1991 in Pakistan

Peaceful and constitutional transfer of power is not the norm in Pakistan but this did take place on November 6, 1990, when Mian Nawaz Sharif was inducted as prime minister. For the first time in Pakistan's history, the ruling party (Islamic Democratic Alliance, commonly IJI1) enjoyed more than a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, and it was also the first time that the same party ruled at the center as well as in all four provinces. Though the opposition Peoples Democratic Alliance (PDA) had charged that the elections were stolen,2 its leader, Benazir Bhutto, departing from traditional tactics, did not take to the streets. She decided to work within the democratic framework, and Nawaz Sharif promised to reciprocate. But this restraint did not last long. Presidential references to special tribunals to look into charges of corruption and misuse of power by Bhutto and some of her ministers, the involvement of her husband in criminal cases, and the persecution of her party's rank and file in Sindh by the Jam Sadiq government vitiated the political climate. In rage against a ruthless establishment, Bhutto took the fight from Parliament to the people. She denounced the elections of October 1990 as totally rigged, described the Parliament as "bogus," and since April 1991 she has conducted a relentless campaign to oust the Nawaz Sharif government. She did not even seem averse to a military takeover. Nawaz responded in an Independence Day speech on August 14 in Lahore that was full of anger, hatred, and threats. The confrontation kept the political climate charged, the people on edge, and the country buzzing with rumors about a change in government either through a military takeover or a palace revolution The bickering, infighting, and the seemingly chaotic Pakistani political scene in 1991 should not cause undue alarm. It is the Pakistani style of politics, and if no extraneous intervention takes place, it may produce corrective action from within the system. Moreover, the heat and dust of confrontational politics should not make one oblivious to an interesting prospect-the beginning of a two-party system in Pakistan where there are more political parties than there are shades of opinion. The elections of 1988 and 1990 have reduced most parties to be, at best, locally influential. The two political alliances-the IJI and the PDA, with the Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party as their respective standard bearers-have, emerged as the main contestants for power. Contrary to common wisdom, the PDA did not suffer a humiliating de- feat in the 1990 elections in terms of popular support. In the National Assembly elections, the difference in the popular vote received by the two alliances was less than one percent (IJI-37.27%, PDA-36.65%), although this was not reflected in the number of seats won (IJI: 105, PDA: 45).3 Not only were the two alliances well balanced in their vote banks but their programs were also complimentary. The ideological confrontation of the 1970s and 1980s was over. Both agreed on a domestic agenda of liberal democracy and market economy although they used different rhetoric and slogans to satisfy their respective constituencies. Even on foreign policy issues, the stances of the IJI and the PDA became identical after the IJI shed its anti-India, anti-U.S. rhetoric and came around to supporting a political settlement in Afghanistan. In fact, the two-party system successfully operated in the Punjab where the two alliances together captured 88% of the votes cast in the election. The provincial government and the opposition also developed a working relationship. The IJI record as a ruling coalition has been a mixed one. The government took credit for the passage of the Shariat Bill in May and the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution in July. The Shariat Bill declared the Quran and the Sunnah as the law of the land, not just the guideline. This could render legislatures superfluous but they were retained as the sole instrument of legislation. The opposition pointed out this contradiction and charged that a theocracy was being established; minority and women's groups also protested. The prime minister tried to disarm the critics by proclaiming he was not a fundamentalist but satisfied neither the moderates nor the fundamentalists. The Twelfth Amendment provided for special courts for speedy trial in cases of a heinous nature. Its provisions for suppression of fundamental rights and extension of police powers drew the wrath of the opposition, but the amendment so far has not been used by the government to persecute its opponents. The Nawaz Sharif government successfully tackled two very contentious issues that had waited to be resolved for more than 17 years-the allocations of Indus waters and the distribution of revenues between the federation and the provinces. The agreements were reached on both counts in the Council of Common Interest in March. But the government was vulnerable on several fronts. Nawaz Sharif found it difficult to hold his disparate coalition together; political expediency forced him to expand the cabinet to a record number of 48 ministers, ministers of state, and advisors. The law and order situation remained alarming in the country, particularly in Sindh. The Kalashnikov culture refused to be subdued and terrorism continued to stalk the land. The kidnapping for ransom of three Japanese students and two Chinese engineers in Sindh (they were subsequently released); bomb blasts in different parts of the country, notably Karachi; attacks on working journalists; and the murder of General Fazl-i- Haq, ex-governor of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), were some indications of the pervasiveness of violence. The government also failed to control the rampant corruption in the bureaucracy and in the ety at large. In September Pakistan was rocked by the Cooperative Societies scandal in the ab in which some two million people lost deposits of Rs 17 billion (about US$700 million). Coming as it did on the heels of the BCCI collapse, confidence in the financial institutions of the country was shattered and the credibility of the government seriously eroded.

