Civil Cooperation Bureau

When South African newspapers first revealed its existence in the late 1980s, the CCB appeared to be a unique and unorthodox security operation: its members wore civilian clothing; it operated within the borders of the country; it used private companies as fronts; and it mostly targeted civilians. However, as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) discovered a decade later, the CCB's methods were neither new nor unique. Instead, they had evolved from precedents set in the 1960s and 70s by Eschel Rhoodie's Department of Information (see Muldergate Scandal[7]), the Bureau of State Security (B.O.S.S.)[8] and Project Barnacle[9] (a top-secret project to eliminate SWAPO detainees and other "dangerous" operators).[10]

From information given to the TRC by former agents seeking amnesty for crimes committed during the apartheid era, it became clear that there were many other covert operations similar to the CCB, which Nelson Mandela would label the Third Force. These operations included Wouter Basson's 7 Medical Battalion Group,[11] the Askaris, Witdoeke, Experimental Group Program (also called "Clandestine Cooperation Bureau") and C1/C10 or Vlakplaas.

Besides these, there were also political front organisations like the International Freedom Foundation, Marthinus van Schalkwyk's Jeugkrag (Youth for South Africa),[12] and Russel Crystal's National Student Federation[13] which would demonstrate that while the tactics of the South African government varied, the logic remained the same: Total onslaught demanded a total strategy.[14]

Inaugurated in 1986 with the approval of Minister of Defense General Magnus Malan[15][16] and Chief of SADF General Jannie Geldenhuys, the CCB became fully functional by 1988. As a reformulation of Project Barnacle, the nature of its operations were disguised, and it disassociated itself from all other Special Forces and DMI (Directorate Military Intelligence) structures. The CCB formed the third arm of the Third Force, alongside Vlakplaas C1 and the Special Tasks projects.[17]

In his 1997 submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,[18] General Malan described the CCB as follows:

15.1 Let me now deal with the matter of the CCB. The CCB-organisation as a component of Special Forces was approved in principle by me. Special Forces was an integral and supportive part of the South African Defence Force. The role envisaged for the CCB was the infiltration and penetration of the enemy, the gathering of information and the disruption of the enemy. The CCB was approved as an organisation consisting of ten divisions, or as expressed in military jargon, regions. Eight of these divisions or regions were intended to refer to geographical areas. The area of one of these regions, Region Six, referred to the Republic of South Africa. The fact that the organisation in Region Six was activated, came to my knowledge for the first time in November 1989. The CCB provided the South African Defence Force with good covert capabilities. 15.2 During my term of office as Head of the South African Defence Force and as Minister of Defence instructions to members of the South African Defence Force were clear: destroy the terrorists, their bases and their capabilities. This was also government policy. As a professional soldier, I issued orders and later as Minister of Defence I authorised orders which led to the death of innocent civilians in cross-fire. I sincerely regret the civilian casualties, but unfortunately this is part of the ugly reality of war. However, I never issued an order or authorised an order for the assassination of anybody, nor was I ever approached for such authorisation by any member of the South African Defence Force. The killing of political opponents of the government, such as the slaying of Dr Webster, never formed part of the brief of the South African Defence Force.

Reports about the CCB were first published in 1990 by the now-defunct weekly Vrye Weekblad, and more detailed information emerged later in the 1990s at a number of TRC amnesty hearings. General Joep Joubert, in his testimony before the TRC, revealed that the CCB was a long-term special forces project in the South African Defence Force. It had evolved from the 'offensive defence' philosophy prevalent in P.W. Botha's security establishment.[19]

Nominally a civilian organisation that could be plausibly disowned by the apartheid government, the CCB drew its operatives from the SADF itself or the South African Police. According to Joubert, many operatives did not know that they were members of an entity called the CCB.[20]

In the wake of the National Party government's Harms Commission, whose proceedings were considered seriously flawed by analysts and the official opposition, the CCB was disbanded in August 1990.[21] Some members were transferred to other security organs.[22] No prosecutions resulted.

The Assassin's Web[23]

The CCB consisted of four groups with different functions:[24] an executive, a management board, two staff functions, eight operational sections known as regions, and an ad hoc collection of contractors. The overall size of the CCB never exceeded 250–300 full-time personnel.[25]

Operatives were required to have a 'blue plan'. This referred to a front operation (mostly a business) funded by the CCB. Slang Van Zyl, for instance, started a private investigation business while Chappies Maree ran an electronic goods export company called Lema. Operatives were allowed to keep the proceeds of their activities.[29] Proceeds from all blue plan activities vastly exceeded the funding CCB received from the state. A large private sector was created, which employed tens of thousands of people. Former security officers not in the CCB ran these companies alongside CCB officers.[25] In the December 1993 Goldstone Commission, the task group found that ex CCB members were involved in various illegal activities including gun and drug smuggling

Red plans, on the other hand, detailed the activities they would undertake against the enemy. Operations could be of a criminal nature as long as they had prior approval from the CCB bureaucracy. These mostly began with a feasibility study. If the report showed merit it was verified, then reviewed by a panel of five: the operative, the manager or handler, the coordinator, the managing director and in the case of violent operations, the chairman. Where loss of life was anticipated the chairman was required to obtain approval from the Chief of the Army or the Chief of Staff.[29]

The 'red plan' targeted victims and detailed action to be taken against them. The scenario, as described by Max Coleman in A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing the Repression of the Apartheid State, was as follows:

Step 1: A person or a target would be identified as an enemy of the State. A cell member would then be instructed to monitor the 'target'.

Step 2: A project – i.e. the elimination of a target would be registered with the co-ordinator. The co-ordinator would then have the project authorised by the regional manager and the managing director.

