Copacabana Fort revolt

Nilo Peçanha and Artur Bernardes with the presidential sash

In 1922, Brazil was undergoing a reassessment of Brazilian nationality on the eve of the centenary of the country's independence, with the Modern Art Week as a symbolic milestone, while public finances suffered from the fall of international demand for coffee, Brazil's main export product.[2] In the presidential election, scheduled for 1 March, the government candidate to succeed Epitácio Pessoa was Artur Bernardes, president (governor) of Minas Gerais and a representative of the dominant groups of his state and São Paulo. In previous disputes, the government's candidate easily achieved the consensus of the regional oligarchies, but this time the regime showed signs of exhaustion.[3]

In June 1921, the political leaders of Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco, "second rate" states, organized themselves in the Republican Reaction bloc and launched an opposition ticket with Nilo Peçanha, from Rio de Janeiro, for president, and José Joaquim Seabra, from Bahia, for vice president. Several explanations have already been proposed for this oligarchic split, such as the dispute for the vice presidency, the challenge to the economic policy favorable to coffee, a first test of populism or a challenge to the domination of the federal system by Minas Gerais and São Paulo.[3][4] Some studies show the instability of the Minas Gerais-São Paulo alliance, but there was, in any case, dissatisfaction with the political arrangement.[5]

The Republican Reaction's proposals were reformist and peaceful. It did not intend to break with the model of the First Brazilian Republic, but only to achieve equality between the states,[6] and its state leaders had the same profile and practices as the government's ones;[7] in his state, Nilo Peçanha also applied coronelism practices, and the Reaction sought the support of disaffected oligarchs. In the electoral game of the First Republic, based on the coronelist compromise, the Republican Reaction was at a disadvantage, as it could not use the federal public machine to distribute privileges and favors. Thus, the Reaction added to traditional methods the campaign among the urban masses, a novelty at the time, as well as the search for military support.[8] Military officers gathered around marshal Hermes da Fonseca joined Nilo Peçanha's ticket after Fonseca failed to get a candidacy.[9] Fonseca was president of the Military Club, former president of Brazil and "virtual head of the Army",[10] "perceived by the military as the hierarchical superior of all".[11]

Nilo Peçanha and military supportes

Nilo Peçanha campaigning in Vitória for the upcoming elections, 1921

In the 1920s, the Brazilian Army was reformed and modernized under the management of Minister of War Pandiá Calógeras and advice from the French Military Mission, fulfilling the ambitions of the Young Turks years before.[1][12] The young officers left the Military School of Realengo with a level of technical preparation unprecedented in the history of the Brazilian Army.[13] But there were tensions within the officer corps. Officials were frustrated with the scorn they received from the public. Lieutenants were discouraged by their slow career progression and their failure to join and fight in World War I. Calógeras' management and the French Mission attracted criticism, accusations of corruption and difficulties in adapting to the new models. In April 1921, the dismissal of general Bento Ribeiro, chief of the Brazilian Army General Staff and an enemy of Calógeras, generated a demonstration of solidarity by more than one hundred officers, threatening to split the Army, but Ribeiro was not interested in a revolt.[14] The fact that the Ministers of War and Navy, Calógeras and Raul Soares, respectively, were both civilians was used in Nilo Peçanha's criticisms.[15]

The rapprochement between the Republican Reaction and the military reached its peak with the publication of false letters attributed to Artur Bernardes, with insulting content to the military, in order to position them against his candidacy.[16] There were two documents published in Correio da Manhã in October 1921 as part of the newspaper's anti-Bernardes campaign.[17] The author of the letters called Hermes a "sergeant without manners", tapping into the resentment of Army officers for the disdain they received from the civilian elite.[18] The crisis was similar to the Military Crisis at the final days of the Brazilian Empire.[19] The Military Club examined the letters attributed to Artur Bernardes and assessed them as true.[20] Its creators ended up confessing to the forgery, but tensions in the military environment increased.[21] Bernardes' explanations ended up being accepted by most of the officers, with the exception of a minority of captains and lieutenants.[22] After the Military Club's examination, officers in uniform and armed campaigned for the opposition. "The garrisons and the Military School itself were fermenting with revolt".[20] The atmosphere at the Club was unruly and angry.[23]

The election took place in an agitated atmosphere, and government supporters, controlling the official machine, guaranteed the victory of Artur Bernardes in March 1922.[16] It was widely known that the ballot boxes were rigged.[24] Unlike previous elections, the opposition contested the results and called for a Court of Honor to arbitrate the process. To maintain the pressure, it radicalized its speech and waved to a solution by arms. In April, J.J. Seabra spoke: "If this patriotic and honorable solution by the Court of Arbitration is not accepted, we will have a struggle and bloodshed". Government supporters were not intimidated. In May Raul Soares replied: "If the armed classes think they have the right to make a revolution, we think it is our duty to quell it". This intransigence accelerated radicalization. The opposition press denounced the arrests and transfers of anti-Bernardes lieutenants.[25] On 7 June, Congress confirmed the results of the election.[21] The oppositionists were removed from the commissions of the Chamber of Deputies and from the work of electoral recognition. All that remained was to appeal to the military.[26]

Nilo Peçanha invested in military agitation only as a form of pressure and did not want a revolt, but rather a popular movement before Congress on inauguration day on 15 November.[27] He was listed in the police inquiry following the uprising, but the charges were not substantiated.[26] Different from what Peçanha planned, a military movement on a national scale was outlined with the goals of removing Epitácio Pessoa and preventing the inauguration of Artur Bernardes.[28] For years, criticism of electoral fraud had paved the way for the idea of a violent solution.[29]

