Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale

Bhindranwale was born on 2 June 1947,[5]^: 151 as Jarnail Singh Brar to a Jat Sikh family, in the village of Rode,[3] in Moga District (then a part of Faridkot District),[45] located in the region of Malwa.[1] The grandson of Sardar Harnam Singh Brar, his father, Joginder Singh Brar was a farmer and a local Sikh leader, and his mother was Nihal Kaur.[4] Jarnail Singh was the seventh of eight siblings of seven brothers and one sister.[46] He was put into a school in 1953 at the age of 6 but he dropped out of school five years later to work with his father on the farm.[47]

He married Pritam Kaur, the daughter of Sucha Singh of Bilaspur at the age of nineteen.[3][48] The couple had two sons, Ishar Singh and Inderjit Singh, in 1971 and 1975, respectively.[4] After the death of Bhindranwale, Pritam Kaur moved along with her sons to Bilaspur village in Moga district and stayed with her brother.[48] She died of heart ailment at age 60, on 15 September 2007 in Jalandhar.[49]

In 1965, he was enrolled by his father at the Damdami Taksal also known as Bhindran Taksal, a religious school near Moga, Punjab, named after the village of Bhindran Kalan where its leader Gurbachan Singh Bhindranwale lived.[4][50] Though based out of Gurdwara Akhand Parkash there, he took his pupils on extended tours of the countryside.[45] After a one-year course in scriptural, theological and historical studies with Gurbachan Singh Khalsa, partly during a tour but mostly during his stay at Gurdwara Sis Asthan Patshahi IX near Nabha, he rejoined his family and returned to farming, marrying in 1966.[45] Maintaining ties with the Taksal, he continued studies under Kartar Singh, who became the new head of the Taksal after Gurbachan Singh Khalsa's death in June 1969, and would establish his headquarters at Gurdwara Gurdarshan Prakash at Mehta Chowk, approximately 25 kilometers northeast of Amritsar.[45] He quickly became the favourite student of Kartar Singh.[30] Unlike other students he had had familial responsibilities, and he would take time off from the seminary and go back and forth month to month to take care of his wife and two children, balancing his familial and religious responsibilities.[51]

Kartar Singh Khalsa died in a car accident on 16 August 1977. Before his death, Kartar Singh had appointed the then 31-year-old Bhindranwale as his successor.[3] His son, Amrik Singh,[30] would become a close companion of Jarnail Singh.[27]

Bhindranwale was formally elected the 14th jathedar of the Damdami Taksal at a bhog ceremony at Mehta Chowk on 25 August 1977.[1][4] He adopted the name "Bhindranwale" meaning "from [the village of] Bhindran [Kalan]", the location of the Bhindran Taksal branch of the Damdami Taksal,[1][50] and attained the religious title of "Sant".[1] He concluded most of his family responsibilities to dedicate full time to the Taksal, thus following a long tradition of “sants”, an important part of rural Sikh life.[51] Henceforth his family saw him solely in Sikh religious congregations known as satsangs, though his son Ishar Singh would describe his youth as being "well looked after" and "never in need."[1] As a missionary Sant of the Taksal, he would tour the villages to give dramatic public sermons and reading of scripture.[27] He preached the disaffected young Sikhs, encouraging them to return to the path of the Khalsa by giving up consumerism in family life and abstaining from drugs and alcohol,[52] the two main vices afflicting rural society in Punjab,[30] and as a social reformer, denounced practices like the dowry, and encouraged a return to the simple lifestyle prior to the increased wealth of the state[30] and the reversal of the decline in morals following the Green Revolution.[53] As one observer noted, "The Sant's following grew as he successfully regenerated the good life of purity, dedication and hard work.... These basic values of life...had been the first casualty of commercial capitalism."[30] His focus on fighting for the Sikh cause appealed to many young Sikhs. Bhindranwale never learned English but had good grasp of Punjabi language. His speeches were released in the form of audio cassette tapes and circulated in villages.[54] Later on, he became adept with press and gave radio and television interviews as well.[27] His sermons urged the centrality of religious values to life, calling on the members of congregations to be:

"…one who takes the vows of faith and helps others take it; who reads the scriptures and helps others do the same; who avoids liquor and drugs and helps others do likewise; who urges unity and co-operation; who preaches community, and be attached to your Lord's throne and home."[52]

From July 1977 to July 1982, he extensively toured cities and villages of Punjab to preach the Sikh faith. He also visited other states and cities in India, mostly in gurdwaras, in Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh.[55] His meetings were attended by rapt "throngs of the faithful - and the curious."[55] He advocated against decreasing religious observance, cultural changes occurring in Punjab, rising substance abuse, and use of alcohol and pornography, encouraging religious initiation by taking amrit (the administration of which had been his primary task during his tours)[45] and fulfilling religious obligations, including wearing the outward religious symbols of the faith, like the turban and beard.[30] He appeared at a time when leaders were not engaged in the community, traveled from city to city instead of being based in an office or gurdwara and delegating, solved domestic disputes and showed no interest in a political career, seeing himself foremost as a man of religion.[54] People soon began to seek his intervention in addressing social grievances, and he began to hold court to settle disputes. This reflected the widespread disenchantment among the masses with expensive, time-consuming bureaucratic procedures that often did not ensure justice. Bhindranwale's verdicts were widely respected and helped to gain him enormous popularity,[30] as well as his "remarkable ability" as a preacher and his ability to quote religious texts and evoke the relevance of historical events in the present time.[56]

Khushwant Singh, a critic of Bhindranwale, allowed that “Bhindranwale's amrit parchar was a resounding success. Adults in their thousands took oaths in public to abjure liquor, tobacco and drugs and were baptized. Videocassettes showing blue films and cinema houses lost out to the village gurdwara. Men not only saved money they had earlier squandered in self-indulgence, but now worked longer hours on their lands and raised better crops. They had much to be grateful for to Jarnail Singh who came to be revered by them."[57]

