 The process was invariably partisan in approach and outcome.[3][4]

In 1873, Parliament enacted a new Act that applied uniformly to federal elections in all provinces, and which repealed the pre-existing provincial laws, to the extent they applied to federal elections.[5]^: s.54 The 1873 Act set up an Election Court in each province, drawing on the judges of the superior courts of the province to sit in the Election Court.[5]^: s.6 Those courts would have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide election petitions, taking that power away from the House of Commons.[5]^: s.51

The 1873 Act only stayed in force for one year. In 1874, following the 1874 federal election, Parliament enacted a new statute, The Dominion Controverted Elections Act, 1874, and repealed the 1873 Act.[6]^: s.1 Unlike the 1873 Act, the 1874 Act did not create special Election Courts. Instead, it assigned the jurisdiction to try election petitions directly to the superior courts of each province.[6]^: s.3 It was the 1874 Act which was challenged in Valin v Langlois.

Jean Langlois, QC, the unsuccessful candidate, who challenged the election

Valin v Langlois arose from a controverted election in the riding of Montmorency, in the federal general election of 1878. The riding of Montmorency was located in the rural area outside Quebec City. Jean Langlois was the member for Montmorency from 1867 to 1878, and contested the seat again in the 1878 election. Pierre-Vincent Valin was his opponent in 1878. Valin was declared the winner, but Langlois challenged the election result in the Quebec Superior Court under the Dominion Controverted Elections Act, 1874.

Valin raised a preliminary objection, challenging the jurisdiction of the court. He argued that the federal Parliament could not give jurisdiction over federal election matters to the provincial courts. Chief Justice Meredith of the Superior Court dismissed the objection and held that the court had jurisdiction.[7] Valin then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

On appeal, Valin was represented by Honoré-Cyrias Pelletier, QC, a lawyer who specialised in controverted elections.[8] Pelletier argued three points: (1) that the structure of the provincial courts was a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, and the federal government could not add to their jurisdiction; (2) that the federal government had not created a federal court in the 1874 legislation; (3) that the right to sit in Parliament was a political right, which could not be assigned to the civil courts.[2]^: 2–7

Langlois was a lawyer and appeared on his own behalf. He responded that Parliament can confer jurisdiction on the provincial courts, provided Parliament stays within its legislative authority, such as federal elections. He also argued that Parliament had in fact created a federal court, and that it was immaterial whether the right be characterised as a political right or a civil right.[2]^: 7–9

Chief Justice Ritchie, who wrote the longest decision upholding the Act

The five judges who decided the case unanimously upheld the validity of The Controverted Elections Act, 1874. (All six judges of the Court initially heard the appeal, but Justice Strong did not participate in the decision due to illness.[2]^: 1)

The five judges who decided the case each wrote their own reasons, as was the Court's practice at that time. The longest set of reasons was given by Chief Justice Ritchie, who outlined the history of election challenges.[2]^: 10–13 He also cited the power of the federal Parliament to govern its own election processes under s. 41 of the Constitution Act, 1867,[2]^: 14–18 before turning to the issue of court jurisdiction. He concluded that when Parliament conferred jurisdiction over a federal law on the provincial courts, it was in no way interfering with the powers of the provincial legislatures to govern matters within their authority.[2]^: 18–19 He also held that the provincial superior courts are courts of general jurisdiction, capable of exercising authority granted by federal laws as well as provincial laws:

These courts are surely bound to execute all laws in force in the Dominion, whether they are enacted by the Parliament of the Dominion or by the Local Legislatures, respectively. They are not mere local courts for the administration of the local laws passed by the Local Legislatures of the Provinces in which they are organized. ... They are the Queen's Courts, bound to take cognizance of and execute all laws whether enacted by the Dominion Parliament or the Local Legislatures, provided always, such laws are within the scope of their respective legislative powers.[2]^: 19–20

He concluded that whether the federal statute conferred jurisdiction on provincial courts, or constituted the provincial courts to be federal courts for a specific purpose, was immaterial. In either event, the law was within federal jurisdiction.

Justice Fournier wrote reasons in French, which were also published in English. He wrote that he concurred with the reasons of the Chief Justice. His main point to add was that if Parliament could not confer jurisdiction on the provincial courts to implement federal laws, such as election laws passed under the authority of s. 41 of the Constitution Act, 1867 then there was a significant gap in the constitutional powers of the Parliament. It would lack a way to ensure the execution of federal laws.[2]^{: 38, 49–51} He concluded that Parliament had the authority to confer jurisdiction over federal law on the provincial courts.

Justice Henry approached the matter from the scope of the federal Parliament's power to legislate. He acknowledged that Parliament had sole power to legislate with respect to federal election matters.[1] Parliament therefore had the power to assign the election jurisdiction to the provincial courts, just as it did with other matters of federal law, such as the criminal law. He did not see any difference between matters of political character, such as elections, and other types of federal laws. Assigning jurisdiction did not in any way infringe on the powers of the provincial legislatures, since they had no jurisdiction over federal elections.[2]^: 69–70

Justice Taschereau held that there was no doubt that Parliament could legislate in the area of federal elections, and therefore could assign jurisdiction over that topic to the provincial courts, just as with other matters of federal jurisdiction, such as the criminal law and bankruptcy.[2]^: 74–77

Justice Gwynne focussed on the argument that the issue of election challenges was a political right, rather than a civil right, which could not be assigned to the courts. He rejected that argument, relying on the British precedents where Parliament had transferred election challenges to the courts, as well as by concluding that the right to stand for election to Parliament was clearly a civil right. The jurisdiction therefore could be assigned to the provincial courts.[2]^: 89

In addition to the main jurisdictional issue, there was also a procedural issue raised by the Superior Court decision. Valin had filed a cross-petition, accusing Langlois and his agents of corrupt practices. Chief Justice Meredith ruled that there had been a statutory time limit for Valin to file a cross-petition against the unsuccessful candidate, and he had not done so within that time period. He therefore dismissed the cross-petition.[7]

In a separate decision from the jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal relating to the cross-petition. For varying reasons, the Court agreed that there was only a limited time to file a cross-petition against the unsuccessful candidation, and Valin had not met the timelimit.[9]