Albanian nationalism

Group photo of some Prizren League delegates (1878)

Some authors argue that Albanian nationalism, unlike its Greek and Serbian counterparts has its origins in a different historical context that did not emerge from an anti-Ottoman struggle and instead dates to the period of the Eastern Crisis (1878) and threat of territorial partition by Serbs and Greeks,[13] while others hold views that Albanian nationalism emerged earlier as a societal reform movement that turned into a geopolitical one in response to the events of 1878, reacting against both the policies of Ottoman rule and those of rival Balkan nationalisms. Competing with neighbours for contested areas forced Albanians to make their case for nationhood and seek support from European powers.[37] Some scholars disagree with the view that Albanian nationalism emerged in 1878 or argue that the paradigm of setting a specific start date is wrong,[38][39][40] but those events are widely considered a pivotal moment that led to the politicization of the Albanian national movement[14] and the emergence of myths being generated that became part of the mythology of Albanian nationalism that is expressed in contemporary times within Albanian collective culture and memory.[13] That historical context also made the Albanian national movement defensive in outlook as nationalists sought national affirmation and to counter what they viewed as the erosion of national sentiments and language.[41] By the 19th century Albanians were divided into three religious groups. Catholic Albanians had some Albanian ethno-linguistic expression in schooling and church due to Austro-Hungarian protection and Italian clerical patronage.[42] Orthodox Albanians under the Patriarchate of Constantinople had liturgy and schooling in Greek and toward the late Ottoman period mainly identified with Greek national aspirations.[42][43][44][45] Muslim Albanians during this period formed around 70% of the overall Balkan Albanian population in the Ottoman Empire with an estimated population of more than a million.[42]

Just as we are not and do not want to be Turks, so we shall oppose with all our might anyone who would like to turn us into Slavs or Austrians or Greeks, we want to be Albanians.

— Excerpt from the League of Prizren memorandum to the British delegation at the Berlin Congress, 1878, [46]

.

With the rise of the Eastern Crisis, Muslim Albanians became torn between loyalties to the Ottoman state and the emerging Albanian nationalist movement.[48] Islam, the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire were traditionally seen as synonymous in belonging to the wider Muslim community.[10] The Albanian nationalist movement advocated self-determination and strived to achieve socio-political recognition of Albanians as a separate people and language within the state.[49] Albanian nationalism was a movement that began among Albanian intellectuals without popular demand from the wider Albanian population.[50] Geopolitical events pushed Albanian nationalists, many Muslim, to distance themselves from the Ottomans, Islam and the then emerging pan-Islamic Ottomanism of Sultan Abdulhamid II.[49][51][13] During the Russo-Turkish war, the incoming Serb army expelled most of the Muslim Albanian population from the Toplica and Niš regions into Kosovo triggering the emergence of the League of Prizren (1878–1881) as a response to the Eastern crisis.[11][43][52] The League of Prizren was created by a group of Albanian intellectuals to resist partition among neighbouring Balkan states and to assert an Albanian national consciousness by uniting Albanians into a unitary linguistic and cultural nation.[11][43] The Ottoman state briefly supported the league's claims viewing Albanian nationalism as possibly preventing further territorial losses to newly independent Balkan states.[14][53] The geopolitical crisis generated the beginnings of the Rilindja (Albanian National Awakening) period.[11][12] From 1878 onward Albanian nationalists and intellectuals, some who emerged as the first modern Albanian scholars, were preoccupied with overcoming linguistic and cultural differences between Albanian subgroups (Gegs and Tosks) and religious divisions (Muslim and Christians).[11] At that time, these scholars lacked access to many primary sources to construct the idea that Albanians were descendants of Illyrians, while Greater Albania was not considered a priority.[54] Compared with their Balkan counterparts, these Albanian politicians and historians were very moderate and mainly had the goal to attain socio-political recognition and autonomy for Albanians under Ottoman rule.[54][55] Albanians involved in these activities were preoccupied with gathering and identifying evidence, at times inventing facts to justify claims to "prove" the cultural distinctiveness and historical legitimacy of the Albanians in being considered as a nation.[56]