Lieutenant Eduardo Gomes

The mobilization that would culminate in the armed revolt sought to purify the armed class from the interference of civilian politics and repair the pride of the Army.[30] Dissident soldiers considered politics dominated by the "low and private interests" of status quo supporters;[29] for them, civilian politicians had betrayed the Republic, which had been proclaimed by the Army. They were dissatisfied with society and the Army's position, not accepting obedience without question.[31] Their rebellious inclinations came from esprit de corps, still without claims to the new forces of society, which would come in later movements.[32][33] There was no revolutionary manifesto in the midst of the revolt and it was at first a corporate one, defending military honor against the figure of Artur Bernardes. It was, even so, the expression of a revolutionary climate[34] and the wear and tear of the regime that was not very open to new political, economic and social demands. Participants had the identity of a moral elite capable of defeating oligarchies.[35]

Low-ranking soldiers were high among the insurgents, but few senior officers joined the conspiracy.[36] The biggest exception was Hermes da Fonseca himself, who lent his name to the rebellion. Fonseca had several possible motives: the offenses he suffered, the desire to regain his reputation, the influence of his children and dissatisfaction with the election results. The commanders of Fort Copacabana and the garrison of Mato Grosso, who participated in the revolt, were his relatives. The rebels were mostly beneficiaries of investments in military education in the previous years, with a mixture of instructors from the "Missão Indígena" at the Military School of Realengo, new graduates and junior officers with recent French training.[37][38] They had strong bonds built in the Military School; a few years earlier, Siqueira Campos, Eduardo Gomes and other future revolutionaries discussed politics and the First World War in a space outside the school.[39] The lieutenants, as the lowest sector from the officialdom, lived closer to the population's needs.[40] They were numerous, but still needed a prestigious officer to lead them, a role played by Hermes da Fonseca.[37]

The revolt arose only in one faction within the Army, which, as an institution, remained loyal to the power structure.[30] By mid-1922 the officer corps split between loyalists and revolutionaries, both of whom believed in a civic role for the Army, but the revolutionaries believed in ending regionalism and corruption.[41] Only a minority took up arms.[32] They had support or sympathy among the urban population and some politicians, such as Maurício de Lacerda.[21]

O Paiz associating the incidents in Maranhão and Paraná with "agitating agents of Nilo Peçanha"

Confirmation of Bernardes' victory was met with destabilizing uprisings.[42] In April, the Public Force of Maranhão destituted the government of Raul da Cunha Machado for one day; similar movements occurred in Paraná and Santa Catarina.[43][21] There was an attempt at a rebellion on the Navy's ships. In Ceará, there was an incident between the governor and the officers. In Alagoas, the troops paraded singing a little song against the official candidate.[20] Some young naval aviators at Enxadas Island planned an air attack against the presidential motorcade.[44] It was in this climate, and after incidents like these, that the July uprising would come.[20]

At the time of the election, there were already conspiratorial talks in Rio de Janeiro, including among Hermes da Fonseca's sons, but without the coordination of high-ranking military personnel. They intended to prevent the presidential inauguration. Some police officers and sergeants loyal to the government infiltrated the conspirators.[45] In February, the journal Estado de S. Paulo published a circular, signed "The Army", in which there was a conspiracy to depose governors and the president and hand over power to Nilo Peçanha or a dictator.[29] In May, Epitácio Pessoa was already discussing the conspiracy behind the scenes. He had transferred the suspected officers far from the capital and appointed reliable replacements, but he still thought that Artur Bernardes should resign, since "he will not last 24 hours in the Catete".[46]

After the defeat in Mato Grosso, general Clodoaldo da Fonseca declared that he hoped to count on the Army and the Military Brigade of Rio Grande do Sul, and the movement could come at the end of October. Previously, he had described a plan on a national scale to his officers, with support in São Paulo, Bahia and Minas Gerais.[47] In Pará, officers who could have participated in the revolt had been transferred before it began, such as lieutenant Pires Camargo, from the 3rd Company of the 26th Battalion of Caçadores, who had threatened to use weapons during the electoral campaign.[48]

Rumors about an uprising in Mato Grosso had been circulating in the press since May, and even then the conspirators were already making their connections, with an intended start in Ponta Porã. After the defeat of the revolt, the inquiry of one of the lieutenants gave 16 June as the planned start date, although there was a possibly typographical error and the date would be in July. If in June, the date would be a week after the opinion of the president of Congress, the Mato Grosso senator Antônio Azeredo, recognizing the victory of Artur Bernardes. Senate approval could be the pretext for revolt.[49] On 27 June, Gazeta de Notícias reported an imminent revolutionary movement in the state.[50]

Hermes da Fonseca

On 29 June, Hermes da Fonseca sent a telegram to colonel Jaime Pessoa da Silveira, commander of the 6th Military Region, in Pernambuco, advising him to deny his support to the faction favored by the government in the state political dispute.[51][52] The faction in the Pernambuco government, favorable to the Republican Reaction, had defeated the opposition, including relatives of Epitácio Pessoa, in the gubernatorial election on 27 May.[lower-alpha 12] The opposition contested the results and the state entered a climate of civil war. The president named a new commander, who brought in reinforcements from other states and used his troops on behalf of the opposition.[53][lower-alpha 13] Army soldiers killed dentist Tomás Coelho Filho, bringing national attention to the crisis. Thus, officials in Recife appealed to Hermes da Fonseca.[54]

In the telegram, on behalf of the Military Club,[55] Fonseca warned against the Army's deviations, recalling that it "serves to defend the people, not attack them" and "political situations pass and the Army remains". It was a call to disobey the presidential order.[11][56] Jaime Pessoa resigned. Epitácio Pessoa did not let it go. As Hermes da Fonseca confirmed that the telegram was his own, the Ministry of War sent him a notice of reprimand. Offended, Hermes reiterated his statements on 2 July, declaring himself capable of expressing his opinion as "head of the National Army", a position legally held by the president. As a result, he received a 24-hour arrest warrant. He was taken to the 3rd Infantry Regiment, where he was released after 17 hours, at noon on 3 July.[11][57] He was also removed from the presidency of the Military Club, which, due to assuming its participation, was closed for six months[56] based on the Adolfo Gordo Law, which allowed the closure of brothels and anarchist establishments.[33][58]