Step 3: The CCB member would then do a reconnaissance to study the target's movements with a view to eliminating him or her.

Step 4: The operative would propose the most practical method to the managing director. If the director felt this method was efficient, he would sign the proposal at what was called an 'in-house' meeting. There adjustments could be made to the plan before it was approved. The budget would be considered and finance would be made available for the project. The finance would come from the budget the Defence Force allocated to CCB activities. Indications are that money was always paid in cash.

Step 5: The co-ordinator would be requested to make available the necessary arms and ammunition such as limpet mines, poison and/or live ammunition or other logistical support such as transport, etc.

Step 6: The project would be carried out and the target would be eliminated. To do this the cell member could engage the assistance of what were termed 'unconscious members'. These were essentially underworld criminals who would, for money, kill as instructed. These 'unconscious' members were never told of the motive or the SADF connection – a false motive was usually supplied.[30]

To date there is no published record covering all operations conducted during the CCB's five-year existence. Some of the active operations conducted included the following:

• Alleged harassment of
  • Afrikaner dissident and Vrye Weekblad editor Max du Preez by pointing an RPG7 at him while forcing him to consume a large amount of mampoer or moonshine[31]
  • actor and playwright Hannes Muller for his role in Somewhere on the Border, a play banned by the authorities for its criticism of the South African Border War[32]
• Alleged shooting of Danger Nyoni – 12 December 1986
• Attempted contamination of drinking water in a Namibian refugee camp, by introducing cholera bacterium into it, in an effort to disrupt that country's independence from South Africa[33] – August 1989[34]
• Attempted assault on UN Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari, in Namibia – 1989. According to a hearing in September 2000 of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, two CCB operatives (Kobus le Roux and Ferdinand Barnard) were tasked not to kill Ahtisaari, but to give him "a good hiding". To carry out the assault, Barnard had planned to use the grip handle of a metal saw as a knuckleduster. In the event, Ahtisaari did not attend the meeting at the Keetmanshoop Hotel, where Le Roux and Barnard lay in wait for him, and thus escaped injury.[35]
• Bombing of a Western Cape kindergarten – the Early Learning Centre – on the evening of 31 August 1989[36]
• Harassment of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, by hanging a baboon foetus in the garden of his Cape Town home in 1989 in the hope that it would bewitch him[37]
• Supplying materials to SAP members for the 1986 killing of KwaNdebele cabinet minister Piet Ntuli[6]

According to TRC records,[48][49][50] CCB operatives were tasked to seriously injure Martti Ahtisaari, UN Special Representative in Namibia,[51] and to eliminate the following:

• Gavin Evans
• Theo-Ben Gurirab (SWAPO)
• Hidipo Hamutenya (SWAPO)
• Pallo Jordan and Ronnie Kasrils[52]
• Gwen Lister (SWAPO)
• Winnie Mandela
• Kwenza Mhlaba
• Jay Naidoo
• Joe Slovo
• Stompie Sepei
• Oliver Tambo
• Daniel Tjongarero (SWAPO)
• Andimba Toivo ya Toivo (SWAPO)
• Roland White

While the CCB was a section of the SADF's Special Forces they were joined on many operations by individuals from other parts of the state's broad security apparatus,[53] sometimes making it difficult to ascertain whether a specific person was part of the CCB or not. Of the estimated one hundred covert members, evidence exists that the following individuals were deployed as administrators or operatives:[54]

• Edward James Gordon – killed 1991[103]
• André Klopper – murdered Thursday 11 May 1995 a week after amnesty ensured his release from jail; found next to a road in Elandsfontein; ex-SADF Special Forces members Mathys de Villiers (Kaalvoet Thysie) and Heckie Horn were tried for his murder and acquitted[104]
• Jackie Lonte – murdered in the 1990s[105]
• "Corrie" Alwyn Meerholtz – died in a car crash on 24 November 1989[106]
• Tai Minnaar – died in September 2002[107] after a chemical and biological weapons deal in which he was involved went wrong[108]
• Eugene Riley – was killed in January 1994[109] after probing the killing of Chris Hani[52][110]) – Died under suspicious circumstances.[87]

Although the entire truth about the Civil Cooperation Bureau may never be known, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) concluded that:[111]

...the CCB was a creation of the SADF and an integral part of South Africa's counter-insurgency system which, in the course of its operations, perpetrated gross violations of human rights, including killings, against both South African and non-South African citizens. The Commission finds that the activities of the CCB constituted a systematic pattern of abuse which entailed deliberate planning on the part of the leadership of the CCB and the SADF. The Commission finds these institutions and their members accountable for the aforesaid gross violations of human rights.

As per the policy of the TRC, its findings were set out, but no action was taken.

According to General Malan, the CCB's three objectives—comparable to those of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE)—were:

• to infiltrate and penetrate the enemy;
• to gather Information; and
• to disrupt the enemy.

In his testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Malan declared that he had never issued an order or authorised an order for the assassination of anybody, and that the killing of political opponents of the government never formed part of the brief of the South African Defence Force.[112]

The front company Oceantec among others was used to embezzle $100 million US from private investors and a collateral trading house as part of a supposed sanctions busting operation between 1989 and 1991.[113]

CCB member Eben Barlow and Michael Mullen recruited other CCB members to start Executive Outcomes, a private military contractor that provided combatants, training and equipment.

• Boipatong Massacre
• Dirk Coetzee
• Eugene de Kock
• Delta G Scientific Company
• Executive Outcomes
• Lema (company)
• National Intelligence Service
• Project Coast
• Vlakplaas
• Protechnik
• Roodeplaat Research Laboratories
• State Security Council
• Craig Williamson