Battle of Tsushima

On 8 February 1904, destroyers of the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian Far East Fleet anchored in Port Arthur; three ships – two battleships and a cruiser – were damaged in the attack. The Russo-Japanese war had thus begun. Japan's first objective was to secure its lines of communication and supply to the Asian mainland, enabling it to conduct a ground war in Manchuria. To achieve this, it was necessary to neutralize Russian naval power in the Far East. At first, the Russian naval forces remained inactive and did not engage the Japanese, who staged unopposed landings in Korea. The Russians were revitalised by the arrival of Admiral Stepan Makarov and were able to achieve some degree of success against the Japanese, but on 13 April Makarov's flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk, struck a mine and sank; Makarov was among the dead.[6] His successors failed to challenge the Japanese Navy, and the remaining six Russian battleships[lower-alpha 5] and five armoured cruisers [lower-alpha 6] were effectively bottled up in their base at Port Arthur.

By May, the Japanese had landed forces on the Liaodong Peninsula and in August began the siege of the naval station. On 9 August, Admiral Wilgelm Vitgeft, commander of the 1st Pacific Squadron, was ordered to sortie his fleet to Vladivostok,[7] link up with the Squadron stationed there, and then engage the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in a decisive battle.[8] Both squadrons of the Russian Pacific Fleet would ultimately become dispersed during the battles of the Yellow Sea, where Admiral Vitgeft was killed by a salvo strike from the Japanese battleship Asahi on 10 August, and the Ulsan on 14 August 1904. What remained of Russian Pacific naval power would eventually be sunk in Port Arthur in December 1904.[9]

With the inactivity of the First Pacific Squadron after the death of Admiral Makarov and the tightening of the Japanese noose around Port Arthur, the Russians considered sending part of their Baltic Fleet to the Far East. The plan was to relieve Port Arthur by sea, link up with the First Pacific Squadron, overwhelm the Imperial Japanese Navy, and then delay the Japanese advance into Manchuria until Russian reinforcements could arrive via the Trans-Siberian railroad and overwhelm the Japanese land forces in Manchuria. As the situation in the Far East deteriorated, the Tsar (encouraged by his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II),[10] agreed to the formation of the Second Pacific Squadron.[11] This would consist of five divisions of the Baltic Fleet, including 11 of its 13 battleships. The squadron departed the Baltic ports of Reval (Tallinn) and Libau (Liepāja) on 15–16 October 1904 (Rozhestvensky and von Fölkersahm fleets), and the Black Sea port of Odessa on 3 November 1904 (armored cruisers Oleg and Izumrud, auxiliary cruisers Rion and Dnieper under the command of Captain Leonid Dobrotvorsky[12]), numbering 48 ships and auxiliaries.[lower-alpha 7][13]

The Rozhestvensky and von Fölkersahm fleets sailed through Øresund strait into the North Sea. The Russians had heard fictitious reports of Japanese torpedo boats operating in the area and were on high alert. In the Dogger Bank incident, the Russian fleet mistook a group of British fishing trawlers operating near the Dogger Bank at night for hostile Japanese ships. The fleet fired upon the small civilian vessels, killing several British fishermen; one trawler was sunk while another six were damaged.[11] In confusion, the Russians even fired upon two of their own vessels, killing some of their own men. The firing continued for twenty minutes before Rozhestvensky ordered firing to cease; greater loss of life was avoided only because the Russian gunnery was highly inaccurate.[14] The British were outraged by the incident and incredulous that the Russians could mistake a group of fishing trawlers for Japanese warships, thousands of kilometres from the nearest Japanese port. Britain almost entered the war in support of Japan, with whom it had a mutual defense agreement (but was neutral in the war, as their treaty contained a specific exemption for Japanese actions in China and Korea). The Royal Navy sortied and shadowed the Russian fleet until a diplomatic agreement was reached.[11] France, which had hoped to eventually bring the British and Russians together in an anti-German bloc, intervened diplomatically to restrain Britain from declaring war.[11] The Russians were forced to accept responsibility for the incident, compensate the fishermen, and disembark officers who were suspected of misconduct to give evidence to the enquiry.[15][16]

Routes taken by the Russian fleets from the Baltic to the Battle of Tsushima. Dobrotvorsky unit[lower-alpha 7] and Fölkersahm detachment in purple, Rozhestvensky fleet in blue, and Nevogatov's 3rd Pacific Squadron in green.[17]