The arrest and closure were offensive to the dissident military[59] and served as a trigger for the revolt.[33] Still, these were pretexts, not causes, as the conspiracy had been developing for months. At Fort Copacabana, the bombing of the city had been planned for almost six months.[59] Hermes da Fonseca considered the uprising premature, but after his arrest the spirits of the young officers were too high to prevent it.[11] On the night of 4 July, with the revolt taking effect, he declared to one of his sons opposed to its beginning: "It is late for everything, my son: late to retreat, late to articulate the strength I need".[60]

Revolutionary plan in Rio de Janeiro

The idea was to revolt the 1st Infantry Regiment in Vila Militar, where the command of the 1st Infantry Division and several units was located.[lower-alpha 14] With the support of the Military School of Realengo, the School of Infantry Sergeants, the 1st Railway Company, the Engineering Battalion, the 15th Cavalry Regiment, the 2nd Artillery Regiment and the Aviation School, it would be possible to force the entire Vila Militar to join the rebellion, including the 2nd Infantry Regiment. Escorted by a picket of the 15th Cavalry Regiment, marshal Hermes da Fonseca would assume command in Cascadura, leading a vanguard to face loyalist forces of the Navy, the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the Military Police, the 1st Divisional Cavalry Regiment and the 3rd Machine Gun Company in Méier. Meanwhile, the rearguard would continue to the South Zone via Jacarepaguá, following the Pica-Pau road and Copacabana. Under the cover of the cannons of the forts of Copacabana and Santa Cruz, the two most important in Guanabara Bay, it would reach the president's headquarters in the Catete Palace.[61][62]

The Ministry of War did not fear the bombing of the city by Fort Copacabana.[63] Its 305mm guns were designed for tense fire, with low elevation, high muzzle velocity and a large projectile load. Thus, they would reach naval targets up to 23 kilometers away, but the São João hill would be a natural obstacle if they aimed for the center of Rio de Janeiro.[64] However, Siqueira Campos and other artillerymen calculated new tables before the rebellion, reducing the projection load to modify the shooting angles. Thus, the cannons could fire over the mountains, threatening the city. One of them consulted the calculations with a professor of ballistics at the Military School, without explaining his intentions.[63] Preparations at the fort began in advance, digging trenches, laying out barbed wire, stocking up on a month's worth of supplies, retaining personnel in the barracks, electrifying the networks, and moving the barracks and kitchen to protected locations.[1] Ironically, the fort was the "apple of the eye" of minister Pandiá Calógeras, who treated its officers with special consideration, including Delso Mendes da Fonseca and Antônio de Siqueira Campos.[23]

Overly optimistic that the rebellion would spread throughout the army, the conspirators acted with indiscretion. Thus, the government was aware of the risk of rebellion and was already taking preventive measures, transferring and removing suspected officers, especially in Vila Militar. The conspirators also had limited organization, with poor communication after the outbreak of the revolt. Some reports attested to a less elaborate conspiracy, with members who only learned about the uprising the day before.[65][66] Many of those who were vehemently in favor of action did not act at the time of the revolt.[67] Before the start, Hermes da Fonseca already had an "absolute premonition of defeat", due to the lack of articulation, delay in contacts and the government's full knowledge of the action. He considered civilian allies to be inert and leakers of information. Vila Militar officers, on the other hand, were not all committed, and almost all were out of the barracks and under control.[60] The marshal declared to his wife before the revolt: "The government controls everything. Telephones, telegraphs, trains and roads. There is no plan. These boys are crazy. They want to raze the city".[11] The government already predicted the revolt of Fort Copacabana and other bodies such as the Military School.[36]

Vila Militar train station

On 4 July there was a meeting of the conspirators, with representatives from all the bodies in Rio de Janeiro. The government probably had insiders.[68] The revolutionaries realized that some of them were identified by the government through their telephone contact with Fort Copacabana.[69] In the afternoon, an excessive concentration of officers in Baiuca, quarters of the Officers Improvement School, confirmed the government's suspicions.[70] Epitácio Pessoa's daughter claimed that he even knew in advance the time set for the revolt.[71] At night, marshal Hermes had disappeared from the Palace Hotel, heading to Vila Militar, as well as several suspicious officers, and the government already predicted the revolt of Fort Copacabana.[72] Around 22:00, colonel Nestor Sezefredo dos Passos, commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment, assigned a company to lieutenant colonel Álvaro Guilherme Mariante, instructing him to arrest the suspected officers when they arrived by train at Vila Militar. Thus, the uprising was made impossible. Officials in Baiuca were also arrested, with the exception of a few who managed to escape.[70] At stations on the Central do Brasil Railway, officers looking for trains were also arrested under orders of general Manuel Lopes Carneiro da Fontoura, commander of the 1st Military Region.[60]

In the 1st Horse Artillery Regiment, the commander, colonel João José de Lima, gathered his officers in the casino and asked their opinions. All but two lieutenants were in favor of the revolution, and thus were arrested, leaving the regiment with the captains and sergeants. This was repeated in many units.[73] In the words of lieutenant João Alberto Lins de Barros, one of the prisoners in that regiment,[74]

On 4 July, at night, all of us revolutionaries were ready to raise the troops at the first signal... There were few of us, within a regiment considered loyalist and we needed support from outside the barracks to carry out the uprising... we were stuck with the impression that the movement had been aborted. Only after being transferred from the unit, when there was nothing else we could do, did we learn that the Military School and Fort Copacabana were in revolt.