It is generally believed that in the late 1970s, Indira Gandhi's Congress party attempted to co-opt Bhindranwale in a bid to split Sikh votes and weaken the Akali Dal, its chief rival in Punjab.[24][58][59][32]^: 174 Congress supported the candidates backed by Bhindranwale in the 1978 SGPC elections. The theory of Congress involvement has been contested on grounds including that Gandhi's imposition of President's rule in 1980 had essentially disbanded all Punjab political powers regardless,[60] with no assistance required to take control, and has been challenged by scholarship.[61][62] According to the New York Times, Sanjay Gandhi had approached Bhindranwale, then the newly appointed head of the Damdami Taksal, after Indira Gandhi lost the 1977 Indian general election, but after Congress resumed power in 1980, would find out that he could not be controlled or directed.[63][58] The Congress CM (and later President) Giani Zail Singh,[64] who allegedly financed the initial meetings of the separatist organisation Dal Khalsa,[24][65] amid attempts to cater to and capitalize on the surge in Sikh religious revivalism in Punjab.[66] The Akali Dal would also attempt to cater to the same electoral trend during the same period following electoral defeats in 1972 and 1980,[67] resulting from a pivot to a secular strategy in the 1960s[68] and the accompanying coalition partnerships necessary to guarantee electoral success, most notably with the Jan Sangh, a party of urban Hindu communalism.[67] This later turned out to be a miscalculation by Congress, as Bhindranwale's political objectives became popular among the agricultural Jat Sikhs in the region,[26] as he would advocate for the state's water rights central to the state's economy, in addition to leading Sikh revivalism.[67]

In 1979, Bhindranwale put up forty candidates against the Akali candidates in the SGPC election for a total of 140 seats, winning four seats.[69] A year later, Bhindranwale used Zail Singh's patronage to put up candidates in three constituencies' during the general elections,[70] winning a significant number of seats from Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepur districts.[66] Despite this success, he would not personally seek any political office.[71] He had the acumen to play off of both Akali and Congress attempts to capitalize off of him, as association with him garnered Sikh votes while putting other constituencies at risk.[72] According to one analysis,

“Nearly every academic and media source on the rise of Bhindranwale notes his apparent ties to the Congress party, particularly through Giani Zail Singh, the president of India, up through the early 1980s. The intent was allegedly to use Bhindranwale as a pawn against the Akali Dal, Congress’ chief political rival in Punjab. Several of my interlocutors claim an opposite scenario: that is, that the Akali Dal itself started rumors of Bhindranwale's links to Congress as a way of thwarting his growing popularity among its own constituency. There is evidence for both of these possibilities, and I believe Robin Jeffrey may be most accurate in his assessment when he writes that “the evidence suggests that Bhindranwale exercised a cunning independence, playing the factional antagonisms of Punjab politics with knowledge and skill…. In this independence lay much of Bhindranwale's appeal. If left him untainted by close association with any of the older political leaders, yet at the same time suggested that he knew how to handle them." Whatever ties Bhindranwale may have had with Congress in the early days, it would be misleading to suggest that Congress "created" the Bhindranwale phenomenon. It was in my opinion, sui generis. Help may have been received from outside [later on during the insurgency], but the dynamic to be understood here is internal. Emphasizing the role of outside agencies, rather, is a way of minimizing the seriousness of the challenge presented by Bhindranwale himself.”[61]

Bhindranwale himself addressed rumors of being such an agent, which were spread by Akali leadership during mid-1983, as his expanding support came at the expense of the Akali Dal amid mass leadership defections,[63] seeing them as attempts to reduce his by-then huge support base in Punjab. He would refute this in April 1984 by comparing his actions to the Akalis, referring to the granting of gun licenses to Akalis by the Congress administration while his had been canceled, and that he did not enter the house of any Congress-aligned faction (including congressites, communists, and socialists), Sikhs associated with him being arrested and their homes confiscated, and police destruction on his property, while Akali politicians would have dinners with figures aligned with Congress, like former chief minister Darbara Singh, who Bhindranwale would accuse of atrocities against Sikhs.[71]

Bhindranwale did not respect conventional SGPC or Akali Dal apparatchiks, believing them to have "become mealy-mouthed, corrupt and deviated from the martial tenets of the faith,"[66] after they had failed to support the Sikhs during the 1978 Sikh-Nirankari clashes due to pressure from their coalition partners. Described as having "unflinching zeal and firm convictions," Bhindranwale did "not succumb to the pressure of big-wigs in the Akali Party nor could he be manipulated by the authorities to serve their ends." According to Gurdarshan Singh, "Those who tried to mend him or bend him to suit their designs underestimated his tremendous will and ultimately lost their own ground. He never became their tool. People who promoted his cause or helped him to rise to prominence were disillusioned, when he refused to play the second fiddle to them and declined to tread the path laid down for him. Paradoxical though it may seem, they became his unwilling tools. Thousands listened to him with rapt attention at the Manji Sahib gatherings. He had tremendous power to mobilise the masses. His charisma and eloquence overshadowed other leaders."[18]

In order to overcome the hegemony of the Akali Dal, rather than being used, Bhindranwale would exploit the Congress and then the Akali Dal itself.[62] The Akali Dal had begun to neglect Sikh needs in favor of maintaining political alliances necessary to keep power, resulting in their electoral loss in 1972, and the resulting Anandpur Sahib Resolution, meant to win back Sikh support, remained neglected while the party focused on reversing the overcentralization of political power that had taken place during the Emergency.[67] Described as "a rational actor with his own goals," his first concern was to rejuvenate Sikhism as a leader of the community.[62]

Further, the Damdami Taksal already had a history of openly opposing and criticizing Congress government policies before, as Kartar Singh Khalsa Bhindranwale, the leader of the institution prior to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, had been a severe critic of the excesses of Indira Gandhi's Emergency rule, even in her presence as far back as 1975.[29][3] Kartar Singh had also gotten a resolution passed by the SGPC on November 18, 1973, condemning the various anti-Sikh activities of the Sant Nirankaris, which were based in Delhi.[73] Both Kartar Singh Bhindranwale and the Damdami Taksal had commanded such a level of respect in Sikh religious life that the Akali ministry had given him a state funeral upon his death on August 20, 1977.[74] Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale would also mention the Sikhs facing the government with 37 major protests against Emergency rule under Congress during this era as fighting against tyranny.[55] Emergency rule had initially been utilized to avert criminal charges on Gandhi, who was linked to misuse of government property during the upcoming election, which would have invalidated her campaign, and endowed the central government with powers including preemptive arrests, as well as the arrest of many political opponents.

On Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale becoming leader of the Damdami Taksal, another of the Taksal students explained, “[Nothing changed] in political terms. It was just the same way. The Indian government thought that maybe although they could not stop Sant Kartar Singh [Bhindranwale], maybe Sant Jarnail Singh [Bhindranwale] would be weaker. That was not the case.”[51]

The Anandpur Sahib Resolution, and the 1978 Ludhiana Resolution based on it, put socio-economic concerns at the core[124] and called for an end to the center's control of Punjab's river waters and its unjust distribution, state control of the headworks, and better procurement prices and subsidies for the state's farmers.[23][125] These issues were of particular concern to the state's rural Sikh population who supported them, as the Sikhs dominated the agricultural sector and rural areas.[23] Other demands included the maintenance of the ratio of Sikhs in the army, protections of Sikhs outside Punjab, Punjabi as a second language for states with significant Punjabi-speaking populations, amendments to tax and property policies for rural populations, a broadcasting station and a dry port at Amritsar, and a stock exchange at Ludhiana.[125]

From a set of 45 economic, political, religious, and social policies formulated in September 1981, a list of 15 demands would be prepared in October,[126] of which five were economic.[23] The Dharam Yudh Morcha would champion these preliminary demands. The subsequent inclusion of religious demands were a result of polarization of Akali goals following failed negotiations in November[126] with the Congress government, which would raise the spectre of separatism to exploit the fears of Hindu voters and push the Akalis into a corner.[72] Other factors included attempts to ally with, or outbid, more militant Sikh factions, which gained traction following the lack of progress in talks, and the growing religious revivalism that both the Akalis and Congress[66] would attempt to play to gain influence.[23] According to Atul Kohli,

"The repeated failure of the Akalis to wrest power from Congress had left open a political space for those who argued that increased militancy was the only means for protecting Sikh interests. Bhindranwale stepped into that space."[72]

As a result of his rising popularity, Bhindranwale faced opposition from all sides, including the government and rival Sikh factions, both political and militant. One of Bhindranwale's main concerns in his speeches was condemning factionalism and internal disunity among the Sikhs.[56] The Akali Dal leadership had initially opposed Bhindranwale.[24] While Bhindranwale ceded leadership to the Akali Dal and disavowed political ambition,[71] in 1980 the Akali Dal faced a serious challenge from Bhindranwale and his mass support from the AISSF, the Akali youth wing.[122] As Bhindranwale became increasingly influential, the party decided to join forces with him. In August 1982, under the leadership of Harcharan Singh Longowal, the Akali Dal launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha, or "righteous campaign,"[23] in collaboration with Bhindranwale to win more autonomy for Punjab. At the start of the protest movement, in response to long-standing wrongs not addressed by the state's economic and political process,[127] the Akali leaders had, in their Ardas, or prayer, at the Akal Takht, resolved that they would continue the struggle until the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was accepted and implemented by the Government. The Akalis, in their subsequent electoral defeat in 1980, would be forced by the presence of Bhindranwale and his huge base of support in the AISSF to return to its Sikh base,[101] for whom the Anandpur Sahib Resolution had originally been written to regain the declining support of,[128] before it had fallen by the wayside.[68]

Later, noting Indira Gandhi's intransigence, it appeared that the Akali leaders were willing to water down their demands. Bhindranwale reminded his audiences that it had been Gurcharan Singh Tohra, Surjit Singh Barnala, Balwant Singh and other leaders who had been were signatories to the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and that he was not present when the Resolution was adopted. He insisted, however, that having said the Ardas at the Akal Takht, no Sikh could go back on his solemn word. Longowal's core political base began to wither; about a third of his SGPC members and district Akali presidents reportedly defected to Bhindranwale.[63] Bhindranwale promised the Sikh masses that he would not allow the chief Akali leadership to fail them as during the Punjabi Suba movement.[10]

Despite the Resolution's endorsement of "the principle of State autonomy in keeping with the concept of Federalism," Indira Gandhi and the central government took a hard line, emphasizing the Sikh demands and treating them as tantamount to secession, thus putting moderate Sikh politicians at a competitive disadvantage in an increasingly frustrated and militant political arena.[63] She would be later characterized by prime minister Charan Singh as following "a megalomaniacal policy based on elitist philosophies,"[63] and her successor Rajiv Gandhi would later describe the Resolution as "not secessionist but negotiable,"[63] recognizing the failures of her autocratic style of governance.[129] Thousands of people joined the movement as they felt that it represented a real solution to their demands, such as a larger share of water for irrigation, and return of Chandigarh to Punjab.[24] By early October, more than 25,000 Akali workers courted arrest in Punjab in support of the agitation.[130]

Bhindranwale expected misrepresentation from reporters, telling the press, “I know what you are going to print, that you are only working for rupees.”[28] He regarded the media as being puppets for the central government, granting interviews chiefly to reach other Sikhs. Bhindranwale became the focus of press attacks for any violence that took place in Punjab, while police atrocities and torture went unreported.[155] He is said to have once remarked, “Even if a fly is killed in Punjab, it is blamed on me.”[156] He criticized the coverage by journalists who he had held audience with as distorted, denying that he had ever had anyone killed, and emphasizing that every strident statement he had made had always been in response to provocation by other parties;[157] in an interview with Shekhar Gupta in December 1983:

"Parliament is agitated by what I said last week. The ruling party, the Opposition, they all condemned me. But did anyone take note of the fact that I had only reacted to the threat to the Sikhs in Rajasthan by the Jai Hindu Sangh? I challenge you, examine all my statements. Each one has been in reaction to what someone else said first. Someone else brandishes a lathi, and just because we try to shield ourselves we are held guilty." "That is the game. A Hindu does something and you dismiss him as a petty criminal or communal fanatic. A Sikh does something and you malign the whole community."[157]

In early 1982, he addressed in a speech at a college in Karnal, Haryana, about his perception on the constant distortions by the press::

“You have learnt from the newspapers, the news, and propaganda by ignorant people, that Bhindranwale is an extremist; that he is a dangerous man, a communalist; that he kills Hindus, There are many Hindus sitting here. You should carefully note how many I injure and how many I kill before leaving. You will be with me. Keep listening attentively. Having listened, do think over who are the communalists: whether they are the turban-wearers or your newspaper owners, the Mahasha (Arya Samaj) Press. Follow your own logic.”[158][note 1]

Bhindranwale also referenced the double standards of the media in the failure to register cases against prominent Hindu politicians for making threatening statements against Sikhs, including Swami Adityavesh, an Arya Samaji Congress MLA, who demanded that Sikhs be expelled from Haryana to Punjab, Kewal Krishan, a Congress MLA in Punjab, who threatened to destroy all Sikh organizations, and Harbans Lal Khanna, a BJP MLA in Punjab, who stated publicly in Amritsar on 30 May 1981,[160] "Dukki tikki khehan nahin deni, sir te pagri rehan nahin deni; kachh, kara, kirpaan; ehnoon bhejo Pakistan." ('We are not going to let any second or third group exist, we are not going to let a turban remain on any head; the shorts, the iron bangle, the sword, send these to Pakistan’),[161] and had a model of the Golden Temple desecrated by a mob,[162] Baldev Prakash, also a BJP MLA, who had posters of such slogans printed.[163] and extremist president of the Hindi Suraksha Samiti in Patiala, Pawan Kumar Sharma, backed by the Arya Samaj press and furtively by the Congress party,[164][165] with links to Bhajan Lal, who in a raid had been discovered with large stocks of arms, explosives, and hand grenades.[148] Amrik Singh would also allude to the double standard of the government's soft behavior towards Dhirendra Brahmachari, who had smuggled 500 guns through Jammu from Spain, in contrast with the government's concern with the Sikhs; Amrik Singh would also state that "Delhi likes Sikhs like Zail Singh and Buta Singh who pay court to the Government. All other Sikhs are called extremists. We don't want secession but seek status of first-class citizens."[166]

