Zalmay Khalilzad

Khalilzad also wrote several articles on the subject of the value of U.S. global leadership in the mid-1990s. The specific scenarios for conflict that he envisioned if a decline in American power occurred have made his writings extremely popular in competitive high school and college policy debate, particularly his writing that links the loss of US hegemony to global instability.[15] Khalilzad was a signatory of the letter from members of the Project for the New American Century to President Bill Clinton sent on January 26, 1998. It called for Clinton's help in "removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power" by using "a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts."[16]

Khalilzad has been described as a "lifelong Republican", though he did not support Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign.[17]

Khalilzad has sometimes been characterized as a neoconservative, with one profile in The Guardian in 2006 characterizing him as "combin[ing] the commitment of an American neocon with the cultural sensitivity of his Islamic background".[18] At times, Khalilzad has embraced the label, authoring an article titled "The Neoconservative Case for Negotiating With Iran" in Politico magazine in 2006.[19]

In 1995, Khalilzad articulated his views regarding the appropriate role of the United States in the Post-Cold War period:[20]

"The United States should be willing to use force if necessary for this purpose. There are currently two regions whose control by a hostile power could pose a global challenge: East Asia and Europe. The Persian Gulf is critically important for a different reason—its oil resources are vital for the world economy. In the long term, the relative importance of various regions can change. A region that is critical to American interests now might become less important, while some other region might gain in importance."

Regarding U.S. military preeminence, Khalilzad argued in favor of maintaining a sufficiently strong military to be able to embark in "two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously":[20]

"For the foreseeable future, this means having the capability for fighting two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously, e.g., Korea and the Gulf. The United States should also acquire increased capabilities for occasional intervention in lesser regional conflicts, such as humanitarian relief operations, and for countering weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles. For the longer term, it should consider moving toward sizing its forces to be able to defeat the plausible military challenges to critical American interests that might be posed by the two next most powerful military forces in the world—which are not allied with the United States."[20]

In June 2001, Khalilzad argued that the "United States must act now to weaken the Taliban and stem the spread of Talibanism".[21] In a letter, Khalilzad endorsed the following policies to weaken the Taliban's control over Afghanistan:[16]

1. "change the balance of power by offering assistance to the foes of the Taliban;
2. oppose the Taliban ideology--giving air time over the Voice of America to Taliban opponents and moderate Islamic leaders;
3. press Pakistan to withdraw its support;
4. aid victims of the Taliban;
5. support moderate Afghans through helping to convene a grand assembly to select a broad transitional government; and
6. elevate the importance of Afghanistan at home."

In June 2009, Khalilzad stated the following at a UC Berkeley Event:[22]

"I believe and I've told president Karzai few month ago, because he is talking a lot about reconciliation, which is conceptually an absolute necessity, every war must end, but circumstance must be created for that wish to be successful. I've told him [to] get your house in order first, get the corruption issue dealt with, get governance improved, get services improved, then people would say `ahaa ... i want to be on this side, it looks like it is a better side, the side that is producing resolve.' But if they see your judges are corrupt, and your governors are not providing any services, initially people would think `why should I die for this, I'm going to become neutral`, or worse if the other side is providing more security, let's say, it [sic] will be even more difficult."[22]- June 17, 2009. UC Berkeley Events "If the sanctuary could be put at risk, I think the prospect of Reconciliation will improve."[22]

In a published 1993 paper, he advocated for "trade sanctions" against North Korea, "enhancing U.S. and South Korean military readiness", and "direct military attacks".[23]

"Use of force by a U.S.—allied coalition has better prospects for achieving the U.S. objective, either by setting back the program or by producing a more compliant North Korea—depending on how much and how effectively the force is applied. However, given the risk of triggering a second Korean war, it is unclear whether the South Koreans or Japanese could be induced to agree."

Khalilzad presenting President George W. Bush a ballot from the first democratic election in Afghanistan on October 18, 2004.

Khalilzad conversing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld accompanied by Lieutenant General David Barno and Brigadier General Lloyd Austin, during Rumsfeld visit to Kandahar, Afghanistan on February 26, 2004.