The draught of the newer battleships, which had proven to be considerably greater than designed,[18] preventing their passage through the Suez Canal[lower-alpha 8] caused the fleet to separate after leaving Tangiers on 3 November 1904. The newer battleships and a few cruisers proceeded around the Cape of Good Hope under the command of Admiral Rozhestvensky while the older battleships and lighter cruisers made their way through the Suez Canal under the command of Admiral von Fölkersahm. They planned to rendezvous in Madagascar, and both sections of the fleet successfully completed this part of the voyage.[21] The longer journey around Africa took a toll on the Russian crews under Rozhestvensky, "who had never experienced such a different climate or such a long time at sea" as "conditions on the ships deteriorated, and disease and respiratory issues killed a number of sailors".[16] The voyage took half a year in rough seas, with difficulty obtaining coal for refueling – as the warships could not legally enter the ports of neutral nations – and the morale of the crews plummeted. The Russians needed 500,000 short tons (450,000 t) of coal and 30 to 40 re-coaling sessions to reach French Indochina (now Vietnam), and coal was provided by 60 colliers from the Hamburg-Amerika Line. By April and May 1905 the reunited fleet had anchored at Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina.[lower-alpha 9][13][22][23]

The Russians had been ordered to break the blockade of Port Arthur, but the battleships in the port were sunk by the Japanese land artillery, and the heavily fortified city/port had already fallen on 2 January just after the Second Pacific Squadron arrived at Nossi Be, Madagascar, before the arrival of the Fölkersahm detachment. The objective was therefore shifted to linking up with the remaining Russian ships stationed in the port of Vladivostok, before bringing the Japanese fleet to battle.[24]

Departure of the Japanese Combined Fleet in the morning of 27 May 1905

Because the Russians wanted to slip undetected into Vladivostok, they approached Japanese waters in radio silence. They steered outside regular shipping channels to reduce the chance of detection. On the night of 26 May 1905 the Russian fleet approached the Tsushima Strait.[30]

In the night, thick fog blanketed the straits, giving the Russians an advantage. At 02:45 on 27 May Japan Standard Time (JST), the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru observed three lights on what appeared to be a vessel on the distant horizon and closed to investigate. These lights were from the Russian hospital ship Orel,[lower-alpha 14] which, in compliance with the rules of war, had continued to burn them.[31] At 04:30, Shinano Maru approached the vessel, noting that she carried no guns and appeared to be an auxiliary. The Orel mistook the Shinano Maru for another Russian vessel and did not attempt to notify the fleet. Instead, she signaled to inform the Japanese ship that there were other Russian vessels nearby. The Shinano Maru then sighted the shapes of ten other Russian ships in the mist.

Wireless telegraphy played an important role from the start. At 04:55, Captain Narikawa of the Shinano Maru sent a message to Admiral Tōgō in Masampo that the "Enemy is in square 203". By 05:00, intercepted radio signals informed the Russians that they had been discovered and that Japanese scouting cruisers were shadowing them. Admiral Tōgō received his message at 05:05, and immediately began to prepare his battle fleet for a sortie.[32]

Routes of the Russian and Japanese fleets on 27–28 May 1905

At 06:34, before departing with the Combined Fleet, Admiral Tōgō wired a confident message to the navy minister in Tokyo:

In response to the warning that enemy ships have been sighted, the Combined Fleet will immediately commence action and attempt to attack and destroy them. Weather today fine but high waves.[33]

The final sentence of this telegram has become famous in Japanese military history, and has been quoted by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe.[34]

The entire Japanese fleet was put to sea, with Tōgō in his flagship Mikasa leading over 40 vessels to meet the Russians. Meanwhile, the shadowing Japanese scouting vessels sent wireless reports every few minutes as to the formation and course of the Russian fleet. There was mist which reduced visibility and the weather was poor. Wireless gave the Japanese an advantage; in his report on the battle, Admiral Tōgō noted the following:

Though a heavy fog covered the sea, making it impossible to observe anything at a distance of over five miles, [through wireless messaging] all the conditions of the enemy were as clear to us, who were 30 or 40 miles distant, as though they had been under our very eyes.[35]

At 13:40, both fleets sighted each other, ready to engage. At around 13:55, Tōgō ordered the hoisting of the Z flag, issuing a predetermined announcement to the entire fleet:

The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.[36]

By 14:45, Tōgō had 'crossed the Russian T'[37] enabling him to fire broadsides, while the Russians could reply only with their forward turrets.[38][39]

Russian battleship Oslyabya, the first warship sunk in the battle

The Russians sailed from south southwest to north northeast; "continuing to a point of intersection which allowed only their bow guns to bear; enabling him [Tōgō] to throw most of the Russian batteries successively out of bearing."[40] The Japanese fleet steamed from northeast to southwest, then Tōgō ordered the fleet to turn in sequence, which enabled his ships to take the same course as the Russians, although risking each battleship consecutively. Although Tōgō's U-turn was successful, Russian gunnery had proven surprisingly good and the flagship Mikasa was hit 15 times in five minutes. Before the end of the engagement, she was struck 15 more times by large calibre shells.[41] Rozhestvensky had only two alternatives, "a charge direct, in line abreast", or to commence "a formal pitched battle."[40] He chose the latter, and at 14:08, the Japanese flagship Mikasa was hit at about 7,000 metres, with the Japanese replying at 6,400 meters. Superior Japanese gunnery then took its toll,[42] with most of the Russian battleships being crippled.