Taking their lead from the Italian national movement, the Arbëresh, (an Albanian diaspora community settled throughout southern Italy from the medieval period) began to promote and spread national ideas by introducing them to Balkan Albanians.[57][58][59][60] Prominent among them were Girolamo de Rada, Giuseppe Schirò and Demetrio Camarda of whom were influenced through literature on Albania by Western scholars and referred within their literary works to Skanderbeg and a pre-Ottoman past, with reference to Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great.[61][57][59] While Muslim (especially Bektashi) Albanians were heavily involved with the Albanian National Awakening producing many figures like Faik Konitza, Ismail Qemali, Midhat Frashëri, Shahin Kolonja and others advocating for Albanian interests and self-determination.[49][62][63][64][65] The Bektashi Sufi order of the late Ottoman period in Southern Albania also played a role during the Albanian National Awakening by cultivating and stimulating Albanian language and culture and was important in the construction of national Albanian ideology.[42][66][67][68][69] Among Catholic Albanian figures involved were Prenk Doçi, Gjergj Fishta and Pashko Vasa who penned the famous poem Oh Albania which called for Albanians overcoming religious divisions through a united Albanianism.[70][51][71] The last stanza of Vasa's poem Feja e shqyptarit asht shqyptarija (The faith of the Albanian is Albanianism) became during the national awakening period and thereafter a catchword for Albanian nationalists.[72][73]

Skanderbeg Monument in Tirana.

Another factor overlaying geopolitical concerns during the National Awakening period were thoughts that Western powers would only favour Christian Balkan states and peoples in the anti Ottoman struggle.[51] During this time Albanian nationalists attempting to gain Great Power sympathies and support conceived of Albanians as a European people who under Skanderbeg resisted Ottoman Turks that later subjugated and cut the Albanians off from Western European civilisation.[51][74] Skanderbeg subliminally presented Albanians as defending Europe from "Asiatic hordes" to western powers and allowed Albanians to develop the myth of Albanian resistance to foreign enemies that threatened the "fatherland" and the unity of the Albanian nation.[74][75] Albanian nationalists needed an episode from medieval history to centre Albanian nationalist mythology upon and chose Skanderbeg in the absence of a medieval kingdom or empire.[76] From the 15th to the 19th century Skanderbeg's fame survived mainly in Western Europe and was based on a perception of Skanderbeg's Albania serving as Antemurale Christianitatis (a barrier state) against "invading Turks".[77][78][79] As a result of Skanderbeg's adaptation as a national hero, Albanians had to turn their back on the Ottoman empire.[74][79] Skanderbeg's Christian identity was avoided and he was presented mainly as a defender of the nation.[74][75] Albanian nationalist writers transformed Skanderbeg's figure and deeds into a mixture of historical facts, truths, half-truths, inventions, and folklore.[80]

In the 19th century Western academia imparted its influence on the emerging Albanian identity construction process by providing tools that were utilised and transformed in certain contexts and toward goals within a changing environment.[58] This differed from the context from which Western authors had originally generated their theories.[58] Albanian nationalists of the period were educated in foreign schools abroad.[81] Some 19th century Western academics examining the issue of Albanian origins promoted the now-discredited theory of Albanian descent from ancient Pelasgians.[82][58] Developed by the Austrian linguist Johann Georg von Hahn in his work Albanesiche Studien (1854) the theory claimed the Pelasgians as the original proto-Albanians and the language spoken by the Pelasgians, Illyrians, Epirotes and ancient Macedonians being closely related.[83][84] This theory quickly attracted support in Albanian circles, as it established a claim of precedence over other Balkan nations, the Slavs and particularly the Greeks.[83][85][84] In addition to generating a "historic right" to territory, this theory also established that ancient Greek civilization and its achievements had an "Albanian" origin.[86]