Newspaper report on the 3rd Infantry Regiment, which began the siege of Fort Copacabana

Lieutenant Telmo Borba, who was supposed to revolt the School of Infantry Sergeants, could not fulfill his commitment, as well as lieutenant Luís Carlos Prestes, deputy commander of the 1st Railway Company, who was sick. Captain Luís Gonzaga Borges Fortes tried to damage the field radiotelegraph station, mobilizing the Sapper Company of the 1st Engineering Battalion, but was defeated.[75][76] The Aviation School was occupied by a loyalist battalion on the night of 4 to 5 July, when the revolutionary pilots were testing aircraft engines. Uprising attempts at the Santa Cruz fort and the 15th Cavalry Regiment also failed.[1][77]

Two hundred revolutionary officers and soldiers entered the fort, being joined at 22:00 by a battery of 54 men from Fort Vigia.[78][79] Among them was lieutenant Eduardo Gomes, who arrived in the afternoon.[80] At 21:00 captain José da Silva Barbosa went to the Ministry of War, where he was charged with taking command of the 1st Coastal Artillery Battery, Fort Copacabana, to prevent the uprising.[lower-alpha 15] Captain Barbosa was accompanied by his superior, general Bonifácio Gomes da Costa, commander of the 1st Coastal Artillery District, and a company from the 3rd Infantry Regiment. The general and the captain entered the fort at 23:30, without escort, where soldiers were preparing trenches and barbed wire and carrying ammunition and a cart with a 190mm cannon. Captain Euclides Hermes da Fonseca, commander of the fort, suggested that the transfer be carried out the following morning, but general Bonifácio, after communicating with general Fontoura, did not accept it. The fort commander arrested the two envoys.[78][79]

Captain Libânio da Cunha Matos, commander of the 3rd Infantry Regiment's company, went to the fort, where general Bonifácio ordered his company to return to the barracks. He did not give the order a literal interpretation and instead occupied Túnel Novo. Another company, the 3rd, was already at Barata Ribeiro Street at that time. The rebels had mined the ground around the fort. While the captain was out of command, his lieutenants Álvaro Barbosa Lima and Mário Tamarindo Carpenter also went to the fort. Carpenter joined in, while Lima managed to flee.[81]

Rebel soldiers from Fort Copacabana

The director of the Army's Cartridge Factory, colonel João Maria Xavier de Brito Júnior, removed the ammunition for use in the revolt from the nearby Military School of Realengo.[76] The instructor officers[lower-alpha 16] armed the students.[82] Nine cadets refused to participate, as well as some officers, being arrested as a result. At 23:50, captain Oton de Oliveira Santos, in charge of the night watch by orders of the school's director, general Eduardo Monteiro de Barros, found colonel Brito with a large number of officers and students in his house, which would normally be closed and with the lights off at this time. Upon being called to enter, Oton fired two shots in the air and ran to the general's house. Monteiro de Barros headed for the Military School, but on the way rebel patrols fired in his direction. He intended to seek reinforcements in Vila Militar,[83] but ended up being arrested.[82][lower-alpha 17] Oton was also captured by the rebels before reaching Vila Militar.[83]

Shortly before 01:00, at night, lieutenant Frederico Cristiano Buiz woke up the soldiers of his company, the 7th Company of the 1st Infantry Regiment, and divided them into two platoons. One stayed in front of the barracks, while he led the other to the regimental officers' casino, where captain José Barbosa Monteiro (commander of the company), colonel Sezefredo dos Passos and others were. With his pistol in hand and in front of his armed soldiers, he declared — "The revolution has broken out! I am with the revolution!" Despite being unarmed, Sezefredo dos Passos advanced against Buiz and grabbed his pistol. The other officers also confronted the platoon, and captain Monteiro was killed in the clash.[84] Buiz missed the opportunity, allowing himself to be restrained. Officers who were not yet on the government's side were arrested.[lower-alpha 18] For his act of bravery, the regiment's commander was later promoted to general.[76]

Marshal Hermes left his hotel at 23:00. He would wait for the 15th Cavalry Regiment near Vila Militar. He went in one of three cars, being intercepted at the Engenho de Dentro station by a squadron of the 1st Divisional Cavalry Regiment. After abandoning the car, they managed to reach the farm belonging to deputy Mário Hermes, near Marechal Hermes station. The picket of the 15th Cavalry Regiment arrived, but to arrest the marshal. General Ribeiro da Costa announced his arrest at 06:00 in the morning. Hermes was kept in the battleship Floriano.[85] His presence in Vila Militar could have had a great impact.[76]

At 01:15 or 01:20, Fort Copacabana fired its first shot, targeting the uninhabited island of Cotunduba. The shots were heard throughout the city at dawn and marked the beginning of the uprising. The second shot went in the same direction; the third, to the rock at the base of Fort Vigia, alerting the population, and the fourth, to the 3rd Infantry Regiment, as a protest against the arrest of Hermes da Fonseca.[86] Shots were then expected from the other forts, especially from Santa Cruz and Imbuí, to mark their participation, but there was only silence.[76]

Vila Militar and its surroundings, with the Monte Alegre and Caixa D'Água hills highlighted

The Military School of Realengo had 638 students in arms.[87] About a hundred of them stayed at the school to take care of those who did not join the revolt, while another five hundred,[76] or 449, headed to Vila Militar under the leadership of colonel Brito.[1] They were of the four branches,[lower-alpha 19] each under its instructional assistant. The cavalry squadron went ahead along the Estrada Real de Santa Cruz to the Piraquara bridge. The journey began at midnight along the São Pedro de Alcântara road. The expected goal was to join the revolutionaries at Vila Militar, but it was hostile.[82][88]

General Fernando Setembrino de Carvalho was woken up at 02:00 to take over the General Staff of the Army, to which he had been appointed a few days before. The Minister of War, as a civilian, did not command the repression of the uprising, which was the responsibility of the commander of the region. However, according to Carvalho's testimony, general Carneiro da Fontoura was "invisible", resting in his office, while confusion reigned in command, with conflicting information about the revolt. Hearing the artillery on the way, Setembrino went to Vila Militar in person,[89][90] where he assumed command. Most of the 1st Division remained loyal to the government.[23]