Regarding incidents of bus passengers shooting in the state in October 1983 and other crimes, the discovery of discarded turbans, pistols, and cartridges found at certain crime scenes prompted open Akali allegations that killings were being done by professionals under the orders of the Third Agency, an intelligence wing formed by Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, looking for a pretext to impose President's rule in Punjab, which she did on 6 October. Longowal himself repeatedly challenged the Government that he would prove that the Dhilwan shootings were not done by any Sikh or Akali if a judicial enquiry was conducted.[156]

According to former Punjab DGP Kirpal Dhillon, the incident was characterized by several unusual circumstances: the perpetrators had never been seriously tracked, the bus had not been a scheduled service and had deviated from its usual route, and the victims did not belong to sects and castes typical of the area,[167] noting the possibility of it being authorized by Congress ministers and managed through the police and central agency.[168] Darbara Singh was finally dismissed by Zail Singh after the incident, the first of its kind. The entire spectrum of Sikh groups condemned the incident "in the strongest possible terms," though a section of the Jalandhar media nevertheless persisted in insinuating Sikh militant involvement.[167]

Bhindranwale, as well as all militant groups, would "squarely and unequivocally" condemn the bus shootings, the 20 October train derailment, and all fatal incidents, demanding a judicial inquiry into the spate of events during the month.[169] Even radical Sikh groups, which normally did not shy away from claiming responsibility for violence, denied any role in bus killings or desecrations and condemned them, with the Babbar Khalsa denouncing the "killing of any Hindus, robberies, or any religiously provocative acts." According to them, their targets were only either Sant Nirankaris involved in 1978, or police officers who were deemed guilty of "torturing and humiliating" detained Sikh youth and harassing their family members.[170] Nevertheless, he was often held responsible for the events.[171] Bhindranwale would state, "It suits the government to publicize me as an extremist, thus making an excuse to frustrate the just cause and the legitimate demands of the entire Sikh community and Punjab state."[159]^: 6[172]

In addition, many such killings that took place between December 1983 and June 1984 were rather the result of personal vendettas,[10] and fundamentalist groups not affiliated, and often opposed, to Bhindranwale,[10] including the Dal Khalsa and Babbar Khalsa, who claimed responsibility for most crimes blamed on Bhindranwale, who denied responsibility for all such acts.[166] Meanwhile, hundreds of individual Sikhs, even many who were not politically involved, had been harassed, beaten and killed in communal mob incidents, and tortured, imprisoned, and killed by police forces for the previous two years during the Dharam Yudh Morcha, amidst lack of government action. A report by S. M. Sathananthan et al. characterized the actions of extremists opposing constitutional Sikh demands as fueled by "one-sided anti-Sikh misinformation from various news agencies.".[159]^: 2Bhindranwale had commented in 1983:

"Someone killed seven Hindus in a bus. No Sikh has said this was good, everyone deplored it. But because seven Hindus had died, even twenty-four hours didn't pass. The Ministry was dissolved. President's rule was imposed. The region declared as disturbed. However, one hundred and fifty Sikhs died and one man was not charged. Now all of you Sikhs should sit down and figure out as to what the thoughts of this Government of the Hindus are about the turban and the beard."[173]

B.D. Pande, who was appointed Governor of Punjab from 10 October 1983 to 27 June 1984 during President's rule, criticized the methods of the central leadership, especially that of Indira Gandhi, who he characterized as having "introduced what was called the amoral theory in Indian politics," as well as "Hindu hardliners and vernacular press for contributing to the false narrative." He also blamed the rivalry between Congress officials President Zail Singh and Punjab CM Darbara Singh for the course of events.[174]

When the insurgency against the central government began, it was against the main backdrop of unresolved Anandpur Sahib Resolution claims and an increased sense of disillusionment with the democratic process, which when it worked seemed to end up with Sikhs’ not achieving satisfactory representation, and when it did not, ended up with the dictatorship of Emergency rule, as well as the backdrop of communal conflict on the subcontinent which gave Sikhs a historical justification to fear for the future of their religion in a Hindi-dominated state.[177] The failure of the central government to address political, social, and economic problems of the Sikhs facilitated the rise of militancy.[178] Sikh demands had been fundamentally political rather than religious,[63] while prolonged intransigence by the central government[63] on water, state border, and devolutionary issues, in addition to centralization,[179] led to alienation[179] and militancy.[63] Bhindranwale accused Indira Gandhi of sending Darbara Singh, former Congress chief minister of Punjab, to "wreak atrocities on the Sikh nation."[71]

On 8 February 1984, the Akalis held a successful bandh to demonstrate their strength and continued commitment to non-violent struggle.[31] The following week, a tripartite talk with five cabinet ministers, five Akali leaders, and fifteen leaders from opposition parties came close to a successful settlement, but was deliberately sabotaged once again by Bhajan Lal with more anti-Sikh violence in Haryana.[180] This was followed by Akali to express frustration in further protests, leading to their arrest along with many volunteers.[180] On 25 May 1984, Longowal announced another morcha to be initiated on June 3, the day Operation Blue Star would be launched,[180][181] practicing civil disobedience by refusing to pay land revenue, water or electricity bills, and block the flow of grain out of Punjab. Gandhi's emissaries met Akali leaders on May 27 to once again suggest the negotiation of a settlement, but though the Akalis showed signs of yielding, Bhindranwale would accept nothing short of the full implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.[180]

According to Gandhi's principal secretary P. C. Alexander, it would be Longowal's announcement of withholding Punjabi grain and tax from the central government that had been the true "last straw" for Gandhi to send the army when she did,[182] as opposed to any militancy.