The Pelasgian theory was adopted among early Albanian publicists and used by Italo-Albanians, Orthodox and Muslim Albanians.[82][87][88][89] Italo-Albanians being of the Greek rite and their culture having strong ecclesiastical Byzantine influence were not in favour of the Illyrian-Albanian continuity hypothesis as it had overtones of being Catholic and hence Italianate.[90] For Italo-Albanians, the origins of the Albanians lay with the Pelasgians, an obscure ancient people that lived during antiquity in parts of Greece and Albania.[91] To validate Albanian claims for cultural and political emancipation, Italo-Albanians maintained that Albanian was the oldest language in the region, even older than Greek.[91] The theory of Pelasgian origins was used by the Greeks to attract and incorporate Albanians into the Greek national project through references to common Pelasgian descent.[82][92] The Pelasgian theory was welcomed by some Albanian intellectuals who had received Greek schooling.[92] For Orthodox Albanians such as Anastas Byku a common ancestry of both Albanians and Greeks through Pelasgian ancestors made both peoples the same and viewed Albanian as a conduit for Hellenisation.[87] For Muslim Albanians like Sami Frashëri Albanians stemmed from the Pelasgians, an older population than Illyrians thereby predating the Greeks making for him the Albanians descendants of Illyrians who themselves originated from Pelasgians.[88][93] Figures originating from the ancient period such as Alexander the Great and Pyrrhus of Epirus were enveloped in myth and claimed as Albanian men of antiquity while Philip II of Macedon, the ancient Macedonians were Pelasgian or Illyrian-Albanian.[94][86]

Albanian writers of the period felt that they had counter arguments that came from the Greek side and from Slavic circles.[95][96] The Greeks claimed that Albanians did not constitute a people, their language was a mixture of different languages and that an Albanian member of the Orthodox church was "really a Greek", while Slav publicists claimed that Kosovar Albanians were "really" Slavs or they were "Turks" who could be "sent back" to Anatolia.[95][96] Apart from Greek nationalism being viewed as a threat to Albanian nationalism, emphasising an antiquity of the Albanian nation served new political contexts and functions during the 1880s.[97] It also arose from the Albanian need to counter Slavic national movements seeking independence from the Ottomans through a Balkan federation.[97] In time the Pelasgian theory was replaced with the Illyrian theory regarding Albanian origins and descent due it being more convincing and supported by some scholars.[98] The Illyrian theory became an important pillar of Albanian nationalism due to its consideration as evidence of Albanian continuity in territories such as Kosovo and the south of Albania contested with the Serbs and Greeks.[98]

Unlike their Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian neighbours who had territorial ambitions, Albanians due to being mainly Muslim lacked a powerful European patron. This made many of them want to preserve the status quo and back Ottomanism.[99] By the early 20th century, Albanian nationalism was advanced by a wide-ranging group of Albanian politicians, intellectuals and exiles.[100] An Albanian emigrant community was present in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the majority being illiterate and individuals like Sotir Peci worked to impart a sense of Albanian nationhood among them encouraging the spread of literacy in Albanian.[101] In 1908, an alphabet congress in Bitola with Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox delegates in attendance agreed to adopt a Latin character-based Albanian alphabet and the move was considered an important step for Albanian unification.[102][103][104][105] Opposition toward the Latin alphabet came from some Albanian Muslims and clerics who with the Ottoman government preferred an Arabic-based Albanian alphabet, due to concerns that a Latin alphabet undermined ties with the Muslim world.[102][103][104] Due to the alphabet matter and other Young Turk policies, relations between Albanian elites and nationalists, many Muslim and Ottoman authorities broke down.[105][99] Though at first Albanian nationalist clubs were not curtailed, the demands for political, cultural and linguistic rights eventually made the Ottomans adopt measures to repress Albanian nationalism which resulted in two Albanian revolts (1910 and 1912) toward the end of Ottoman rule.[106][107][108]

Delegates from the Alphabet Congress of Manastir (1908)

Albanian nationalism during the late Ottoman era was not imbued with separatism that aimed to create an Albanian nation-state, though Albanian nationalists did envisage an independent Greater Albania.[109][110] Albanian nationalists of the late Ottoman period were divided into three groups.[110] Pan-Albanian nationalists, those who wanted to safeguard Albanian autonomy under an Ottoman state and an Albania divided along sectarian lines with an independent Catholic Albania envisaged mainly by Catholics.[110] The emerging Albanian nationalist elite promoted the use of Albanian as a medium of political and intellectual expression.[111] Albanian nationalism overall was a reaction to the gradual breakup of the Ottoman Empire and a response to Balkan and Christian national movements that posed a threat to an Albanian population that was mainly Muslim.[109][112] Efforts were devoted to including vilayets with an Albanian population into a larger unitary Albanian autonomous province within the Ottoman state.[109][108]