However, on one front at least, the government could breathe easier: a change of guard in the army on August 16 retired General Mirza Aslam Beg as chief of the army staff (COAS) and placed General Asif Nawaz in charge. In his order of the day to the troops, the new COAS said: "Let the elected representatives do their job while we concentrate on acquiring ever greater professional excellence." He also declared that "the army must have nothing to do with politics."4 Thus, the democratic polity, though fragile, survived the year. [2]

For almost a decade Pakistan was on the center stage of world politics. But the eclipse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War saw it pushed into the wings. The sudden, swift, and sweeping changes in the global political system and the emerging realities at the regional level created a feeling of unease and isolation in Pakistan. The year saw the country hurrying to review and reassess its foreign policy priorities and its diplomatic options, and the signals emanating from Islamabad lacked clarity and cohesion. At one level, Pakistan was seeking to push a political settlement in Afghanistan, improve its ties with the United States, and mend fences with India; at another level, it seemed to be returning to its Islamic and regional moorings and to be seeking alternate linkages.

Pakistan made a ninety-degree turn on Afghanistan. In a crucial meeting of the Afghan Cell on April 3, chaired by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, an intra-establishment consensus was reached to go all out for a political settlement as soon as possible. Time, it was felt, was running out for Pakistan. The inability of the Afghan resistance to dislodge the Kabul regime, the prospect of the continuing burden of Afghan refugees, and the apprehension that opportunities to establish close links with the new Central Asian republics might be missed weighed heavily on the decision-makers in Islamabad.

On May 21, 1991, sensing the new mood in Pakistan, U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar presented a five-point peace plan for Afghanistan that seeks to evolve, through an intra-Afghan dialogue, an impartial transitional mechanism leading to the establishment of a broad-based government in Kabul. The plan was endorsed by all the major actors in the Afghan conflict except three fundamentalist resistance leaders who still believe that jihad (holy war) is the only way to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan. Pakistan (and Iran) moved ahead with the U.N. plan, hoping that as the momentum built up these leaders would not want to be left out of the political settlement.

A broad consensus emerged after two rounds of tripartite talks in Islamabad (July) and Tehran (August) between Pakistan, Iran, and the moderate Afghan resistance groups, including the Iran-based Hizb-i-Wahdat. The "negative symmetry" announced on September 13 by the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the reported assurance by the Soviets to Perez de Cuellar that they would not insist on a role for controversial personalities in the peace process and in the transitional mechanism further brightened prospects for a political settlement. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan, in a BBC interview in September, indicated a time frame of three months for the peace process to be finalized.

The hardliners in the Afghan resistance vitiated, if not derailed the peace process by launching attacks for the capture of Gardez and Jalalabad, but the disunity in their ranks and the Kabul air force turned the attacks into fiascos. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar issued a threat to turn Afghanistan into a Lebanon and to destabilize both Iran and Pakistan if a government of communists and so-called nationalist Afghans was imposed on the Afghan people.10 However, Pakistan remained determined not to allow the peace process to become hostage to any leader's whims and personal ambitions. Peace negotiations between the moderate Afghan resistance leaders and Soviet and Russian authorities continued, first in New York (October) and then in Moscow (November) where an agreement was reached for the transfer of power in Kabul to an interim Islamic government that would hold elections within two years under the aegis of the U.N. and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). A joint commission was named to implement the Moscow accord.

After Afghanistan, the issue that most engaged attention of Islamabad was the bilateral relationship with the United States. For Pakistan, the news from Washington in 1991 was seldom comforting. On October 1, 1990, all U.S. aid, training, and transfer of weapons and technology (except economic aid in the pipeline) were suspended when President Bush did not certify the nuclear virginity of Pakistan as required under the Pressler Amendment. The U.S. charged that Pakistan had raised the enrichment of uranium to weapons grade level, which Pakistan denied. Aid remained on hold until October 1, 1991, when it was finally terminated.

The IJI, during the 1990 election campaign, made U.S. aid suspension a major issue, accusing the PPP of maneuvering the cutoff and generating anti-American sentiment. Anti-U.S. feelings grew during the Gulf War when the Jamaat-i-Islami and other fundamentalist groups took a pro-Iraq stance. Most Americans were evacuated, and for several months the country remained on the list of "unfavorable nations with a tendency toward hostility for the U.S. and its interests." The Nawaz Sharif government tried to contain the damage by implementing all the Security Council resolutions on Iraq and sending 11,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. But an intra- establishment consensus on the Gulf situation was missing. Some statements of the COAS, General Beg, appeared to be supportive and appreciative of Iraq. Because of these divergent voices, Pakistan reaped no rewards for supporting the "allied" cause in the Gulf-such as the massive debt write-offs for Syria and Eqypt, or even the opportunity to buy surplus U.S. military stores that were offered for sale at throwaway prices after the war. To re-establish the channels of communication, the government sent a high-powered delegation to Washington in June 1991, led by Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad. Before the group departed, Nawaz Sharif made two moves. He announced (earlier than usual) the appointment of a new COAS, and in a speech on June 6 he put forth a seven-point plan for an "equitable and non-discriminatory solution of the nuclear proliferation problem in South Asia." In essence, he called for a five-nation conference (Pakistan, India, China, USSR, and U.S.) to deliberate the nuclear and related security issues in the region.

