Spanish Armada

The Spanish Armada (Spanish: Grande y Felicísima Armada, lit. 'Great and Most Fortunate Navy') was a Spanish fleet that sailed from Lisbon in late May 1588, commanded by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, an aristocrat without previous naval experience appointed by Philip II of Spain. His orders were to sail up the English Channel, link up with the Duke of Parma in Flanders, and escort an invasion force that would land in England and overthrow Elizabeth I. Its purpose was to reinstate Catholicism in England, end support for the Dutch Republic, and prevent attacks by English and Dutch privateers against Spanish interests in the Americas.

This article is about the Spanish fleet that sailed against England in 1588. For the modern navy of Spain, see Spanish Navy.

Spanish Armada
Part of the Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604) and the Eighty Years' War

The Spanish Armada and English ships in August 1588, (unknown, 16th-century, English School)
DateJuly – August 1588
Location
English Channel and the British Isles
50°10′00″N 4°15′42″W
Result Anglo-Dutch victory[1][2][3]
Belligerents

Spain

  • Portugal
Commanders and leaders
  • Alonso Pérez de Guzmán
  • Juan Martínez de Recalde
  • Miguel de Oquendo
  • Alexander Farnese
Strength
  • 34 warships[4]
  • 163 armed merchant vessels
    (30 more than 200 tons)[4]
  • 30 flyboats
  • 24 warships[5]
  • 44 armed merchantmen[6]
  • 38 auxiliary vessels[7]
  • 31 supply vessels[8]
  • 2,431 artillery pieces[9][10]
  • 7,000 sailors
  • 17,000 soldiers (90% Spaniards, 10% Portuguese)[11]
Casualties and losses
Battle of Gravelines:
  • 50–100 dead[12]
  • 400 wounded
  • 8 fireships burnt[13]
Disease: 2,000–3,000 dead[14]		 Battle of Gravelines:
  • More than 600 dead
  • 800 wounded[15]
  • 397 captured
  • Five ships sunk or captured[16]
Overall:

The Spanish were opposed by an English fleet based in Plymouth. Faster and more manoeuvrable than the larger Spanish galleons, they were able to attack the Armada as it sailed up the Channel. Several subordinates advised Medina Sidonia to anchor in The Solent and occupy the Isle of Wight, but he refused to deviate from his instructions to link up with Parma. Although the Armada reached Calais largely intact, [22] while awaiting communication from Parma, it was attacked at night by English fire ships and forced to scatter.

The Armada suffered further losses in the ensuing Battle of Gravelines, and was in danger of running aground on the Dutch coast when the wind changed, allowing it to escape into the North Sea. Pursued by the English, the Spanish ships returned home via Scotland and Ireland, but many ships were wrecked along the way and more than a third of the initial 130 ships were lost.[23]

The expedition was the largest engagement of the undeclared Anglo-Spanish War. The following year, England organised a similar large-scale campaign against Spain, the English Armada, sometimes called the "counter-Armada of 1589", which was also unsuccessful.[24]

Etymology

The word armada is from the Spanish: armada, which is cognate with English army. Originally from the Latin: armāta, the past participle of armāre, 'to arm', used in Romance languages as a noun for armed force, army, navy, fleet.[25] Armada Española is still the Spanish term for the modern Spanish Navy.

Background

The first documented suggestion of what's called the Spanish Armada was in the summer of 1583 when, flushed with pride of his victory in the Azores, Álvaro de Bazán, Marquis of Santa Cruz addressed the suggestion to Philip II of taking advantage of it to attack England.[26]

King Henry VIII began the English Reformation as a political exercise over his desire to divorce his first wife, Catherine of Aragon. Over time, England became increasingly aligned with the Protestant reformation taking place in Europe, especially during the reign of Henry's son, Edward VI. Edward died childless, and his half-sister Mary ascended the throne in 1553. Mary and her husband, Philip II of Spain, began to reassert Roman Catholic influence over church affairs. Her attempts led to more than 260 people being burned at the stake, earning her the nickname "Bloody Mary".[27]

Opposing monarchs

Mary's death in 1558 led to her half-sister Elizabeth taking the throne. Unlike Mary, Elizabeth was firmly in the reformist camp and quickly reimplemented many of Edward's reforms. Philip, no longer co-monarch, deemed Elizabeth a heretic and illegitimate ruler of England. In the eyes of the Catholic Church, Henry had never officially divorced Catherine, making Elizabeth illegitimate. It is alleged that Philip supported plots to have Elizabeth overthrown in favour of her Catholic cousin and heir presumptive, Mary, Queen of Scots. These plans were thwarted when Elizabeth had Mary imprisoned in 1567; Mary was forced to abdicate the crown of Scotland in favour of her son James VI; Elizabeth was forced to have Mary executed, finally, in 1587, due to constant plots against Elizabeth carried out in Mary's name. Elizabeth also retaliated against Philip by supporting the Dutch Revolt against Spain, as well as funding privateers to raid Spanish ships across the Atlantic. She had also negotiated an enduring trade and political alliance with Morocco.

In retaliation, Philip planned an expedition to invade England in order to overthrow Elizabeth and, if the Armada was not entirely successful, at least negotiate freedom of worship for Catholics and financial compensation for war in the Low Countries.[28] Through this endeavour, English material support for the United Provinces, the part of the Low Countries that had successfully seceded from Spanish rule, and English attacks on Spanish trade and settlements[29] in the New World would end. Philip was supported by Pope Sixtus V, who treated the invasion as a crusade, with the promise of a subsidy should the Armada make land.[30] Substantial support for the invasion was also expected from English Catholics, including wealthy and influential aristocrats and traders.[31]

A raid on Cádiz, led by privateer Francis Drake in April 1587, had captured or destroyed about 30 ships and great quantities of supplies, setting preparations back by a year.[32][33] There is also evidence that a letter from Elizabeth's security chief and spymaster, Sir Francis Walsingham, to her ambassador in Istanbul, William Harborne, sought to initiate Ottoman Empire fleet manoeuvres to harass the Spaniards,[34] but there is no evidence for the success of that plan.

