Communist Youth League of China

Founded in May 1920, it was originally named as the Socialist Youth League of China.[3]^: 17 While the CCP was officially established in July 1921, the Chinese Socialist Youth League was organized prior to the CCP's establishment. In May 1922, the 1st National Congress (simplified Chinese: 全国代表大会; traditional Chinese: 全國代表大會; pinyin: Quánguó Dàibiǎo Dàhuì) of the League was held under the leadership of the CCP,[3]^: 17 and therefore became a unified organization in China. In the 3rd National Congress in January 1925, the Chinese Socialist Youth League was renamed as the Chinese Communist Youth League. After the Second Sino-Japanese War, in order to adapt to the new social and political situation, it was officially renamed as the Chinese New Democracy Youth League in April 1949.

Later in May 1957, its name as the Chinese Communist Youth League was resumed, historically combining the congresses of all three leagues (the Chinese Socialist Youth League, the Chinese Communist Youth League as well as the Chinese New Democracy Youth League).

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the CYLC was a major mass organization which had an important role in political mobilization and implementing party-state policies.[3]^: 17 During the Cultural Revolution, the CYLC was accused of revisionism and stopped operating in 1966.[3]^: 17 Various local CYLC operations began resuming after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the CYLC was resumed national operations in 1978.[3]^: 17

Following the Mao era, the CYLC has been a major path to CCP membership.[3]^: 21 This became especially true after the 1982 establishment of the "Recommendation of Outstanding CYL Members" system, which emphasized that those under the age of 28 who wish to join the CCP should be recommended by the CYLC.[3]^: 21

In 1988, reformist Chinese policymakers proposed a project to loosen CCP control of the CYLC and make the organization more independent.[3]^: 18 However, CCP leadership set aside the reform proposal following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.[3]^: 18

Also in the late 1980s and in an attempt to increase the relevance of the CYLC and make it more "responsive",[4] the CYLC diversified its activities, beginning to organize classes for CCP applicants and hosting leisure activities in addition to the CYLC's political activities.[3]^: 37–38 Along with university student unions, the CYLC began hosting on-campus cultural activities like singing, poetry, and sports competitions.[3]^: 38 In 1989, the CYLC's central body organized a national "challenge cup" science competition, which was later also adopted by various universities.[3]^: 38

After the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, community service activities expanded in the 1990s.[3]^: 38 In 1993, the CYLC started The Young Volunteers Operation.[3]^: 18 Through this program, the CYLC has channeled millions of volunteers into poverty alleviation, educational assistance, and environmental protection projects.[3]^: 18 The CYLC has also mobilized university student volunteers to participate in the China Youth Development Foundation's Project Hope, which focuses on educational assistance to primary school children in China's least developed regions.[3]^: 38

In 2003, the CYLC started the “plan for university graduates voluntary service to the West” (daxuesheng zhiyuan fuwu xibu jihua, 大学生志愿服务 西部计划) as part of its effort to promote volunteer service.[3]^: 57 If accepted into the program after passing an exam, university graduates work for three years in underdeveloped parts of western China.[3]^: 57

The Communist Youth League has contributed a number of top echelon leaders of the CCP-led government of the People's Republic of China. The proliferation of leaders with a Youth League background has led to the informal name "Tuanpai" (abbreviation for "Youth League faction") being used to describe certain members of the leadership at different times. The first "Youth League faction" was represented by Hu Yaobang. The second "Youth League faction" is represented by Hu Jintao. While there is no direct political lineage between the two Hus, Hu Jintao's administration formally elevated the memory of the earlier Hu. In 2005, the 90th anniversary of Hu Yaobang's birth, a new museum and a series of commemorative books and television programs were launched. During the Hu Jintao era, CYLC membership expanded as the organization recruited broadly.[3]^: 39

During the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, the CYLC mobilized 1.7 million volunteers to assist with the Olympics.[3]^: 130

The death of the son of Ling Jihua and Gu Liping, a couple associated with the Communist Youth League, may have tarnished the reputation of the organization as a path to power.[5]

Current CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has sought to reduce the prominence of the CCP's youth wing, stating that "All they [cadres] can do is just repeat the same old bureaucratic, stereotypical talk".[6][7] Political commentators have noted that the diminishing of the Tuanpai curtailed the influence of former paramount leader Hu Jintao, solidifying Xi's own political faction.[7] Following Xi's more critical stance of the CYLC, the CYLC's membership has decreased.[3]^: 22

CYLC's budget was cut, dropping from around 700 million yuan ($96 million) in 2012 to 260 million yuan ($40 million) in 2021, while its membership dropped from 90 million to 74 million in the same period.[8][9] Xi effectively closed the Central School of China Communist Youth League, folding it into the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.[7] He also effectively demoted Qin Yizhi, first secretary of the CYLC in 2017.[10] During the Xi-era, the CYLC's rule that non-cadre over the age of 28 must leave the organization has been more strictly enforced.[3]^: 22