Loyalist reinforcements were already on the way: a squadron from the 1st Divisional Cavalry Regiment, heading towards Realengo in reconnaissance, and, towards Méier, a detachment under general João de Deus Mena Barreto, commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade. He had the 3rd Military Police Battalion, the 3rd Machine Gun Company, under captain Daltro Filho, and other units, without withdrawing many troops from the seat of government. All of Central do Brasil was occupied: a battalion of Caçadores at Méier station, a battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment at Todos os Santos, and so on. To the south of Vila Militar, a police cavalry squadron guarded the Estrada Real de Santa Cruz.[91][90] The Catete Palace was protected since 02:00 by a company of infantry from the Naval Battalion, and at 06:00 a company from the 3rd RI and an artillery battery garrisoned the courtyard of the Ministry of War.[92]

The first contact was between the Realengo cavalry picket and a patrol of the 15th Independent Cavalry Regiment. At daybreak, the Realengo infantry collided with the barracks of the 1st Engineering Battalion, at the west end of Vila Militar. The revolutionaries took up positions on the Monte Alegre hill, in the locality of Árvore Seca.[lower-alpha 20] From there they fought a duel with the 1st Horse Artillery Regiment, which had a 75mm battery near the barracks and two others on the Caixa d'Água hill. 150 men from the School of Sergeants protected the artillery in the direction of Estrada Real de Santa Cruz. The projectiles flew over the roofs of Vila Militar.[lower-alpha 21] Captain Mascarenhas de Morais, of the 2nd Legalist Battery, reported how the rebels' artillery hit near the officers' residences, leading some families to withdraw.[93] General Ribeiro Costa, commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, led the response from Vila Militar. The Assault Car Company and a section of the 1st Heavy Machine Gun Company were in reserve.[91]

At 10:00 the bitter fight had already lasted four hours. Vila Militar's artillery went from indirect to direct and barrage fire. At that time the loyalists started an enveloping movement. In the testimony of Colonel Xavier de Brito, a new element of loyalist infantry was seen heading towards the school to bypass it from the left flank. According to O Paiz, the maneuver was behind Monte Alegre, led by colonel Nestor Sezefredo, with the 1st Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the 2nd and a squadron of the 1st Divisional Cavalry Regiment as a flank guard.[94][91] Colonel Brito assembled his General Staff. There was no chance of victory, and he needed to save the cadets' lives. In Cascadura, more loyalists were waiting. Thus, the revolutionaries raised the white flag and returned to the school. The arrested officers and students were released.[95] The result was one dead and several wounded, among the rebels, and two dead and five wounded, among the loyalists.[lower-alpha 22] After 12:00 or 14:00 a squadron of loyalist cavalry, under captain Euclides Figueiredo, entered the school without resistance. Later, it was replaced by a battalion from Vila Militar. Colonel Brito and the instructors and other officers were arrested.[96][97]

Fort Copacabana in 1920

At dawn at Fort Copacabana, the revolutionaries, at first without information, were waiting for news of their victory. Loyalist infantry remained nearby, and colonel João Nepomuceno da Costa was appointed commander of the attacking force.[98] The infantry stayed in the Novo and Velho tunnels, and the artillery, in the mountains in the region of the tunnels in Vila Rica and Leme. The detachment consisted of a cavalry squadron (for reconnaissance and liaisons), a battalion of the 3rd Infantry Regiment and two companies, a battalion of Caçadores and two batteries, one of mountain artillery and the other of howitzers. At 14:30 colonel Nepomuceno received the order to attack. The bulk of the 3rd Infantry Battalion would advance to Cantagalo hill and block the enemy, while the other forces would attack the defenders in Ipanema and Copacabana, trying to isolate them from the fort.[99]

The order was to attack as soon as possible, without fail before nightfall, but the detachment could only concentrate at 19:00.[100] At the end of the morning, the commander of the fort used the 190mm Krupp cannons to fire at the left wing of the Ministry of War, in order to reach the table where the arrest order for Hermes da Fonseca had been signed. The first shot landed in front of República square, raising dust and shrapnel and causing workers and residents to flee. The second fell into the back of Light & Power company, hitting a townhouse and killing a man, a woman and two children.[101] Minister Calógeras himself telephoned to protest the damage.[102] Colonel Nepomuceno had orders to cut off telephone connections and the water and electricity supply, but he did not permanently cut off communications so that the rebels would know of their defeat in the rest of the city.[103]

Without realizing it, Calógeras had indicated the target that had been hit. The gunners realized that they had forgotten to brake the gun during firing. Correcting their mistake, they fired again and hit the Ministry of War. The cannon fired twice more, hitting the courtyard and the opposite end. Two soldiers died and one was injured. Panic gripped the building. The headquarters was transferred to the Fire Department, in the same square, and then to another headquarters in Largo do Humaitá.[63]

Copacabana and its surroundings

Shortly before 15:00,[101] colonel Nepomuceno, a personal friend of commander Euclides, summoned the fort to surrender, warning of the failure of the revolt. The fort's envoy said that they would only obey marshal Hermes da Fonseca and asked for an armistice. Colonel Nepomuceno granted it, under the reasoning of gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements,[104] but president Epitácio Pessoa, sure of his position, did not want to negotiate. While the ceasefire was in effect, at 16:00, under his orders, the Fortress of Santa Cruz opened fire.[101] There was a "duel of the fortresses".[63] The rebels retaliated against government troops in Copacabana; one of the three shots hit the Guinle family mansion. At 18:30, Fort Imbuí joined the fire against Copacabana. Through the intervention of general Bonifácio, whose wife was in Imbuí, captain Euclides Hermes spared the target, choosing the Naval Battalion.[101] Fort Vigia also participated. Loyalists were slow; Imbuí fired late, as the boiler needed three to four hours to provide sufficient pressure. Fort São Luís was supposed to participate, but it didn't even get to fire. At 19:00, a new emissary from the Attack Forces Detachment warned that there would be no armistice and called for the surrender of the fort.[105] It was a formality, as the arrival of night imposed the ceasefire.[101]

According to Siqueira Campos, a poorly communicated withdrawal order, during the bombardment of Santa Cruz, resulted in the destruction of a French 75mm cannon used in the external defense; it was thrown into the water. For Eduardo Gomes, it was a way to prevent the cannon from falling into enemy hands.[106] Another possible motive was to express opposition to the French Military Mission. The cannon was new and was there for testing.[107]

