Jakob Suritz

In 1937, Suritz was reassigned to the Soviet embassy in Paris. A cosmopolitan, sophisticated intellectual fluent in French, Suritz fitted in better in Paris than he ever did in Berlin. Within the Narkomindel, Suritz was considered to be a Litvinovets ("Litvinov man").[28] Suritz viewed French politics in Marxist terms as he believed that the French haute bourgeoisie, driven by an obsessive fear of a Communist revolution were turning towards fascism, and that the Franco-Soviet alliance was not a real one.[28] Suritz wrote that for the French haute bourgeoisie, class interests trumped national interests and that the French were heading toward a "complete capitulation to Hitler and Mussolini".[28] Despite being a Communist, the French politician whom Suritz was closest to was Georges Mandel, the former right-hand man to Georges Clemenceau.[29] France and the Soviet Union had signed a defensive alliance in 1935, which called for Franco-Soviet staff talks in the event of a attack by Germany. On 12 June 1937, as part of the Yezhovshchina ("Yezhov times"), Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army along with a number of other senior Red Army commanders were shot on charges of treason and espionage for Germany and Japan.[30] Following the executions, Marshal Maurice Gamelin, the commander-in-chief of the French military, suspended until further notice all Franco-Soviet staff talks under the grounds that any information that he had shared with Tukhachevsky must had reached Berlin and Tokyo since the Soviet government was claiming he was a spy for Germany and Japan. Suritz's primary duty in Paris at first was to argue that the staff talks should be resumed as soon as possible as he noted that Joseph Stalin put much emphasis on the staff talks as a sign that the French were serious about the alliance.[30]

Besides for pressuring the staff talks to resume, Suritz was highly critical of the Front populaire government led by the Socialist Premier Léon Blum, especially its policy of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War.[28] In his reports to Moscow, Suritz abused Blum as an ineffectual leader who was too concerned about maintaining good relations with Great Britain and he charged that Blum was a coward for refusing military aid to the Spanish republic.[28] Suritz very strongly pressed Blum and his foreign minister Yvon Delbos to resume the military aid to the Frente Popular government in Spain which they had ceased in August 1936, and lashed out in anger at their refusal.[28] Despite the Yezhovshchina and being a former Menshevik, Suritz was not recalled to Moscow to be executed as most of the Soviet ambassadors were at the time.[31] The British historian D.C. Watt noted that with Stalin "an exception was always made for Litvinov and the other Menshevik members of the Soviet diplomatic services-Jakob Suritz in Paris, Ivan Maisky in London, Boris Shtein in Rome. They were certainly watched, but where their colleagues disappeared wholesale, they survived".[31]

During the Sudetenland crisis of 1938, Suritz was ordered by Litvinov to tell the French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet that there was a possibility that Poland might invade Czechoslovakia if Germany did.[32] Litvinov's instructions to Suritz on 7 June 1938 were: "We want to know in advance if France, in the event of our decision to prevent the intervention of Poland, considers itself bound to Poland by the virtue of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance".[32] On 26 August 1938, Suritz reported to Litvinov that all intelligence indicated that Germany planned to invade Czechoslovakia that September.[33] In September 1938, Suritz reported to Litvinov that he learned "from a very solid source" within the French government that the British government was pressuring France not to resume the Franco-Soviet staff talks.[34] Suritz reported that a group of French cabinet ministers led by Mandel had insisted that France resume the staff talks and that: "I fully acknowledge that having made this démarche under pressure, Bonnet secretly calculated that we would give a negative reply, or any case an answer useful for arming him with reasons against contact".[34] Mandel had planned to resign in protest against French policy against Czechoslovakia, but he told Suritz that he changed his mind in order to remain in the cabinet.[35] Mandel told Suritz that Bonnet was the chief architect of the French "capitulation" and that he "intentionally distorted the position of the USSR, and in particular hidden [Litvinov's] proposal calling for a meeting of general staffs".[35]