The Prince of Parma was initially consulted by Philip II in 1583.[26] Alexander stressed that three conditions would need to be met so as to achieve success; absolute secrecy, secure the possession and defense of the Dutch provinces, and keep the French from interfering either with a peace agreement or by sowing division between the Catholic League and the Huguenots.[35][36] Secrecy couldn't be maintained which made the enterprise vastly more complicated. Philip ultimately combined Parma's plan with that of Santa Cruz, initially entertaining a triple attack, starting with a diversionary raid on Scotland, while the main Armada would capture either the Isle of Wight or Southampton to establish a safe anchorage in The Solent. Farnese would then follow with a large army from the Low Countries crossing the English Channel.

The appointed commander of the naval forces of the Armada was the highly experienced Marquis of Santa Cruz while Alexander Farnese would be in command of the invasion forces.[37] Unfortunately, Santa Cruz died in February 1588 and the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a high-born courtier, took his place. While a competent soldier and distinguished administrator, Medina Sidonia had no naval experience. He wrote to Philip expressing grave doubts about the planned campaign, but his message was prevented from reaching the King by courtiers on the grounds that God would ensure the Armada's success.[38]

Execution
Spanish commanders

  • Alonso Pérez de Guzmán

  • Alexander Farnese
English commanders

Prior to the undertaking, Pope Sixtus V allowed Philip to collect crusade taxes and granted his men indulgences. The blessing of the Armada's banner on 25 April 1588 was similar to the ceremony used prior to the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. On 28 May 1588, the Armada set sail from Lisbon and headed for the English Channel. When it left Lisbon, the fleet was composed of 141 ships,[39] 8,000 sailors and 18,000 soldiers, and bore 1,500 brass guns and 1,000 iron guns. The full body of the fleet took two days to leave port.

The Armada was delayed by bad weather. Storms in the Bay of Biscay along the Galician coast forced four galleys and one galleon to turn back, and other ships had to put in to A Coruña for repairs, leaving 137 ships that sailed for the English Channel.[40] Nearly half of the ships were not built as warships and were used for duties such as scouting and dispatch work, or for carrying supplies, animals and troops.[41] It included 24 purpose-built warships, 44 armed merchantmen, 38 auxiliary vessels and 34 supply ships.[42][41]

In the Spanish Netherlands, Alexander Farnese had mustered 30,000 soldiers and ordered and hundreds of flyboats built to carry them across the channel[43] while awaiting the arrival of the Armada. Since the secret was out from the get go and the element of surprise was long gone,[44] the new plan was to use the cover of the warships to convey the army on barges to a place near London. In all, 55,000 men were to have been mustered, a huge army for that time. On the day the Armada set sail, Elizabeth's ambassador in the Netherlands, Valentine Dale, met Parma's representatives in peace negotiations.[45] The English made a vain effort to intercept the Armada in the Bay of Biscay. On 6 July, negotiations were abandoned,[46] and the English fleet stood prepared, if ill-supplied, at Plymouth, awaiting news of Spanish movements.

Only 122 ships from the Spanish fleet entered the Channel; the four galleys, one nao, five pataches and the 10 Portuguese caravels had left the fleet before the first encounter with the English fleet. An additional 5 pataches, dispatched to deliver messages to Parma, should be deducted which brings the number to 117 Spanish ships facing the roughly 226-strong English fleet.[47] while the Spanish fleet outgunned that of the English. The Spanish available firepower was 50% more than that of the English.[48] The English fleet consisted of the 34 ships of the Royal Fleet, 21 of which were galleons of 200 to 400 tons, and 163 other ships, 30 of which were of 200 to 400 tons and carried up to 42 guns each. Twelve of the ships were privateers owned by Lord Howard of Effingham, Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake.[4]

In the beginning of June, Parma had sent Captain Moresin with some pilots to Admiral Sedonia. Upon Moresin's return on June 22, the report he made to Farnese caused him distress. Medina Sedonia was under the impression that Farnese could simply sail out into the channel with his barges filled with troops.[49] Parma had continually informed the king that his passage to the channel was blocked by English and Dutch ships, and the only way he could bring his boats out was if the Armada cleared the blockade.[50]

The fleet was sighted in England on 29 July when it appeared off the Lizard in Cornwall. The news was conveyed to London by a system of beacons that had been constructed along the south coast. The same day the English fleet was trapped in Plymouth Harbour by the incoming tide. The Spanish convened a council of war, where it was proposed to ride into the harbour on the tide and incapacitate the defending ships at anchor. From Plymouth Harbour the Spanish would attack England, but Philip explicitly forbade Medina Sidonia from engaging, leaving the Armada to sail on to the east and toward the Isle of Wight. As the tide turned, 55 English ships set out to confront the Armada from Plymouth under the command of Lord Howard of Effingham, with Sir Francis Drake as vice admiral. The rear admiral was Sir John Hawkins.

Action off Plymouth

On 30 July, the English fleet was off Eddystone Rocks with the Armada upwind to the west. To execute its attack, the English tacked upwind of the Armada, thus gaining the weather gage, a significant advantage. At daybreak on 31 July, the English fleet engaged the Armada off Plymouth near the Eddystone Rocks. The Armada was in a crescent-shaped defensive formation, convex toward the east. The galleons and great ships were concentrated in the centre and at the tips of the crescent's horns, giving cover to the transports and supply ships in between. Opposing them, the English were in two sections, with Drake to the north in Revenge with 11 ships, and Howard to the south in Ark Royal with the bulk of the fleet.

Given the Spanish advantage in close-quarter fighting, the English ships used their superior speed and manoeuvrability to keep beyond grappling range and bombarded the Spanish ships from a distance with cannon fire. The distance was too great for the manoeuvre to be effective and, at the end of the first day's fighting neither fleet had lost a ship in action. The English ships again used their superior speed and manoeuvrability to catch up with the Spanish fleet after a day of sailing.