Among the loyalists, the mountain artillery arrived at 20:00, and the other battery, at 21:30, positioning themselves respectively in Vila Rica and in the Leme gorge. The siege was only tightened at 23:00, with the troops reaching Serzedelo Correia square, with a patrol on the beach. In an elevated position on Toneleros street, captain Eurico Gaspar Dutra served as an observer for the artillery. A company of the 3rd Infantry Division remained at Fort Vigia, and the cavalry remained near Cantagalo Hill, guarding Leblon beach. The troops did not come closer as support from the Navy's cannons was expected.[108]

Battleship São Paulo

Inside the fort, with the supply of electricity and water being cut out, the defenders relied on candles and brackish water distilled from the sea. On 6 July, the lieutenants wanted to spare captain Euclides Hermes, the only officer with a wife and children, sending him to negotiate his surrender, but he did not want to leave. At 04:00 at night, minister Calógeras telephoned to warn the rebels of the total isolation of the fort, but gave them a guarantee of life. The commander gathered his officers and explained the situation. The rebels inside the fort knew of the imminent bombardment by the Navy and the other fortifications. A faction led by Siqueira Campos and Eduardo Gomes wanted to resist, but another considered the revolt over. The commander gave each the option of leaving or staying in the fort. Of the more than three hundred men in the garrison, only 29 remained — five officers (Euclides, Siqueira, Eduardo Gomes, Mário Carpenter and Newton Prado), two sergeants, a corporal, sixteen privates and five civilians. The prisoners were released.[101][109][110]

At 07:35, the battleship São Paulo crossed the mouth of Guanabara Bay. Behind it, slightly displaced to port, came the Minas Geraes. The destroyer Paraná, with an admiral's pennant, accompanied the duo.[64][lower-alpha 23] Each battleship had a main battery of twelve 305mm guns (of which a maximum of ten could be used at the same time, due to the position of the turrets), against two cannons of the same caliber at the fort. But several factors favored the revolutionaries. The fort's shells had 1,500 meters more range than the battleships, and its concrete armor, up to 12 meters thick, was much stronger than the ships' steel armor. The geography of Guanabara Bay nullified the battleships' mobility advantage, forcing them to fight at close range (less than 7,250 meters), in which even their most protected parts could be pierced by the fort's shells.[64]

190mm and 305mm turrets at Fort Copacabana

When Siqueira Campos saw the ships, the fort's 305mm guns were too high and aimed at Vila Militar. The revolutionaries were unable to maneuver the turret as the diesel engine failed—the result of sabotage in the confusion of the retreat. The Navy was probably aware of this, and therefore risked its ships at close range. The naval task force continued on a north-south axis, along the Ilha Rasa-Ilha da Laje line. At the signal from Fort Vigia, São Paulo fired a first salvo at 08:00. Taking care not to hit Leblon, the bombardment continued for half an hour, firing 19 or 20 shells at the fort. Minas Gerais did not fire,[64][111] but the bombardment was supported on land by colonel Nepomuceno's batteries.[112]

The low fog did not allow the sailors to see the shells impact zone. Only in the last salvo did they see smoke in the fort; according to captain Euclides, two shots finally hit.[64][111] The shots did not pierce the protected area, but one of them opened a hole five feet deep.[101] In the words of the fort's commander, "we received, inert, as simple spectators, the violent shells from the 305 pieces of São Paulo".[113] The ship was within range of the fort's 190mm guns, but sources differ as to whether or not the fort responded to the bombardment; Navy sources do not state that São Paulo was a target.[lower-alpha 24]

Shortly before sighting the battleship, the revolutionaries had fired the 190mm guns at targets on land. This bombardment continued even when the navy was close.[64] The fort fired on Ilha das Cobras, the army headquarters, Fort Vigia and the Catete Palace.[114] On Ilha das Cobras, three marines died in the Naval Battalion barracks.[92] As they did not find the tables with the calculations, the shot against Catete missed, destroying a nearby house.[101]

The Minister of War again telephoned the revolutionaries to ask for a ceasefire. The fort's commander agreed, warning, however, that he still had 72 tons of ammunition and would fight back any provocation.[101][114] At 09:07 the fort raised the white flag.[64][lower-alpha 25] Around 10:00 two emissaries of the minister went to parliament with the rebels, but at the same time two Breguet 14 planes from the navy, which was not informed of the agreement, bombed the fort, resulting in a fight with the emissaries. Calógeras proposed a personal conversation with Euclides Hermes, but this could be a trap. Siqueira Campos defined the conditions for the rebels, who wanted free passage to leave the country. The captain left the fort and was arrested at his home.[101]

Command of the fort was left to Siqueira Campos, and the plan was to bombard the city if the captain did not return within two hours.[115] At 12:30, general Hastínfilo de Moura, head of the Casa Militar, telephoned to threaten the execution of Euclides Hermes if the fort fired again. Siqueira Campos managed to speak with Euclides by telephone, being informed that the Ministers of War and Navy guaranteed the life of the rebels if they left the fort and surrendered unconditionally. Siqueira put the handset on the hook and did not answer.[101] The white flag remained flying over the fort.[116]

Siqueira Campos proposed bombing the city and then blowing up the fort in a collective suicide. Eduardo Gomes contested: the bombings would kill more civilians, and the fort belonged to Brazil. The soldiers agreed. It was then decided to abandon the fort. Their names were inscribed on the wall with nails. The flag of Brazil was cut into 28 or 29 pieces, one for each member.[lower-alpha 26] They distributed some brandy, filled their pockets with ammunition, and left armed with Mauser 1908 rifles and Parabellum pistols.[117] There would be no surrender: the way out was to fight the government supporters. They were "volunteers of death".[118]