Albanian nationalists were mainly focused on defending rights that were sociocultural, historic and linguistic within existing countries without being connected to a particular polity.[109][108] Unlike other Balkan nationalisms religion was seen as an obstacle and Albanian nationalism competed with it and developed an anti clerical outlook.[113][114][115][116] As Albanians lived in an Ottoman millet system that stressed religious identities over other forms of identification, the myth of religious indifference was formed during the National Awakening as a means to overcome internal religious divisions among Albanians.[115][116] Promoted as civil religion of sorts, Albanianism as an idea was developed by Albanian nationalists to downplay established religions such as Christianity and Islam among Albanians while a non-religious Albanian identity was stressed.[117][73][118] Religion did not play a significant role as in other Balkan nationalisms or to mainly become a divisive factor in the formation of Albanian nationalism which resembled Western European nationalisms.[113][114] The Albanian language instead of religion became the primary focus of promoting national unity.[117][119] Albanian National Awakening figures during the late Ottoman period generated vernacular literature in Albanian.[120] Often those works were poems which contained nationalist aspirations and political themes which in part secured support for the Albanian nationalist cause when transformed into narrative songs that spread among the male population of Albanian speaking villagers in the Balkans.[120] Nation building efforts gained momentum after 1900 among the Catholic population by the clergy and members such as craftsmen and traders of the Bektashi and Orthodox community in the south.[55] With a de-emphasis of Islam, the Albanian nationalist movement gained the strong support of two Adriatic sea powers Austria-Hungary and Italy who were concerned about pan-Slavism in the wider Balkans and Anglo-French hegemony purportedly represented through Greece in the area.[121][71]

Imitating Stalinist trends in the Communist Bloc, Albania developed its own version of protochronist ideology, which stressed the national superiority and continuity of Albanians from ancient peoples such as the Illyrians.[190][191][192] Albanian archaeologists were directed by Hoxha (1960s onward) to follow a nationalist agenda that focused on Illyrians and Illyrian-Albanian continuity with studies published on those topics used as communist political propaganda that omitted mention of Pelasgians.[85][193] Emphasising an autochthonous ethnogenesis for Albanians, Hoxha insisted on Albanian linguists and archaeologists to connect Albanian with the extinct Illyrian language.[194] The emerging archeological scene funded and enforced by the communist government stressed that the ancestors of the Albanians ruled over a unified and large territory possessing a unique culture.[194] Toward that endeavour Albanian archaeologists also claimed that ancient Greek poleis, ideas, culture were wholly Illyrian and that a majority of names belonging to the Greek deities stemmed from Illyrian words.[194] Albanian publications and television programs (1960s onward) have taught Albanians to understand themselves as descendants of "Indo-European" Illyrian tribes inhabiting the western Balkans from the second to third millennium while claiming them as the oldest indigenous people in that area and on par with the Greeks.[148] Physical anthropologists also tried to demonstrate that Albanians were biologically different from other Indo-European populations, a hypothesis now refuted by genetic analysis.[194][195]

The communist regime through Albanian nationalism attempted to forge a national identity that transcended and eroded religious and other differences with the aim of forming a unitary Albanian identity.[103][186] The communists promoted the idea that religious feeling, even in a historic context among Albanians was minimal and that instead national sentiment was always important.[196] Albanian communists viewed religion as a societal threat that undermined the cohesiveness of the nation.[103][197][185] Within this context religions like Islam and Christianity were denounced as foreign with Muslim and Christian clergy criticised as being socially backward with the propensity to become agents of other states and undermine Albanian interests.[103][185] Nationalism was also used as a tool by Hoxha during his struggle to break Albania out of the Soviet bloc.[4] Inspired by Pashko Vasa's late 19th century poem for the need to overcome religious differences through Albanian unity, Hoxha took and exploited the stanza "the faith of the Albanians is Albanianism" and implemented it literally as state policy.[103][198][186][199] The communist regime proclaimed that the only religion of the Albanians was Albanianism.[4] In 1967 the communist regime declared Albania the only atheist and non-religious country in the world and banned all forms of religious practice in public.[200][201][202][203][4][113] Within the space of several months the communist regime destroyed 2,169 religious buildings (mosques, churches and other monuments) while Muslim and Christian clergy were imprisoned, persecuted and in some cases killed.[204][205][201]