The Wasim delegation met with top-level policy makers, concerned congressional leaders, and media representatives. The meetings helped take the chill out of Pakistan-U.S. relations but could not bridge the gap in perceptions. The Pakistanis were surprised to see the area of American concerns in South Asia widened by the inclusion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the alleged Pakistani intervention in Indian Punjab and Indian-held Kashmir. The unfinished dialogue in Washington was resumed in Islamabad in November. General Joseph P. Hoar, C-in-C of the U.S. Central Command, and Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew held in-depth talks covering the whole range of bilateral relations. Goodwill was expressed by both sides but there was no consensus on basic issues. Pakistanis were irritated by the selective American approach in the region, noting the failure of the U.S. Congress to bring India within the purview of the Pressler Amendment. The high-level negotiations between India and the U.S. on establishing a security arrangement in South Asia were also extensively reported and commented upon in the Pakistani media. Thus, Pakistan-U.S. relations in 1991 were highly strained and marked by suspicion and distrust. Neither side was happy over this steep decline, but both could go only a limited distance to reach an amicable settlement. Bush could not avoid his obligations under the Pressler law and Nawaz Sharif could not fly in the face of public opinion in Pakistan. In a Gallup poll in June, 77% of the respondents favored rejection of American aid rather than giving up the nuclear program, and 87% were in favor of Pakistan making nuclear weapons.-"

Among all the changes at the global and regional levels, what did not change for Pakistan was the adversarial relationship with India. But though tension remained high and the most bloody border clash in recent years took place in the Poonch Sector in September, the two countries managed to check the drift toward war. The Kashmiris' right of self-determination, delimitation of borders in Siachin, construction of the Wullar Barrage on the Jhelum River in Indian-held Kashmir, demarcation of boundaries in Sircreek in the Rann of Kutch, and disarmament issues occupied the Indo-Pak agenda. There was no dearth of the usual accusations and recriminations but the channels of communication were kept open and busy. The two prime ministers met informally twice and reiterated their determination to resolve the issues through bilateral negotiations. Five rounds of foreign secretaries' meetings and two of defense secretaries resulted in agreements or near agreements on all issues except Kashmir and disarmament. "We raise the Kashmir issue every time we meet. The Indians don't respond," complained the foreign secretary. 12 However, dis- armament, including the nuclear issue, was discussed for the first time at the fifth round of talks in October. Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey described India as a "nuclear weapon-capable state," and he asserted that signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not in the interest of India or Pakistan even if China did so. Instead, he wanted the two countries to think of "capping" their nuclear capabilities and taking confidence-building measures.

September-October saw three sets of visits significant for the general thrust of Pakistan's foreign policy-President Ghulam Ishaq Khan went to Iran and Saudi Arabia, PRC President Yang Shangkun visited Pakistan and Iran, and General Asif Nawaz made trips to China and Iran within a few weeks of taking over as COAS. Ishaq Khan, in his address to the Iranian Majlis, expounded the Islamic worldview, stressing the economic integration of the Ummah and resistance to international and regional hegemonism. The Chinese president, in all his speeches in Pakistan, demanded that the new world order be based on equality, justice, and the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Pakistan, China, and Iran-all under pressure from the United States- were reported in the Western media to be moving toward strategic consensus and some sort of a defense pact. No doubt the economic and technological cooperation among these states has made rapid strides in recent years, but to view it as an emerging Beijing-Islamabad-Tehran axis would be to give their cooperation a meaning that was not there. All three were trying to adjust to new trends and new realities of the international political system and to enhance their leverage in it. [3]

• 1991 – Pakistan and India sign the Rail Communication Agreement, also known as the "Samjhauta Express agreement".[4]
• 1991 – Retirement of the famed International Pakistani hockey player, Zahid Shareef.

• 15 January – Rubab Raza, swimmer[8]
• 6 February – Sarah Mahboob Khan.[9]
• 16 March – Hammad Azam, cricketer.
• 25 November – Muhammad Rizwan Jr.[10]

• Mahmood Hussain, cricketer.
• Fazle Haq, army general

• List of Pakistani films of 1991