  • The Spanish fleet off the coast of Cornwall on 29 July 1588
  • The Spanish and English fleets near Plymouth on 30 - 31 July 1588
  • The English engage the Spanish fleet near Plymouth on 31 July 1588
  • The English pursue the Spanish fleet east of Plymouth on 31 July - 1 August 1588

Actions of Portland Bill and Isle of Wight
Capture of the Nuestra Señora del Rosario - Admiral Pedro de Valdés (commander of the Squadron of Andalusia) surrenders to Francis Drake

The English fleet and the Armada engaged once more on 1 August, off Portland. A change of wind gave the Spanish the weather gage, and they sought to close with the English, but were foiled by the smaller ships' greater manoeuvrability. While the Spanish center manoeuvred to support Santa Ana the Nuestra Señora del Rosario collied with a number of ships losing her foremast and began to drift and was taken off by the current in the opposite direction of the fleet and closer to the English. Drake in the Revenge immediately sailed to the Rosario and was taken in action with Admiral Pedro de Valdés (commander of the Squadron of Andalusia) surrendering along with his entire crew. On board the English seized supplies of much-needed gunpowder and 50,000 gold ducats.[51] Drake had been guiding the English fleet by means of a lantern, which he snuffed out to slip away from the Spanish ships, causing the rest of his fleet to become scattered and disarrayed by dawn. At one point, Howard formed his ships into a line of battle to attack at close range, bringing all his guns to bear, but he did not follow through with the manoeuvre and little was achieved. During a lull in battle, San Salvador's gunpowder magazine exploded, lighting a portion of the ship on fire. The Spanish attempted to scuttle the ship but this failed when the Golden Hind came up, the Spanish evacuated the vessel and the Golden Hind promptly captured her.[52]

If the Armada could create a temporary base in the protected waters of the Solent, a strait separating the Isle of Wight from the English mainland, it could wait there for word from Parma's army; Farnese didn't get news of this until August 6.[53] However, in a full-scale attack, the English fleet broke into four groups with Martin Frobisher of the ship Aid given command over a squadron, and Drake coming with a large force from the south. Medina Sidonia sent reinforcements south and ordered the Armada back to open sea to avoid the Owers shoals.[54] There were no other secure harbours further east along England's south coast, so the Armada was compelled to make for Calais, without being able to wait for word of Parma's army.

Starting on August 1, Sedonia began sending Farnese messages detailing his position and movements.[55] It wasn't until the follwoing day that the first report from the Admiral was received by Alexander.[55]

  • The English and Spanish fleets on 1 - 2 August 1588
  • The English and Spanish fleets between Portland Bill and the Isle of Wight on 2 - 3 August 1588
  • The battle off the Isle of Wight on 4 August 1588

Fireships at Calais

On 7 August, the Armada anchored off Calais in a tightly packed defensive crescent formation, not far from Dunkirk (Farnese learned of this on August 7[56]), where Parma's army, reduced by disease to 16,000, was expected to be waiting, ready to join the fleet in barges sent from ports along the Flemish coast. Communication was more difficult than anticipated, and word came too late that Parma's army had yet to be equipped with sufficient transport or to be assembled in the port, a process that would take at least six days.[46] As Medina Sidonia waited at anchor, Dunkirk was blockaded by a Dutch fleet of 30 flyboats under Lieutenant-Admiral Justinus van Nassau.[57] Parma expected the Armada to send its light pataches to drive away the Dutch, but Medina Sidonia would not send them because he feared he would need these ships for his own protection. There was no deep-water port where the fleet might shelter, which had been acknowledged as a major difficulty for the expedition, and the Spanish found themselves vulnerable as night drew on.

English fireships launched at the Spanish armada off Calais

The Dutch flyboats mainly operated in the shallow waters off Zeeland and Flanders where larger warships with a deeper draught, like the Spanish and English galleons, could not safely enter. The Dutch enjoyed an unchallenged naval advantage in these waters, even though their navy was inferior in naval armament. An essential element of the plan of invasion, as it was eventually implemented, was the transportation of a large part of Parma's army of Flanders as the main invasion force in unarmed barges across the English Channel. These barges would be protected by the large ships of the Armada. However, to get to the Armada, they would have to cross the zone dominated by the Dutch navy, where the Armada could not go. This problem seems to have been overlooked by the Spanish planners, but it was insurmountable. Because of this obstacle, England never was in any real danger, at least from the Prince of Parma and the Army of Flanders. Because of the eventual English victory at sea, the Army of Flanders escaped the drowning death van Nassau had in mind for them.[58][59]

At midnight on 8 August, the English set alight eight fireships, sacrificing warships by filling them with pitch, brimstone, gunpowder and tar, and cast them downwind among the closely anchored vessels of the Armada. The Spanish feared that these uncommonly large fireships were "hellburners",[60] specialised fireships filled with large gunpowder charges that had been used to deadly effect at the Siege of Antwerp. Two were intercepted and towed away, but the remainder bore down on the fleet. Medina Sidonia's flagship and the principal warships held their positions, but the rest of the fleet cut their anchor cables and scattered in confusion. No Spanish ships were burnt, but the crescent formation had been broken, and the fleet found itself too far leeward of Calais in the rising southwesterly wind to recover its position. The English closed in for battle. Farnese learned of this the following day[61]

  • The pursuit to Calais, 4 - 6 August 1588
  • The fireship attack on the Spanish Armada, 7 August 1588
  • The battle off Gravelines, 8 August 1588

Battle of Gravelines

On 8 August the Battle of Gravelines took place.[62] The small port of Gravelines was part of Flanders in the Spanish Netherlands close to the border with France and was the closest Spanish territory to England. Medina Sidonia tried to regather his fleet there and was reluctant to sail further east, knowing the danger from the shoals off Flanders, from which his Dutch enemies had removed the sea marks. The English learned of the Armada's weaknesses during the skirmishes in the English Channel and concluded it was possible to close to within 100 yards (91 m) to penetrate the oak hulls of the Spanish ships. They had spent most of their gunpowder in the first engagements and had, after the Isle of Wight, been forced to conserve their heavy shot and powder for an anticipated attack near Gravelines. During all the engagements, the Spanish heavy guns could not easily be reloaded because of their close spacing and the quantities of supplies stowed between decks, as Drake had discovered on capturing the damaged Nuestra Señora del Rosario in the channel.[63] Instead, the Spanish gunners fired once and then transferred to their main task, which was to board enemy ships as had been the practice in naval warfare at the time. Evidence from Armada wrecks in Ireland shows that much of the fleet's ammunition was unused.[64] Its determination to fight by boarding, rather than employing cannon fire at a distance, proved a weakness for the Spanish. The manoeuvre had been effective in the battles of Lepanto and Ponta Delgada earlier in the decade, but the English were aware of it and sought to avoid it by keeping their distance.