Within the context of anti-religion policies the communist regime ordered in 1975 mandatory name changes, in particular surnames for citizens in Albania that were deemed "inappropriate" or "offensive from a political, ideological and moral standpoint".[202][206] The regime insisted that parents and children attain non religious names that were derived from Albanian mythological figures, geographical features and newly coined names.[203] These names were often ascribed a supposedly "Illyrian" and pagan origin while given names associated with Islam or Christianity were strongly discouraged.[206] Non-Albanian names were replaced which went alongside the state's variant of Albanian nationalism.[202] These approaches resulted for example in the Albanianisation of toponyms in areas where some Slavic minorities resided through official decree (1966) and of Slavic youth though not outright of the Macedonian community as a whole.[202][207] The communist regime also pursued a nationalistic anti-Greek policy.[208] Greeks in Albania were forced to Albanianise their names and choose ones that did not have ethnic or religious connotations resulting in Greek families giving children different names so as to pass for Albanians in the wider population.[209] Albanian nationalism in the 1980s became an important political factor within the scope of Hoxha's communist doctrines.[210]

Repression of Albanian nationalism and Albanian nationalists by authorities in Belgrade strengthened the independence movement and focused international attention toward the plight of Kosovar Albanians.[241][242] The recentralisation of Yugoslavia was promoted due to events in Kosovo, while Serbian nationalism within cultural institutions and the media gained strength.[243] Expressions of Albanian national identity were perceived as overwhelmingly anti-Yugoslav and increasingly anti-Serb.[244] Within that context Albanian-language education was viewed as threatening Serbian borders and sovereignty and was identified with Albanian nationalism.[244] By 1989 the degree of autonomy that Kosovo had attained within Yugoslavia was rescinded by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosević.[241][245][246] Albanian nationalists created a non-governmental organisation called the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) that also gained many dissatisfied Kosovar Albanian communists who joined its ranks after autonomy was rescinded.[242] It was led by the intellectual Ibrahim Rugova who began a period of pacifist resistance and the league created a parallel form of government and civil society while maintaining as its goal to achieve an independent Kosovo.[247][248][249][250] The Kosovo education system became the place where Serbian and Albanian nationalisms played out their conflict.[251] Serbs asserted control of the education system, while educational opportunities for Albanians became limited as they were excluded from university and schools.[251] This prompted Kosovar Albanians to establish a parallel education system where private homes served as schools.[251] Albanian students became immersed in nationalist culture by learning an Albanian history of Kosovo and were no longer exposed to Yugoslav "Brotherhood and Unity" era principles and to learning the Serbian language.[252]

Logo of the KLA

Kosovar Albanian national identity making unique claims to Kosovo became homogenised during the 1990s and included multiple factors that led to those developments.[253] Of those were Albanian civil disobedience and popular resistance, the creation of a parallel society in opposition to the Serb state and some underground cells initiating conflict which in all was a reaction to Serbian government policies and repression.[253] From the late 1980s onward Islam within the scope of Albanian identity was downplayed by many Kosovar Albanian intellectual and political figures while Christianity was promoted as a Western marker of "European identity".[254] Post-communism, Kosovo Albanians alongside Albanians in Macedonia became the main force steering Albanian nationalism, while Islam did not become a main focal point in articulating Albanian political nationalism.[255] Islam was not a significant factor in the recent political mobilization of Kosovar Albanian Muslims who joined with Catholic Albanians during their struggle against the Serbs.[254] During these years Rugova as elected president by Albanians promoted an Albanian identity that stressed their Europeanness and antiquity, in particular one based on ancient Dardania.[256] With the Kosovo issue sidelined at the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) ending the dissolution of Yugoslavia, more militant and younger voices disillusioned with Rugova's pacifism dominated like the Kosovo Liberation Army (founded 1992) that began attacks against Serbian forces.[257][249][258] The KLA had emerged from the LPRK as many of its members belonged to the political movement.[259] As its founding goal was to unite Albanian inhabited lands in the Balkans into a Greater Albania, the ideological underpinnings of the KLA were overwhelmingly that of Albanian nationalism stressing Albanian culture, ethnicity and nation.[247][260][261] Post-independence, a referendum was held in Albanian majority western North Macedonia for autonomy and binational state federalisation of which some Albanian politicians from Tetovo and Struga declared the Republic of Ilirida (1991-1992) aiming to unite all Yugoslav Albanians into one entity.[262][263][264]