Captain 2nd Rank Vladimir Semenoff, a Russian staff officer aboard the flagship Knyaz Suvorov, said "It seemed impossible even to count the number of projectiles striking us. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one after another. The steel plates and superstructure on the upper decks were torn to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were crumpled up into rings, guns were literally hurled from their mountings. In addition to this, there was the unusually high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst."[43][44]

Ninety minutes into the battle, the first warship to be sunk was the Russian battleship Oslyabya from Rozhestvensky's 2nd Battleship division. This was the first time a modern armoured warship had been sunk by gunfire alone.[45]

A direct hit on the Russian battleship Borodino's magazines by the Japanese battleship Fuji caused her to explode, which sent smoke thousands of metres into the air and trapped all but one[lower-alpha 15] of her crew on board as she sank.[43] Rozhestvensky was knocked out of action by a shell fragment that struck his skull. In the evening, Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov took over command of the Russian fleet. The Russians lost the battleships Knyaz Suvorov, Oslyabya, Imperator Aleksandr III and Borodino. The Japanese ships suffered only light damage.

At night, around 20:00, 21 destroyers and 45 Japanese torpedo boats[lower-alpha 16] were thrown against the Russians.[lower-alpha 17] The destroyers attacked from the vanguard while the torpedo boats attacked from the east and south of the Russian fleet. The Japanese were aggressive, continuing their attacks for three hours without a break; as a result, during the night there were a number of collisions between the small craft and Russian warships. The Russians were now dispersed in small groups trying to break northwards. By 23:00, it appeared that the Russians had vanished, but they revealed their positions to their pursuers by switching on their searchlights – ironically, the searchlights had been turned on to spot the attackers. The old battleship Navarin struck a chained floating mines laid in front and was forced to stop in order not to push the chain forward, inviting other floating mines on the chain in on herself. She was consequently torpedoed four times and sunk. Out of a crew of 622, only three survived, one to be rescued by the Japanese and the other two by a British merchant ship.[47]

The battleship Sissoi Veliky was badly damaged by a torpedo in the stern and was scuttled the next day. Two old armoured cruisers – Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh – were badly damaged, the former by a torpedo hit to the bow, the latter by colliding with a Japanese destroyer. They were both scuttled by their crews the next morning off Tsushima Island, where they headed while taking on water.[48] The night attacks placed a great strain on the Russians, as they lost two battleships and two armoured cruisers, while the Japanese lost only three torpedo boats.[49]

At 05:23 on 28 May, what remained of the Russian fleet was sighted heading northeast. Tōgō's battleships proceeded to surround Nebogatov's remaining squadron south of the island of Takeshima and commenced main battery fire at 12,000 meters.[50] The Russian cruiser Izumrud then turned South and attempted to flee.[1]^: p.116 Realising that his guns were outranged by at least one thousand metres,[lower-alpha 19] and the Japanese battleships had proven on the day before to be faster than his own so that he could not close the distance if he tried, Nebogatov ordered the six ships remaining under his command to surrender.[lower-alpha 20][lower-alpha 21] XGE, an international signal of surrender, was hoisted; however, the Japanese navy continued to fire as they did not have "surrender" in their code books and had to hastily find one that did.[51] Still under heavy fire, Nebogatov then ordered a white table cloth sent up the masthead, but Tōgō, having had a Chinese warship escape him while flying that flag during the 1894 war, did not trust it.

Moreover, his lieutenants found the codebook that included XGE signal and reported that stopping of engines is a requirement for the signal and all the Russian ships were still moving, so he continued firing while the response flag signal "STOP" hoisted.[1]^{: pp.119–120} Nebogatov then ordered St. Andrew's Cross lowered and the Japanese national flag raised on the gaff and all engines stopped.[52] Seeing the Japanese flag raised as the ensign, Tōgō gave the cease-fire and accepted Nebogatov's surrender. Nebogatov surrendered knowing that he could be shot for doing so.[43] He said to his men:

You are young, and it is you who will one day retrieve the honour and glory of the Russian Navy. The lives of the two thousand four hundred men in these ships are more important than mine.[43]

Damaged Oryol[lower-alpha 14] at Maizuru Naval Arsenal[lower-alpha 22]

As an example of the level of damage inflicted on a Russian battleship, Oryol[lower-alpha 14] was hit by five 12-inch, nine 8-inch, 39 six-inch and 21 smaller or unidentified shells.[lower-alpha 23] This damage caused her to list, and the engine ceased to operate when she was being taken by the Japanese navy to First Battle Division home port of Sasebo in Nagasaki after Tōgō accepted the surrender. Cruiser Asama and then battleship Asahi had to tow Oryol, and their destination was changed to the closer Maizuru Naval Arsenal to avoid losing the prize of war.[1]^{: pp.122, 136–141}

The wounded Admiral Rozhestvensky went to the Imperial Japanese Naval Hospital in Sasebo to recover from a head injury caused by shrapnel; there, the victorious Admiral Tōgō visited him personally in plain clothes, comforting him with kind words: "Defeat is a common fate of a soldier. There is nothing to be ashamed of in it. The great point is whether we have performed our duty".[53]

Nebogatov and Rozhestvensky were placed on trial on return to Russia. Rozhestvensky claimed full responsibility for the fiasco and was sentenced to death, but as he had been wounded and unconscious during the last part of the battle, the Tsar commuted his death sentence. Nebogatov, who had surrendered the fleet, was imprisoned for several years and eventually pardoned by the Tsar.