With its superior manoeuvrability, the English fleet provoked Spanish fire while staying out of range. The English then closed, firing damaging broadsides into the enemy ships, which enabled them to maintain a windward position, so the heeling Armada hulls were exposed to damage below the water line when they changed course later. Many of the Spanish gunners were killed or wounded by the English broadsides, and the task of manning the cannon often fell to foot soldiers who did not know how to operate them. The ships were close enough for sailors on the upper decks of the English and Spanish ships to exchange musket fire. After eight hours, the English ships began to run out of ammunition, and some gunners began loading objects such as chains into cannon. Around 4 p.m., the English fired their last shots and pulled back.[65]

Five Spnish ships were lost - the galleass San Lorenzo, flagship of Don Hugo de Moncada, ran aground at Calais and was taken by Howard after murderous fighting between the crew, galley slaves, English, and the French. The galleons San Mateo and San Felipe drifted away in a sinking condition, ran aground on the island of Walcheren the next day and were taken by the Dutch. One carrack ran aground near Blankenberge and another foundered. Many other Spanish ships were severely damaged, especially the Portuguese and some Spanish Atlantic-class galleons, including some Neapolitan galleys, which bore the brunt of the fighting during the early hours of the battle.[66] and the Spanish plan to join with Parma's army had been defeated.

Elizabeth's Tilbury speech

Because of the potential invasion from the Netherlands, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester assembled a force of 4,500 militia at West Tilbury, Essex, to defend the Thames Estuary against any incursion up-river toward London. The result of the English fireship attack and the sea battle of Gravelines had not yet reached England, so Elizabeth went to Tilbury on 8 August to review her forces, arriving on horseback in ceremonial armour to imply to the militia she was prepared to lead them in the ensuing battle. She gave to them her royal address, which survives in at least six slightly different versions.[67] One version is as follows:

Queen Elizabeth I, the Armada Portrait at Woburn Abbey, Bedfordshire

My loving people, we have been persuaded by some that are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes for fear of treachery; but, I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear, I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and, therefore, I am come amongst you as you see at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of battle, to live or die amongst you all – to lay down for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king – and of a King of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take up arms – I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. I know already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns, and, we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. In the mean time, my lieutenant general shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject; not doubting but by your obedience to my general, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over those enemies of my God, of my kingdom, and of my people.

— Elizabeth I, [68]

After the victory, typhus swept the English ships, beginning among the 500-strong crew of the Elizabeth Jonas and killed many mariners. The sailors were not paid for their service, and many died of disease and starvation after landing at Margate. Howard did what he could out of his own purse to help the sailors but upwards of 3,000 perished.[14][69]: 144–148 

Elizabeth I and the Spanish Armada; the Apothecaries painting,[70] sometimes attributed to Nicholas Hilliard.[71] A stylised depiction of key elements of the Armada story: the alarm beacons, Queen Elizabeth at Tilbury, and the sea battle at Gravelines.[72]

Return to Spain
Route taken by the Spanish Armada

On the day after the battle at Gravelines, the disorganised and unmanoeuvrable Spanish fleet was at risk of running onto the sands of Zeeland because of the prevailing wind. The wind then changed to the south, enabling the fleet to sail north. The English ships under Howard pursued to prevent any landing on English soil, although by this time his ships were almost out of shot. On 12 August, Howard called a halt to the pursuit at about the latitude of the Firth of Forth off Scotland. The only option left to the Spanish ships was to return to Spain by sailing round the north of Scotland and home via the Atlantic or the Irish Sea. As the Spanish fleet rounded the British isles on 20 August, it consisted of 110 vessels; a patache, one of the 117 ships that encountered the English, returned to Spain to report the events.[73] The Spanish ships were beginning to show wear from the long voyage, and some were kept together by having their damaged hulls strengthened with cables. Supplies of food and water ran short. The intention would have been to keep to the west of the coast of Scotland and Ireland in the relative safety of the open sea. There being no way of accurately measuring longitude, the Spanish were not aware that the Gulf Stream was carrying them north and east as they tried to move west, and they eventually turned south much closer to the coast than they thought. Off Scotland and Ireland, the fleet ran into a series of powerful westerly winds which drove many of the damaged ships further toward the lee shore. Because so many anchors had been abandoned during the escape from the English fireships off Calais, many of the ships were incapable of securing shelter as the fleet reached the coast of Ireland and were driven onto the rocks; local inhabitants looted the ships. The late sixteenth century and especially 1588 was marked by unusually strong North Atlantic storms, perhaps associated with a high accumulation of polar ice off the coast of Greenland, a characteristic phenomenon of the "Little Ice Age".[74] More ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in direct combat.

Most of the 28 ships lost in the storms where along the jagged steep rocks of the western coast of Ireland.[75] About 5,000 men died by drowning, starvation and slaughter by local inhabitants after their ships were driven ashore on the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland. The English Lord Deputy William FitzWilliam ordered the English soldiers in Ireland to kill any Spanish prisoners, which was done on several occasions instead of asking for ransom as was common during that period.[76] Reports of the passage of the remnants of the Spanish Armada around Ireland abound with onerous accounts of hardships and survival.[77] Spanish Captain Francisco de Cuéllar was wrecked on the coast of Ireland and gave a remarkable account of his experiences in the fleet and on the run in Ireland.