Two Kosovo Liberation Army members (background) with US marine (foreground), 1999

Conflict escalated from 1997 onward due to the Yugoslavian army retaliating with a crackdown in the region resulting in violence and population displacements.[247][265] Myths of first settlement and Illyrian descent served to justify for Kosovar Albanians the independence struggle seen as one to eventually unite Albanian lands into a unitary state recreating the mythical state of Illyicum encompassing contemporary Balkan Albanian inhabited lands.[266] A shootout at the Jashari family compound involving Adem Jashari, a KLA commander and surrounding Yugoslav troops in 1998 resulted in the massacre of most Jashari family members.[267][258] The event became a rallying myth for KLA recruitment regarding armed resistance to Serb forces.[267][258] By 1999 international interest in Kosovo eventuated into war resulting in NATO intervention against Milosević, ethnic cleansing of thousands of Albanians driving them into neighbouring countries with the cessation of conflict marking the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces.[247][268][258] Many people from non-Albanian communities such as the Serbs and Romani fled Kosovo fearing revenge attacks by armed people and returning refugees while others were pressured by the KLA and armed gangs to leave.[269] Post conflict Kosovo was placed under an international United Nations framework with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) overseeing administrative affairs and the UN Kosovo Force (KFOR) dealing with defence.[270]

Due to the legacy of Hoxha's dictatorial and violent regime, Albanians in a post communist environment have rejected Hoxha's version of Albanian nationalism.[271] Instead it has been replaced with a weak form of civic nationalism and regionalism alongside in some instances with a certain anti-nationalism that has inhibited the construction of an Albanian civil society.[271] Post-communist Albanian governments view the tenets of the Albanian National Awakening as being a guiding influence for Albania by placing the nation above sociopolitical and religious differences and steering the country toward Euro-Atlantic integration.[272] Themes and concepts of history from the Zog and later Hoxha era have still continued to be modified and adopted within a post communist environment to fit contemporary Albania's aspirations regarding Europe.[124] Trends from Albanian nationalist historiography composed by scholars during and of the communist era onward linger on that interpret Ottoman rule as being the "yoke" period, akin to other Balkan historiographies.[273] The legacy of understanding history through such dichotomies has remained for a majority of Albanians which for example they view Skanderbeg and the anti-Ottoman forces as "good" while the Ottomans are "bad".[273] The Albanian government depicts Skanderbeg as a leader of the Albanian resistance to the Ottomans and creator of an Albanian centralised state without emphasizing his Christian background.[274] Figures from the Muslim community such as state founder Ismail Qemali is revered by the government and viewed by Albanians as a defender of the nation though their religious background has been sidelined.[274] The figure of Saint Mother Teresa, an Albanian nun known for missionary activities in India has been used for nationalist purposes in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia.[275] Within Albania she is promoted inside and outside Albania by the political elite as an Albanian symbol of the West to enhance the country's international status regarding Euro-Atlantic aspirations and integration.[276]

Within the sphere of Albanian politics, the Illyrians are officially regarded as the ancestors of the Albanians.[277] The Illyrian theory continues to influence Albanian nationalism, scholarship, and archeologists as it is seen as providing some evidence of continuity of an Albanian presence in Kosovo, western Macedonia, and southern Albania, i.e., areas that were subject to ethnic conflicts between Albanians, Serbs, Macedonians, and Greeks.[85][278][148] For some Albanian nationalists claiming descent from Illyrians as the oldest inhabitants of the Western Balkans allows them to assert a "prior claim" to sizeable lands in the Balkans.[148] In the context of the so-called authochtony theory, Albanian scholars reject any resemblances of Mycenaean Greek burial patterns found in Albania during the Late Bronze Age as coincidental or non-existent.[279] Though archaeological and linguistic evidence points that Illyrians had not a homogeneous ethnic entity, even today this is challenged in local scholarship.[280] Greek and Roman figures from antiquity such as Aristotle, Pyrrhus of Epirus, Alexander the Great, and Constantine the Great are also claimed.[281][282][283]