The last rebels marching on Atlântica Avenue

They left the fort in the early afternoon.[lower-alpha 27] By then, surrender was expected in Catete. Upon being informed by the ministers, Epitácio Pessoa ordered an attack by the Navy and the land forces and dispatched Catete's own police guard to reinforce Copacabana.[117][119] Not all the 28 men left the fort, and others scattered along the way. Passersby followed as spectators.[120] They went along Atlântica Avenue towards Túnel Novo and from there to the presidential palace. Octavio Correia, a civilian and engineer from Rio Grande do Sul, joined the rebels, receiving Newton Prado's carbine. Meanwhile, four soldiers fled.[117] Correia already knew the commander of the fort and the lieutenants before the revolt.[121] At the time, Atlântica Avenue was already a dual carriageway and several buildings were under construction. The gentrification of the shore was beginning, and the beach was frequented by various social classes.[122] The revolutionaries stopped at Hotel Londres to drink water, where photographer Zenóbio Couto took the famous photographs. Siqueira Campos was left out. Two more defections followed.[117] From afar, members of the 3rd Infantry Regiment shouted for them to surrender.[123]

The nearby loyalist commander, captain Pedro Chrysol Fernandes Brasil, commanded the 6th Company of the 3rd Infantry Regiment[lower-alpha 28] and had three platoons in Serzedelo Correia Square under lieutenants João Francisco Sauwen, João de Segadas Viana and Pedro Miquelena. Upon learning of the rebels' departure, he left lieutenant Segadas Viana at Barroso Street (now Siqueira Campos Street), Miquelena at Hilário de Gouveia Street and Sauwen at the square.[124] He acted under the orders of colonel Nepomuceno, but he lived a drama, as his son was among the rebels arrested at the Military School.[117]

Statue representing the moment Siqueira Campos was shot

When lieutenant Segadas Viana approached the beach with his platoon to spot the rebels, he found them on the corner of Atlântica Avenue. A tense conversation ensued, pistols in hand, between him, Mário Carpenter (his colleague in the 3rd Infantry Regiment) and Siqueira Campos. Viana wanted them to surrender, and they wanted him to join them. Captain Brasil also approached. Carpenter, his subordinate, declared: "captain, we didn't come to surrender, we want to die fighting, against you. It is useless, therefore, to advise us". One of the rebels shouted: "We are going to Catete, captain". He insisted that it was madness, as they would have to face the entire regiment, and asked them to surrender, guaranteeing their life, but they threatened him personally. So he gave the order to fire and the fighting began.[lower-alpha 29]

The first to die was a rebel soldier shot between Barroso Street and Hilário de Gouveia Street.[125] The rebels divided into two groups and fired at the platoons of lieutenants Viana and Miquelena; Miquelena's platoon, suffering casualties, retreated to Serzedelo Correia square, linking up with Sauwen's.[126] The platoon at the rear moved ahead in reinforcement. The avenue was under construction, and the rebels found shelter in the gap between the sand and the sidewalk. The government supporters, in turn, also climbed trees and roofs to shoot. With their rifles and machine guns, "it seemed to rain in the sea given the constant spray". The rebels, on the other hand, saved ammunition.[117] The 9th Company of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, led by captain Floriano Gomes da Cruz, went to the rear of the rebels. Captain Brasil called for reinforcements and ammunition.[127]

One by one the rebels were shot. Captain Brasil had orders to finish them off with a bayonet charge, but he ignored it, hoping his enemies would cease fire and survive. The job fell to colonel Tertuliano Potiguara, with about 100 men from the Military Police and the 3rd Infantry Regiment, coming from the presidential guard. "The charge order was given, and the last elements of the Copacabana garrison were broken".[117][128] In the end, Potiguara's men cried out: "Lift up the living! Let the living rise!"[129] The dead and wounded were collected on the beach. The 3rd Infantry Regiment company proceeded to Fort Copacabana, where they arrested, without resistance, eight soldiers and about 15 civilians.[130]

Plaque in homage to the "18" in Rio de Janeiro

The number of those rescued may have exceeded 80, including a team from Brasília Filmes that tried to film the revolt; the driver was killed in the shootout and the operator and bookkeeper were wounded.[131] Epitácio Pessoa visited the revolutionaries in the hospital.[132] Among the government supporters, colonel Potiguara reported six deaths, with several more injured, before the bayonet charge.[133] In this charge, a sergeant was killed by Siqueira Campos, who was shot while stabbing his liver with his bayonet.[lower-alpha 30] Historian Glauco Carneiro counted 33 government supporters dead or wounded.[lower-alpha 31] Gazeta de Notícias reported 14 rebels dead, in addition to 5 wounded. Among the loyalists, still with uncertainty, there might have been 10 dead and 4 wounded.[134] Correio da Manhã reported 30 wounded, between both forces, 13 privates, an "inferior" (probably a sergeant) and Mário Carpenter; at this point Newton Prado had not yet died.[135] Another source gives 6 dead and 20 wounded among government forces in Copacabana.[136]

The number of rebels in combat was given as 18 (3 officers and 15 soldiers) the following morning by Gazeta de Notícias.[137] The newspaper was the first to use this number, which became mythical, being soon exalted in verse and prose.[138][139] In Hélio Silva's words, "in a cold and rigorous calculation, that number that history has kept as a symbol, is not reached".[140] There were several desertions along the way, and not all of them were recorded. The testimonies contradict each other.[132]

Eduardo Gomes remembered that Siqueira Campos identified 10 fighters, and personally mentioned four officers and about 20 enlisted men. Newton Prado reported two officers and 14 soldiers, omitting Carpenter and Eduardo Gomes, which would add up to 18. Captain Pedro Brasil gave a much higher estimate of approximately 60 rebels.[141] The photograph, which excludes Siqueira Campos, depicts the other three officers, Otávio Correia and two soldiers in the foreground, with five or six indistinct figures behind.[120]