Aftermath

The captured Spanish galleons Nuestra Señora del Rosario and the San Salvador were studied by the English. The San Salvador became known as the 'Great Spaniard' but was lost in a wreck in November 1588 off Studland. Nuestra Señora del Rosario she was brought to Dartmouth and then later sent to Chatham where she was dry docked and eventually sunk to support a wharf.[78] Pedro de Valdés was held prisoner by the English, in the Tower of London for five years, until his ransom was paid by his family for his release back to Spain. He was not blamed for the loss of his ship and was appointed colonial governor of Cuba from 1602 to 1608.[79]

The detailed administrative records maintained by Spain's bureaucracy reveal that, of the 141 ships that left Lisbon, no more than 34 or 35 ships in total were lost.[80] 87 ships returned from their voyage through the Channel and around the British isles[81] In the end, 67 ships and fewer than 10,000 men survived.[82]Many of the men were near death from disease, as the conditions were very cramped, and most of the ships had run out of food and water. Some were captured and imprisoned by the English in what was later called the "Spanish Barn" in Torquay on the south coast of England. More Armada survivors later died in Spain or on hospital ships in Spanish harbours from diseases contracted during the voyage. It was reported that when Philip learned of the result of the expedition, he declared, "I sent the Armada against men, not God's winds and waves".[83]

The following year the English launched the Counter Armada, with 27,667 men and 180+ ships under Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Norris. It was utterly disastrous with only 102 ships and 3,722 men returning,[84][85][86] and about 80 ships were sunk, scuttled or captured.[87] The attempt to restore the Portuguese Crown from Spain was unsuccessful, and the opportunity to strike a decisive blow against the weakened Spanish Navy was lost. The failure of the expedition depleted the financial resources of England's treasury, which had been carefully restored during the long reign of Elizabeth I.

During the course of the war, the Spanish struggled to gain control of the English Channel or stop the English intervention in Flanders or English privateer transatlantic raids. Although substantially weaker than the great armada sent in 1588, three more armadas were sent by Spain in 1596, 1597 and 1601, but were scattered by storms and ended in failure.[88] This doesn’t mean Spain was in any way impotent nor England unscathed. Spanish corsairs made incursions on the English coast and plundered English and Dutch ships.[89] For instance the raid on Cawsand bay followed a few months later with the Raid on Mount's Bay where Spain launched four galleys under the command of Carlos de Amésquita from Blavet for Cornwall on July 26, 1595, landing at Mount's Bay on August 4 with 400 arquebusiers and some pikemen. They marched on Mousehole which was set ablaze then continued to Penzance, destroying Newlyn and Paul taking the fort that protected the coast and three loaded ships, despite 1,200 men putting up a show of defending it. On learning that several thousand men were on their way to repulse them, Amésquita gathered up his troops and spoils and, after three days on English soil, sailed away only to encounter 46 Dutch merchantmen escorted by 4 warships. The latter were attacked: two were sunk and the other two damaged. Amésquita lost 20 men in the battle and despite his ships being hit repeatedly, all 4 galleys returned to Blavet two-weeks after their departure.[90] Through Philip's naval revival, the English and Dutch ultimately failed to disrupt the various fleets of the Indies despite the great number of military personnel mobilised every year. Thus, Spain remained the predominant power in Europe for several decades.[91] The conflict wound down with diminishing military actions until a peace was agreed between the two powers on the signing of the Treaty of London in 1604.

Technological revolution

The failure of the Spanish Armada vindicated the English strategy and caused a revolution in naval tactics, taking advantage of the wind (the "weather gage") and line-to-line cannon fire from windward, which exposed the opponent ship's hull and rudder as targets. Also instilled was the use of naval cannon to damage enemy ships without the need to board. Until then, the cannon had played a supporting role to the main tactic of ramming and boarding enemy ships.

Most military historians hold that the battle of Gravelines reflected a lasting shift in the balance of naval power in favour of the English, in part because of the gap in naval technology and cannon armament which continued into the next century.[92] In the words of historian Geoffrey Parker, by 1588, "the capital ships of the Elizabethan navy constituted the most powerful battlefleet afloat anywhere in the world".[93] The English navy yards were leaders in technical innovation, and the captains devised new battle formations and tactics. The sleeker and more manoeuvrable full-rigged ship, with ample cannon, was one of the greatest advances of the century and permanently transformed naval warfare.

English shipwrights introduced novel designs, first demonstrated in the Foresight in 1570 and the Dreadnought in 1573, that allowed the ships to sail faster, manoeuvre better, and carry more and heavier guns.[94] Whereas before warships had tried to grapple with each other so soldiers could board the enemy ship, they were able to stand off and fire broadside cannonades that could sink the vessel. Superior English ships and seamanship had foiled the invasion. The English also took advantage of Spain's complex strategy that required coordination between the invasion fleet and the Spanish army on shore. The outdated design of the Spanish cannon meant they were much slower in reloading in a close-range battle, allowing the English to take control. Spain still had numerically larger fleets, but England was catching up.[95]

Legacy
Day seven of the battle with the Armada, 7 August 1588, by Hendrick Cornelisz Vroom, 1601

In England, the boost to national pride from the defeat of the Spanish invasion attempt lasted for years, and Elizabeth's legend persisted and grew long after her death. Repulsing the Spanish naval force may have given heart to the Protestant cause across Europe and the belief that God was behind the Protestants.[96] The wind that scattered the Armada has been called the Protestant Wind,[97] a phrase also used for later navy attacks favourable to the Protestant cause that were helped by the wind. This was shown by the striking of commemorative medals that bore variations on the inscription, "1588. Flavit Jehovah et Dissipati Sunt" – with "Jehovah" in Hebrew letters ("God blew, and they are scattered"), or He blew with His winds, and they were scattered. There were also more lighthearted medals struck, such as the one with the play on the words of Julius Caesar: Venit, Vidit, Fugit (he came, he saw, he fled).