Until the evening of 28 May, isolated Russian ships were pursued by the Japanese until almost all were destroyed or captured. Three Russian warships reached Vladivostok. The cruiser Izumrud, which escaped from the Japanese despite being present at Nebogatov's surrender, was destroyed by her crew after running aground on the Siberian coast.[54]

Admiral Rozhestvensky faced a more combat-experienced battleship admiral in Tōgō Heihachirō. Admiral Tōgō had already killed two Russian admirals: Stepan Makarov outside of Port Arthur in the battleship Petropavlovsk in April 1904, then Wilgelm Vitgeft in his battleship Tsesarevich in August of the same year. Before those two deaths, Tōgō had chased Admiral Oskar Starck, also flying his flag in the Petropavlovsk, off the battlefield. Admiral Tōgō and his men had two battleship fleet action experiences, which amounted to over four hours of combat experience in battleship-to-battleship combat at Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea.[55] The Japanese fleets had practiced gunnery extensively since the beginning of the war, using sub-calibre practice guns[lower-alpha 24] mounted in their larger guns.[lower-alpha 25][lower-alpha 26][lower-alpha 27]

In contrast, Russian battleship Borodino underwent sea trials from 23 August to 13 September 1904[52] as a brand new ship upon her completion,[58] and the new crew did not have much time for training before she set sail for the Pacific on 15 October 1904. Borodino's sister ship, Knyaz Suvorov started trials on 9 August, Oryol[lower-alpha 14] started trials the latest on 10 September 1904, leaving Imperator Aleksandr III (the trials finished in October 1903) as the only Borodino-class ship actually ready for deployment.[52][lower-alpha 28] As the Imperial Russian Navy planned on building 10 Borodino-class battleships (5 were ultimately built) with the requirement for thousands of additional crewmen, the basic training, quality and experience of the crew and cadets were far lower[59] than those onboard the battleships in the seasoned Pacific Fleet.[60]

1899 ad in The Mail and Express of New York

The Imperial Russian Admiralty Council (Адмиралтейств-совет) and the rest of the Admiralty were quite aware of this disadvantage, and opposed the October dispatch plan for the following reasons:

1. The Japanese navy has completed the battle preparations with all the crew having some combat experience.

2. The long voyage is mostly through extreme tropical weather, so meaningful training is practically impossible on the way.

3. Therefore, the newly created Second Pacific Fleet should conduct training in the Baltic until the next spring while waiting for the rigging of another battleship, Slava,[lower-alpha 29] and the purchase of Chilean and Argentine warships.[lower-alpha 30][52]

However, at the council in the imperial presence on 23 August 1904 held at the Peterhof Grand Palace, this opinion was overruled by Admiral Rozhestvensky (Commander in Chief of the Fleet), Navy Minister Avellan, and Tsar Nicholas II; for it was deemed impossible to re-arrange the massive coaling for the long voyage if the navy broke the contract that was already signed with Hamburg-American Steamship Line of Germany.[52]

Up to the Battle of the Yellow Sea on 10 August 1904, naval guns were controlled locally by a gunnery officer assigned to that gun or a turret. He specified the elevation and deflection figures, gave the firing order while keeping his eyes on the inclinometers indicating the rolling and pitching angles of the ship, received the fall of shot observation report from the spotter on the mast, calculated the new elevation and deflection to 'walk' the shots in on the target for the next round, without much means to discern or measure the movements of his own ship and the target. He typically had a view on the horizon, but with the new 12-inch gun's range extended to over 8 miles (13 km), his vantage point was lower than desired.[lower-alpha 31]

In the months before the battle, the Chief Gunnery Officer of Asahi, Lieutenant Commander Katō Hiroharu, aided by a Royal Navy advisor who introduced him to the use of the early mechanical computer Dumaresq in fire control, introduced a system for centrally issuing the gun-laying and salvo-firing orders. Using a central system allowed the spotter to identify a salvo of distant shell splashes much more effectively than trying to identify a single splash among the many in the confusion of fleet-to-fleet combat.[62] Further, the spotter needed to keep track of just one firing at a time as opposed to multiple shots on multiple stopwatches, in addition to having to report to just one officer on the bridge. The 'director' officer on the bridge had the advantage of having a higher vantage point than in the gun turrets, in addition to being steps away from the ship commander giving orders to change the course and the speed in response to the incoming reports on target movements.