Occupation of the Fort by Loyalists after the final combat

From the 28 men who remained in the fort, plus Octavio Correia, Hélio Silva listed ten, nine military and one civilian, in the shooting, including two unknown soldiers, a black and a white one. A soldier and a civilian accompanied the march but disbanded, being arrested far from the combat site. The two strangers died. Siqueira Campos, Eduardo Gomes, Otávio Correia, Mário Carpenter, Nilton Prado and José Pinto de Oliveira were taken to the hospital wounded, where only the first two survived. Two soldiers (Hildebrando da Silva Nunes and Manoel Antônio dos Reis) "were discharged from the hospital, sued and arrested, but they did not last long".[142]

This enumeration includes the black soldier Pedro Ferreira de Melo, present in the photograph, as absent from the lists of dead, wounded and arrested, but he was the first of those killed.[117][123] Another soldier included in this category by Hélio Silva, Manoel Antonio dos Santos, testified to O Cruzeiro magazine 42 years later, declaring that he had fought on the beach alongside ten other men. He allegedly escaped from the beach and was arrested the next day.[143][lower-alpha 32]

On the other side of Guanabara Bay, on the night of 4 to 5 July, the rebellion was led by the commander of the Navy, Álvaro de Vasconcelos. With the support of state police chief César Sampaio Leite and a group of revolutionary civilians, including deputy José Eduardo de Macedo Soares, they occupied federal and state offices including the Telephone Company, preventing communication with Rio de Janeiro. The rebellion was quelled after the Rio de Janeiro police chief imposed his authority on the local police chief.[144][145]

Map of the revolt in Mato Grosso

In Mato Grosso, general Joaquim Ignacio, commander of the 1st Military Circumscription, took part in the conspiracies against the government in Campo Grande, for which reason he was dismissed on 30 March. The military in that state participated in several other revolts and coronelist conflicts in the first decades of the Brazilian Republic. The new commander, Clodoaldo da Fonseca, was a relative of Hermes da Fonseca. When he took office, on 5 July, he found an already revolutionary environment. At night, meeting with his officers, he reported the revolution and claimed that it had the support of the majority of the Army. They decided to rise up and issue a proclamation.[1][146] Clodoaldo's leadership was symbolic, as the initiative actually rested with the lieutenants. Mato Grosso officers were unaware of the revolt's failure in Rio de Janeiro, as the telegraph and railway lines were interrupted. Clodoaldo was already aware of this, but he went ahead with the revolt for fear of a rebellion by his commanders or because of the commitment he had made before his departure to Mato Grosso.[147]

The revolutionaries followed pre-planning, occupying public buildings and calling up reservists. In Corumbá, the military quartermaster's office was broken into to provide weapons and uniforms for the conscripts, but the effort to form another battalion of Caçadores was unsuccessful. Revolutionary authorities promised peace and maintenance of state civil servants, but in several places they overthrew civilian authorities and looted tax collection and money-issuing bodies. Civilian support was limited, existing among supporters of the Republican Reaction. In Porto Murtinho it was stronger, but martial law was applied.[148] The rebellion had the aspect of a barracks revolt, without popular enthusiasm.[149]

To the north, in Cuiabá, the state government of Pedro Celestino Corrêa da Costa remained loyal to Epitácio Pessoa. In the 16th Battalion of Caçadores, headquartered in the city, the commander delayed the orders of the Minister of War to hand over his battalion to the state command, but he was replaced and the battalion was outside the authority of Clodoaldo da Fonseca.[150] The 10th Independent Cavalry Regiment (RCI), from Bela Vista, also did not participate. It was divided and its commander was against the revolt.[151] The monitor Pernambuco, from the Mato Grosso Flotilla, went to Ladário to help fight the revolt.[152] The Minister of War praised the loyalty of the employees of the Postal and Telegraph Company and of the Northwest Brazil Railroad. They emptied the railroad's water tanks to slow down the journey and passed on the telegraph communications to the loyalists, who were able to decipher the revolutionary plan.[153]

The 1st Military Circumscription constituted the Provisional Liberating Division, organized into two brigades, receiving units from Campo Grande, Porto Murtinho and Ponta Porã.[154] The main one was the 17th Battalion of Caçadores, under the interim command of lieutenant Joaquim Távora.[155][lower-alpha 35] It is difficult to quantify the number of troops, but it was probably between 800 and 1,000 men.[156] The plan was to concentrate forces in Três Lagoas, cross the Paraná River, enter São Paulo through Araçatuba and face the forces from São Paulo and allies in support of the lieutenants in Rio de Janeiro. The first train only left Campo Grande on 8 July. Upon arriving at Três Lagoas, they discovered that railway officials had removed the ferry from trains and other ships, leaving them on the other side and without essential parts. Even so, the revolutionaries seized a barge for 25 to 30 men, built another and captured a boat. They positioned four Krupp caliber 8 cannons, taken from Fort Coimbra, at the mouth of the Sucuriú River, pointing to the São Paulo side.[157][lower-alpha 36]

Railway ferry on the Paraná River

On 10 July, colonel Tertuliano Potiguara was tasked with crushing the uprising. President Epitácio Pessoa dismissed Clodoaldo da Fonseca on 12 July. Forces from the 2nd Military Region (including the 4th Battalion of Caçadores) and the Public Force of São Paulo moved to the Paraná River, on the border of Mato Grosso. A squadron of three planes did the reconnaissance.[158] The Public Force contingent included 255 soldiers and 21 officers from its 2nd Infantry Battalion reinforcing colonel Potiguara, while the 4th Battalion, with 617 men, remained in reserve in Bauru.[lower-alpha 37] The loyalist forces concentrated near Três Lagoas, on the São Paulo side. A veteran of World War I, colonel Potiguara prepared to cross the Paraná River under the cover of his artillery and machine guns.[158]

The fight never took place. On 13 June, general Alberto Cardoso de Aguiar conferred with Clodoaldo da Fonseca at the Três Lagoas railway station, convincing him to surrender unconditionally to avoid bloodshed. Some of the most extreme revolutionaries still wanted to fight, but Clodoaldo gave up command and was arrested. The new commander, general Cardoso de Aguiar, returned the units to their headquarters. Mato Grosso reservists, with the exception of those in the 16th Battalion of Caçadores, were disbanded.[159][160]

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