In the midst of the protests, police violence, and the burgeoning insurgency ensuing, it would be increasingly clear that the government would seek a military rather than a political solution to the unrest in Punjab, and Bhindranwale would instruct the people to be prepared for a showdown with the government.[45] Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale had with himself a group of devoted followers armed with firearms who served as his bodyguards and acolytes, occasionally as willing and unpaid assassins.[80] Bhindranwale urged all Sikhs to buy weapons and motorcycles, which would be helpful to fight state oppression, instead of spending on television sets.[85] He believed that amritdharis (baptized Sikhs) should also be shastradharis (weapon bearers),[85] as had been required by Guru Gobind Singh for defensive purposes.[183] Bhindranwale and Amrik Singh started carrying firearms at all times, hearkening to the Sikh religious duty of carrying a Kirpan, which is also a weapon,[27] and police brutality on Sikh protesters. Upon the imposition of President's rule and the designation of Punjab as a disturbed area, the police were given broad powers to search, arrest, and shoot whom they would, immune from legal action.[45]

Bhindranwale's call to Sikhs to keep weapons as required by their faith was misrepresented by the press. Commenting on this, he said, "I had given a statement that in every village there should be a motorcycle and three young men with three revolvers of high quality. Opposition newspapers, the Mahasha (Arya Samaj) Press, have published this news: ‘Bhindranwale says, get these and kill Hindus.’ Have you ever heard me say that?”[184] As Indira Gandhi began to use the term "extremists," a term meant to push Punjab back into line with the government, Sikhs were relieved of duty from police and military forces in large numbers. Sikhs in government positions were profiled by police across India from the 1970s to the 1990s, who arrested and tortured suspected criminals at will.

On 12 May 1984, Ramesh Chander, son of Lala Jagat Narain and editor of Hind Samachar group was alleged by Kuldip Nayar to have been murdered by "supporters" of Bhindranwale.[58] Lala's paper had had a "shrill tone when reporting on Sikh issues," and "was widely dubbed pro-Hindu," with its "tone" changing only subsequently.[185] In 1989, seven editors and seven news hawkers and newsagents were assassinated. Punjab Police had to provide protection to the entire distribution staff and scenes of armed policemen escorting news hawkers on their morning rounds became common.[185]

According to KPS Gill, a few Sikh leaders raised their voice against Bhindranwale's presence in the Akal Takht complex. Giani Partap Singh, an eighty year old former Jathedar of the Akal Takht, had criticised Bhindranwale for the arsenal of modern weapons in the Akal Takht, and was shot at his home in Tahli Chowk, as were Niranjan Singh the Granthi of Gurdwara Toot Sahib, Granthi Jarnail Singh of Valtoha, and Granthi Surat Singh of Majauli.[86] The police, reportedly on instructions from superiors, did not check the trucks used for kar seva (religious service) that brought in supplies needed for the daily langar. During a random check, one truck was stopped and guns and ammunition were found.[86]

Militant organizations would lose popular support by the late 1980s, years after Bhindranwale's death, once their membership had begun to attract lumpen elements that joined the movements for the allure of money, rather than the long cherished cause of a separate homeland for the Sikhs.[186] Separatists were accused by Indian authorities and critics for being responsible for crimes including assassination, bank robbery, home invasion, organising training camps, and stockpiling weapons.[187]

The Babbar Khalsa were opposed to Bhindranwale and his initial strategy of opting to join the Akalis' protest movement for Punjab's rights instead of immediately pursuing more militant means; it was more focused on propagating its view of Sikh religious life than on politics and states' rights, and contested with Bhindranwale for dominance of the movement. The rivalry intensified in April and May 1984, with the two groups blaming each other for several assassinations. Bhindranwale would subsequently be regarded as the head of the movement.[188]

In July 1982, at the start of the Dharam Yudh Morcha, the President of Shiromani Akali Dal, Harchand Singh Longowal had invited Bhindranwale to take up residence at the Golden Temple compound. He called Bhindranwale "our stave to beat the government."[189] On 19 July 1982, Bhindranwale took residence with approximately 200 armed followers in the Guru Nanak Niwas guest house, on the precincts of the Golden Temple. Bhindranwale developed a reputation as a man of principle who could settle people's problems about land, property or any other matter without needless formality or delay, more expediently than the legal system. The judgement would be accepted by both parties and carried out. This added to his popularity.[190] Bhindranwale led the campaign in Punjab from the complex guest house,[32] from where he met and was interviewed by international television crews.

Bhindranwale and his followers moved to the Akal Takht complex in December 1983

On 23 April 1983, the Punjab Police Deputy Inspector General A. S. Atwal was shot dead as he left the Harmandir Sahib compound by a gunman from one of the several groups residing there, in apparent revenge for police conduct.[191] The assassination was never solved. The government promptly blamed militant groups, though all militant factions, as well as the Akalis, Bhindranwale, and the AISSF, all vehemently denied all accusations and unequivocally condemned the incident.[192]

On the assassination, Longowal stated, "Whenever the situation becomes ripe for settlement, some violent incident takes place. I think there is a government conspiracy behind the DIG's murder." When asked who could be responsible, he implied Darbara Singh's involvement: "The one who is afraid of losing his seat (of power);" observers had noted that Darbara Singh had been on the verge of being replaced by the Congress high command, partly on Akali request and partly due to ineptitude.[192] Bhindranwale condemned it as "the handiwork of the Punjab [Congress] government," and "an attempt to foil the Akali agitation and to malign the Sikhs." The president of the AISSF termed the shooting "anti-Sikh" and carried out by certain elements in the Congress party, demanding a judicial inquiry.[192]

The CRPF, a central paramilitary police force, had been deployed in Punjab during President's rule as an alternative to the Punjab Police, who due to its mostly Jatt Sikh composition were seen with apprehension by the central government, which imposed a recruitment ban on it for a time. CRPF troops first fired on the Golden Temple in February 1984 following the Panipat riots the same month, furthering misgivings among Sikhs. The Punjab Police, traditionally seen as oppressive, were briefly seen by Sikhs as a counterbalance to the CRPF, even resulting in frayed relations and even a few clashes between the two forces, before the militancy would take off after Blue Star when it would again become the primary opposing force.[193] When J S Aurora had visited the Golden Temple with his wife in December 1983, while Bhindranwale was living in the Guru Nanak Niwas, and looked at various areas of the complex, he had noticed no defensive preparations anywhere. Visiting again on 24 February the next year, when Bhindranwale had moved to the Akal Takht building, he only saw sandbags on the langar complex which "did not appear very formidable," which he was told was placed for protection after the CRPF had fired on the complex in February. He would visit again a month after the operation, attributing the professional defenses that had been built between March and June to Shabeg Singh who had served under him.[194]