This fire control director system was introduced to other ships in the fleet with Katō being promoted to the Chief Gunnery Officer of the fleet flagship Mikasa in March 1905.[63] The training and practice on this system were carried out in the months waiting for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet[62][lower-alpha 26][lower-alpha 25] while its progress was reported by the British intelligence from their naval stations at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden (Yemen), Cape of Good Hope, Trincomalee (Ceylon), Singapore and Hong Kong, among other locations.[64]

As a result, Japanese fire was more accurate in the far range (3 to 8 miles or 5 to 13 kilometres), on top of the advantage they held in the shorter distances using the latest 1903 issue Barr and Stroud FA3 coincidence rangefinders of baselength 5 ft (1.5 m),[lower-alpha 32] which had a range of 6,000 yards (5,500 m), while the Russian battleships were equipped with Liuzhol stadiametric rangefinders from the 1880s (except battleships Oslyabya and Navarin, which had the Barr and Stroud 1895 issue FA2 of baselength 4.5 ft (1.4 m) retrofitted), which only had a range of about 4,400 yards (4,000 m).[65]

The wireless telegraph (radio) had been invented during the last half of the 1890s, and by the turn of the century nearly all major navies were adopting this improved communications technology. Tsushima was "the first major sea battle in which wireless played any role whatsoever".[66][67]

Lieutenant Akiyama Saneyuki (who was the key staff to Admiral Tōgō in formulating plans and directives before and during the battle as a Commander, who also went aboard Nikolai I to accompany Admiral Nebogatov to Mikasa for a formal meeting with Tōgō) had been sent to the United States as a naval attaché in 1897. He witnessed firsthand the capabilities of radio telegraphy and sent a memo to the Navy Ministry urging that they push ahead as rapidly as possible to acquire the new technology.[67] The ministry became heavily interested in the technology; however it found the Marconi wireless system, which was then operating with the Royal Navy, to be exceedingly expensive. The Japanese therefore decided to create their own radio sets by setting up a radio research committee under Professor Kimura Shunkichi,[lower-alpha 33] which eventually produced an acceptable system. In 1901, having attained radio transmissions of up to 70 miles (110 km), the Navy formally adopted radio telegraphy. Two years later, a laboratory, a factory, and a radio communication school were set up at Yokosuka Naval Arsenal to produce the Type 36 (1903) radios, and these were quickly installed on every major warship in the Combined Fleet by the time the war started.[67]

Alexander Stepanovich Popov of the Naval Warfare Institute had built and demonstrated a wireless telegraphy set in 1900. However, technology improvement and production in the Russian empire lagged those of Germany, and "System Slaby-Arco",[lower-alpha 34][68] originally made by Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) and then produced in volume by its successor radio maker Telefunken in Germany (by 1904, this system was in wide use by Kaiserliche Marine) was adopted by the Imperial Russian Navy. Although both sides had early wireless telegraphy, the Russians were using German sets tuned and maintained by German technicians half-way into the voyage,[19] while the Japanese had the advantage of using their own equipment maintained and operated by their own navy specialists trained at the Yokosuka school.

The United Kingdom assisted Japan by manufacturing guns[lower-alpha 35] and building battleships for the IJN.[69] The UK also assisted Japan in intelligence, finance, technology, training and other aspects of the war against Russia. At the time, Britain owned and controlled more harbor facilities around the world – specifically shipyards and coaling stations – than Russia and its allies (France, and to some extent Germany) combined. The UK also obstructed, where possible, Russian attempts to purchase ships and coal.[64]

At the end of the Argentine-Chilean naval arms race in 1903, two Chilean-ordered and British-built battleships (then called Constitución and Libertad) and two Argentine-ordered, Italian-built cruisers (then called Bernardino Rivadavia and Mariano Moreno) were offered to Russia and the purchase was about to be finalized.[70] Britain stepped in as the mediator of Pacts of May that ended the race, bought the Chilean battleships (which became HMS Swiftsure and HMS Triumph), and brokered the sale of Argentine cruisers to Japan. This support not only limited the growth of the Imperial Russian Navy, but also helped IJN in obtaining the Italian-built cruisers (IJN Kasuga and Nisshin) with the latest armour design that enabled IJN to use the cruisers in the main line of battle along with the heavier-armoured battleships.[71][lower-alpha 36]

Also, this support created a major logistics problem for around the world deployment of the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific in procuring coal and supplies on the way.[72][73] At Nosy Be in Madagascar and at Camranh Bay, French Indochina, the fleet was forced to be anchored for about two months each, seriously degrading morale of the crew. By the time it reached the Sea of Japan after crossing the warm waters of the equator twice, the hulls of all the ships in the fleet were heavily fouled in addition to carrying the extra coal otherwise not required on deck.[74][lower-alpha 9]

The Japanese ships, on the other hand, were well maintained in the ample time given by the intelligence. For example, battleship Asahi was under repair from November 1904 to April 1905 at Sasebo for two 12-inch guns lost and serious damage to the hull from striking a mine. They were divided into battle divisions of as much uniform speed and gun range so that a fleet would not suffer a bottleneck in speed, and the range of guns would not render some ships useless within a group in extended-range combat.[75][lower-alpha 2]