The memory of the victory over the Armada was evoked during both the Napoleonic Wars and the Second World War, when Britain again faced a substantial danger of foreign invasion. The Armada Memorial in Plymouth was constructed in 1888 to celebrate the tercentenary of the defeat of the Spanish Armada.[98]

Historiography

Historian Knerr has reviewed the main trends in historiography over five centuries.[99] For 150 years, writers relied heavily on Petruccio Ubaldini's A Discourse Concernye the Spanish Fleete Invadinye Englande (1590), which argued that God decisively favoured the Protestant cause. In the 17th century, William Camden additionally pointed to elements of English nationalism and the private enterprise of the sea dogs. He also emphasized that the Duke of Medina Sidonia was an incompetent seaman. In the 18th century, David Hume praised the leadership of Queen Elizabeth. However, the Whig historians, led by James A. Froude, rejected Hume's interpretation and argued that Elizabeth was vacillating and almost lost the conflict by her unwillingness to spend enough to maintain and supply the Royal Navy's fleet of ships. Scientific modern historiography came of age with the publication of two volumes of primary documents by John K. Laughton in 1894. This enabled the leading naval scholar of the day, Julian Corbett, to reject the Whig views and turn attention to the professionalization of the Royal Navy as a critical factor. Twentieth-century historians have focused on technical issues, such as the comparative power of English and Spanish naval guns and the degree of credit for naval battle tactics that is owed to Francis Drake and Charles Howard. Inclement weather in the English Channel and on the oceans at the time has always been cited as a major factor to the outcome.

  • Armada Medal, bearing the inscription Flavit Jehovah et Dissipati Sunt
  • The Spanish Barn at Torre Abbey - it holds a Blue Plaque noting that it held 397 Spanish prisoners of war for fourteen days during the Armada campaign
  • Bronze saker on carriage and other armament from the Spanish Armada ship, Girona, Ulster Museum, Belfast

The Armada has often featured in fictional accounts of the reign of Elizabeth I. Examples are:

  • The Battle of Gravelines and the subsequent chase around the northern coast of Scotland form the climax of Charles Kingsley's 1855 novel Westward Ho!, which in 1925 became the first novel to be adapted into a radio drama by BBC.[100]
  • The fifth episode of the BBC series Elizabeth R is an account of the defeat of the Armada.
  • The 2007 film Elizabeth: The Golden Age contains a heavily fictionalized retelling of the Spanish Armada and the Battle of Gravelines.

See also
  • Invisible armada
  • The Armada Service
  • Hugo of Moncada i Gralla
  • Armada Tapestries