Reportedly, militants responsible for bombings and murders were taking shelter in some gurdwaras in Punjab.[24] In turn, some members of the Congress-led Punjab assembly alleged that the murder in the temple premises confirmed the charges that the extremists were being sheltered and given active support in religious places and the Guru Nanak Niwas, and that Bhindranwale was openly supporting such elements.[195] However, the central government would later claim that it could not enter the gurdwaras for the fear of hurting Sikh sentiments.[24] After President's rule was imposed in Punjab,[196][153] the burning of a gurdwara at Churu, Rajasthan by the Jai Hindu Sangh on November 26 increased the violence, and on 14 February the Hindi Suraksha Samiti vandalized a train station by destroying a model of the Golden Temple and pictures of the Sikh gurus.[144] Anti-Sikh mob violence in Haryana from 15 to 20 February 1984, mobilized by CM Bhajan Lal at the behest of leaders in Delhi, and the killing of eight Sikhs in Panipat on 19 February in view of the police station, provoked retaliations.[144]

As the days went by the law and order situation further deteriorated and violence escalated. While the Akalis pressed on with their two-pronged strategy of negotiations and massive campaigns of civil disobedience directed at the Central Government, others were not so enamoured of nonviolence. Communists known as "Naxalites", and armed Sikh groups – the "Babbar Khalsa" and "Dal Khalsa", both of which opposed Bhindranwale, sometimes worked hand in hand and clashed with the police. A covert government group known as the Third Agency was also engaged in dividing and destabilising the Sikh movement through the use of undercover officers, paid informants and agents provocateurs.[197] Bhindranwale himself always kept a revolver and wore a cartridge belt and encouraged his followers to be armed.[198] However, a Chandigarh officer in an interview with the December 1983 issue of India Today explained that the worst offense Bhindranwale could be accused of was "harsh speech rhetoric."[166]

The earliest demands for army intervention, under the guise of terms like "martial law," "army rule," "army takeover, and "imposition of Emergency," were made by organizations like the RSS, Hindi Suraksha Samiti, and the BJP.[199] Later joined by other outwardly secular parties, the Congress would seek to consolidate its vote bank along communal lines.[200] During the debate in the Parliament of India members of both the houses demanded the arrest of Bhindranwale. Sensing a prospect of his arrest from the hostel premises, he convinced the SGPC president Tohra to set up his headquarters on the Akal Takht complex.[201] While the move was supported by Gurcharan Singh Tohra, an Akali who was then President of the SGPC, it was opposed by Harchand Singh Longowal, leader of the Akali political party. On 15 December 1983, Bhindranwale was asked to move out of Guru Nanak Niwas house by members of the Babbar Khalsa who acted with Longowal's support. Longowal by now feared for his own safety.[202] Tohra then convinced the high priest to allow Bhindranwale to reside in Akal Takht.[201] 15 December 1983 Bhindranwale and his supporters moved to the Akal Takht complex and began fortifying the complex with sand bags and light weaponry. Longowal attempted to block the move by persuading Giani Kirpal Singh, then Jathedar (head priest) of the Akal Takht, to use his authority and issue a Hukamnama (edict) disallowing Bhindranwale from relocating to the complex.[203] The temple high priest protested this move as a sacrilege since no Guru or leader ever resided in Akal Takht that too on the floor above Granth Sahib but Tohra agreed to prevent Bhindranwale's arrest,[201] In the end, while Giani Kirpal Singh did protest the move, Bhindranwale's was permitted to relocate.[204] as Bhindranwale believed that the Morcha leader Longowal was negotiating with the government for his arrest.[201] By December 1983, Bhindranwale and his followers, now joined by senior ex-military personnel like Major General Shabeg Singh, retired Major General J.S. Bhullar, retired brigadier Mohinder Singh, and others, had made the Golden Temple complex an armoury and headquarters,[205] fortifying it with sandbags in preparation for a siege.[45] Mark Tully and Satish Jacob wrote, "All terrorists were known by name to the shopkeepers and the householders who live in the narrow alleys surrounding the Golden Temple... the Punjab police must have known who they were also, but they made no attempt to arrest them. By this time Bhindranwale and his men were above the law."[206] However, Bhindranwale presented himself, along with over 50 of his supporters, at the Deputy Commissioner's residence on the day he moved to the Darbar Sahib complex, revealing his purpose in moving there was not to hide from the law,[207] as the District Magistrate at Amritsar, until shortly before the invasion, was on record as having assured the Governor of the state that he could arrest anyone in Darbar Sahib at any time, though not seeing a need to.[207][55]

After Blue Star, Lieutenant General J S Aurora commented on the lack of sophisticated weapons, mentioning a number of light machine guns and two rocket launchers, but the lack of medium machine guns or mortars, with the only weapons bearing foreign markings being 60 self-loading rifles. He would ascribe most of the weaponry to either simply having been picked up from misplaced weapons drops during border wars, issued by the government to people living close to the border for security purposes, government gun-running, or from Punjab's long-established rural trade of unaccounted guns, used in family feuds, property disputes, dacoit bands and the like. Describing the weaponry seized after the operation, he stated, "Quite a lot, yes, but the impression that has been built up in the public mind of foreign governments deliberately arming the terrorists with a view to overthrowing the government is grossly overdone."[208]

Bhindranwale was not an outspoken supporter of Khalistan, although he often emphasized the separate identity of the Sikhs.[52] Bhindranwale stated his position on Khalistan, a movement which was first introduced in concept during the 1946 independence negotiations.[209] During interviews with domestic and foreign journalists and public speeches through his phrase that "Sikh ik vakhri qaum hai" (or, "Sikhism is a distinct nation"),[85] using the word 'Qaum' (nation, people, or also religion) when referring to the Sikh population of Punjab,[210] though others have argued that "national" is a mistranslation of 'qaum,' as India was a nation of various races and 'qaums.' In a speech given by Bhindranwale on 27 March 1983:

I stayed ten days in Delhi. There I too was asked, just as they ask me here all the time when friends from the newspaper come, [They ask] "Sant Ji, do you want Khalistan?’ I replied; “Brothers, I don't oppose it nor do I support it. We are silent. However, one thing is definite, if this time the Queen of India does give it to us, we shall certainly take it. We won't reject it. We shall not repeat the mistake of 1947. As yet, we do not ask for it. It is Indira Gandhi's business and not mine, nor Longowal's, nor of any other of our leaders. It is Indira's business, Indira should tell us whether she wants to keep us in Hindustan or not. We like to live together [with the rest of Indians]; we like to live in India.”[211][212][109][213]