On 18 October 1938, Bonnet told Suritz that he still hoped for close Franco-Soviet relations, which Litvinov received with contempt, writing on the margin of Suritz's report: "Bonnet's most recent declaration has as little meaning as the Anglo-French declaration that 'they do not intend to exclude us from the resolution of European questions'".[36] Litvinov told Suritz not to respond to Bonnet's offer and to avoid talking to him as much as possible.[37] In November 1938, Litvinov told Suritz "The international situation is become ever more clear" as he was convinced that Neville Chamberlain was seeking an understanding with Germany at the expense of the Soviet Union and he felt that Édouard Daladier would not oppose British foreign policy too strongly.[38] On 22 November 1938, Bonnet told Suritz that the planned Franco-German Declaration of Friendship would not affect the existing Franco-Soviet alliance.[39] When Suritz asked Bonnet the next day in a telephone call for the full text of the declaration, Bonnet refused, saying it was a private matter between him and the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.[39] On 26 November, a stormy meeting occurred as Bonnet accused to Suritz's face the Comintern of being behind the recent industrial unrest and wave of strikes in France that followed the end of the 40 hour work week.[39] Bonnet claimed that "the campaign against the government, by newspapers and organisations incontestably supported by Moscow would profoundly alienate French public opinion".[39]

In December 1938, Mandel told Suritz that he learned from that the Deuxième Bureau believed that Hitler's long-range intention was to conquer the Soviet Union, but Poland and/or Romania were the most likely next German targets..[40] Mandel also told Suritz that Bonnet was planning to renounce the Franco-Polish alliance, a step that Daladier was stoutly opposed to.[40] Mandel concluded that he felt "slightly guilty" about serving as the Colonial Minister in the Daladier government, but he felt could do more for France as a minister than as an opposition politician.[39] Besides for Mandel, Suritz was in contact with Raymond Patenôtre, the minister of national economy, and César Campinchi, the minister of the marine.[39] On 21 December 1938, Patenôtre told Suritz that he was "an advocate of close co-operation with the Soviet Union" and had heard a rumor that the Soviet Union was planning to renounce the Franco-Soviet alliance, which for him "would be nothing short of a catastrophe for France".[39] Suritz denied the rumor.[39] Likewise, Campinchi told Suritz that he wanted to see the Franco-Soviet alliance strengthened.[41]

On 10 February 1939, Suritz reported that talked with the Socialist leader Léon Blum who told him of his belief that Daladier and Bonnet were leading France "to a new Sedan".[42] Surtiz described Blum as passive and depressed as he was convinced that something terrible would soon happen to France, but he seemed unwilling to do anything practical to stop it.[42] Suritz reported with approval that Mandel was "the complete opposite of Blum", whom Suritz disparaged as a well meaning, but weak willed intellectual.[42] Suritz admiringly wrote that Mandel was "absolutely devoid of any sentimentality. This is in the purest sense a rationalist with a proclivity to cynicism and a strong inclination to conspiracy and intrigue".[42] Suritz wrote that Mandel was trying very hard to have Bonnet sacked as foreign minister as he wrote: "He [Mandel] picks up facts, rumors, materials and bides his times. During the September days [of 1938], when he foresaw impending war and played for the first time the role of a second Clemenceau, he had already soaped the hangman's rope for Bonnet. He is keeping quiet now, but his hatred of Bonnet has not weakened. If you want to know anything about Bonnet, you have to go to Mandel".[43]

On 15 March 1939, Germany violated the Munich Agreement by occupying the Czech half of Czecho-Slovakia. Like Maisky in London, Suritz in his reports to Moscow stressed that there was much anger in both Britain and France over the way that Munich Agreement had been violated.[44] However, Litvinov in response treated both the reports of Maisky and Suritz as referring to something ephemeral as he insisted that the policy of both London and Paris was to encourage Germany to move east.[44] During the Tilea Affair when France's ally Romania appeared to be on the brink of a German invasion, Bonnet asked Suritz if the Soviet Union would be willing to assist Romania.[45] Suritz told Bonnet that Romania was an ally of France, not the Soviet Union, and he expected France to take the lead if Germany should invade Romania.[45] On 4 April 1939, Litvinov in a message to Suritz told him "we do not need advice as how to protect our own interests".[46] On 14 April 1939, Suritz told Bonnet that the Soviet Union would be willing to defend Romania in the event of German aggression and was willing to join an alliance with France and Britain to keep Germany out of Eastern Europe.[47] On 13 April 1939, Britain gave an "guarantee" of Romania and Greece. On 14 April 1939, Bonnet told Suritz that he was willing to add an annexe to the Franco-Soviet alliance of 1935 committing the Soviet Union to declare war on Germany if the Reich should invade Poland and/or Romania.[48]

