William Colby

Major William Colby (front left) & the Norwegian Special Operations Group parading in Trondheim on the 17th of May 1945.

Following his first year at Columbia, in 1941 Colby volunteered for active duty with the United States Army and served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as a "Jedburgh," or special operator, who was trained to work with resistance forces in occupied Europe to harass German and other Axis forces. During World War II, he parachuted behind enemy lines twice and earned the Silver Star as well as commendations from Norway, France, and Great Britain. In his first mission he deployed to France as a Jedburgh commanding Team BRUCE, in mid-August 1944, and operated with the Maquis until he joined up with Allied forces later that fall. In April 1945, he led the NORSO Group Operasjon Rype into Norway on a sabotage mission to destroy railway lines in an effort to hinder German forces in Norway from reinforcing the final defense of Germany.[7]

After the war, Colby graduated from Columbia Law School and then briefly practiced law in William J. Donovan's New York firm, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine. Bored by the practice of law and inspired by his liberal beliefs, he moved to Washington to work for the National Labor Relations Board.

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby discusses the situation in Vietnam with Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and Deputy Assistant For National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft during a break in a meeting of the National Security Council, 04/24/1975

William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, briefs President Gerald Ford and his senior advisors on the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, April 28, 1975. (clockwise, left to right) Colby; Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State; Henry Kissinger; President Ford; James R. Schlesinger, Defense Secretary; William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Vice President Rockefeller; and General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

William Colby, outgoing Director of Central Intelligence, with President Ford and incoming DCI George Bush, 1975.

Then, an OSS friend offered him a job at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and he accepted. Colby spent the next 12 years in the field, first in Stockholm, Sweden. There, he helped set up the stay-behind networks of Operation Gladio, a covert paramilitary organization organized by the CIA to make any Soviet occupation more difficult, as he later described in his memoirs.[8]

Colby then spent much of the 1950s based in Rome under the cover as a State Department officer,[7] where he led the Agency's covert political operations campaign to support anti-communist parties in their electoral contests against left wing Soviet–associated parties. The Christian Democrats and allied parties won several key elections in the 1950s, preventing a takeover by the Communist Party. Colby was a vocal advocate within the CIA and the United States government for engaging the non-Communist left wing parties in order to create broader non-Communist coalitions capable of governing fractious Italy. That position first brought him into conflict with James J. Angleton.

In 1959 Colby became the CIA's deputy chief and then chief of station in Saigon, South Vietnam, where he served until 1962. Tasked by CIA with supporting the government of South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm, Colby established a relationship with Diem's family and with Ngô Đình Nhu, the president's brother, with whom Colby became close.[7] While in Vietnam, Colby focused intensively on building up Vietnamese capabilities to combat the Viet Cong insurgency in the countryside. He argued that "the key to the war in Vietnam was the war in the villages."[9] In 1962, he returned to Washington to become the deputy and then chief of CIA's Far East Division, succeeding Desmond Fitzgerald, who had been tapped to lead the Agency's efforts against Fidel Castro's Cuba. During those years, Colby was deeply involved in Washington's policies in East Asia, particularly with respect to Vietnam, as well as Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and China. He was deeply critical of the decision to abandon support for Diem, and he believed that played a material part in the weakening of the South Vietnamese position in the following years.[10]

In 1968, while Colby was preparing to take up the post of chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the Agency, US President Lyndon Johnson instead sent Colby back to Vietnam as deputy to Robert Komer, who had been charged with streamlining the civilian side of the American and South Vietnamese efforts against the Communists. Shortly after arriving Colby succeeded Komer as head of the U.S./South Vietnamese rural pacification effort named CORDS. Part of the effort was the controversial Phoenix Program, an initiative designed to identify and attack the "Viet Cong Infrastructure." There is considerable debate about the merits of the program, which was subject to allegations that it relied on or was complicit in assassination and torture. Colby, however, consistently insisted that such tactics were not authorized by or permitted in the program.

More broadly, along with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander General Creighton Abrams, Colby was part of a leadership group that worked to apply a new approach to the war designed to focus more on pacification (winning hearts and minds) and securing the countryside, as opposed to the "search and destroy" approach that had characterized General William Westmoreland's tenure as MACV commander.[11] Some, including Colby later in life, argue that approach succeeded in reducing the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam, but that South Vietnam, without air and ground support by the United States after the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, was ultimately overwhelmed by a conventional North Vietnamese assault in 1975.[10] The CORDS model and its approach influenced U.S. strategy and thinking on counterinsurgency in the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan.[12]

Colby returned to Washington in July 1971 and became executive director of CIA. After long-time DCI Richard Helms was dismissed by President Nixon in 1973, James Schlesinger assumed the helm at the Agency. A strong believer in reform of the CIA and the intelligence community more broadly, Schlesinger had written a 1971 Bureau of the Budget report outlining his views on the subject. Colby, who had had a somewhat unorthodox career in the CIA focused on political action and counterinsurgency, agreed with Schlesinger's reformist approach. Schlesinger appointed him head of the clandestine branch in early 1973. When Nixon reshuffled his agency heads and made Schlesinger secretary of defense, Colby emerged as a natural candidate for DCI, apparently on the basis of the recommendation that he was a professional who would not make waves. Colby was known as a media-friendly CIA director.[5] His tenure as DCI, which lasted two-and-a-half tumultuous years, was overshadowed by the Church and Pike congressional investigations into alleged US intelligence malfeasance over the preceding 25 years, including 1975, the so-called Year of Intelligence.