The Japanese used mostly high-explosive shells filled with Shimose powder, which was a pure picric acid (as opposed to the French Melinite or the British Lyddite, which were picric acid mixed with collodion (French) or with dinitrobenzene and vaseline (British) for stability).[76] Engineer Shimose Masachika (1860–1911) solved the instability problem of picric acid on contact with iron and other heavy metals by coating the inside of a shell with unpigmented Japanese lacquer and further sealing with wax.[77] Because it was undiluted, Shimose powder had a stronger power in terms of detonation velocity and temperature than other high explosives at the time.[76] These shells had a sensitive Ijuin fuse[78] (named after Vice Admiral Ijuin Gorō[lower-alpha 37]) at the base as opposed to the tip of a shell that armed itself when the shell was spun by the rifling. These fuses were designed to explode on contact and wreck the upper structure of ships.[lower-alpha 38][81] The Japanese Navy imported cordite from Great Britain as the smokeless propellant for these Shimose shells,[76] so that the smoke off the muzzle would not impede the visibility for the spotters.

In the early 1890s, Vice Admiral Stepan O. Makarov, then the Chief Inspector of Russian naval artillery, proposed a new 12-inch gun design, and assigned a junior officer, Semyon V. Panpushko, to research the use of picric acid as the explosive in the shell. However, Panpushko was blown into pieces in an accidental explosion in experiment due to the instability.[lower-alpha 39] Consequently, high explosive shells remained unreachable for the Russian Navy at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and the navy continued to use the older armour-piercing rounds with guncotton (Nitrocellulose, Pyroxylin) bursting charges and the insensitive delayed-detonation fuses. They mostly used brown powder or black powder as the propellant, except Sissoi Veliky and the four Borodino-class ships that used smokeless gunpowder for the main 12-inch guns.[82]

As a result, Japanese hits caused more damage to Russian ships than Russian hits on Japanese ships. Shimose blasts often set the superstructure, the paintwork and the large quantities of coal stored on the decks on fire,[72] and the sight of the spotters on Russian ships was hindered by the large amount of smoke generated by the propellant on each uncoordinated firing.[lower-alpha 40] Moreover, the sensitivity difference of the fuse caused the Japanese off-the-target shells to explode upon falling on the water creating a much larger splash that sent destabilizing waves to Russian inclinometers,[lower-alpha 41] as opposed to the Russian shells not detonating upon falling on the water.[lower-alpha 42] This made an additional difference in the aforementioned shot accuracy by aiding the Japanese spotters to make an easier identification in fall of shot observation.

The Makarov proposal resulted in Model 1895 12-inch gun that extended the range of the previous Model 1886 12-inch Krupp guns (installed on Imperator Nikolai I and Navarin) from 5–6 km to 11 km (at 15-degrees elevation) at the expense of significantly limited amount of explosives that can be contained in the 332 kg (732 lb) shell.[83][lower-alpha 43] Reload time was also improved from 2–4 minutes previously to a rated 90 seconds, but in reality, it was 2.5–3 minutes.[86] These guns were installed to Sissoi Veliky and the four Borodino-class ships.[82]

The four Japanese battleships, Mikasa, Shikishima, Fuji and Asahi, had the latest Armstrong 12-inch 40-calibre naval gun designed and manufactured by Sir W.G. Armstrong & Company ahead of its acceptance by the Royal Navy in the UK. These British-built 12-inch guns had a range of 15,000 yards (14 km) at 15-degrees elevation and the rate of fire at 60 seconds with a heavier 850 lb (390 kg) shell.[87] One of the reasons for the Royal Navy's late adoption of this type of gun was the accidental shell explosions in the barrel Japanese battleships experienced up to the Battle of the Yellow Sea in August 1904, which were diagnosed and almost rectified[lower-alpha 44] by the Japanese Navy with the use of aforementioned Ijuin Fuse[78] by the time of this battle.

The Russian fleet had 20 of the 1895-issue longer range 12" guns on five battleships compared to 16 of the Armstrong 12" guns on four battleships for the Japanese. Statistically, this 20% advantage in the number of guns was much more than offset by the 60% disadvantage in the rate of fire difference of one shot in 2.5 minutes versus one minute. The range difference of 11 km versus 14 km translated into a flatter trajectory (smaller elevation and fall angle) for the Japanese shells, which resulted in a considerably better hit rate for the Japanese shots[lower-alpha 45] when both sides had an equal distance facing each other in 11 km and shorter range.[lower-alpha 47]

Source:[88]

Heavy damage to Oryol[lower-alpha 14]

Oryol[lower-alpha 14] port side damage

Light damage to Imperator Nikolai I.