Ismail Kadare, a prominent Albanian novelist, has reflected in his writings themes from nationalistic Albanian historiography about Albanian closeness to ancient Greeks based on Homeric ideals, claiming that the Albanians are more Greek than the Greeks themselves. He has initiated debates on Albanian identity, saying that Albanians are a white people and Islam has been the result of foreign invasions.[284][273]

Rejected by modern scholarship, during the late 1990s and early 2000s the Pelasgian theory has been revived through a series of translated foreign books published on Albania and other related topics and plays an important role in Albanian nationalism today.[285][286] Among them are authors Robert D'Angély, Edwin Everett Jacques, Mathieu Aref and Aristeidis Kollias, whose works have revitalised 19th century ideas about Albanian descent from ancient Pelasgians (shared with the Greeks) and being a European "white race" originating from them alongside many Greek words having an Albanian etymology.[285] In Albania the Pelasgian theory has been used by Albanians in Albania and Albanian immigrants in Greece as a tool to rehabilitate themselves as an ancient and autochthonous population in the Balkans to "prove" the precedence of Albanians over Greeks.[285] The revival of the alternative Pelasgian theory has occurred within the context of post-communist Greek-Albanian relations to generate cultural hegemony and historical precedence over the Greeks and sometimes toward other (historical) European cultures by Albanians.[287][283] Albanian schoolbooks, mainly in relation to language, have also asserted at times that the Illyrians are the heirs of the Pelasgians.[288][289]

Official flag of the Kosovan President designed by Ibrahim Rugova.

The Kosovo war (1999) generated enthusiasm for using the internet among Balkan Albanians and diaspora (Europe and North America) for information and communication between communities separated by borders and geography and cyberspace has increasingly become an ethno-political space where Albanian irredentists promote Greater Albania through content like maps on websites.[290] In post conflict Kosovo Rugova as first president in his drive toward emphasising aspects of statehood spent time researching and pursued an identity management project that centred on ancient Dardania and designed state symbols like the presidential flag for a future independent Kosovo.[291][21][292] Some Kosovar Albanians have referred to Kosovo as Dardania and Rugova at times supported those moves.[21] To define Kosovo as an Albanian area, a toponyms commission (1999) led by Kosovar Albanian academics was established to determine new or alternative names for some settlements, streets, squares and organisations with Slavic origins that underwent a process of Albanisation during this period.[293][294] Those measures have been promoted by sectors of the Kosovar Albanian academic, political, literary and media elite that caused administrative and societal confusion with multiple toponyms being used resulting in sporadic acceptance by wider Kosovar Albanian society.[294]

In Kosovo, Albanians view themselves as being the oldest nation in the Balkans and descendants of the ancient Illyrians with their self-determination struggle being interpreted as one of first settlers in the area fighting against the Slavic Serb "interlopers".[266][20] Serbs are regarded by Albanian nationalists in generalised terms as "Slavs" and view them without historic territorial rights within an expanded Albanian state.[178] In Kosovo, the additional Dardanian-Illyrian theory also exists that claims contemporary Kosovar Albanians as direct descendants of Dardanians, a subgroup of the Illyrian people who inhabited the area in antiquity.[266][21][20] The Dardanians are viewed by Kosovar Albanians as having been Catholics and interpreted as making Albanians historically part of Western civilisation in opposition to the Slavs who are alleged to have taken Catholic churches and converted them into Orthodox ones.[21] The myth has impacted the struggle for Kosovan self-determination from the Serbs in that an independent Kosovo is viewed separate from Albania and as a recovery and recreation of the ancient Dardanian kingdom.[266] Albanian unification has however been interpreted by Kosovar Albanians in the context of reuniting ancient Dardanians into a larger Illyrian whole or modern Albanians of Kosovo into a Greater Albania.[266] The myth has also served to justify expulsion and dispossession of the perceived enemy understood as either temporary or hostile occupiers.[266] A strong link exists in Kosovo for Albanians between nationalist politics and archaeology.[295] Kosovar Albanian archaeologists continue to attempt through archeological excavations and their interpretations to connect Kosovar Albanians with the local ancient Dardanian and Illyrian populations.[296]