While Bhindranwale never explicitly supported Khalistan,[214] in a BBC interview, he stated that if the government agreed to the creation of such a state, he would not refuse and repeat the mistakes made by Sikh leadership during the 1946 independence: “How can a nation which has sacrificed so much for the freedom of the country want it fragmented but I shall definitely say that we are not in favor of Khalistan nor are we against it.”[214][215] adding that the Sikhs would opt for a separate state only if they were discriminated against and were not respected in India, or if their distinct Sikh identity was in any way threatened.[52] In regards to the idea of the Indian government attacking the Darbar Sahib, he stated, "if the Indian Government invaded the Darbar Sahib complex, the foundation for an independent Sikh state will have been laid."[216]

In his final interview to Subhash Kirpekar, Bhindranwale stated that "Sikhs can neither live in India nor with India. If treated as equals it may be possible. But frankly speaking I don't think that is possible."[217] Kuldip Brar, who would later head Operation Blue Star, would subsequently put forth that per the Indian intelligence sources in early June 1984, there was a "strong feeling" and "some sort of information" among the government that Bhindranwale was supposedly planning to declare Khalistan an independent country any moment with support from Pakistan, that Khalistani currency had allegedly already been distributed, and that this declaration would have increased chances of Punjab Police and security personnel siding with Bhindranwale.[218]

In later disclosures from former R&AW special secretary G.B.S. Sidhu, R&AW itself helped "build the Khalistan legend," actively participated in the planning of Operation Blue Star. While posted in Ottawa, Canada in 1976 to look into the "Khalistan problem" among the Sikh diaspora, Sidhu found "nothing amiss" during the three years he was there,[8] stating that "Delhi was unnecessarily making a mountain of a molehill where none existed," that the agency created seven posts in West Europe and North America in 1981 to counter non-existent Khalistan activities, and that the deployed officers were "not always familiar with the Sikhs or the Punjab issue."[8] Describing the secessionist movement as a "chimera" until the attack on the Darbar Sahib, after which the insurgency would start,[8] he would later contend that:

Bhindranwale never raised the demand for Khalistan or went beyond the Akali Anandpur Sahib Resolution, while he himself was prepared for negotiations to the very end. All talks with the more moderate Akalis had already failed. The hawks had taken control of Mrs Gandhi and so the worst was to happen and the Sikhs never forgave her for what happened.[8]

According to a New York Times article written just a few weeks after the operation:

Before the raid on the Golden Temple, neither the Government nor anyone else appeared to put much credence in the Khalistan movement. Mr. Bhindranwale himself said many times that he was not seeking an independent country for Sikhs, merely greater autonomy for Punjab within the Indian Union....One possible explanation advanced for the Government's raising of the Khalistan question is that it needs to take every opportunity to justify the killing in Amritsar and the invasion of the Sikhs' holiest shrine.[9]

Khushwant Singh had written that "considerable Khalistan sentiment seems to have arisen since the raid on the temple, which many Sikhs, if not most, have taken as a deep offense to their religion and their sensibilities," referring to the drastic change in community sentiments after the army attack.[9]

The planning for Operation Blue Star was initiated long before Bhindranwale had relocated to the complex in December 1983 and begun to fortify it[227][228] running sand-model exercises for the attack[229][230][231] on a Golden Temple replica in the Doon Valley over 18 months prior,[227][228] and over 125 other Sikh shrines were simultaneously attacked.[228] According to Gen. S.K. Sinha, it had not been a last resort, but on Gandhi's mind since after the 1982 Akali agitations.[228] During publicly recorded speeches in May and July in 1983 (still several months before relocating to the Akal Takht and initiating efforts to fortify it) Bhindranwale warned that senior officers of the CID were planning to initially occupy Taksal and Nihang camps of Mehta, and gradually take control of the Golden Temple.[232] A previous request to solicit the use of army personnel and tanks had been made by Chief Minister Darbara Singh and Prime Minister Gandhi to aid in the arrest of Bhindranwale at Mehta Chowk in 1982. However, then military commander Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha, a "dear friend" of General Shabeg Singh,[233] Bhindranwale's military advisor, viewed the request as "very strange" and advised against the use of military force considering the sanctity of the complex and potential repercussions.[229] While Bhindranwale surrendered peacefully at Mehta Chowk, Sinha would opt for early retirement when the same request came again two years later for him to deploy tanks and army personnel to conduct Operation Blue Star, and what he advised against, his replacements Gen. A. S. Vaidya (selected by Gandhi to supersede Sinha) and Lt. Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarji did "gladly."[229]

The government made elaborate plans for an army action while feigning readiness for negotiations and denying any intention of sending armed forces inside the Darbar Sahib complex.[45] Six additional divisions of the army including especially trained para commandos were inducted into Punjab by the end of May 1984.[45] The government sent a team led by Narasimha Rao,[96] which proved unsuccessful,[234] as Bhindranwale's firm position was nothing short of full implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, rejecting, for instance, the offer to give Chandigarh to Punjab in exchange for areas of southwestern Punjab state,[211] as Chandigarh had been promised exclusively to Punjab in a formal communication issued by the Union government on January 29, 1970.[235] The Sikhs would ultimately withdraw, believing they had seen a commando unit move into the city.[236] Indira Gandhi tried to persuade the Akalis to support her in the arrest of Bhindranwale. These talks ended up being futile.[96] On 26 May, Tohra informed the government that he had failed to convince Bhindranwale and that Bhindranwale was not under anyone's control.[237] As Gandhi had no intention of implementing the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and feared the loss of Hindu electoral support, and as the Akali Dal also feared losing power, as over 40 SGPC members and 130 Akali leaders, including former legislators, had revolted against Longowal's leadership in favor of Bhindranwale, Akali Dal and central government interests had finally converged.[211] Faced with imminent army action and with Longowal abandoning him, Bhindranwale declared "This bird is alone. There are many hunters after it".[237]

Army action in the Punjab, which had been discussed in December 1983 to consolidate Hindu votes for Congress, began on 3 June, the day of Longowal's planned morcha.[180] Punjab's borders were sealed off and intrastate movement was disabled by the troop presence, with the water and electricity supply to the Golden Temple cut off. Exploratory fire was attempted on 4 June, with army commandos and CS gas proving ineffective on 5 June. The use of tanks on the complex began on 6 June, with tanks, helicopters, and other means used to deter the thousands of upset villagers attempting to gather in Amritsar, along with any other attempted gathering at over 125 other gurdwaras which had been taken over preemptively by the state.[238] The main action was concluded by 6 June, in which a large number of pilgrims, including women and children, had been killed, and young men shot, by incensed troops who had entered the complex, with their hands tied back with their own turbans, with others dying of suffocation in the guest rooms set up as detainment camps.[238] The operation resulted in 700 army casualties and 5,000 civilian deaths.[238]

Chandan Mitra wrote after observing the insurgency:[239]

Looking back, I am not sure if Bhindranwale was a terrorist by conviction who seriously sought Punjab's separation from India through force or if he painted himself into a corner and became a puppet in the hands of Pakistan's ISI which was looking for a face to project in its war of a thousand cuts against India to avenge East Pakistan's dismemberment. Maybe he was carried away by crowds that thronged his pravachans in rural Punjab in which he railed against decrepit practices creeping into Sikhism and exaggeratedly spoke of the alleged betrayal of his community by New Delhi, particularly the "biba", meaning Indira Gandhi. In that sense, he was the latest in a long line of Sikh leaders who led episodic agitations to distance the faith from Hindu influences, worried that the preponderant assimilative thrust of Hinduism would overwhelm Sikhism the way it had done Jainism and Buddhism.