In response to the Danzig crisis, the Permanent Committee of National Defense chaired by Daladier decided to reopen the Franco-Soviet staff talks that had been suspended in 1937.[49] Suritz reported to Moscow: "The military, whom one did not see before, new seek my acquaintance. The other day the military governor of Paris gave me breakfast. Many of the military were present. Yesterday I received an invitation from the commander of the fleet".[49] On 14 April 1939, Bonnet met with Suritz to suggest to him a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact to protect Poland and Romania.[49] On the same day, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax told the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, that he wanted the Soviet Union to make an unilateral declaration of assistance to Poland and Romania.[49] After hearing of Lord Halifax's offer, Bonnet changed course and declared his support for the British proposal.[49] On 16 April 1939, Bonnet told Suritz "we will not withdraw our proposition, in which we could continue to see every advantage", which led to much ill-will when Suritz learned that Bonnet had in fact withdrawn his support.[49]

On 17 April 1939 Litvinov called a "peace front" of Britain, France and the Soviet Union to protect the peace. On 18 April 1939, Suritz reported to Litvinov after meeting Bonnet "that his first impression is very favorable".[50] On 20 April 1939, Lord Halifax obtained a promise from Alexis St. Léger, the secretary-general of the Quai d'Orsay, that the French would not reply to Litvinov's offer without consulting with the Foreign Office first.[49] On 22 April 1939, Bonnet told Suritz that he had objections to Litvinov's plan, namely that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were to be protected by the proposed "peace front", but not the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland.[50] On 28 April, Bonnet told Suritz that his initial approval was only "semi-official" and his own "personal suggestion" that should be not considered binding on France.[51] The next day, Bonnet met with Suritz to say that British had not entirely agreed with his plans.[52] Bonnet told Suritz that he had been "engaged constantly in negotiations with the English but until now he still had not obtained an agreement".[52] Despite the promise to Lord Halifax, Bonnet gave Suritz an amended mutual assistance pact.[49] Having given the impression that he was in favor of Litvinov's plan, Bonnet then sought to probe Suritz about his views on Bonnet's version of the "peace front".[52] When Suritz complained about the "absence of reciprocity in obligations" as he charged that under Bonnet's draft, the Soviet Union would have to declare war on Germany in event of aggression against France, but not vice-versa, Bonnet professed ignorance and blamed St. Léger.[52] Bonnet told Suritz that St. Léger was incompetent and usually phrased documents very poorly.[52] Bonnet claimed that he was not trying to deceive Suritz, and that the oversight in the draft treaty that omitted any obligation on the part of France to declare war in the event of German aggression against the Soviet Union was another example of St. Léger's typical "incompetence".[52]

Litvinov wrote to Litvinov that he saw merit in Bonnet's plan which covered all of Eastern Europe, only for Bonnet to tell Suritz on 30 April that the only states he envisioned being protected by the "peace front" were Poland, Romania and Turkey.[52] However, Bonnet still insisted to Suritz that he did not share the British view of a very limited role for the projected "peace front" and wanted something more closer to the Soviet version.[53] Suritz described Bonnet as very devious and cunning, and reported to Moscow he was playing his own game.[53] Suritz stated that he was not entirely certain just what Bonnet was trying to do, but it appeared that he wanted better Franco-Soviet relations as a bargaining chip to improve relations with Germany, and that ultimately he was willing to recognize Eastern Europe as being in the German sphere of influence. On 2 May 1939, Bonnet expressed to Suritz displeasure with the direction of British foreign policy in Eastern Europe and told him that he preferred a military alliance uniting Britain, France and the Soviet Union.[54] In response to a complaint from Lord Halifax that the French had violated their promise to make an make an alliance offer to the Soviet Union without consulting the Foreign Office, Jean Charvériat, the political director of the Quai d'Orsay, told the British ambassador Sir Eric Phipps that "in the heat of the conversation and in order to dispel Souritz's [Suritz] suspicions the undertaking to Lord Halifax was broken".[49]