At the CYLC's centennial in May 2022, Xi described the organization as the "party's loyal assistant and reliable reserve force."[3]^: 16

Communist Youth League headquarters

The CYLC is active at every political level of China, and most active in social structures which include many young people like schools and universities.[3]^: 16 By the end of 2002, there were approximately 210,000 committee members of fundamental organizations. 2021 estimates put the number of Youth League members at over 81 million.[11] The CYLC had 73.58 million members by the end of 2022.[12] All CYLC members and their personal details are tracked in a database known as Smart League Building.[9]

CYLC local groups (including those which are associated with institutions like universities or state-owned enterprises) send a total of 1,500 representatives to the CYLC National Congress, which is held every five years.[3]^: 143 The National Congress in turn elects the CYLC Central Committee, which is composed of 200 representatives and 120 alternates.[3]^: 143 Smaller CYLC congresses and committee plenums are also held.[3]^: 143

The CYLC directly manages the All-China Youth Federation.[3]^: 19 The All-China Youth Federation in turn serves as a consultative body to the CYLC.[3]^: 19 The All-China Youth Federation is also an umbrella organization which includes the Young Pioneers of China, among other youth-focused groups.[3]^: 19

The CYLC is also the parent entity of other youth-related projects, such as the China Youth Development Fund.[3]^: 19

The CYLC supervises university student societies through one of its departments.[3]^: 36

Officially defined as a "reserve force" for the CCP, the CYLC recruits and trains future party members and officials.[3]^: 21 In addition to the CYLC members it trains for future involvement in the party, the CYLC employs young party cadre who lead the organization, providing them with experience for subsequent leadership roles in other aspects of the party-state.[3]^: 21

CYLC's newspaper is the China Youth Daily.[3]^: 114

As it lost political influence under Xi, CYLC has started to increase its presence on social media, appealing to nationalism and attacking foreign brands in China accused of misbehavior.[8] The social media accounts of the CYLC have engaged in harassment of foreign journalists, including during the 2021 Henan floods when the Communist Youth League asked its social media followers to locate and report the location of a BBC News journalist on assignment covering the story. They also accused foreign reporters in general of slandering China with their reporting about the floods.[13] CYLC has also spread COVID-19 disinformation and attacked Chinese dissidents.[9]

• Yu Xiusong (俞秀松): 1920–1922
• Shi Cuntong (施存统): 1922–1925
• Zhang Tailei (张太雷): 1925–1927
• Ren Bishi (任弼时): 1927–1928
• Guan Xiangying (关向应): 1928–1946
• Feng Wenbin (馮文彬): 1949–1953
• Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦): 1953–1978
• Han Ying (韩英): 1978–1982
• Wang Zhaoguo (王兆国): 1982–1984
• Hu Jintao (胡锦涛): 1984–1985
• Song Defu (宋德福): 1985–1993
• Li Keqiang (李克强): 1993–1998
• Zhou Qiang (周强): 1998–2006
• Hu Chunhua (胡春华): 2006–2008
• Lu Hao (陆昊): 2008–2013
• Qin Yizhi (秦宜智): 2013–2017
• He Junke (贺军科): 2018–2023[14]
• A Dong (阿东): 2023–[15]

• 1st National Congress (Socialist Youth League): 5–10 May 1922
• 2nd National Congress (Socialist Youth League): 2–25 August 1923
• 3rd National Congress (Socialist Youth League): 26–30 January 1925
• 4th National Congress: 10–16 May 1927
• 5th National Congress: 12–16 July 1928
• 6th National Congress (1st Congress, New Democratic Youth League): 11–18 April 1949
• 7th National Congress (2nd Congress, New Democratic Youth League): 23 June–2 July 1953
• 8th National Congress (3rd Congress, New Democratic Youth League): 12–25 May 1957
• 9th National Congress: 11–29 June 1964
• 10th National Congress: 16–26 October 1978
• 11th National Congress: 20–30 December 1982
• 12th National Congress: 4–8 May 1988
• 13th National Congress: 3–10 May 1993
• 14th National Congress: 19–25 June 1998
• 15th National Congress: 22–26 July 2003
• 16th National Congress: 10–13 June 2008
• 17th National Congress: 17–21 June 2013
• 18th National Congress: 26–29 June 2018[16]
• 19th National Congress: 19–22 June 2023[12]

• Komsomol
• Socialist Patriotic Youth League
• China Youth University of Political Studies
• Kuomintang Youth League

• This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. Ristaino, Marcia R. (1988). Worden, Robert L.; Savada, Andrea Matles; Dolan, Ronald E. (eds.). China: A Country Study (Fourth ed.). Federal Research Division. "Party and Government", pp. 407–442. OCLC 232918611.

• Official website