Āstika and nāstika

A list of six systems or ṣaḍdarśanas (also spelled Sad Darshan) consider Vedas as a reliable source of knowledge and an authoritative source.[19] These are the Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedanta schools of Hinduism, and they are classified as the āstika schools:

1. Nyaya, the school of logic
2. Vaisheshika, the atomist school
3. Samkhya, the enumeration school
4. Yoga, the school of Patañjali (which assumes the metaphysics of Sāṃkhya)
5. Mīmāṃsā, the tradition of Vedic exegesis
6. Vedanta or Uttara Mimāṃsā, the Upaniṣadic tradition.

These are often coupled into three groups for both historical and conceptual reasons: Nyāyá-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and Mimāṃsā-Vedanta.

The main schools of Indian philosophy that reject the Vedas were regarded as heterodox in the tradition:[3]

1. Buddhism
2. Jainism
3. Charvaka
4. Ājīvika
5. Ajñana

The use of the term nāstika to describe Buddhism and Jainism in India is explained by Gavin Flood as follows:

At an early period, during the formation of the Upaniṣads and the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, we must envisage a common heritage of meditation and mental discipline practiced by renouncers with varying affiliations to non-orthodox (Veda-rejecting) and orthodox (Veda-accepting) traditions.... These schools [such as Buddhism and Jainism] are understandably regarded as heterodox (nāstika) by orthodox (āstika) Brahmanism.

— Gavin Flood[20]

Tantric traditions in Hinduism have both āstika and nāstika lines; as Banerji writes in "Tantra in Bengal":

Tantras are ... also divided as āstika or Vedic and nāstika or non-Vedic. In accordance with the predominance of the deity the āstika works are again divided as Śākta, Śaiva, Saura, Gāṇapatya and Vaiṣṇava.

— Banerji[21]

Manusmriti, in verse 2.11, defines Nāstika as those who do not accept "Vedic literature in entirety based on two roots of science of reasoning (Śruti and Smriti)".[5] The 9th century Indian scholar Medhatithi analyzed this definition and stated that Nāstika does not mean someone who says "Vedic literature are untrue", but rather one who says "Vedic literature are immoral". Medhatithi further noted verse 8.309 of Manusmriti, to provide another aspect of the definition of Nāstika as one who believes, "there is no other world, there is no purpose in giving charity, there is no purpose in rituals and the teachings in the Vedic literature."[5]

Manusmriti does not define, or imply a definition for Astika. It is also silent or contradictory on specific rituals such as animal sacrifices, asserting Ahimsa (non-violence, non-injury) is dharma in its verses such as verse 10.63 based on Upanishadic layer of Vedic literature, even though the older layer of Vedic literature mention such sacrifices unlike the later layer of Vedic literature.[22] Indian scholars, such as those from Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vedanta schools, accepted Astika to be those that include Śabda (शब्द; or Aptavacana, testimony of Vedic literature and reliable experts) as a reliable means of epistemology, but they accepted the later ancient layer of the Vedic literature to be superseding the earlier ancient layer.[5]

In contrast to Manusmriti, the 6th century CE Jain scholar and doxographer Haribhadra, provided a different perspective in his writings on Astika and Nāstika. Haribhadra did not consider "reverence for Vedas" as a marker for an Astika. He and other 1st millennium CE Jaina scholars defined Astika as one who "affirms there exists another world, transmigration exists, virtue (punya) exists, vice (paapa) exists."[5][6]

The 7th century scholars Jayaditya and Vamana, in Kasikavrtti of Pāṇini tradition, were silent on the role of or authority of Vedic literature in defining Astika and Nāstika. They state, "Astika is the one who believes there exists another world. The opposite of him is the Nāstika."[5][23]

Similarly the widely studied 2nd–3rd century CE Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, in Chapter 1 verses 60–61 of Ratnāvalī, wrote Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools of Hinduism were Nāstika, along with Jainism, his own school of Buddhism and Pudgalavadins (Vātsīputrīya) school of Buddhism.[24][25]

Astika, in some texts, is defined as those who believe in the existence of Atman (Self), while Nastika being those who deny there is any "Self" in human beings and other living beings.[12][26] All six schools of Hinduism classified as Astika philosophies hold the premise, "Atman exists". Buddhism, in contrast, holds the premise, "Atman does not exist."[27][28] Asanga Tilakaratna translates Astika as 'positivism' and Nastika as 'negativism', with Astika illustrated by Brahmanic traditions who accepted "Self and God exists", while Nastika as those traditions, such as Buddhism, who denied "Self and God exists."[29]

According to G. S. Ghurye, the Jain texts define na+astika as one "denying what exists" or any school of philosophy that denies the existence of the Self.[30] The Vedanta sub-traditions of Hinduism are "astika" because they accept the existence of Self, while Buddhist traditions denying this are referred to as "nastika".[30]

One of the earliest mentions of astika concept in Jain texts is by Manibhadra, who states that an astika is one who "accepts there exist another world (paraloka), transmigration of Self, virtue and vice that affect how a Self journeys through time".[31]

The 5th–6th century Jainism scholar Haribhadra, states Andrew Nicholson, does not mention anything about accepting or rejecting the Vedas or god as a criterion for being an astika or nastika. Instead, Haribhadra explains nastika in the manner of the more ancient Jain scholar Manibhadra, by stating a nastika to be one "who says there is no other worlds, there is no purpose in charity, there is no purpose in offerings".[31] An astika, to Haribhadra, is one who believes that there is a purpose and merit in an ethical life such as ahimsa (non-violence) and ritual actions.[31] This exposition of the word astika and nastika by Haribhadra is similar to one by the Sanskrit grammarian and Hindu scholar Pāṇini in section 4.4.60 of the Astadhyayi.[32]

The 12th century Jaina scholar Hemachandra similarly states, in his text Abithana Chintamani, that a nastika is any philosophy that presumes or argues there is "no virtue and vice."[33]

Nagarjuna, according to Chandradhar Sharma, equates Nastikya to "nihilism".[34]

The 4th century Buddhist scholar Asanga, in Bodhisattva Bhumi, refers to nastika Buddhists as sarvaiva nastika, describing them as who are complete deniers. To Asanga, nastika are those who say "nothing whatsoever exists", and the worst kind of nastika are those who deny all designation and reality.[35] Astika are those who accept merit in and practice a religious life.[35] According to Andrew Nicholson, later Buddhists understood Asanga to be targeting Madhyamaka Buddhism as nastika, while considering his own Yogachara Buddhist tradition to be astika.[35] Initial interpretations of the Buddhist texts with the term astika and nastika, such as those composed by Nagarjuna and Aśvaghoṣa, were interpreted as being directed at the Hindu traditions. However, states John Kelly, most later scholarship considers this as incorrect, and that the astika and nastika terms were directed towards the competing Buddhist traditions and the intended audience of the texts were Buddhist monks debating an array of ideas across various Buddhist traditions.[36]

The charges of being a nastika were serious threat to the social standing of a Buddhist, and could lead to expulsion from Buddhist monastic community. Thus, states Nicholson, the colonial era Indologist definition of astika and nastika schools of Indian philosophy, was based on a narrow study of literature such as a version of Manusmriti, while in truth these terms are more complex and contextually apply within the diverse schools of Indian philosophies.[35]

The most common meaning of astika and nastika, in Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism was the acceptance and adherence to ethical premises, and not textual validity or doctrinal premises, states Nicholson. It is likely that astika was translated as orthodox, and nastika as heterodox, because the early European Indologists carried the baggage of Christian theological traditions and extrapolated their own concepts to Asia, thereby distorting the complexity of Indian traditions and thought.[35]