In 2001, President George W. Bush asked Khalilzad to head the Bush-Cheney transition team for the Department of Defense, and Khalilzad briefly served as Counselor to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In May 2001, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice announced Khalilzad's appointment as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Southwest Asia, Near East, and North African Affairs at the US National Security Council. In December 2002, Bush appointed Khalilzad to the position of Ambassador at Large for Free Iraqis with the task of coordinating "preparations for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq."[24]

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bush came to rely on Khalilzad's Afghanistan expertise. Khalilzad was involved in the early stages of planning to overthrow the Taliban and on December 31, 2001, he was selected as Bush's Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan. He served in that position until November 2003, when he was appointed to serve as US ambassador to Afghanistan. Khalilzad held that position from November 2003 until June 2005.[25]

During that time, he oversaw the drafting of the constitution of Afghanistan, was involved with the country's first elections and helped to organize the first meeting of Afghanistan's Loya Jirga (traditional grand assembly). At the June 2002 Loya Jirga to select the Head of State, representatives of the US convinced the former king of Afghanistan, 87-year-old Zahir Shah, to withdraw from consideration even though a majority of Loya Jirga delegates supported him. That move angered Pashtuns, who were concerned with the disproportionate power of the Northern Alliance in the Karzai government.[26] During Khalilzad's tenure as ambassador, the new Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, consulted closely with him on a regular basis about political decisions, and the two dined together regularly.[27][28] In 2004 and 2005, he was also involved in helping with the establishment of the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF), which is the first American-style higher learning educational institution in Afghanistan.[29] In 2016, the Friends of the American University of Afghanistan[30] presented him with the International Public Service Award.

Khalilzad with Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in April 2006.

Khalilzad began his job as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq on June 21, 2005. He was credited for helping negotiate compromises which allowed the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq in October 2005. Khalilzad also worked to ensure that the December 2005 elections ran smoothly and played a substantial role in forming the first post-Saddam government. Khalilzad also helped establish the American University of Iraq, in Sulaimaniya, and sits on its board of regents.[31]

In comparison to his predecessors, Paul Bremer and John Negroponte, in Baghdad, Khalilzad was considered a success as an ambassador and credited with bringing a cultural sophistication and human touch to the job that helped connect with Iraqis.[32]

Khalilzad was one of the first high-level administration officials to warn that sectarian violence was overtaking the insurgency as the top threat to Iraq's stability. After the Al Askari Mosque bombing, in February 2006, he warned that spreading sectarian violence might lead to civil war and possibly to even a broader conflict, involving neighboring countries. Khalilzad sought political solutions to the problem of sectarianism, and in particular, he worked to integrate the balance of power between Iraq's three main ethnic groups to head off growing the growing Sunni violence.[32]

Khalilzad's term as ambassador ended on March 26, 2007. He was replaced by Ryan Crocker, a career diplomat and former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.

Khalilzad at the 2008 World Economic Forum, in Switzerland, attending the plenary session; 'Understanding Iran's Foreign Policy' on January 26, 2008.

On February 12, 2007, the White House submitted Khalilzad's nomination to the Senate to become the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.[33] He was unanimously confirmed by the Democratic-controlled US Senate on March 29, 2007.[34] That marked a strong contrast to Khalilzad's predecessor, John R. Bolton, whose often-controversial rhetoric caused him to fail to be confirmed by the Senate but obtained a recess appointment.

Colleagues at the UN noted that Khalilzad has a different style from Bolton and was more conciliatory.[35]

In November 2007, Khalilzad charged that Iran was helping the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. He also told the media, soon after the International Atomic Energy Agency's release of its report on Iran, that the Iranian government was clearly going ahead with its nuclear program. Khalilzad explained that the US would try to pass another resolution in the Security Council, under Chapter 7, to impose additional sanctions against Iran.[36]

In August 2008, he urged the Security Council to "take urgent action" and to "condemn Russia's military assault on the sovereign state of Georgia".[37] He also stated that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had told US Secretary of State Rice that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili "must go."[38]