On 3 May 1939, Litvinov was sacked as Foreign Commissar and replaced with Vyacheslav Molotov. Molotov used Bonnet's statement to Suritz to press for an alliance with Britain and France, must to the discomfort of Chamberlain who merely wanted an Anglo-Soviet understanding.[55] Suritz in a telegram to Molotov on 10 May 1939 wrote that under the British offer the Soviet Union would play "the role of a blind companion in a coalition".[56] Suritz told Bonnet and St. Léger that the French alliances and the British "guarantees" of Poland and Romania were insufficient.[57] Suritz warned that it was quite possible that the Iron Guard would assassinate King Carol II of Romania and/or stage a coup d'etat, at which point Romania would follow into the German sphere of influence.[57] Likewise, Suritz stated that the Sanacja military dictatorship in Poland might collapse or ally itself with Germany..[57] Suritz stated that only a full military alliance with Britain and France would be acceptable to his government and that the Soviet Union did not feel protected by the Anglo-French security commitments to Poland and Romania..[57]

Suritz privately felt that Molotov's negotiating tactics were too heavy-handed as true to his surname (Molotov means hammer in Russian) he proceeded to relentlessly hammer home the message to the French ambassador Émile Naggiar and the British ambassador Sir William Seeds that only an alliance on Soviet terms would be acceptable to him and he had no interest in any compromises.[58] Suritz felt that Litvinov had more "finesse" as a diplomat in contrast to Molotov's stern, uncompromising negotiating tactics, which he knew were making a highly negative impression in Paris.[58] However, Suritz never warned Molotov that his abuse of Naggiar was not helping the "peace front" talks, out of fear of Molotov. On 26 May 1939, Bonnet gave Suritz the full text of the Anglo-French offer of an alliance, which the British historian Anthony Admathwaite wrote was either a "blunder" or "that he was trying to sabotage the whole negotiations".[59] On 27 May 1939, when Seeds along with the French charge d'affairs Jean Payart met with Molotov to present the offer of an alliance, Molotov had already read the full text which Suritz had forwarded to him and was well prepared to offer his objections.[59]

Suritz wrote that British offer of an alliance of sorts would be to accept being a "blind companion" as he charged that under Chamberlain's offer, the Soviet Union would be obligated to declare war on Germany in the event of a German attack on the United Kingdom, but not vice-versa.[60] However, Suritz advised against rejecting Chamberlain's offer, which he felt to be playing into the hands of Bonnet and Chamberlain.[60] Instead, he advised accepting Bonnet's offer of 29 April, which he claimed would "be declaring before the entire world our willingness to support our neighbors exposed to attack and we will put an end to all the fables about our double dealing with Germany"..[60] In his reports to Moscow during the Danzig crisis, Suritz expressed much doubt the willingness of the Chamberlain government to go to war against Germany and stated an alliance with Britain to be as firm as possible to tie the British to an anti-German course.[61] Suritz believed it was possible to tie the French to such an alliance, but felt that the British were the weakest link as he believed that Chamberlain was seeking some sort of understanding with Hitler.[61] As part of the campaign for the "peace front", Suritz told French officials that Germany and Japan were moving closer together, and that as such the Soviet Union was engaged in a border war with Japan, he wanted the "peace front" alliance to be as firm as possible to face both Germany and Japan..[62] During the "peace front" talks, Molotov insisted on signing a military convention first that would lay out the Anglo-French-Soviet operational plans in the event of war and then signing a political alliance.[59] Both Daladier and Bonnet told Suritz that France would never agree to this procedure and wanted an alliance signed first, to be followed by a military convention.[59]

