Chinese imperialism

Jeffrey Reeves argues that since 2012, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has demonstrated "a concerted imperialist policy" towards its developing neighbor states to the south and west, especially Mongolia,[9] Kazakhstan,[10][11] Tajikistan,[12][13] Kyrgyzstan,[14] Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal,[15] Myanmar, Cambodia,[16][17][18] Laos,[19] and Vietnam.[20] This is associated with criticism of debt trap diplomacy.[6][21][22][23][24]

With China's rapid economic development and its increased investment in Africa, a new round of debate has emerged over whether Chinese investment in Africa is imperialistic. Horace Campbell has called this debate "superficial" and considers China's involvement as still distinct from Western imperialism.[25] Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) coordinates much of the investment. According to Evan Hsiang in Harvard International Review, China's investment in countries such as Zambia, which had a debt crisis in 2020 and had the "highest number of Chinese lenders of all African states", has been seen with the lens of economic imperialism, but may result from mismanagement and lack of regulations rather than planned debt traps. Nonetheless, Hsiang also cites "China's structural dominance" in the Zambian mining industry and that many of the projects neglect working conditions due to "China's unchallenged power" and the projects go through due to pressure by Chinese bureaucracy on African governments. He recommends that greater scrutiny of FOCAC would limit exploitative interactions.[26]

China official sources have pointed out that countries were not compelled to take the loans and they came with no strings attached in their agreements; however outside observers have noted that many of the debtor countries have entered fiscal difficulty, such as Sri Lanka, who defaulted on its sovereign debt.[24] Sri Lanka's Hambantota International Port has been leased to China for 99 years starting in 2017.[27] China signing a 99-year lease on a foreign port is seen as both a current erosion of sovereignty and a symbolic one similar to 19th century colonialism, because that is the amount of time Britain leased colonial Hong Kong from China in 1898.[27][28][29][30] China has also leased Gwadar Port in Pakistan for 43 years,[31] significant protests have occurred against Chinese interests in the port of Gwadar.[32] The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been seen as a geostrategic effort to advance the PRC's influence. Baloch insurgent militant groups in Pakistan have also labeled the CPEC as an imperialist endeavor by China.[33][34] According to The Economic Times, Chinese state interests in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh form a cohesive strategy to encircle India. This overall strategy, named by U.S. and Indian commentators, is the String of Pearls which is a combination of economic and naval interests by China surrounding India.[35]

However other researchers dispute this view. An October 2019 report by the Lowy Institute said that China had not engaged in deliberate actions in the Pacific which justified accusations of debt-trap diplomacy (based on contemporaneous evidence), and China had not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific; the report expressed concern about the scale of the country's lending, however, and the institutional weakness of Pacific states which posed the risk of small states being overwhelmed by debt.[36][37] A 2020 Lowy Institute article called Sri Lanka's Hambantota International Port the "case par excellence" for China's debt-trap diplomacy, but called the narrative a "myth" because the project was proposed by former Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa, not Beijing. The article added that Sri Lanka's debt distress was not caused by Chinese lending, but by "excessive borrowing on Western-dominated capital markets".[38]

According to The Diplomat, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investment also exacerbates separatism and ethnic tensions in host countries, because the PRC government and state-backed corporations "preference for dealing exclusively with the those who hold positions of power. Analysis of the BRI should go beyond the 'debt trap', geopolitics, or economic spillovers, but also examine the social fissures that emerge from the massive inflows of Chinese capital in host countries."[34]

Xinjiang internment camps were established in the late 2010s under Xi Jinping's administration.[39][40] Human Rights Watch says that they have been used to indoctrinate Uyghurs and other Muslims since 2017 as part of a "people's war on terror", a policy announced in 2014.[41][42][43] The camps have been criticized by the governments of many countries and human rights organizations for alleged human rights abuses, including mistreatment, rape, and torture,[44] with some of them alleging genocide.[45][46]

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims of China and the claims of several neighboring sovereign states in the region, namely Brunei, the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The disputes are over islands, reefs, banks, and other features in the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands. The main point of criticism is that the PRC is building artificial islands to extend its claims into other nations' territorial waters and militarizing the islands.[47][48][1] Chinese salami slicing strategy and cabbage tactics describe the way the PRC has used small provocations to increase its strategic position.[49]

Tibetan Review evaluated the China's government policy on Tibet as colonial based on several criteria, including "forced penetration of the colonizing group", "social destructiveness", "external political control", "economic dependence of internal groups", "sub-standard social services", and "social stratification".[50][51]