The wreck of the cruiser Izumrud off St. Vladimir Bay

Battle damage to the cruiser Zhemchug, with shell hole in the stack

Battle damage to the cruiser Oleg

Damage to the cruiser Oleg, in Manila Bay

Battle damage to the cruiser Aurora

The Russian cruiser Almaz (imperial yacht) and two torpedo boat destroyers Grozniy and Braviy reached Vladivostok.[111] Protected cruisers, Aurora, Zhemchug, and Oleg, escaped to the U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay in the Philippines, and were interned.[112] Destroyer Bodriy, ammunition ship Koreya, transports Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Kuronia, Voronezh, Livonia and Meteor as well as ocean tug Svir were interned in Shanghai. Auxiliary cruisers Rion and Dniepr[113] eventually reached back home after some raiding activities in the Yellow Sea. Auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were interned at Batavia in Dutch East Indies by the Netherlands. Auxiliary Anadyr escaped to Madagascar. Hospital ships Orel[lower-alpha 14] and Kostroma were captured by the Japanese. Kostroma was later released.[lower-alpha 63]

Battle damage to the cruiser Nisshin

Total Russian personnel losses were 216 officers and 4,614 men killed; with 278 officers and 5,629 men taken as Prisoners Of War (POW). Interned in neutral ports were 79 officers and 1,783 men. Escaping to Vladivostok and Diego-Suarez were 62 officers and 1,165 men. Japanese personnel losses were 117 officers and men killed and 583 officers and men wounded.[111]

The battle was humiliating for Russia, which lost all its battleships and most of its cruisers and destroyers. The battle effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's favour. The Russians lost 4,380 killed and 5,917 captured with a further 1,862 interned.[53] Two admirals, Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov, were captured by the Japanese Navy. The second in command of the fleet, Rear Admiral Dmitry Gustavovich von Fölkersahm, after suffering a cerebral hemorrhage on 16 April, died in the night of 24 May 1905 onboard battleship Oslyabya.[52] Vice Admiral Oskar Enqvist fled to Manila onboard cruiser Oleg and was interned by the United States.

The Russians lost eleven battleships, including three smaller coastal battleships, either sunk or captured by the Japanese, or scuttled by their crews to prevent capture. Four were lost to enemy action during the daylight battle on 27 May: Knyaz Suvorov, Imperator Aleksandr III, Borodino and Oslyabya. Navarin was lost during the night action on 27–28 May, while the Sissoi Veliky and Admiral Ushakov[112] were either scuttled or sunk the next day. Four other battleships, under Rear Admiral Nebogatov, were forced to surrender and would end up as prizes of war. This group consisted of only one modern battleship, Oryol, along with the old battleship Imperator Nikolai I and two small coastal battleships General-Admiral Apraksin and Admiral Seniavin.[112]

The Russian Navy lost five of its nine cruisers during the battle, three more were interned by the Americans, with just one reaching Vladivostok. Vladimir Monomakh and Svetlana were sunk the next day after the daylight battle. The cruiser Dmitrii Donskoi fought against six Japanese cruisers and survived; however, she was scuttled on 29 May 1905 due to heavy damage. Izumrud ran aground on the Siberian coast.[112] Three Russian protected cruisers, Aurora, Zhemchug, and Oleg, escaped to the U.S. naval base at Manila[112] in the then-American-controlled Philippines where they were interned, as the United States was neutral. The armed yacht (classified as a cruiser) Almaz, alone was able to reach Vladivostok.[124]

Imperial Russia also lost six of its nine destroyers in the battle, had one interned by the Chinese, and the other two reached Vladivostok. Buyniy ("Буйный"), Bezuprechniy ("Безупречный"), Gromkiy ("Громкий") and Blestyashchiy ("Блестящий") were sunk on 27 May. Bistriy ("Быстрый") ran aground and was destroyed by her crew the next day. Byedoviy ("Бедовый") surrendered also on 28 May. Bodriy ("Бодрый") was interned in Shanghai; Grozniy ("Грозный") and Braviy ("Бравый") reached Vladivostok.[125]

Of the auxiliaries, repair ship Kamchatka, auxiliary cruiser Ural and ocean tug Rus were sunk on 27 May, supply ship Irtysh was disabled, abandoned and then sank on 29 May. Ammunition ship Koreya and ocean tug Svir reached Shanghai and were interned. After being ordered to separate from the fleet on May 8–9, auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were interned at Batavia in Dutch East Indies by the Netherlands on 9 June 1905 after raiding a British and a Danish steamer destined for Japan. Transports Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Kuronia, Voronezh, Livonia and Meteor were detached from the fleet on 25 May and had been interned in Shanghai. Auxiliary cruisers Rion and Dniepr[113] escorted the transports to Shanghai, engaged in commerce raiding activities in the Yellow Sea, and returned to Kronstadt on 31 July 1905.[126] Transport Anadyr escaped to Madagascar and then returned home. The hospital ships Orel and Kostroma were captured during the battle; Kostroma was released afterward.[lower-alpha 63]

The Japanese lost three torpedo boats (Nos. 34, 35 and 69). Total casualty of 117 men killed and 500 wounded.[53]