Notes
  1. Mattingly p. 401: "the defeat of the Spanish armada really was decisive"
  2. Parker & Martin p. 5: "an unmitigated disaster"
  3. Vego p. 148: "the decisive defeat of the Spanish armada"
  4. Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker, The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1901341143, p. 40.
  5. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 117.
  6. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 117.
  7. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 117.
  8. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 117.
  9. Kinard, Jeff. Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact. p. 92.
  10. Burke, Peter. The New Cambridge Modern History: Volume 13, Companion Volume.
  11. Kamen, Henry (2014). Spain, 1469–1714: A Society of Conflict. Routledge. p. 123.
  12. Lewis, Michael.The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968, p. 184.
  13. John Knox Laughton,State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588, printed for the Navy Records Society, MDCCCXCV, Vol. II, pp. 8–9, Wynter to Walsyngham: indicates that the ships used as fire-ships were drawn from those at hand in the fleet and not hulks from Dover.
  14. Bicheno 2012, p. 262.
  15. Lewis, p. 182.
  16. Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P.M. Jones (1985) The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 108 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
  17. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1991. ISBN 978-0859763004, p. 122.
  18. Garrett Mattingly rejects old estimations, makes a recount and concludes: "So, lost, at most, 31 ships (not 41), 10 pinnaces at most (not 20), two galleasses (not three), one galley. Total, not more than 44 (not 65), probably five or six and perhaps a doze less." Mattingly, Garrett: The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. ISBN 978-0395083666, p. 426.
  19. Lewis p. 208
  20. Lewis pp. 208–209
  21. Hanson p. 563
  22. "The Safeguard of the Sea, A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649", N. A. M. Rodgers, Penguin, 2004, pp. 263–269
  23. John A. Wagner (2010). Voices of Shakespeare's England: Contemporary Accounts of Elizabethan Daily Life: Contemporary Accounts of Elizabethan Daily Life. ABC-CLIO. p. 91. ISBN 978-0313357411.
  24. Elliott p.333
  25. Oxford English Dictionary, 'armada'
  26. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V pp. 157–158.
  27. Waller, Maureen (2006). Sovereign Ladies: The Six Reigning Queens of England. New York: St. Martin's Press. p. 115. ISBN 978-0312338015.
  28. Pendrill, Colin (2002). Spain 1474–1700:The Triumphs and Tribulations of Empire. Bristol: Heinemann. p. 286. ISBN 978-0435327330. "If the Armada is not as successful as we hoped but yet not entirely defeated, then you may offer England peace on the following terms. The first is that in England the free use and exercise of our Holy Catholic faith shall be permitted to all Catholics, native and foreign, and that those that are in exile shall be permitted to return. The second is that all the place in my netherlands which the English hold shall be restored to me and the third that they shall recompense me for the injury they have done me, my dominions and my subjects, which will amount to an exceeding great sum. With regard the free exercise of Catholicism, you may point out to them that since freedom of worship is permitted to the huguenots of France, there will be no sacrifice of dignity in allowing the same privilege to Catholics in England." April 1588, Philip II to the Duke of Parma.
  29. Hart, Francis Rußel, Admirals of the Caribbean, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922, pp. 28–32, describes a large privateer fleet of 25 ships commanded by Drake in 1585 that raided about the Spanish Caribbean colonies.
  30.  Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). "The Spanish Armada". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. "...the widespread suffering and irritation caused by the religious wars Elizabeth fomented, and the indignation caused by her religious persecution, and the execution of Mary Stuart, caused Catholics everywhere to sympathise with Spain and to regard the Armada as a crusade against the most dangerous enemy of the faith," and "Pope Sixtus V agreed to renew the excommunication of the Queen, and to grant a large subsidy to the Armada but, given the time needed for preparation and actual sailing of the fleet, would give nothing until the expedition should actually land in England. In this way he eventually was saved the million crowns, and did not take any proceedings against the heretic queen."
  31. Hutchinson, Robert. "10 things you (probably) didn’t know about the Spanish Armada". BBC History Extra, April 2005. Retrieved 5 April 2020
  32. Wagner, John (1999). Historical Dictionary of the Elizabethan World; Britain, Ireland, Europe, and America. Oxford and New York: Routledge. p. 45. ISBN 978-1579582692. Retrieved 16 October 2013.
  33. Shepherd, Andrew. "The Spanish Armada in Lisbon: preparing to invade England". British Historical Society of Portugal. Retrieved 10 September 2021.
  34. Ezard, John. "Why we must thank the Turks, not Drake, for defeating the Armada". The Guardian, 1 June 2004. Retrieved 5 April 2020
  35. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020c, v. III pp. 161–162.
  36. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V pp. 165–166.
  37. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V p. 170.
  38. Coote, Stephen (2003). Drake, The Life and Legend of an Elizabethan Hero. London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. pp. 248–252. ISBN 978-0743220071. Retrieved 16 October 2013.
  39. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, pp. 113-117.
  40. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 116
  41. Garrett Mattingly, The Invincible Armada and Elizabethan England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 12–13.
  42. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 117
  43. Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1901341143, p. 94, gives 30,500 and raised to 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry on p.96. Also, the hoax paper The English Mercurie published by Authoritie, Whitehall 23 July 1588, Imprinted at London by Chriss Barker, Her Highnesse's Printer, 1588, otherwise states fairly accurately, p. 3, "...all the Spanish troops in the Netherlands, and consists of thirty thousand Foot and eighteen hundred Horse."
  44. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V pp. 164, 167, 199–200.
  45. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V pp. 206–207.
  46. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V p. 225.
  47. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, pp. 114–116
  48. Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1901341143, p. 185.
  49. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V pp. 218–219.
  50. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V p. 220.
  51. Konstam 2009, p. 150.
  52. Konstam 2009, p. 151.
  53. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V p. 223.
  54. Mcdermott. England and the Spanish Armada. p. 260
  55. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V p. 221.
  56. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V p. 224.
  57. Patrick Fraser Tytler (1833), Life of Sir Walter Raleigh, Edenburgh: Oliver & Boyd; [etc., etc.], OCLC 3656130, OL 6949907M
  58. Israel, J. I. and Parker, G. (1991) "Of Providence and Protestant Winds: the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Dutch armada of 1688", in: The Anglo-Dutch moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact. Cambridge U.P., ISBN 0521390753; pp. 349–351
  59. Motley, John Lothrop (1860). "XVII.1587". History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Synod of Dort. Vol. 1586–89. London: John Murray. 4194.
  60. "Hellburners" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 February 2007. (143 KiB).
  61. Marek y Villarino de Brugge 2020e, v. V pp. 226–227.
  62. "Events at Calais, the 'fireships' and the Battle of Gravelines – the Spanish Armada – WJEC – GCSE History Revision – WJEC".
  63. Coote, Stephen (2003). Drake. London: Simon & Schuster. p. 259. ISBN 978-0743220071. Retrieved 5 December 2009.
  64. Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker, The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1901341143, pp. 189–190
  65. Battlefield Britain: Episode 4, the Spanish Armada
  66. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 120
  67. John Guy (2016). . Elizabeth: The Forgotten Years. Viking. p. 119.
  68. Damrosh, David, et al. The Longman Anthology of British Literature, Volume 1B: The Early Modern Period. Third ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006.
  69. John Guy (2016). Elizabeth: The Forgotten Years. Penguin Books Limited. ISBN 978-0241963647.
  70. Aled Jones (2005). Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth Series. Cambridge University Press. pp. 129–. ISBN 978-0521849951. Retrieved 8 October 2011.
  71. The Battle of Gravelines by Nicholas Hilliard at bbc.co.uk
  72. Aled Jones (2005). Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth Series. Cambridge University Press. pp. 129–. ISBN 978-0521849951. Retrieved 8 October 2011.
  73. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 120
  74. Brian Fagan, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History 1300–1850, New York: Basic Books, 2000
  75. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 120
  76. Mattingly, Garrett (1959). The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 369. ISBN 978-0395083666. LCCN 87026210. OCLC 16806339. OL 2396450M. ID information is for the 1987 reprint..
  77. Winston S. Churchill, "The New World", vol. 3 of A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, (1956) Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, p. 130.
  78. "British First Rate galleon 'Nuestra Señora del Rosario' (1588)". threedecks.org. Three Decks. 2019. Retrieved 24 June 2019.
  79. Martin 1988, pp. 87–92.
  80. Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 120
  81. Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J.: Pilots, navigation and strategy in the Gran Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): "England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604". Barnes & Noble, 1991. ISBN 0389209554, p. 161
  82. "In the end as many as two-thirds of the armada's original complement of 30,000 died and for every one killed in battle or perishing of their wounds another six or eight died due to (non-combat losses)", Hanson p. 563
  83. SparkNotes: Queen Elisabeth – Against the Spanish Armada
  84. Gorrochategui Santos, Luis (2018). English Armada: The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History. Oxford: Bloomsbury. p. 245. ISBN 978-1350016996.
  85. R. O. Bucholz, Newton Key. Early modern England 1485–1714: a narrative history (John Wiley and Sons, 2009). ISBN 978-1405162753 p. 145
  86. John Hampden Francis Drake, privateer: contemporary narratives and documents (Taylor & Francis, 1972). ISBN 978-0817357030 p. 254
  87. Fernández Duro, Cesáreo (1972). Armada Española desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilla y Aragón. Museo Naval de Madrid, Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Tomo III, Capítulo III. Madrid. p. 51
  88. Tenace 2003, pp. 855–882.
  89. Gorrochategui Santos, Luis (2018). English Armada: The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History. Oxford: Bloomsbury. p. 253. ISBN 978-1350016996.
  90. Gorrochategui Santos, Luis (2018). English Armada: The Greatest Naval Disaster in English History. Oxford: Bloomsbury. pp. 258–259. ISBN 978-1350016996.
  91. J. H. Elliott. La Europa dividida (1559–1598) (Editorial Critica, 2002). ISBN 978-8484326694 p. 333
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  93. Geoffrey Parker, 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', Mariner's Mirror, 82 (1996): 273.
  94. Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Dreadnought' Revolution of Tudor England", Mariner's Mirror, Aug 1996, Vol. 82, Issue 3, pp. 269–300
  95. Geoffrey Parker, "Why the Armada Failed", History Today, May 1988, Vol. 38 Issue 5, pp. 26–33
  96. Richard Holmes 2001, p. 858: "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive"
  97. "Europe – MSN Encarta". Archived from the original on 28 October 2009. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
  98. Worth, Richard (1890). History of Plymouth: From the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Plymouth: W. Brenden. pp. 51–54.
  99. Douglas Knerr, "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13.
  100. Briggs, Asa. The BBC: The First Fifty Years. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985. 63.