Colby's time as DCI was also eventful on the world stage. Shortly after he assumed leadership, the Yom Kippur War broke out, an event that surprised the American intelligence agencies but also those of Israeli. The intelligence surprise reportedly affected Colby's credibility with the Nixon administration. Colby participated in the National Security Council meetings that responded to apparent Soviet intentions to intervene in the war by raising the alert level of US forces to DEFCON 3 and defusing the crisis. In 1975, after many years of involvement, South Vietnam fell to Communist forces in April 1975, a particularly difficult blow for Colby, who had dedicated so much of his life and career to the American effort there. Events in the arms-control field, Angola, Australia,[13] the Middle East, and elsewhere also demanded attention.

Colby also focused on internal reforms within the CIA and the intelligence community. He attempted to modernize what he believed to be some out-of-date structures and practices by disbanding the Board of National Estimates and replacing it with the National Intelligence Council.[14] In a speech from 1973 addressed to NSA employees, he emphasised the role of free speech in USA and moral role of CIA as a defender, not a preventer, of civil rights, an attempt to rebut the then emerging revelations of CIA and NSA domestic spying. He also mentioned a number of reforms intended to limit excessive classification of governmental information.[15]

President Gerald Ford, advised by Henry Kissinger and others concerned by Colby's controversial openness to Congress and distance from the White House, replaced Colby late in 1975 with George H. W. Bush during the so-called Halloween Massacre in which Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was also replaced (by Donald Rumsfeld). Colby was offered the position of United States Permanent Representative to NATO but turned it down.

In 1977 Colby founded a D.C. law firm, Colby, Miller & Hanes, with Marshall Miller, David Hanes, and associated lawyers, and worked on public policy issues. In consonance with his long-held liberal views, Colby became a supporter of the nuclear freeze and of reductions in military spending. He practiced law and advised various bodies on intelligence matters.

During that period, he also wrote two books, both of which were memoirs of his professional life, combined with discussions of history and policy. One was titled Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA; the other, on Vietnam and his long involvement with American policy there, was called Lost Victory. In the latter book, Colby argued that the US–South Vietnamese counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam had succeeded by the early 1970s and that South Vietnam could have survived if the US had continued to provide support after the Paris Accords. The topic remains open and controversial, but some recent scholarship, including by Lewis "Bob" Sorley, supports Colby's arguments.

Colby also lent his expertise and knowledge, along with Oleg Kalugin, to the Activision game Spycraft: The Great Game, which was released shortly before his death. Both Colby and Kalugin played themselves in the game.

Colby was a member of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns. His name appears on a note to Senator John Heinz dated July 5, 1989 as a "National Sponsor."

At the time of the Senate hearings to confirm his appointment, Colby was relentlessly grilled about The Family Jewels, a secret 693-page report ordered by Schlesinger, directed by Colby, and compiled by CIA's own Inspector General's Office. It dealt with what Colby calls "some mistakes," specifically CIA abuses ranging from assassination plans to dosing people with mind-control drugs to domestic spying.

• Colby, William; Peter Forbath (1978). Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-671-22875-0.
• Colby, William; James McCargar (1989). Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary Books. ISBN 0-8092-4509-4. OCLC 20014837.

• Colby, William (1975). Intelligence and the press: Address to the Associated Press annual meeting by William E. Colby on Monday, 7 April 1975. CIA.
• Colby, William (1975). Foreign intelligence for America: Address to the Commonwealth Club of California by William E. Colby on Wednesday, 7 May 1975 in San Francisco, California. CIA (1975).
• Colby, William (1975). Director of Central Intelligence press conference: CIA Headquarters auditorium, 19 November 1975. CIA.
• Colby, William (1986). The increased role of modern intelligence: A public speech on February 21, 1986 in Taipei. AWI lectures. Asia and World Institute.

• Colby, Carl (2011). Colby: A Secret Life of a CIA Spymaster. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute. ISBN 9781591141228. OCLC 751577970.
• Ford, Harold P. (1993). William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973-1976. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. Declassified official CIA history of Colby's tenure, available at nsarchive.gwu.edu
• Prados, John (2009). William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 9780700616909. OCLC 320185462.
• Waller, Douglas C. (2015). Disciples: The World War II Spy Story of the Four OSS Men Who Later Led the CIA: Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, William Casey. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 9781451693720. OCLC 911179767.
• Woods, Randall B. (2013). Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA. Basic Books. ISBN 9780465021949. OCLC 812081249.

• "William Colby: Retrospect". Central Intelligence Agency. 2007-05-08. Archived from the original on June 13, 2007. Retrieved 2007-09-07. Evaluation of his tenure by CIA historian/official.
• Sorley, Lewis (1999). A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. Harcourt. ISBN 0-15-100266-5.
• Garthoff, Douglas (2005). Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946–2005. Central Intelligence Agency. ISBN 1-929667-14-0.
• "Randall B. Woods: William E. Colby and the CIA". 2011-04-29. Retrieved 2011-09-18. Talk on Colby's legacy by University of Arkansas Cold War historian Randall Woods.
• Fallaci, Oriana (1977). Interview With History. Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 0-395-25223-7. Interview with William Colby