Imperial Russia's prestige was badly damaged and the defeat was a blow to the Romanov dynasty. Most of the Russian fleet was lost; the fast armed yacht Almaz (classified as a cruiser of the 2nd rank) and the destroyers Grozny and Bravy were the only Russian ships to reach Vladivostok.[124] In The Guns of August, the American historian and author Barbara Tuchman argued that because Russia's loss destabilized the balance of power in Europe, it emboldened the Central Powers and contributed to their decision to go to war in 1914.[127]

The battle had a profound cultural and political impact on the world. It was the first defeat of a European power by an Asian nation in the modern era.[128][129] It also heightened the alarm of "The Yellow Peril" as well as weakening the notion of white superiority that was prevalent in some Western countries.[130][131] Mahatma Gandhi (India), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Turkey), Sun Yat-sen (China) and Jawaharlal Nehru (India) were amongst the future national leaders to celebrate this defeat of a colonial power.[132] The victory established Japan as the sixth greatest naval power[133] while the Russian navy declined to one barely stronger than that of Austria-Hungary.[133]

In The Guinness Book of Decisive Battles, the British historian Geoffrey Regan argues that the victory bolstered Japan's increasingly aggressive political and military establishment. According to Regan, the lopsided Japanese victory at Tsushima:

...created a legend that was to haunt Japan's leaders for forty years. A British admiral once said, 'It takes three years to build a ship, but 300 years to build a tradition.' Japan thought that the victory had completed this task in a matter of a few years ... It had all been too easy. Looking at Tōgō's victory over one of the world's great powers convinced some Japanese military men that with more ships, and bigger and better ones, similar victories could be won throughout the Pacific. Perhaps no power could resist the Japanese navy, not even Britain and the United States.[53]

Regan also believes the victory contributed to the Japanese road to later disaster, "because the result was so misleading. Certainly the Japanese navy had performed well, but its opponents had been weak, and it was not invincible... Tōgō's victory [helped] set Japan on a path that would eventually lead her" to the Second World War.[53]

Takano Isoroku, the future Japanese admiral Yamamoto Isoroku who would plan the attack on Pearl Harbor and command the Imperial Japanese Navy through much of the Second World War, served as a junior officer (aboard Nisshin) during the battle and was wounded and lost two fingers by an accidental explosion of an 8-inch shell in a forward gun. Had he lost a third, he would have been medically discharged from the IJN.

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, countries constructed their battleships with mixed batteries of mainly 6-inch (152 mm), 8-inch (203 mm), 10-inch (254 mm) and 12-inch (305 mm) guns, with the intent that these battleships fight on the battle line in a close-quarter, decisive fleet action. The Battle of Tsushima conclusively demonstrated that faster battleships and big guns[134] with longer ranges were superior to batteries of mixed-size guns.[135]

Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Jackie Fisher, reasoned that the Japanese victory at Tsushima confirmed the importance of large guns and speed for modern battleships.[136][137] While Captain William Pakenham of the British Royal Navy, who had been present aboard the Japanese battleship Asahi as an official observer during the Tsushima Battle, "famously remarked...the effect of the fire of every gun is so much less than that of the next larger size, that when 12in guns are firing, shots from 10in pass unnoticed...everything in this war has tended to emphasize the vast importance to a ship, at every stage of her career, of carrying some of the heaviest and furthest shooting guns that can be got into her."[138] In October 1905 the British started the construction of HMS Dreadnought, which marked the beginning of a naval arms race between Britain and Germany in the years before 1914.[139]

The battle also accelerated the naval arms race on a geopolitical level; though the Anglo-German naval arms race had begun in 1897, the collapse of Russian naval power in 1905 allowed Britain to send the bulk of its naval forces to other regions, reassured by the naval superiority of its ally Japan in the Far East. In turn, the presence of a larger British fleet in Europe meant that the Germans must build a proportionally larger fleet to maintain the same relative power, in accordance with Tirpitz' fleet in being principle. The Royal Navy, in turn, must increase its fleet size to maintain the relative power as set out by its two-power standard. This positive feedback meant that any external increase in the regional naval power of one side – in this case, the British – would precipitate not just a proportional increase in naval power from the opposing side, but rather a mutual multi-stage build-up in naval power on both sides, before settling to a higher equilibrium. Ultimately, the Germans passed three of its five Fleet Acts after Tsushima within a span of 6 years.[140]

Upon the breakout of World War I, the British and Germans were both aware of the potentially devastating consequences of a naval defeat on the scale of Tsushima. Britain needed its battle fleet to protect its empire, and the trade routes vital to its war effort. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, described British Admiral John Jellicoe as "the only man who on either side could lose the war in an afternoon."[141] German naval commanders, for their part, understood the importance Kaiser Wilhelm II attached to his navy and the diplomatic prestige it carried. As a result of caution, the British and German fleets met in only one major action in World War I, the indecisive Battle of Jutland.[142]