References
  • Bicheno, Hugh. (2012). Elizabeth's Sea Dogs: How England's Mariners Became the Scourge of the Seas. Conway. ISBN 978-1-84486-174-3.
  • Corbett, Julian S. Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power (1898) online edition vol. 1; also online edition vol. 2
  • Cruikshank, Dan: Invasion: Defending Britain from Attack, Boxtree Ltd, 2002 ISBN 0752220292
  • Fernández-Armesto, Felipe. The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588. (1988). 336 pp.
  • Froude, James Anthony. The Spanish Story of the Armada, and Other Essays (1899), by a leading historian of the 1890s full text online
  • Hanson, Neil. The Confident Hope of a Miracle: The True History of the Spanish Armada Random House, 2011 ISBN 978-1446423226
  • Hutchinson, Robert. The Spanish Armada, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2013 ISBN 978-0297866374
  • Kilfeather T. P.: Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada, Anvil Books Ltd, 1967
  • Knerr, Douglas. "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13. ISSN 0003-0155
  • Konstam, Angus (2009). The Spanish Armada: The Great Enterprise against England 1588. Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781846034961.
  • Lewis, Michael. The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968.
  • Mcdermott, James (2005). England and the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300106985.
  • Marek y Villarino de Brugge, André (2020c). Alessandro Farnese: Prince of Parma: Governor-General of the Netherlands (1545–1592): v. III. Los Angeles: MJV Enterprises, ltd., inc. ISBN 979-8688759655.
  • Marek y Villarino de Brugge, André (2020e). Alessandro Farnese: Prince of Parma: Governor-General of the Netherlands (1545–1592): v. V. Los Angeles: MJV Enterprises, ltd., inc. ISBN 979-8689560397.
  • Martin, Colin, and Geoffrey Parker. The Spanish Armada (2nd ed. 2002), 320 pp by leading scholars; uses archaeological studies of some of its wrecked ships excerpt and text search
  • Martin, Colin (with appendices by Wignall, Sydney): Full Fathom Five: Wrecks of the Spanish Armada (with appendices by Sydney Wignall), Viking, 1975
  • Martin, Paula (1988). Spanish Armada Prisoners The Story of the Nuestra Señora Del Rosario and Her Crew, and of Other Prisoners in England, 1587-97. University of Exeter. ISBN 9780859893053.
  • Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada (1959). ISBN 0618565914, the classic narrative excerpt and text search
  • Parker, Geoffrey. "Why the Armada Failed." History Today 1988 38(may): 26–33. ISSN 0018-2753. Summary by leadfing historian.
  • Pierson, Peter. Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia. (1989). 304 pp.
  • Rasor, Eugene L. The Spanish Armada of 1588: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. (1992). 277 pp.
  • Rodger, N. A. M. The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660–1649 vol 1 (1999) 691 pp; excerpt and text search
  • Rodriguez-Salgado, M. J. and Adams, Simon, eds. England, Spain, and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604 (1991) 308 pp.
  • Tenace, Edward (2003), "A Strategy of Reaction: The Armadas of 1596 and 1597 and the Spanish Struggle for European Hegemony", English Historical Review, 118 (478): 855–882, doi:10.1093/ehr/118.478.855
  • Thompson, I. A. A. "The Appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia to the Command of the Spanish Armada", The Historical Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2. (1969), pp. 197–216. in JSTOR
  • Vego, Milan N. (2013). Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. Routledge. ISBN 978-1136317941.
  • Alcalá-Zamora, José N. (2004). La empresa de Inglaterra: (la "Armada invencible" : fabulación y realidad). Taravilla: Real Academia de la Historia ISBN 978-8495983374

Further reading
  • Graham, Winston. The Spanish Armadas (1972; reprint 2001) ISBN 0141390204
  • Hanson, Neil. The Confident Hope of a Miracle. The True History of the Spanish Armada. Knopf (2003), ISBN 1400042941.
  • Holmes, Richard. The Oxford Companion to Military History. Oxford University Press. 2001. ISBN 978-0198606963
  • Howarth, David. The Voyage of the Armada: The Spanish Story (1981). ISBN 0002115751
  • Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe, The Spanish Armada: The Experience of war in 1588 (Oxford University Press, 1989). ISBN 978-0192851963
  • Feros, Antonio (2002). El Duque de Lerma: realeza y privanza en la España de Felipe III (in Spanish). Marcial Pons Historia. p. 305. ISBN 978-8495379399.
  • Kilfeather T. P. Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada (Anvil Books, 1967)
  • Lewis, Michael The Spanish Armada First published Batsford, 1960 – republished Pan, 1966
  • McDermott, James. England & the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel (1990) ISBN 0731701275
  • McKee, Alexander. From Merciless Invaders: The Defeat of the Spanish Armada. Souvenir Press, London, 1963. Second edition, Grafton Books, London, 1988.
  • Mattingly, Garrett. The Defeat of the Spanish Armada (Jonathan Cape, 1959) – UK edition of The Armada (US edition).
  • Padfield, Peter. Armada: A Celebration of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588–1988. Gollancz (1988). ISBN 0575037296
  • Parker, Geoffrey Mariner's Mirror. 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', 82 (1996): pp. 269–300.
  • Wernham A. B. The Return of the Armadas: the Later Years of the Elizabethan War against Spain, 1595–1603, ISBN 0198204434
  • Whiting J. R. S. The Enterprise of England: The Spanish Armada (1988) Sutton Publishing (1995) ISBN 0862994764
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