In 2004, prolonged negotiations over Kosovo's future status, sociopolitical problems and nationalist sentiments resulted in the Kosovo riots.[297][298] Organised and spontaneous acts of violence and damage by Kosovar Albanians was directed at properties of the Serbs, their churches and the Romani leaving some dead and many displaced.[297] International legal precedents based on territorial sovereignty overriding self-determination were brushed aside in the case of Kosovo when parts of the international community recognised the declaration of Kosovan independence (2008).[299] This was put down to fears that not doing so would result in Albanian nationalism possibly making the situation difficult and worse for the international community in Kosovo had conflict eventuated.[299] Albanian nationalism is viewed in the Balkans as having furthered events in Kosovo which has caused concerns about the phenomenon of nationalism and generated fears among Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Romanians and Bulgarians.[300] The ending of the Kosovo war resulted in the emergence of offshoot guerilla groups and political organisations from the KLA continuing various violent struggles.[301] In the Preševo valley the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac (UÇPMB) fought Serb forces (1999-2001) attempting to unite the area with neighbouring Kosovo with conflict ending in peace talks and greater Albanian rights in Serbia.[302][301] In northern parts of the Republic of Macedonia the National Liberation Army (NLA) fought against Macedonian forces (2001) with conflict ending in peace talks and the signing of the Ohrid Agreement granting greater Albanian rights in Macedonia.[303]

Monument to fallen NLA fighters, Sopot

Post conflict, Albanians in Macedonia have placed new statues of Albanian historical figures like Skanderbeg in Skopje and named schools after such individuals while memorials have been erected for fallen KLA and NLA fighters.[304] Albanian nationalists view Macedonian ethnicity as invented by the Yugoslavs to weaken Serbia, prevent other identities forming and to legitimise the existence of Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia.[305] Macedonians are referred to by (nationalist) Albanians as an ethnic collectivity with the term Shkie (Slavs) that also carries pejorative connotations.[178][306] Albanian nationalists view Macedonians as being without historic territorial rights over areas in Macedonia that would become part of a Greater Albania and lay claim to half of the territory of the republic.[178] In the political sphere Albanian parties maintain secular and nationalistic platforms while supporting the secular framework of the state with an insistence on protecting Islam and the culture of Muslim constituents along with control and interference of Muslim institutions.[307][308][309] Unlike Albania and Kosovo, national identity and Islam are traditionally linked and stronger among Albanians from Macedonia.[254] The status of Albanians being a minority in Macedonia and that most are Muslims have blended national and religious identity in opposition to the Orthodox Slavic Macedonian majority.[254] Some Muslim Albanian establishment figures in Macedonia hold that view that being a good Muslim is synonymous with being Albanian.[307]

Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi (left), U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (centre) and President Fatmir Sejdiu (right) with Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 2009

In post conflict Kosovo KLA fighters have been venerated by Kosovar Albanian society with the publishing of literature such as biographies, the erection of monuments and sponsoring of commemorative events.[310] The exploits of Adem Jashari have been celebrated and turned into legend by former KLA members, some in government, and by Kosovar Albanian society resulting in songs, literature, monuments, memorials with streets and buildings bearing his name across Kosovo.[311][312] In the context of de-emphasising Islam, Kosovar Albanians have shown interest in and referred to Albanian Christian origins and heritage, in particular the Laramans (Kosovan crypto-Catholics) assisted to present Albanians as originally European despite being Muslim.[313] Old Albanian traditions within the Drenica region hailing as a local the medieval Serb figure Miloš Obilić (Albanian: Millosh Kopiliq) who killed Sultan Murad I have been utilised within Kosovo school textbooks and by some Albanian nationalists to claim the knight as an Albanian.[314] Establishing the participation of Albanians at the Battle of Kosovo has been a means for Kosovar Albanians to claim roots of being European and to sideline the historic conversion to Islam.[315] Within the context of the Kosovo battle and nation building, some in government circles and wider Kosovo Albanian society have promoted a narrative of continuous Albanian resistance from medieval until contemporary times to states and peoples considered foreign occupiers.[315] With the declaration of independence (2008), the Kosovo government has promoted the country both internally and internationally as Newborn generating an ideology that attempts to break with the past and establish a democratic multicultural future.[316] Albanian nationalism in Kosovo is secular while Islam is mainly subsumed within the parameters of national and cultural identity that entails at times dominant clan and familial identities.[317] Within the public sphere Islam at times resurfaces to challenge the dominant nationalistic view of Albanians being superficial Muslims however the political sphere remains mainly secular.[254][318]