During the Bastille Day parade on 14 July 1939, Daladier spoke to Suritz to ask him "anything new from Moscow?".[63] When Suritz gave him a negative reply, Daladier stated: "We need to conclude quickly, the more so, that now I do not see any serious disagreements".[63] Daladier was being too optimistic as the British still objected to the Soviet definition of "indirect aggression"..[63] In a message to Suritz and Maisky on 17 July 1939, Molotov wrote "our partners are resorting to all kinds of trickery and disgraceful subterfuge", going on to write: "Our crooks and cheats could pretend that our demands for the simultaneous conclusion of a political and military agreement are something new in the negotiations...It is hard to understand just what they expect when they resort to such clumsy tricks...It seems that nothing will come of the endless negotiations. Then they will have no one but themselves to blame".[63] The American historian Gerhard Weinberg described Molotov's telegrams to Maisky and Suritz as the end of Soviet interest in the "peace front" and the turn towards the alternative strategy of seeking an understanding with Germany at the expense of Poland.[64] In response, Suritz wrote back to Molotov that the British and French "do not want a real agreement" as the ambassador claimed that only French public opinion had pressured Daladier and Bonnet to open the talks.[65]

In July 1939, the Chamberlain government decided to end the Tientsin incident by seeking a diplomatic compromise with Japan while at the same time Britain was rocked by the Hudson affair when a junior British cabinet minister Robert Hudson, 1st Viscount Hudson made an unauthorized offer of a loan to Germany in exchange for ending the Danzig crisis.[66] In a cable to Molotov on 25 July 1939, Suritz stated that France might be a worthwhile Soviet ally, but not Britain.[66] Suritz stated that he believed that Hudson was acting for Chamberlain and he accused the Chamberlain government of a "capitulation" to Japan with respect to the Tinstin crisis.[66] Suritz wrote that the Chamberlain government was not to be trusted as he wrote that the British had no willingness to confront the Axis states such as Japan and Germany.[66] On 27 July 1939, it was announced that an Anglo-French military mission under Admiral Reginald Drax and General Joseph Doumenc would go to Moscow to negotiate an alliance as the British and French had finally accepted the Soviet demand for a military convention first to be followed by a political alliance.[67] On 2 August 1939, Mandel told Suritz that: "London and Paris want to avoid a breakdown of the talks, but there is no sign of any desire to achieve a serious agreement that should be put into effect immediately"..[68] Mandel told Suritz that the talks in Moscow were regarded, especially by the British, as a way to improve the bargaining position with Germany in regard to the Danzig crisis instead being the beginning of a permanent alliance to link together the Soviet Union, France and Britain.[67]

After the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact was signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939, Bonnet called in Suritz to his office to complain..[69] Bonnet stated that the non-aggression pact had led to "a painful impression" in France and that the French cabinet was "stupefied" that Molotov would sign the non-aggression pact while an Anglo-French military mission was in Moscow to negotiate an alliance with the Soviet Union..[69] Bonnet lied to Surtiz by claiming that the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Józef Beck had just granted the Red Army transit rights into Poland in the event of a German invasion, which would have settled the main point of contention in the Anglo-French-Soviet talks.[69] Suritz reported to Moscow that Bonnet had an extraordinary capacity for lies as he crossly noted that Colonel Beck had not granted the Red Army transit rights into Poland.[69]

Suritz also served as the Soviet ambassador to the League of Nations. On 30 November 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland, a fellow member of the League. On 11 December 1939, the former Finnish Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti gave a speech before the League General Assembly that accused the Soviet Union of unprovoked aggression against his nation.[70] Suritz who seemed embarrassed by his country's actions in attacking Finland did not attend Holsti's speech and instead hide himself away in a hotel.[70] Surtiz did not give a rebuttal speech to Holsti's speech that day.[70] Suritz defended his government's actions at the League during the Winter War and was unable to prevent the Soviet Union from being expelled from the League of Nations on 14 December 1939, the first and only nation to be ever be expelled from the League. During the Winter War, French public opinion was strongly pro-Finnish and whenever Suritz left the Soviet embassy, he faced large crowds that shouted "Vive Finlande!"" ("Long Live Finland!").[71]

On 28 March 1940, Suritz was declared persona non grata after he sent an uncoded telegram to Stalin where he praised him for having foiled the "plans of the Anglo-French warmongers" by defeating Finland in the Winter War.[72] In 1940, Time declared: "Since 1919 bulging, bearded Jacob Suritz has been No. 1 Soviet diplomat, with a brilliant record in Afghanistan, Turkey, Germany and League of Nations wrangles".[72]