Biotechnology risk

The following are potential health risks related to the consumption of GMOs.

The expected outcomes of the transferred gene construct may differ due to gene interactions. It has been hypothesized that genetic modification can potentially cause changes in metabolism, though results are conflicting in animal studies.[8]

GM crops require lower amounts of pesticide compared to non-GM crops.[9][10][11] Because some pesticides' main component is glyphosate, the lower amounts of pesticides needed on GM crops may reduce the risk of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in workers who handle raw GM products.[12][13]

Allergenic potential is the potential to elicit an allergic reaction in already sensitized consumers. A particular gene that has been added to a GM crop possibly can create new allergens, and constant exposure to a particular protein allergen may have resulted in developing new allergies. This is not related directly to the use of GM technology; but since no test can predict allergenicity, it is highly possible that the new proteins or their interactions with usual proteins could produce new allergies.[7]

Horizontal gene transfer is any process by which an organism acquires genetic material from a second organism without descending from it. In contrast, the vertical transfer is when an organism acquires genetic material from its ancestors (i.e., its parents). HGT is the transfer of DNA between cells of the same generation. Humans and animals have been in contact with "foreign DNA". In humans, DNA has absorbed through food daily through fragments of plant and animal genes and bacterial DNA.

Theoretically, antibiotic resistance can occur by consuming genetically modified plants. Genes can be transferred to bacteria in the human gastrointestinal tract and develop resistance to that specific antibiotic. Considering this risk factor, more research is needed.[7]

Pathogens may be intentionally or unintentionally genetically modified to change their characteristics, including virulence or toxicity.[2] When intentional, these mutations can serve to adapt the pathogen to a laboratory setting, understand the mechanism of transmission or pathogenesis, or in the development of therapeutics. Such mutations have also been used in the development of biological weapons, and dual-use risk continues to be a concern in the research of pathogens.[14] The greatest concern is frequently associated with gain-of-function mutations, which confer novel or increased functionality, and the risk of their release. Gain-of-function research on viruses has been occurring since the 1970s, and came to notoriety after influenza vaccines were serially passed through animal hosts.

A group of Australian researchers unintentionally changed characteristics of the mousepox virus while trying to develop a virus to sterilize rodents as a means of biological pest control.[2][15][16] The modified virus became highly lethal even in vaccinated and naturally resistant mice.[17]

In 2011, two laboratories published reports of mutational screens of avian influenza viruses, identifying variants which become transmissible through the air between ferrets. These viruses seem to overcome an obstacle which limits the global impact of natural H5N1.[18][19] In 2012, scientists further screened point mutations of the H5N1 virus genome to identify mutations which allowed airborne spread.[20][21] While the stated goal of this research was to improve surveillance and prepare for influenza viruses which are of particular risk in causing a pandemic,[22] there was significant concern that the laboratory strains themselves could escape.[23] Marc Lipsitch and Alison P. Galvani coauthored a paper in PLoS Medicine arguing that experiments in which scientists manipulate bird influenza viruses to make them transmissible in mammals deserve more intense scrutiny as to whether or not their risks outweigh their benefits.[24] Lipsitch also described influenza as the most frightening "potential pandemic pathogen".[25]

In 2014, the United States instituted a moratorium on gain-of-function research into influenza, MERS, and SARS.[26] This was in response to the particular risks these airborne pathogens pose. However, many scientists opposed the moratorium, arguing that this limited their ability to develop antiviral therapies.[27] The scientists argued gain-of-function mutations were necessary, such as adapting MERS to laboratory mice so it could be studied.

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity also has instituted rules for research proposals using gain-of-function research of concern.[28] The rules outline how experiments are to be evaluated for risks, safety measures, and potential benefits; prior to funding.

In order to limit access to minimize the risk of easy access to genetic material from pathogens, including viruses, the members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium screen orders for regulated pathogen and other dangerous sequences.[29] Orders for pathogenic or dangerous DNA are verified for customer identity, barring customers on governmental watch lists, and only to institutions "demonstrably engaged in legitimate research".