In June 1984, after the negotiations, Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi ordered Operation Blue Star, an Indian Army operation carried out between 1 and 8 June 1984, to remove Bhindranwale and his armed militants from the buildings of the Harmandir Sahib complex in Amritsar, Punjab.[240] Bhindranwale was killed in the operation.[241][242] Army officers and soldiers commented on 'the courage and commitment' of the followers of Bhindranwale who died in action.[238]

According to Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar, who commanded the operation, the body of Bhindranwale was identified by a number of agencies, including the police, the Intelligence Bureau and militants in the Army's custody.[241] Bhindranwale's brother also identified Bhindranwale's body.[243][47] Pictures of what appear to be Bhindranwale's body have been published in at least two widely circulated books, Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Bluestar and After and Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle. BBC correspondent Mark Tully also reported seeing Bhindranwale's body during his funeral.

In 2016, The Week quoted former members of the confidential Special Group (SG) of India's Research and Analysis Wing as stating that SG had killed Bhindranwale using AK-47 rifles during Operation Blue Star, despite the Para SF claiming responsibility for it.[244]

Cynthia Keppley Mahmood wrote in Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants that Bhindranwale never learned English but mastered Punjabi. He was adept at television, radio and press interviews.[27] Keppley further stated that "those who knew him personally uniformly report his general likability and ready humour as well his dedication to Sikhism".[27] The author further states that "Largely responsible for launching Sikh militancy, he is valorized by militants and demonised by enemies and the accounts from the two divergent sources seem to refer to two completely different persons."[27]

Though journalist Khushwant Singh was opposed to Bhindranwale, he allowed that the Sikh preacher-become-activist genuinely made no distinction between higher and lower castes, and that he had restored thousands of drunken or doped Sikh men, inured to pornographic films, to their families,[245] and that Operation Blue Star had given the movement for Khalistan its first martyr in Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.[246] In 2003, at a function arranged by the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, at Akal Takht Amritsar under the vision of president SGPC Prof. Kirpal Singh Badungar and Singh Sahib Giani Joginder Singh Vedanti, former jathedar of the Akal Takht made a formal declaration that Bhindranwale was a "martyr" and awarded his son, Ishar Singh, a robe of honour.[247] Harbans Singh's The Encyclopedia of Sikhism describes Bhindranwale as "a phenomenal figure of modern Sikhism".[45]

• Amrik Singh
• Shabeg Singh
• 1984 anti-Sikh riots

• Sandhu, Ranbir Singh (1999). Struggle for Justice: Speeches and Conversations of Sant Jarnail Singh Khalsa Bhindranwale (1st ed.). Dublin, Ohio, U.S.A.: Sikh Educational & Religious Foundation. ISBN 9780967287416. Retrieved 23 March 2020.
• Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley (1996). Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 50–80. ISBN 978-0812215922. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
• Dhillon, Gurdarshan Singh (1996). Truth about Punjab: SGPC White Paper (1st ed.). Amritsar, Punjab: Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee. ISBN 978-0836456547. Retrieved 25 March 2020.
• Telford, Hamish (1992). "The Political Economy of Punjab: Creating Space for Sikh Militancy". Asian Survey. 46 (11): 969–987. doi:10.2307/2645265. JSTOR 2645265.
• Singh, Sangat (1999) The Sikhs in History, New Delhi, Uncommon Books
• Dilgeer, Harjinder Singh (2011) Sikh History in 10 volumes (vol. 7, 9), Waremme, Sikh University Press
• Tully, Mark; Satish Jacob (1985). Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle. London: Jonathan Cape. ISBN 0-224-02328-4.
• Fair, C. Christine (2005), "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements", Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 11: 125–156, doi:10.1080/13537110590927845, S2CID 145552863
• Van Dyke, Virginia (2009), "The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India, and the Post-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions", Asian Survey, 49 (6): 975–997, doi:10.1525/as.2009.49.6.975
• Pettigrew, Joyce (1987). "In Search of a New Kingdom of Lahore". Pacific Affairs. 60 (1): 1–25. doi:10.2307/2758827. JSTOR 2758827.
• Pettigrew, Joyce (1995). The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerilla Violence. London, UK: Zed Books. ISBN 978-1856493567. Retrieved 20 April 2020.
• Singh, Joginder (2003). "Setting Agenda for Sikh Militancy: A Study of Punjabi Vernaculars". Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. 64: 1083–1090. JSTOR 44145535.
• Bakke, Kristin (2015). Decentralization and Intrastate Struggles: Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec (illustrated ed.). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107094383.
• Jetly, Rajshree (2008). "The Khalistan Movement in India: The Interplay of Politics and State Power". International Review of Modern Sociology. 34 (1): 61–75. JSTOR 41421658.
• Deol, Harnik (2000). Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia) (1st ed.). New York City, U.S.A.: Routledge. ISBN 978-0415201087. Retrieved 17 June 2020.
• Kumar, Ram Narayan; Singh, Amrik; Agrwaal, Ashok; Kaur, Jaskaran (2003). Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab: Final Report, Volume 1. Kathmandu, Nepal: South Asia Forum for Human Rights. ISBN 9789993353577. Retrieved 2 July 2020.
• Grewal, J. S. (1998). The Sikhs of the Punjab (The New Cambridge History of India II.3) (Revised ed.). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 205–241. ISBN 9781316025338. Retrieved 16 April 2020.
• Dhillon, Kirpal S. (2006). Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India, 1978-1993. London, United Kingdom: Penguin Books. ISBN 9780143100362. Retrieved 2 July 2020.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.

• June 6, 1984 BBC broadcast of Indian troops raiding the Golden Temple
• "Oh, That Other Hindu Riot of Passage – an article by Khushwant Singh